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
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
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
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
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GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. XII.

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THE
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N^o. XLIX.

NEW SERIES — N^o. XIX.

MARCH, 1832.

- ART. I. — 1. *Thoughts on the Punishment of Death for Forgery.* By BASIL MONTAGU, Esq. London. 1830. 18mo. pp. 202.
2. *The Opinions of different Authors upon the Punishment of Death*, selected by BASIL MONTAGU, Esq. of Lincoln's Inn. London. 3 vols. 8vo. pp. 800.
3. *Facts relating to the Punishment of Death in the Metropolis*, by EDWARD GIBBON WAKEFIELD, Esq. London. 1831. 12mo. pp. 198.
4. *Speech of Sir SAMUEL ROMILLY, in the House of Commons, on Moving for Leave to bring in a Bill for Reforming the Criminal Code.* Parliamentary Debates. London. 1810–1829.

‘Such,’ says the late Mr. Roscoe in his excellent work on Penal Jurisprudence, ‘is the present state of the criminal law of England, that it seems to be universally admitted, that if it were carried into strict execution, it would form the bloodiest system of legislation, by which any nation, ancient or modern, ever punished itself.’ And in defence of this terrible system, Dr. Paley, in his Political Philosophy, says, ‘that by the number of statutes creating capital offences, it sweeps into the net every crime, which, under any possible circumstances, may merit the punishment of death; but when the execution of the sentence comes to be deliberated upon, a small proportion of each class are singled out, the general character or particular aggravation of whose crimes render

them fit examples for public justice ; and by this expedient few suffer death, whilst the dread and danger of it hang over the crimes of many.'

It is by such reasoning as this, that even wise and humane men, like this eminent writer, and others experienced in the law, but wedded to ancient systems and usages,—of whom are distinguished examples the two late Chancellors of England, Lords Eldon and Lyndhurst,—taking for granted that every thing is perfect as by law established, and regarding with implacable hatred the very name of reform as another name for subversion,—persist to this day in defending a system, at which in the mere theory every feeling of humanity revolts, and which long experience has shown to defeat its own end.

'It is a melancholy fact,' says Blackstone, whose testimony on this subject will be regarded of the highest authority, 'that among the variety of actions, which men are daily liable to commit, no less than an hundred and sixty have been declared to be felonies without benefit of clergy; in other words, to be worthy of instant death. So dreadful a list,' adds this celebrated commentator, 'instead of diminishing, increases the number of offenders. The injured, through compassion, will often forbear to prosecute; juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the guilty, or mitigate the nature of the offence; and judges, through compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal mercy. Among so many chances of escaping, the needy and hardened offender overlooks the multitude that suffer. He boldly engages in some desperate attempt to relieve his wants, or to supply his vices; and if unexpectedly the hand of justice overtakes him, he deems himself peculiarly unfortunate in falling at last a sacrifice to those laws, which long impunity had taught him to condemn.'

Such is the undeniable operation of laws, of which the penalty annexed is disproportioned to the offence committed; when, not the public only, but the individuals who have been the sufferers by the violation of it, prefer that the offender should escape rather than be themselves the prosecutors to an unreasonable punishment, sometimes inflicted in all its severity. To remedy both these evils, to protect the law from contempt, and its inflictions from the reproach of inhumanity, Sir Samuel Romilly urged a reformation in

the whole pénal code. To this purpose, that enlightened philanthropist, that upright statesman, and most excellent of men, devoted the last years of his useful life. He gave his whole heart and soul to the object. He suffered neither the pressure of his professional affairs, which left him scarce an hour for domestic enjoyment, and which proved at last too burdensome for his susceptible frame, nor the opposition of judges, nor defeat year after year in Parliament, to discourage him. Like Wilberforce, in contending for the abolition of slavery, he would not suffer himself to be silenced or put down. He was not to be intimidated by ministerial authority, nor by the grave experience repeatedly urged against him of Lord Ellenborough, nor by sneers freely vented at his enthusiastic notions of reform, nor by praises, contemptuously bestowed upon his amiable temper or laudable motives; but, year after year, he pressed upon Parliament what he regarded as a most momentous subject. The rejection of a motion at one session he failed not to follow up with another at the next. Where he found no prospect of obtaining a vote for a general reform of the criminal code, he would insist upon some specific alteration, as in the Speech before us, proposing the abolition, *in certain cases*, of the punishment of death. And had not the life of this great and good man been suddenly closed, it can scarcely be doubted that his powerful exertions, sustained as they were by the influence of his character and virtues, would have accomplished, in some degree at least, the object so near to his heart. We believe, that he left nothing to his friends or to his country to lament, but the melancholy suddenness of his death.

In the excellent Speech, to which we have referred, delivered in the House of Commons in 1810, he remarks, that there is probably no country in the world, in which so many and so great a variety of actions are punishable with loss of life as in England; while at the same time these sanguinary statutes are not carried into execution. 'For some time past,' he adds, 'the sentence of death has not been executed on more than a sixth part of all the persons, on whom it has been pronounced, even taking into calculation crimes the most atrocious and the most dangerous to society. And if we exclude these from our consideration, we shall find, that the proportion, which the number executed bears to those

convicted, is *one to twenty*, and that if we go further, and confine our observation to those petty crimes, unaccompanied by any circumstances of aggravation, for which, notwithstanding, a capital punishment is appointed by law, such as stealing privately in shops or dwelling-houses, we shall find the proportion of those executed falling far below that even of one to twenty.*

To illustrate the same general principles as are maintained in the Speech of Sir Samuel Romilly ; to expose the bad tendencies of the present penal code of Great Britain, and particularly to show, that crimes are more effectually prevented by the *certainly* than by the *severity* of punishment, is the design both of Montagu and of Wakefield in the volumes before us. Mr. Montagu has for many years devoted much attention to the subject of capital punishments. His selection of the opinions of different authors has been for many years before the public, and contains in three large volumes a valuable repository of argument and facts upon this interesting topic. He is honorably known, as we understand, by his professional attainments, and more extensively by his judicious efforts for the interests of humanity. The little volume before us, '*On the Punishment of Death*,' &c. recently published, is evidently the result of much reflection and observation, of which his official situation furnished ample opportunities, that an ardent zeal in the cause disposed him to improve.

Among other obvious effects of all undue severity, in the criminal law, on which the writer particularly remarks, is such a refinement in the practice of it, as equally defeats the ends of justice, as if the whole code were in reality a dead letter. He tells us, that not only juries from a principle of humanity, but judges in applying and pronouncing the law, have resorted to such wire-drawn distinctions, that it is made difficult to convict the guilty of the simplest crimes, though proved by

* Our limits must prevent our entering into the details, by which, from official reports obtained for the purpose, the arguments of Sir Samuel Romilly are sustained. But for these and other important facts, connected with the whole subject of penal statutes, as executed in various countries, particularly in France, England, and in our own country, we refer our readers to a very full and authentic article, in Lieber's '*Encyclopedia Americana*,' under the head of '*Statistics of Crime*.'

the clearest testimony ; and that, to escape the cruelty and odium of inflicting upon small offences capital punishments, doubts are raised, where there is no shadow of pretence for them, and verdicts are given in the very face of common sense and of truth. In proof of this assertion, he adduces numerous instances of prosecution for robbery, in which the guilt of the prisoner was put beyond all question, the amount taken and every circumstance undeniably proved, but which ended either in an absolute acquittal, or in a verdict finding the prisoner guilty of stealing a sum less than that, which constituted the offence capital. For example, a woman was indicted for stealing in a dwelling-house two guineas with two half-guineas, and forty-four shillings in other money. She confessed the fact, and the jury found her guilty ; but as the stealing of such a sum would be death, they found that the sum stolen was thirty-nine shillings. Another female was indicted for stealing lace, for which she had refused to take eight guineas, offering it for sale at twelve. The jury, who convicted her of the theft, found the lace to be worth thirty-nine shillings.

A yet stranger case was cited by Sir S. Romilly in the House of Commons, in which it appeared, that two men, George Dawson and Joseph Hitch, indicted for the same offence, being in company together at the same time, stole the same goods privately in a shop, and (five shillings stolen in this manner being punishable with death) the jury found one of the prisoners guilty to the amount of 4s. 10d., and the other to the amount of 5s., that is, that *the same goods were at one and the same moment of different values*. 'This monstrous proceeding,' says Sir S. Romilly, 'is accounted for, by finding that Dawson, who was convicted of the capital offence, had been tried before at the same sessions on a similar charge, and was then convicted of stealing to the amount of 4s. 10d. The jury seem to have thought, that having had the benefit of their indulgence once, he had no further claims upon their mercy, and therefore rendered their verdict according to the evidence.'

These instances, and numerous others like them, which are familiar to every student at law, are apt to shock the common sense and right feelings of the inexperienced. But they are among a vast number of cases, frequently occurring in the English courts, in which humanity continues to

triumph over the severity of law, at the expense of palpable falsehood, in the very face of common arithmetic, which still makes two and two four, and by the most open violation of oath.

The same object, we are told, is obtained by a species of quibbling, allowed by courts, but contrary to the spirit of the law, and scarcely less absurd in itself, than mischievous in its operation. For example, if a man be indicted for stealing a horse, and it is proved to be a female horse, called a mare; or a sheep, and it is proved to be a female sheep, called a ewe, he is acquitted. But still worse, as is affirmed by Mr. Montagu to have happened at the Wiltshire assizes in 1825, 'a man being tried for killing another by running over him in a coach drawn by four horses, and it being proved that one was a mare, he was acquitted.' Who shall wonder, if the guilty sometimes exult, or presumptuously rely on the glorious uncertainty of the law?

Here, then, we find two opposite but altogether compatible evils attending a code of such shocking severity as is the criminal code of England. On the one side, there is the frequent escape or absolute impunity of the most abandoned, from the unwillingness of the injured to prosecute, or of juries to convict to death; and on the other the occasional execution of the law in its full severity upon perhaps a young offender for a transgression of inferior magnitude; which, by turning the just indignation of the community against the crime into pity for the convict, perverts the ends of justice, and begets hatred or jealousy of the law.

To prove the extreme reluctance on the part of the injured to prosecute for offences, not committed with violence, but where conviction would be followed by death, Mr. Montagu adduces a mass of evidence of the most satisfactory kind. And we may observe in passing, that his work, though presented in a somewhat peculiar form,—of apothegms and axioms, or general principles maintained by facts, which he leaves his reader to find in his notes,—is written throughout with calmness and good judgment. It has the merit, which we deem not small, of freedom from that extravagance of sentiment and over-statement, so often found, but invariably offensive, in the works of professed philanthropists; who are continually in danger of injuring their cause, however excellent, by an absurd sentimentality on the one hand, or

exaggeration of facts on the other, which serves but to beget a distrust in the reader even of what he might see reason to admit, and provokes him to hold back his sympathy for the cause just in proportion as it is demanded by the writer. But we will ourselves come to facts.

In the year 1819, as we learn from this author, a committee of the House of Commons was appointed to consider and report upon so much of the criminal law as relates to capital punishment in felonies; and the investigation was with a view to ascertain what severity of legal punishment the moral and religious sentiments of the country would sanction. It will be observed, also, that the inquiry was with particular reference to the crime of forgery, which, as is well known by many signal examples from the times of the unfortunate Perraus and the yet more deplorable instance of Dr. Dodd in 1777, the justice of England has never failed to pursue with stern and unrelenting severity.

Before this committee various persons were examined, of whom were eminent bankers, merchants, and officers connected with the administration of justice. Among these we find the names of Dr. Colquhoun, the well-known writer on the subject of police; Sir Richard Phillips, who had served as a sheriff in London; Mr. Harmer, a solicitor of extensive practice in criminal courts; the Rev. Mr. Cotton, the Ordinary, or Chaplain, of New-gate; the keeper of Newgate; the City Solicitor; the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, and several individuals from different parts of the kingdom.

From this various testimony, which was of the most consistent and decisive character, we can here select but a small part. Nothing further could be demanded to prove the injurious effects of the punishment of death for this class of offences. From among the merchants, we will take the evidence of Isaac Lyon Goldsmid, Esq.

‘Has it ever happened to you to know, whether persons are in many instances deterred from prosecutions for forgery, in consequence of the severity of the punishment if they are convicted?—A circumstance occurred in my own family, in which I was induced to forbear from prosecuting, in consequence of the severity of the punishment.

‘You have probably had some experience with regard to the reluctance to prosecute for forgery, of bankers and the more

opulent tradesmen in this town, when they know the punishment is death?—There is no doubt of it; and great exertions are generally made to awaken every kind of feeling that can possibly exist in the human breast, and those feelings would not be attempted to be excited, if the punishment were of a milder nature.

‘Do you think that the punishment of death has a tendency generally to prevent prosecution?—I have no doubt that is the case; and I should think you might have evidence of that being the case, in hundreds of instances, if you were to make any inquiry on the subject.

‘Have you had occasion to observe, that there is a reluctance to assist the bank in prosecuting persons who have issued forged notes?—Yes, I have observed that is the case; and I have no doubt, that it is in consequence of the severity of the punishment.

‘Do you think, that this indisposition to prosecute for forgery, when the punishment is capital, is prevalent among the leading merchants and bankers in London, to whom your experience is principally confined?—Wherever my experience has enabled me to decide, I have no doubt that that is the case.’—pp. 158, 159.

The evidence of James Harmer, Esq., claims particular attention. He is, or at that time was, a solicitor of high reputation in London, and of more than twenty years’ experience in crown practice at the Old Bailey. We thus condense his testimony, which is too extended for our pages. The intelligent answers given sufficiently indicate the inquiries made.

‘It appears to me, that the punishment of death has no tendency to prevent the crime of forgery. Instances have come within my knowledge, of bankers and opulent individuals, who, rather than take away the life of a fellow-creature, have compromised with the delinquent. Instances have occurred of a prosecutor pretending to have his pocket picked of the forged instrument; in other cases, prosecutors have destroyed, or refused to produce it, and have stated publicly, that it was because the person’s life was in jeopardy. I will relate a very recent circumstance that occurred under my observation at the Old Bailey. A person, through whose hands a forged bill had passed, and whose appearance upon the trial was requisite to keep up the necessary chain of evidence, kept out of the way to prevent the conviction of the prisoner; it was a private bill of exchange. I also know another recent instance, where some private individuals, after the commitment of a prisoner, raised

a thousand pounds for the purpose of satisfying some forged bills of exchange ; and they declared, and I have good reason to know the fact, that if the punishment had been any thing short of death, they would not have advanced a farthing, because he was a man whose conduct had been very disgraceful ; but they were friends to the man's family, and wished to spare them the mortification and disgrace of a relative being executed, and therefore stepped forward and subscribed the before-mentioned sum. I have frequently seen persons withhold their testimony, even when under the solemn obligation of an oath to speak the whole truth ; because they were aware that their testimony, if given to its full extent, would have brought the guilt home to the parties accused ; and they have therefore kept back a material part of their testimony. In all capital indictments, with the exception of murder and some other heinous offences, I have often observed prosecutors show great reluctance to persevere, frequently forfeiting their recognisances ; and, indeed, I have, on many occasions, been consulted by prosecutors as to the consequences of refusing to conform to their recognisances, that is, to appear and prosecute the prisoner.'—pp. 162 – 164.

Again ;

'I know, that many persons,' summoned to serve at Old Bailey, 'have the greatest disinclination to perform the duty on account of the distress, that would be done to their feelings in consigning so many of their fellow-creatures to death.' Some of them will bribe the summoning officer to put them at the bottom of the list, or to keep them out altogether, so as to save them from this painful duty. 'The instances I may say are innumerable, within my own observation, of jurymen giving verdicts, in capital cases, in favor of the prisoner directly contrary to the evidence. I have seen acquittals in forgery, where the verdict has excited the astonishment of every one in court, because the guilt appeared unequivocal, and the acquittal could only be attributed to a strong feeling of sympathy and humanity in the jury to save a fellow-creature from certain death. The old professed thieves are aware of this sympathy, and are desirous of being tried, rather on capital indictments, than otherwise. It has frequently happened to myself in my communications with them, that they have expressed a wish that they might be indicted capitally, because there was a greater chance of escape.'—pp. 164, 165.

Finally, being asked, 'Are the committee to understand you as stating, that you consider capital punishments to be efficacious only in those cases where the general feelings of the pub-

lic go along with them?—Certainly; the thieves observe the sympathy of the public, and it seems to console them, and they appear less concerned than those who witness their sentence. I have been present on very many occasions when the sentence of death has been passed, and the criminals have been far less affected than the auditors.

‘Do you think that the general feeling goes along with the infliction of the punishment of death, in the cases of crime unaccompanied with violence?—Certainly it does not.

‘Do you conceive that the infliction of the punishment of death in those cases, tends rather to excite the public feeling against the criminal laws?—No doubt it does; there are, I believe, very few advocates for the generality of the present capital punishments.’—pp. 166, 167.

‘Mr. Newman, solicitor for the city of London, speaking, from thirty years’ experience, of the course of criminal prosecution in that city, informed the committee, that he had frequently observed a reluctance to prosecute and convict, in capital offences not directed against the lives, persons, or dwellings of men.

‘The Rev. Mr. Cotton, ordinary of Newgate, has described, in strong terms, the repugnance of the public to capital execution in offences unattended with violence, and the acquiescence even of the most depraved classes in their infliction in atrocious crimes.

‘Mr. Colquhoun, for twenty-seven years a police magistrate in this capital, and well known by his publications on these subjects, declares his firm conviction, that capital punishment in the minor offences operates powerfully in preventing convictions; and that there is a great reluctance to prosecute in forgery, shoplifting, larceny in the dwelling-house, burglary without actual entry, horse-stealing, sheep-stealing, cattle-stealing, frame-breaking, house-breaking in the day time, robbery without acts of violence, and other minor offences, now subject to the punishment of death. According to the testimony of this intelligent observer, the public mind revolts at capital punishment in cases not atrocious.

‘Mr. Newman, late keeper of Newgate, and connected with the administration of justice in London for forty years, gave testimony to the same effect.’—pp. 171, 172.

By several of these witnesses it was stated, that they had themselves suffered, and some of them to a large amount, from larcenies or forgeries, but were restrained by the severity of the law and by pure compassion from bringing the offend-

ers to justice. And to conclude this various and concurring testimony, we will only add, that of the Earl Suffolk, who in a debate in the House of Lords, on the adoption of Sir Samuel Romilly's bill, stated the following interesting fact, from his own personal experience, clearly establishing the same conclusions, and highly creditable, as our readers will not fail to perceive, to his Lordship's humanity.

'Lord Suffolk said, "To the general principles upon which the present bill is brought forward, I most cordially assent, but I am more thoroughly induced to give it my support, upon the particular argument urged by my noble friend, namely, that the excess of the punishment deters the injured from prosecuting the guilty. My lords, I cannot doubt the truth of this argument, for I am myself an humble instance of its force. It happened to me, my lords, about four or five years since, to leave my house in town for the purpose of going into the country. An old and faithful servant was left in care of it till my return. In about four or five days I came to town again, and found, to my surprise, that my servant had fled during my absence, carrying off with her a considerable quantity of plate and other property. My lords, public duty pointed out the course I ought to take. I knew I ought immediately to go before a magistrate, who would have committed her for trial, but I must have appeared in a court of justice, as the prosecutor against her, and have embittered my own life by the consciousness of having shortened hers. My lords, humanity triumphed over justice and public duty. I was constrained to turn loose upon the public an individual certainly deserving of punishment, because the law of the land gave me no opportunity of visiting her with a castigation short of death. My lords, upon this ground alone, and for the sake of public justice, this law ought, in my opinion, to be amended. For the sake of the injured, and not of the guilty, I am an enemy to inordinate severity. The prosecutors are those who fear death, and not the persons offending. I shall not trouble your lordships any longer upon this subject. I shall cordially and conscientiously support the bill."—(*Hear ! Hear !*)'

With these evidences of the evils to the community from the undue severity of the laws, we easily connect the yet more pernicious effects of the same causes on criminals themselves ; not less, however, on those who contemplate, than on those who have already committed offence. These are found, first, in the temptation to crime, from the hope,

that if detected, the compassion of the injured will save them from prosecution; and, secondly, in the certainty, that even if convicted of a capital offence, except it be forgery or murder, they shall escape the capital punishment. The object of Mr. Montagu's work, it has been seen, is to exhibit the former. That of Mr. Wakefield's is to show the latter, and to mark the effects, on the prisoners themselves, of the criminal law as administered in London. Of these effects, Mr. Wakefield, as his name would to most of his readers in England sufficiently indicate, was himself *an eye-witness*. He frankly acknowledges in his Preface, that though part of the facts are derived from an official report made to the House of Commons early in the present year; yet most of them, and, we may add, by far the most interesting and decisive, came under his own personal observation, during his confinement from May, 1827, to May, 1830, in Newgate. The truth must not be concealed, that our author is no other than Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Esq., of somewhat notorious memory, who, having been convicted four or five years since of a plot to carry off a rich young heiress, Miss Turner, of Lancashire, with a view to a constrained marriage, and thence to the possession of her large fortune (in which nefarious conspiracy he was aided, to his indelible disgrace, by his own brother, then a clergyman of the Church of England), was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in the county jail of London. If, now, the mentioning of this fact should diminish in the view of our readers the authority, as it unquestionably must the respectability, of the witness, we can only say, we regret it, and cannot help it. In justice, however, to Mr. Wakefield, it should be said, that he has faithfully availed himself of the opportunities, which, though at the expense of his character, were put in his power; that he seems to have had the confidence of the officers of justice, as well as of his fellow-prisoners, with whom he had daily converse; and has given the result of his inquiries with great intelligence in a series of facts and observations, not less curious than instructive.* The fault

* Notwithstanding the doubtful reputation of the author, we find this work commended in an English journal of repute, as characterized 'by an uncommon talent for observation, and as one of the most valuable accessions to criminal jurisprudence, which have been made for many years.'

that may be found with his book is, that it is only too painfully interesting. He carries his reader into the very heart of Newgate. He opens to him the 'school' where the children and the younger offenders are confined, and the wards, among which various other classes of criminals are distributed; and in the press-yard, where capital offenders are kept till trial is over and sentence has been pronounced, in the gloomy cells of the condemned, and, finally, in the chapel, where they hear their last exhortations, and where all are assembled for worship, — he exhibits, as only a frequent spectator could, the varied, complicated, and distressing picture of shame and fear, penitence or rage, stupid insensibility, affected indifference, revolting levity, hardened profligacy, pretending to glory in the distinction of being condemned, hatred and revenge, presumptuous hope or the unutterable agony of despair, which are all to be witnessed, as, according to their character and fate, they are expressed by the inmates of this melancholy abode.

Mr. Wakefield commences his remarks on that part of the subject to which alone we can now refer, with observing, that the escape of so many capital offenders from capital conviction must not be wholly attributed to the source already pointed out, — the compassion, weakness, or corruption of prosecutors and witnesses. 'Judges and juries,' he says, 'are men, like prosecutors and witnesses, and they constantly nullify the law, by saving from capital conviction one, whom they believe to be capitally guilty.' As an evidence of this, and of the strong reliance which is placed on the lenity of these parties, he states, that it is a common practice among the prisoners in Newgate to get up mock-trials, in which the men take the respective parts of judge, jury, witnesses, and the prisoner at the bar; that at some times they make the judge very strict, at others very lenient, in the exercise of his duty; that in most cases, where the evidence is decisive and the offence is capital, they represent the jury as bent upon giving a false verdict, notwithstanding the admonitions of the judge to the contrary; that, on these occasions, they show a remarkable knowledge of the temper of judges and juries; and that 'the best managers of a theatre might be envious of the correctness, with which the thieves imitate those so common squabbles between judge and jury.' The boldness and contempt of law, which such

scenes must produce upon young offenders, who soon become skilful participators, must be obvious to every one, and must make Newgate, and all prisons conducted like it, the mere nurseries of crime. These, it is true, are but scenic representations; but they mark a state of feeling in the minds of these criminals far enough from imaginary. There are facts continually occurring in the administration of criminal justice in England, which fully warrant their confidence of escape. Of such, Mr. Wakefield relates the following, to illustrate the evil influence of the punishment of death on the minds of juries.

'Shortly after the execution of *Joseph Hunton*, in 1828, a man named Hunter was committed to Newgate, charged with forgery. A friend of mine was acquainted with the principal witness against the accused, and, merely from being so led to think on the subject, became desirous to save the prisoner's life. He consulted me as to the best course of proceeding for that purpose. I advised that the prisoner's defence should be entrusted to Mr. Harmer, whose experience and skill as an attorney in criminal matters are well known. This was done; but, on communicating with the prisoner's relations, my friend discovered that he was a bad fellow, and had committed several previous forgeries. There was not the least doubt of his guilt in this case. His friends dreaded, that, if he were acquitted in this case, he would commit other forgeries, and come to be hanged. It was therefore suggested, that the better course would be, to let him be capitally convicted, but on such evidence as would surely induce the King in Council to remit the sentence, so that he might be transported for life. The principal witness against him was induced to frame his evidence for that purpose; and the prisoner, aware of his own bad propensity, entirely concurred in the arrangement. The prisoner, therefore, his friends, his attorney, and the principal witness against him, went into court, bent on procuring a verdict of guilty. The evidence was conclusive; but the jury, without hesitation, returned a verdict of not guilty; and the prisoner was immediately discharged, to the great disappointment of every one interested on his behalf.' — pp. 63, 64.

When, however, conviction is procured, it is always followed by condemnation. Every prisoner capitally convicted by a jury in London and Middlesex,* however incon-

* It appears, that a different, and, as we think, a better practice, obtains in the country, or in the Provincial Assizes, where the judge *passes sentence of death* on none but those, whom he thinks not deserving

siderable the offence, is by the judge sentenced to death. And this step, as Mr. Wakefield observes, 'though strictly in compliance with the law, is a solemn mockery of truth;' for, including the cases of murder, which are never pardoned, the 'judge, the audience, the prisoner, and the public, are fully convinced, that the sentence passed will not be executed in more than one case out of eight.' For, as is shown in a table copied from an official report, out of 451 persons, who were condemned in the course of three years, only 55 were executed.

Now, were there no other objection to this 'strange work' of condemnation, it would to us be sufficient, that it makes null and void, and brings into absolute contempt, nay, the most audacious defiance, one of the most solemn of all earthly procedures. What is more tremendous than the sentence, condemning a fellow-mortal and a fellow-sinner to a speedy and dreadful death? closing for ever his probation, and driving him to the bar of eternal justice to answer for offences, which, even by this awful earthly retribution, may have been unexpiated! Yet in proportion to this fearful solemnity, which even no stranger can contemplate without being moved, is its absolute futility, and worse than futility, when it is known beforehand, that, in the vast majority of cases, it is a mere fiction of law, a form of words, passed indiscriminately upon hardened robbers, who deserve any punishment short of death, and upon boys and children, who scarcely know what is meant by crime.

We now pass with our author to the cells of Newgate, whither are ordered those few unfortunate individuals who are probably to suffer the sentence, which has been pronounced on many, and who are thus separated from the mass of their fellow-criminals. And here the evils of the whole system are equally apparent in another form. In proportion to the previous confidence of pardon, or mitigation of penalty, and to the numbers who actually escape, is the excess of compassion for those who are left for death. 'Before sentence,' says Mr. Wakefield, 'a prisoner has only to observe the regulations of the jail in order to remain neglected and unnoticed. Once, ordered to the cells, friends of

of mercy, and orders it only to be 'recorded' against others, whom it is his intention to save.

all classes suddenly rise up ; his fellow-prisoners, the turnkeys, the chaplain, the keepers, and the sheriffs, all seem interested in his fate. He can make no reasonable request, that is not at once granted'—and 'a stranger to the scene would be astonished to observe the peculiar tenderness, I was going to add respect, which persons under sentence of death receive from all the officers of the prison.' From this, however, must be excepted, the case of murderers who, for the few hours that are left them after condemnation, are immured in a solitary cell, set apart for the purpose, unattended, except possibly by the chaplain ; and are led forth to death in the most summary manner, without being allowed the benefit or solace of religious services. All others are treated as if they were unfortunate victims of the injustice of the laws. Their crimes, however aggravated, are overlooked ; and from pity to them as sufferers, the transition is easy, as we have seen in many instances towards malefactors in this country, to respect for them as martyrs. The remarks of the writer upon this point deserve attention.

Having observed, that in the treatment of other prisoners, even before trial, when they are presumed to be innocent, he had never observed any thing like commiseration from persons in authority over them ; that at the best, they are neglected, except for their safe custody ; but that the same men, once capitally convicted, are treated as brothers or children in distress ; he asks,

'Who shall define any limit to the evils, which arise from a universal feeling amongst the criminal classes, that to be condemned to the greatest punishment is to be taken out of the class of criminals, and to obtain, instead of the dislike usually awarded to known criminals, greater tenderness and respect than are often bestowed upon strangers of unquestioned virtue ? If any one would thoroughly comprehend the description which I am endeavouring to give of the treatment of convicts under sentence of death, let him spend an hour in the cells of Newgate on the day after the sentences of death have been passed at the Old Bailey, and he will there see a number of the worst criminals (not murderers) attended by the keeper of the prison, the chaplain, and perhaps the sheriffs, and receiving from all these words of condolence, offers of service, professions of interest, delivered in a tone and manner so friendly and sympathizing, that were he to fall upon the same scene without any previous knowledge of its true character, he

might suppose that he witnessed the sad and affectionate intercourse of parents with their children in distress. There may be readers who will blame these officers of justice, for so commiserating the state of men in the course of suffering a merited punishment for the good of society. I pretend not to defend them otherwise than by saying, that they cannot help what they do. A late sheriff, who, before the trial of a man for uttering forged notes, had spoken rather harshly of the prisoner's crime, when informed of the same prisoner's danger, could not help letting tears run down his face, nor hinder his voice from faltering, and his whole frame being agitated, whilst he expressed his anxious wish to *do every thing in his power* for saving the convict's life.'—pp. 98–100.

And, finally, in reply to his own question, "Why is the capital convict, he whose crime is most grave and is proven, so favorably distinguished?" He answers,

'Because the punishment of death shocks every mind to which it is vividly presented, and overturns the most settled notions of right and wrong.'

There is, however, a remaining hope to the condemned, which lies in appeal to the King in Council. This constitutes a peculiarity, it would at first view seem an advantage, in favor of the convicts tried in London and Middlesex. For whereas in the country, or the Provincial Assizes, the judge, who tries the prisoner (except in extraordinary cases, as where circumstances arise after the trial to produce distrust of the evidence), ultimately decides his fate, in London every case of capital conviction is, without exception, reported by the Recorder to the King's Council, where it undergoes a new examination; and even after the decision of the Council, is once more submitted to the king in person, or, more properly, to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who is charged with these affairs, and who has unquestionably the principal influence in directing the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy. It was to this tribunal, that the appeal was addressed with so much earnestness, by Dr. Johnson and others, in the instance of the unfortunate Dodd. But the utter failure of this, and of many other more recent applications, shows, that the advantage in favor of the prisoner is rather apparent than real. From various causes, partly from the pressure of other, and to him more important business, embracing the whole government

of the kingdom, the Secretary may not even read the petitions in the prisoner's favor. We believe it was afterwards discovered, that even Dr. Johnson's eloquent letter for Dodd never reached the Secretary's hands. In addition to such chances, flying rumors, injurious to the prisoner, representing him as an old offender, or as having committed the crime in question under circumstances of peculiar atrocity; the known facility with which affidavits are obtained, stating facts in mitigation; the frequent perjuries which have been committed for this purpose; and the strong necessity, sometimes felt by government, as in the instance of Dodd, of making an example, — all operate to the disadvantage of the criminal; and constitute together, as Wakefield shows with much detail of evidence, an extreme difficulty in reversing a decision of the Council, or of saving a person, convicted of a crime which is usually punished by death. So great is this difficulty, we are told, that it is not uncommon to hear sneers at those who have so much courage and humanity as to undertake it.

'On the other hand,' says the writer, 'there can be no doubt, that false statements, favorable to the accused, are sometimes imposed on the Secretary of State for truth; and that lives are saved improperly; that is to say, on the ground of false evidence.' And in corroboration of this, he mentions the surprise, often felt not only by himself, but 'by the officers of the prison, whenever a final decision of the Council was made known in Newgate, at the *selection* of the Council, for death on the one hand, and for reprieve or commutation on the other. On every occasion, it appeared to him that many persons had been spared, not any of whom were less guilty than persons either then condemned, or who had been executed shortly before.' In truth, it is easy to perceive, that before a tribunal so constituted, at a distance from the prisoner and from all means of personal investigation, occupied moreover with other business, a perfectly right decision must be exceedingly difficult.

After the Recorder has made his report, and the final decision is passed by the Council, it is immediately made known by the Recorder in person to the officers of Newgate; and it is then the duty of the Ordinary, or of him who performs the *usual* religious services of the prison, to tell each convict under sentence of death what the Council has

decided for him. The scenes which follow are in themselves of so awful an interest, and are so much better described by the writer, as an eye-witness, than they can possibly be drawn by another, that we shall quote almost entirely the brief chapter, which he entitles 'The Recorder's Report.' This officer, we may premise, whose title is 'The Recorder of London,' is appointed by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen; and, 'being the mouth of the city, it is his duty to pronounce and *record* the sentences of the courts therein,' &c.

'The hour at which the Recorder's Report will reach Newgate is generally known beforehand by the capital convicts and their friends outside the walls. But this is not always the case. On one occasion, in 1829, the Council having been held at Windsor, the Recorder did not deliver the decision of the Council until the day after that on which it took place. The prisoners and their friends, therefore, were kept in a state of the most violent suspense for many hours; during which they counted the moments,—the prisoners in their cells, as usual, and their friends in the street in front of Newgate, where they passed the night. I have heard the protracted agony of both classes described, by those who witnessed it, in terms so strong that I am unwilling to repeat them. More or less an agony of suspense is excited amongst the prisoners and their friends by the approach of every Recorder's Report; a mode of punishing which has been represented as well calculated to strike terror into the criminal classes of the metropolis, but which, I believe, produces a contrary effect, by hardening the character of those who are subjected to it. I have been assured, that, on the occasion just mentioned, the crowd of men and women who passed the night in front of Newgate, began, as soon as the hour was past when they had expected the Report, to utter imprecations against the Recorder, the Secretary of State, the Council, and the King; and that they never ceased cursing until the passion of anger so excited was exchanged for joy in some and grief in others; and I myself heard more than one, of those whose lives were spared by that decision of the Council, afterwards express a wish to murder the Recorder for having kept them so long in suspense. The fact is, that they had, together with their relatives and friends, been kept in suspense for six weeks. The extremity of mixed hope and fear, induced by the Recorder's delay on this occasion, only urged them to express the feelings of exasperation which, more or less, are produced by the infliction of suspense on every body of capital convicts. A fact will be stated presently, which shows that the presumed

object of keeping the convicts in suspense, — that is, the striking with terror the criminal classes of London, — is not attained.

'The Recorder's Report having reached Newgate, the Ordinary visits every convict under sentence of death, and informs him of his fate. The scenes of passionate joy, wild despair, jealousy, envy, hatred, malice, and brutal rage, which follow this proceeding of the Ordinary, should be witnessed, in order to be thoroughly conceived. But there would be no advantage in describing them correctly, were that possible. I therefore pass them by, proceeding to the fact promised above.

'Generally, the Recorder's Report reaches the prison late at night. If there be any convicts in the School under sentence of death, all the boys in the ward are made to sit up during the night when the Report is expected. About midnight the Ordinary, attended by some officers of the Sheriff, enters the School, dressed in his canonicals, and calls over the names of those under sentence of death. They step forth from the crowd, three of them, let us suppose, of the respective ages of fourteen, twelve, and ten. The Ordinary, in his most solemn tone, says — "I am happy to inform you, A. B., and you, C. D., and you, E. F., that your cases have been taken into consideration by the King in Council, and that his Majesty has been mercifully pleased to spare your lives." Instantly, the boys fall on their knees, and recite a thanksgiving to God and the King for the mercy graciously vouchsafed to them.

'To an uninstructed observer this sight might be very edifying; but to those engaged in the scene it is, in truth, only a mockery. The whole scene is got up betwixt the Ordinary, the Schoolmaster, and the boys, — the Ordinary instructing the Schoolmaster, and the Schoolmaster instructing the boys, as to the part which these last are to play in the farce. The boys, amongst themselves, will recite the whole scene before hand; sometimes giving it a different turn, by causing one of themselves, who plays the Ordinary, to say, that the King has ordered the law to take its course; when those who play the convicts will act the most violent distress. Of course, the idea of what they are always made to profess, viz. gratitude to God and the King, never enters their heads; since every one is convinced, that, as to these children, there never has been a question of danger. It is curious, however, to observe the satisfaction of the boys who are distinguished by taking a part in this ceremony. Their pride appears to be gratified by the distinction; and they have just the same air of agreeable excitement and self-importance, for days before the scene takes place, as marks a Westminster boy when he is about to be distinguished

by acting in public. The other boys, waiting for trial or sentenced to transportation, envy those who are to kneel and give thanks to God and the King; whilst the whole party look forward to the midnight mockery as likely to be very amusing, — “to make,” in their own language, “a good bit of fun.” That they should be so easily amused is not surprising, when one considers the monotony of a prison life.

‘The fact goes to prove, that the realities of the Recorder’s Report are not calculated to strike terror into the criminals of the metropolis.’ — pp. 138–143.

The next chapter introduces us to a yet sadder scene, which, in some of its terrible features, we would gladly spare ourselves and our readers, but for the purpose for which the writer introduces it. His object is to show the ‘effect of the religious observances attendant on the punishment of death.’ In this view, the awful scenes which he details from his personal observation are worthy the most serious consideration; though, as to some of the inferences and reflections, with which they are accompanied, we freely confess we want more evidence of a serious temper, and of that true interest in the subject which a Christian compassion would inspire, than Mr. Wakefield discovers in any part of his book, or has authorized us to infer from any thing we know of his history. We therefore take for granted his facts, believing him to be an honest witness; and judge for ourselves of his reflections. * This chapter, in which he treats of the reli-

* If any of our readers should be distrustful of the conclusions of Mr. Wakefield upon such subjects, it may not be useless to offer some additional testimony from unexceptionable sources; which testimony, be it said in justice to that gentleman, and for the credit of his work, entirely accords with the result of his own personal observation, while he was an inmate of Newgate.

Among others, we have before us a letter of the Rev. Dr. Ford, the late exemplary Ordinary of Newgate, whose long continued and faithful service in that office, gives to his opinions authority. In replying to the inquiries of a friend, he writes, Jan. 22, 1808;

‘As to the reformation of convicts in Newgate, I must close the prospect all at once, by informing you, *that I have never yet seen one of that class.* In such a prison as ours, reformation is not thought of, nor expected.’

And having stated his reasons at some length, and shown from the want of suitable arrangements of the prison itself, forbidding the proper separation of the criminals, from the want of labor, from the exposure of the younger to the corrupt examples of the old, the insurmountable difficulties attending all attempts at reforming them, he adds;

gious instruction in Newgate, and of the preparation of the condemned for death, is written with a total disregard to method. But we select from different parts of it what may best suit our purpose.

'From the moment that a prisoner enters the cells of Newgate, no pains are spared to excite in him a strong sentiment of religion; and this course is pursued towards all, without distinction, who are considered to be in danger. I doubt very much whether the attempt ever succeed until after a prisoner is ordered for execution. The Reverend Mr. Cotton, the ordinary of Newgate, who has been chaplain of the jail for more than a dozen years, has often acknowledged to me, that he does not remember an instance of what he considered sincere conversion to religious sentiments, except in prisoners who were executed. A very great show of religious fervor is often made by prisoners even from the moment of their entrance into Newgate, still more after they enter the cells. But in such cases, when the punishment is finally settled at something less than death, the prisoner invariably behaves as if all his religion had been hypocrisy. Still there can be no doubt that a considerable number of those who are executed, die with a firm expectation of happiness in another world. I cannot explain the contradiction — let the reader judge for himself.' — pp. 152, 153.

'Woe be to that man who would dare to show symptoms of reformation before his brother-felons. Nor indeed would their reformation avail them any thing; for after the expiration of their temporary imprisonment, who would be hardy enough to employ them?'

Again, on the subject of the efficacy of *public executions*, to which we shall shortly advert, Dr. Ford writes:

'From every thing I have witnessed on these melancholy occasions,' — and he had been called officially to a great number, — 'I am decidedly clear, that executions, managed as they are at present, answer no end whatever, either for punishment or example.'

And Gilbert Wakefield, the celebrated critic, and translator of the New Testament, thus records his own convictions, after much observation;

'During my abode at Nottingham, I never failed to attend all the capital punishments, that took place there, courting every circumstance that might read me a wholesome lecture on mortality, or suggest an additional motive of gratitude of God for the comforts of my own condition.

'I am cordially persuaded upon a most serious, most frequent, and most mature contemplation of this subject, that if a general reformation of the penal code cannot be effected in our nation, this is one of the enormous sins, for which the Governor of the Universe will surely visit us. Reformation must begin in a moral education, in the scrupulous correction of small offences,' &c.

Again ;

It is not often that much religious fervor is displayed by convicts until after they are ordered for execution ; nor are the same pains taken to imbue them with religious feelings previously to the decision of the Council. As soon as a man is ordered for execution, the great increase of his danger produces extraordinary exertion on the part of those who administer the offices of religion to the inmates of Newgate. These are the Ordinary, a Catholic priest, and one or two Dissenters, who volunteer their services, but who do not confine their offers of service to persons of their own sect. The Catholic priest attends the cells only when a Catholic is in danger. As soon, then, as the council has selected from a body of Old Bailey convicts those who are to be executed, the Ordinary and his assistants visit the press-yard frequently every day, and indeed almost live with the condemned men, exhorting them to repentance, prayer, and faith.

‘In about half such cases the exertions of religious teachers are most successful, and are attended, undoubtedly, with the happiest effects on the prisoners, — the effects described above, as produced by religious sentiments. In about one case out of four no religious impression is produced ; but the prisoner goes through all the ceremonies of his situation with an air of indifference, being occupied to the very last moment with a hope of a reprieve. In the fourth case, not only do the teachers fail in their endeavours to produce a religious feeling, but those very exertions have an effect directly opposite to the one intended, causing the prisoners to rail, I may say to rave, against religion, in terms of ridicule, scorn, and violent hatred. I should but shock the feelings of many, and without any countervailing advantage, by repeating the language, or particularly describing the conduct, of those prisoners, who take offence at the anxiety of the chaplain and others to imbue them with religious sentiments. But I may add that, on almost every execution day, on which several are hanged, the chaplain is subjected to the most outrageous insults from one or more of the doomed men. He will readily confirm this statement. And it may be further proper to say, for the information of religious persons amongst those who make our laws, that, every year, several of their fellow-creatures are cut off in front of Newgate, in the very act of scoffing at God, and Christ, and the Holy Sacrament.’ — pp. 155 – 157.

For an exemplification or illustration of all this, the writer conducts us to the chapel of Newgate, where all the prisoners, as we have said, except the sick, attend once a day dur-

ing the week, for half an hour, and twice on Sunday, when the usual service of the Church of England is performed, and a sermon is preached by the Chaplain. In the midst of this chapel is a large pew, painted black, which is called 'the condemned pew'; and is the place for prisoners under sentence of death.

'This pew,' we are told, 'is more or less filled by the results of every Old Bailey Session; and is emptied by each decision of the Council, which consigns some of those who had occupied it to the hulks,' or to transportation, 'and the rest to the gallows.'

'Let it be supposed that the condemned pew has been lately emptied, and that a new batch of convicts has just been sentenced to death. On the following morning all the inhabitants of the cells attend the service, and sit in the condemned pew. Their demeanour on the occasion, as well as that of the other prisoners, is highly instructive. In that of the mass of prisoners one observes an expression of pity and respect towards the convicts; but that of the convicts shows many differences of feeling. Some tremble, and sigh or weep,—some swagger to their places, tossing their heads, smiling, nodding to their friends, and pretending to glory in the distinction of their danger; others appear stupefied, creeping into the pew, looking around them vacantly, as if unconscious of their state; and some again behave with the most perfect, I mean with real composure, appearing, as they really are at the time, proud of the distinction of being amongst the condemned, but without any admixture of fear,—since these last are either boys whose youth they know protects them, or men convicted of offences, such as returning from transportation, which are never punished with death,—or criminals so hardened by constant contemplation of death by the hangman, that they can look forward to it as their own fate with comparative indifference.

'The entrance of a new batch of convicts into the condemned pew creates some sensation amongst the other prisoners, and produces a display of various feelings amongst the condemned themselves. But after the day when the condemned pew is refilled, a stranger visiting the chapel would be at a loss to distinguish the capital convicts from the great mass of prisoners for trial. If, however, he were to attend the chapel after an interval of some weeks, he would observe a striking change in the physical condition of most of the capital convicts. In several instances I have seen brown hair turned gray, and gray white, by a month of suspense such as most London capital convicts undergo. In the same short period the smooth face of a man oftentimes becomes often marked with decided wrinkles on the

forehead, and about the eyes and mouth; and, in certainly three cases out of four, one month of the cells of Newgate causes a great diminution of flesh over the whole body. "How thin he grows!" is the common remark of the other prisoners, when speaking of one who has passed a month in the condemned pew. But except these changes in the physical state of persons under sentence of death, their appearance in the condemned pew presents nothing remarkable, after the first day or two, when the novelty of their situation has worn off.'—pp. 146–148.

This description, it will be perceived, applies to the usual appearance of the condemned, as they attend from week to week in the chapel. But on the Sunday preceding the execution there is a service, called the 'condemned service,' which is conducted with peculiar solemnity, and is designed to make a strong impression on the minds of the whole congregation. Besides the sermon, which is adapted to the occasion, and always concludes with a direct address to the wretched persons who are appointed for death, appropriate hymns are sung; and if the execution is to take place, as is generally the case, the next morning, (Monday being the stated day from a humane consideration to murderers, who are condemned on Saturday, that they may thus gain the respite of the intervening Sunday,) part of the burial service is performed.

The following description of such a scene, as presented on a particular Sunday, is then given by Mr. Wakefield, promising, that not a circumstance is stated, which he has not witnessed. Having first mentioned the various classes, which form the congregation; the sheriffs, attended by their under sheriffs, in their full state, accompanied by a few friends, drawn thither by curiosity; the prisoners not yet tried; the school-master and his pupils, or the young offenders; those who are sentenced to transportation, among whom are the late companions of the condemned men; and, finally, the women; he thus proceeds:

'Let us turn to the "condemned pew," containing the persons ordered for execution. They are four in number. The first is a youth, about eighteen apparently. He is to die for stealing in a dwelling-house goods valued at more than £5. His features have no felonious cast; on the contrary, they are handsome, intelligent, and even pleasing. Craft, and fear, and debauchery have not yet had time to put decided marks on him. He

steps boldly, with his head upright, looks to the women's gallery, and smiles. His intention is to pass for a brave fellow with those who have brought him to this untimely end; but the attempt fails: fear is stronger in him than vanity. Suddenly his head droops; and, as he sits down, his bent knees tremble and knock together. The second is an older criminal, on whose countenance *villain* is distinctly written. He has been sentenced to death before, but reprieved, and transported for life. Having incurred the penalty of death by the act, in itself innocent, of returning to England, he is now about to die for a burglary committed since his return. His glance at the sheriffs and the Ordinary tells of scorn and defiance. But even this hardened ruffian will wince at the most trying moment, as we shall see presently. The third is a sheep-stealer, a poor ignorant creature, in whose case there are mitigating points, but who is to be hanged, in consequence of some report having reached the ear of the Secretary of State, that this is not his first offence; and, secondly, because, of late, a good many sheep have been stolen by other people. He is quite content to die; indeed, the exertions of the chaplain and others have brought him firmly to believe, that his situation is enviable, and that the gates of heaven are open to receive him. Now observe the fourth,—that miserable old man in a tattered suit of black. He is already half dead.* He is said to be a clergyman of the Church of England, and has been convicted of forgery. The great efforts made to save his life, not only by his friends, but by many utter strangers, fed him with hope until his doom was sealed. He is now under the influence of despair. He staggers towards the pew, reels into it, stumbles forward, flings himself on the ground, and, by a curious twist of the spine, buries his head under his body. The sheriffs shudder; their inquisitive friends crane forward; the keeper frowns on the excited congregation; the lately smirking footmen close their eyes and forget their liveries; the Ordinary clasps his hands; the turnkeys cry "Hush"; and the old clerk lifts up his cracked voice, saying, "Let us sing to the praise and glory of God."

'People of London! is there any scene in any play so striking as this tragedy of real life, which is acted eight times a year in the midst of your serene homes!

'They sing the Morning Hymn, which of course reminds the condemned of their prospect for to-morrow morning. Eight o'clock to-morrow morning is to be their last moment. They come to the burial service. The youth, who, alone of those for

* Rev. Mr. Fenn.

whom it is intended, is both able and willing to read, is, from want of practice, at a loss to find the place in his prayer-book. The Ordinary observes him, looks to the sheriffs, and says aloud, "The Service for the Dead!" The youth's hands tremble as they hold the book upside-down. The burglar is heard to mutter an angry oath. The sheep-stealer smiles, and, extending his arms upwards, looks with a glad expression to the roof of the chapel. The forger has never moved.' — pp. 159 – 162.

He thus speaks of the effect of the exhortation at the close of the sermon, upon the audience generally, and upon the wretched objects of it :

'The sermon of this day, whether eloquent or plain, useful or useless, must produce a striking effect at the moment of its delivery. * * For a while the preacher addresses himself to the congregation at large, who listen attentively, — excepting the clergyman and the burglar, of whom the former is still rolled up at the bottom of the condemned pew, whilst the eyes of the latter are wandering round the chapel, and one of them is occasionally winked, impudently, at some acquaintance amongst the prisoners for trial. At length the Ordinary pauses; and then, in a deep tone, which, though hardly above a whisper, is audible to all, says — "Now to you, my poor fellow-mortals, who are about to suffer the last penalty of the law." But why should I repeat the whole? It is enough to say, that in the same solemn tone he talks for about ten minutes of crimes, punishment, bonds, shame, ignominy, sorrow, sufferings, wretchedness, pangs, childless parents, widows, and helpless orphans, broken and contrite hearts, and death to-morrow morning for the benefit of society. What happens? The dying men are dreadfully agitated. The young stealer in a dwelling-house no longer has the least pretence to bravery. He grasps the back of the pew; his legs give way; he utters a faint groan, and sinks on the floor. Why does no one stir to help him? Where would be the use? The hardened burglar moves not, nor does he speak; but his face is of an ashy paleness; and, if you look carefully, you may see blood trickling from his lip, which he has bitten unconsciously, or from rage, to rouse his fainting courage. The poor sheep-stealer is in a frenzy. He throws his hands far from him and shouts aloud, "Mercy, good Lord! mercy is all I ask. The Lord in his mercy come! There! there! I see the Lamb of God! Oh! how happy! Oh! this is happy!" Meanwhile, the clergyman, still bent into the form of a sleeping dog, struggles violently, — his feet, legs, hands, and arms, even the muscles of his back, move with a quick jerking motion, not naturally,

but, as it were, like the affected part of a galvanized corpse. Suddenly he utters a short, sharp scream, and all is still.

'The silence is short. As the Ordinary proceeds "to conclude," the women set up a yell, which is mixed with a rustling noise, occasioned by the removal of those whose hysterics have ended in fainting. The sheriffs cover their faces; and one of their inquisitive friends blows his nose with his glove. The keeper tries to appear unmoved; but his eye wanders anxiously over the combustible assembly. The children round the communion table stare and gape with childish wonder. The two masses of prisoners for trial undulate and slightly murmur; while the capital convicts, who were lately in that black pew, appear faint with emotion.

'This exhibition lasts for some minutes, and then the congregation disperses; the condemned returning to the cells; the forger carried by turnkeys; the youth sobbing aloud convulsively, as a passionate child; the burglar muttering curses and savage expressions of defiance; whilst the poor sheep-stealer shakes hands with the turnkeys, whistles merrily, and points upwards with madness in his look.'—pp. 162–166.

After these heart-withering descriptions, on which neither our limits, nor inclination, permit us to enlarge, the writer appeals to the reader, whom he has thus made a fellow-spectator of the scene: 'Of what use are the *public* religious ceremonies, in which persons about to be hanged are made to play a part?' And connecting this with all he had previously stated (pages 152–157), we readily concur with him in the conclusion, that they can be of no peculiar benefit to the condemned; and that every good influence which could be derived from religion, might be bestowed without any *public ceremonies*. All that this writer shows of the impression made by the chapel service, both on the miserable wretches themselves, who are actually executed, and on their more fortunate fellow-prisoners, whose sentence is commuted, or whose crimes expose them to a less punishment, confirms the conviction we had already entertained, that *the religious services of a prison should be private*, addressed immediately to the individual, in the deep silence and retirement of his cell. The shame, fear, anguish, or even religious frenzy produced in these last stages of earthly misery, these hours of darkness, in the bosoms of the unhappy victims, are no fit spectacles for the public gaze. While on the other hand, the curiosity, pity, and various emotions in the minds of their fellow-prisoners, must materially diminish, if not wholly

destroy, the good influence of religious services upon both. Let not their penitence or despair, their stupid indifference, or unutterable distress, be exposed at any period or in any shape, either within the dreary walls of their prison, or when their hour is come to die on the scaffold. Let all the instruction and solace, which such wretchedness demands, and Christian truth will admit, be administered within the privacy of their cells. Let the unhappy man be attended by the clergyman of his choice, and his spiritual friends be permitted to administer even to the last, as their prudence and benevolence may suggest, the strength and consolation, which Christian truth and Christian sympathy may supply. But let the last religious services, which his own wishes, his peculiar faith, or the decorum of circumstances may require, be performed within the prison ; so that when he is led forth to the scaffold, it shall be only to die. And nothing shall remain for the public gaze, or the public compassion, but the spectacle of his death.

It is in this mode, we believe, that executions are universally conducted in France ; and no one who has witnessed them will doubt its superior efficacy, whether as an exhibition of justice, or as suited to produce the desired moral influence. The delay, eagerness of curiosity, dangers from crowds, and temptations to crime, — to add nothing of the improper length and objectionable character, not seldom to be noticed, in the religious services of such occasions, — all conspire to make public executions, as usually conducted in this country, any thing but solemn or instructive.

We must here especially protest against that loathsome exhibition of religious frenzy, which in the shape of exulting hopes, special assurances of pardon, and of immediate salvation, has been sometimes witnessed among us. We must express our astonishment, that it is even permitted. What can more effectually defeat the ends of justice, than to present malefactors before the public, in their prisons, or on the scaffold, as if they were martyrs, dying joyfully in Jesus, and ascending from the gallows to glory ? Such exhibitions are as revolting as they are unnecessary. Let the criminal, we repeat, receive all the spiritual help that his sad condition and a true interest for his soul will suggest. But let him not be encouraged to think, that because his offences are to be punished by man, he at once becomes a regenerate child of

God. Let him be instructed tenderly, but faithfully, that he is the victim, not so much of the law he has broken, as of the crimes he has committed; that though to sincere repentance the gospel promises forgiveness, yet he owes to the community he has injured, and to his country, whose justice he has provoked, the example of that penitence; that if, in the mercy of God, the joy of salvation is reserved for him, its triumphs are to begin in heaven, and not on earth. In fine, he should remember, that it becomes him to die, not as a martyr in a glorious cause, but with the meekness and humiliation of a malefactor; not exulting in the anticipations of glory, but humbly supplicating, while he is encouraged to hope for pardon.

The exhibition of religious ceremony, which was witnessed at a late execution in this city, must have been sufficient, if, as we believe, it has been correctly reported, to satisfy every reflecting mind of the worse than uselessness of such performances. Whatever respect or indulgence is due (and, to any reasonable extent, who would not cheerfully yield them?) to the opinions and rites of any church, or to the feelings of any class of Christians, they should in no instance interfere with the salutary influences, which public justice contemplates in this last solemn exercise of its power. Nor is it reasonable, that the executive officers of the law, who must preside at these sad spectacles, should find superadded to the burden of their painful, but indispensable duties, the perplexity of forbidding or of enduring a parade of ceremonies not less unprofitable to the unhappy victim, than to those who from necessity or choice are the witnesses of his fate.

We have already too far exceeded the limits we proposed, to leave us room for some reflections, which the facts we have exhibited obviously suggest, both on the influence of public executions, and the efficacy of the punishment of death in deterring others from crime. We are not ignorant of the practical difficulties attending the great subject of capital punishments, or that there are those who even question the right of any earthly tribunal to inflict them. We therefore approach it with caution and diffidence, aware of the diversities of judgment respecting it among enlightened and philanthropic minds, whose professional experience and observation entitle their opinions to high regard. We pre-

sume, that no one among ourselves at this day, will be disposed to vindicate the sanguinary code of England, written, though it is not executed, in blood; and suited by its theory to convey to a stranger the most unjust ideas of the character of the people.* Happily, in this country we have no such laws. The punishment of death is limited to very few offences; and in this Commonwealth to six.† The question of the total abolition of it is occupying the attention of our Legislatures, as it has long the speculations of humane and enlightened individuals. Whether there be not crimes, as murder, for which no other punishment is adequate, or minds at once profligate and superstitious, whom no other fear will move;—whether the security of society, therefore, does not require such a sanction; or whether, in fine, the apparently milder system of imprisonment and labor for life, *with despair of pardon*, may safely be substituted in its place,—these questions, with others connected with them, of great practical moment, as we are not called to determine, we cheerfully leave to the judgment and mercy of those who are.

* * * * *

At the moment that the last paragraphs of this article are passing the press, we learn, that a Report on Capital Punishment is already before the Legislature of this Commonwealth, prepared by a Committee of the House of Representatives, appointed at a former session for this object.‡ We have been favored with a copy of this judicious and interesting document, in which the Committee take into special consideration the penal code of the Commonwealth, ‘in cases where the punishment of death may be inflicted.’ And having adverted to some general principles, from which a

* A traveller from the Continent, while in London, having been invited on a certain morning to witness the execution of eleven criminals at Newgate, all of whom were to suffer for offences committed without violence, asked, if it were really true, that such a number of persons were to be thus put to death. And on being assured that it was indeed so, ‘Then,’ said he, ‘the English people are the most barbarous of all the civilized nations of the world.’

† These are murder, treason, rape, arson, with burglary, and robbery on the highway, when the offender uses a deadly weapon.

‡ The gentlemen composing this Committee are, Hon. William Sullivan, Robert Rantoul, Thomas Kendall, Oliver Holden, and John B. Davis, Esqrs.

judgment on this important subject may be formed, and briefly stated the arguments, both of those who maintain and of those who deny 'the political right of putting men to death for crime'; having also presented it as their deliberate opinion, that it would 'tend to save life, if no law demanded life, when no life was taken; and that the law should never consign any one to public execution for the destruction of property,' unless it involved also the destruction of life, they present the result of their views in three distinct propositions, which are embodied in separate bills, recommending either the total abolition of the punishment of death, or the limitation of it to the single crime of murder; and further propose, that all executions shall in future be in private, or within the walls of the prison, in the presence only of a competent number of official, or specially authorized witnesses.

Before the time for the publication of this journal, this Report may have undergone the decision of the Legislature, and possibly we may find ourselves anticipated in some of the remarks we have been suggesting. We shall not, therefore, at present, indulge in any further speculations of our own. But, considering the importance of the subject, and the diversity of opinion and feeling relating to it among men of unquestionable judgment and humanity, we rejoice with a writer in one of our weekly journals, that it has been committed to able hands, and will undoubtedly receive from the whole Legislature an impartial examination.

ART. II. — *Plain Letters on Important Subjects.* By JONATHAN FARR. Boston. Leonard C. Bowles. 1831. 18mo. pp. xxii. 230.

PLAIN enough, in all conscience, these letters are; sometimes, we think, a little too plain. 'Important subjects' should certainly be treated with plainness. On this point our mind is made up. We respect not the apothegm, however we may respect him who uttered it, that 'a man may have

his hand full of truths, and only feel justified in lifting up his little finger.' To every man who has got a handful of truths we would say, Open your hand. And yet we should not feel particularly gratified, if, instead of simply opening his hand, and giving us an opportunity of examining what there was in it, he should, with a significant jerk, throw its contents, hard and direct, into our face and eyes. The plainness which we like, which we always like, is openness, manliness, sincerity, the love of truth and of freedom overcoming the fear of man and of prescription. The plainness which we do not always like, and can very seldom approve, is bluntness, the saying a thing dogmatically and rudely which might better have been said modestly and gently. It is the latter kind of plainness which we would characterize as being too plain. It is so plain as to be ugly. Now, while the true and manly kind of plainness pervades the volume before us, the other kind is its occasional blemish. Mr. Farr is a favorite with us; and we wish to be understood as meaning no more than we said at first, that his letters are sometimes a little too plain.

Take, as an instance, the following very decisive reply to some one whose wife had left his own place of worship to join the Calvinists, and who wished Mr. Farr to converse with her and endeavour to bring her back. 'I am persuaded,' Mr. Farr answers, 'it will do no good. *Your wife is an ignorant woman*, not a scholar nor a theologian. "What is not reasoned in, cannot be reasoned out."—We question not the truth of this assertion. We doubt not that the woman was indeed an ignorant woman. What we do question is the propriety of telling her husband so, in just those words. We think the same wholesome truth might have been communicated, by letter, to one who had taken the lady 'for better, for worse,' in other and more comforting terms. If the gentleman became more attached to his minister, after such a piece of consolation, he was a most unprejudiced husband, and a most teachable parishioner.

Nevertheless, as we are inclined to believe that the letter from which we have made the above quotation is one of those which was not 'actually sent' by the writer, and may be considered as addressed to a class rather than to an individual, we will even copy the whole of it, for the sake of its humor, as well as the good and serious advice with which it closes. It

is numbered, by mistake, Letter 'xl.' It should have been lx.

'Sir,

'You told me of your troubles with a heavy heart. Your domestic peace is spoiled by your artful and obtrusive "orthodox" neighbours. Your wife has left your place of worship and has gone to the Calvinists. You wished to have me converse with her and endeavour to bring her back. I am persuaded it will do no good. One who had never seen a college, nor studied divinity would probably have more influence with her. Your wife is an ignorant woman, not a scholar nor a theologian. "What is not reasoned in, cannot be reasoned out." I could bring her such arguments against the trinity and Calvinism, and in favor of Unitarian sentiments, as have satisfied the largest and best minds, and the purest hearts. But they would have no effect on her. You remember the Roman Catholic servant girl. Let all the professors and doctors of Andover Institution go and converse with her on the absurdities, errors, superstitions, and abominations of Popery; do you think they would easily make a proselyte and Protestant of her?

'Your wife has given her faith and confidence to some religious guide. It is probably will, feeling, persuasion, enticement, that has drawn her away to another altar. You wish to have me resolve her cases of conscience; I suspect they might be resolved into something worse. You wish to have me remove her doubts; to clear up difficult passages of Scripture; to explain doctrines. My dear sir, she has no doubts. Some partizan and zealot has told her that if she pursues such a course, she is safe, and will arrive in heaven; and she has determined to believe and trust that person, and let consequences take care of themselves. As to explaining Scripture, I might as well explain to her Pindar or Horace. As to the doctrines of either one denomination, or another, she knows but little more about them than the child, that was baptized yesterday. She has got an impression, or formed a resolution, that such are right and all the rest are wrong. She could not state the doctrines of the church where she has gone, nor of the church she has deserted. I might remind her of her marriage vows; of those duties of subordination and respect, which nature points out. I might direct her to the Old and New Testament—to the case of Vashti—to what was done to prevent the evil of her example. I might read to her the 30th chapter of Numbers—and many plain passages elsewhere—the instructions of Paul and Peter, who both wrote concerning the duties of wives to their husbands;

but all this would do no good. The prophets and apostles may say what they will, she has chosen her guide, and will follow it. This is no flattering account of your wife. You will wish to know, what you shall do. This is a difficult question. Be more at home, and endeavour by a mild, but serious deportment, to sustain your dignity there. You may in a cautious and gentle manner make the visits of those who come to destroy your conjugal union and felicity, less frequent and mischievous. Be a more pious, prayerful Unitarian yourself.

'You have not been so earnest and thoughtful, as you should be. If you are more faithful to your God, he may bring your wife to a sense of her duty. He will, at least, help you bear the evils of your condition. Do not follow her in joining that party. Show a higher regard for religion and for your Saviour. But daily strive to speak to her heart by your tenderness, piety, and virtue; and wait patiently; and let it be your prayer that this trial may be sanctified to you; which is also the prayer of your friend.'—194–196.

We like the following plain expostulation with one of those who are more fond of religious speculation than of a religious life. It forms a part of Letter xxxi.

'Let me exhort you to a religious life. Leave your disputations, debates, &c. and bring practical, vital religion home to your heart and your conscience.

'You do not believe in a devil. Well, I do not say it is indispensable to your salvation, that you should. You ought to receive all the doctrines of the gospel, which you, after patient and faithful search, can find there. Your barely believing or rejecting that doctrine, will not make you happy. If you are on the Lord's side, you have nothing to fear from evil spirits; but if you are not, you can promise yourself but little comfort, whether there be, or be not a devil.

'You believe in a God; then honor, worship, and serve him. Love, imitate, and follow the Saviour, that you may overcome your present enemies, and be guarded against future trouble.

'Say what you will; do what you may; there will be distinctions and differences between the virtuous and the vicious, righteous and wicked, good and bad. You may explain away the Scriptures, but not these. You may reason against these things, but you cannot put them out of existence.

'When you lie on your dying bed, say that you and your friends are Universalists; and that you have lived a sinful and impenitent life. In spite of your doctrines, your feelings and thoughts will be very different, from what they would be, had

you been truly pious. And if you leave the world serious and thoughtful, but unprepared, you cannot have that comfort and satisfaction, which conscious virtue is capable of affording. Say, there is no hell; yet your situation must be inevitably different from that of the virtuous. You will understand me here. The question is not, whether a good, pious Universalist can be saved? (that to me is not so doubtful;) but whether a base, immoral, irreligious person can be happy?'—pp. 105–107.

This is pungent, forcible, good. And so is a great portion of these 'Plain Letters.' The writer's apprehension of the nature of vital religion is eminently clear and just, and his views of its duties are serious, practical, and striking. His remarks on various books and authors, though brief, are, in general, discriminating and sensible. Some may think that he speaks too severely of Orthodox machinations; but they would perhaps cease to think so, if they could see as much of them as he has. The actual observation and experience of hard-faced uncharitableness, ignorant zeal, and family-dividing bigotry, rouse and must always rouse indignation in a free and honest breast.

Beside the directness, shrewdness, and force which are to be found in these letters, there are touches of an affecting simplicity, which reveal a poetical mind and a feeling heart. We may quote the last letter in the book as a specimen of this quality. The idea itself of addressing a letter to Dr. Watts, has a relish of poetry in it.

'LETTER LXVI.

'TO DR. WATTS.

'My dear Watts,

'Why should I not write to you and express my feelings and thoughts, just as if I knew you among the living on earth; or as though this letter could visit you in the world of spirits? Let me indulge myself in this pleasing illusion. It cannot injure you, and it will be a gratification to me. You left this sublunary, mortal scene before my birth. But though an ocean separates the places of our nativity; and a century and a tomb seem to increase the obstacles to our intercourse; yet have I a fellow-feeling for you, as though you were by me and my friend. I have read your life; and many of your writings are familiar to me. These things have endeared you to my memory, and strengthened my attachment to you. I was but a poor little village boy, when I first got a sight of your "Divine Songs for Chil-

dren, y'—divine they were in my eye; though I now perceive errors in them. They were exposed for sale in a shop; but I had not a sixpence in the world, and I went away with an aching and longing heart. But an elder brother had the money; and that pearl, within a few days, became our own. I read it with rapture. You would have been pleased to see us enjoying this mental and moral feast. I never shall forget that day. It scarcely required an effort of memory to treasure up those beautiful hymns. They delighted and impressed my heart. No doubt, before your departure, there were many children, that had learned and loved this little book.

'But you would be glad to know how many millions since, not only in Europe, but in America also, are repeating those hymns. What a satisfaction must it be to you that you have enlightened, warmed, and nourished so many youthful minds! If you could look down from your celestial abode, and hear so many feeble and lisping voices chanting your strains; if you could hear so many pious and affectionate mothers expressing their fond solicitude, and lulling their pretty babes to sleep with singing your cradle hymn; and then could you enter our churches, and find your psalms and hymns lying in every pew;—O it must delight you! I have compared you with some of the poets of the present day, who are by too many accounted greater poets than you. But how awful are the manifestations of their superiority of genius! The wise and pious father will not give their works to his child, any more than he would give him a stone for bread, and a serpent for a fish. And no careful mother would recommend them to her pure and delicate daughter, any more than she would deliver her into the hands of the libertine. I often think of these things, and call your rank an enviable, a glorious one. Johnson thought it presumptuous to write your life, and give you the lowest place in the scale of the muses. Perhaps it was his love of singularity and obstinacy, that made him speak with so much decency, as he did, concerning you, and your literary merits.

'But the voice of time, and unadulterated nature have done you justice. Youthful innocence, and virgin purity, and holy affection, have all ranged themselves on your side. Some of those poets, whom Johnson praised, are but little read and known. They are locked up in libraries, as interdicted fruit, and the worm is feeding sweetly on them, and they are covered with the dust of time.

'Johnson, doubtless, would have done differently, if, instead of trying to assist men in singing the praises of God, you had taught them to sing the praises of his church; or employed your

genius and time on a subject of less importance. But I suspect you had, while living, — you certainly have now, — some learned, and many pious persons for your admirers; and many also are imitating you in devoting their talents and their muse to holy purposes.

'We have taken the liberty to alter many of your hymns, because we have different views of the doctrines they inculcate. We have lately found a letter of your own, which expresses your disapprobation of some of your earlier performances. If there were errors in your creed, you will be glad to find them corrected; if not, you will look with a charitable and pitiful eye on us.

'I do not approve all your poetry. You would suspect me of flattery, if I said I did. I leave out many of your psalms, and more of your hymns; not thinking them proper helps to a Unitarian's devotion. I think you one of the best men that ever lived; but your goodness did not make your opinions certain and true. I was sorry for the mention you made of Locke in one of your Lyric Poems; but I trust, that 'fair charity, sister of faith,'* and yet greater, has, long ago, showed you that excellent man, and that you have embraced him in all the ardor of spiritual love. I imagine, I can see plainly by your writings that you had a tender and benevolent heart; and that if language of seeming severity and harshness fell from your lips, it is to be attributed to that deep interest you felt in the cause of true religion, and the welfare of immortal souls. Your Sermons, Treatise on the Passions, Guide to Prayer, Improvement of the Mind, Solemn Address to the Deity, Orthodoxy and Charity United, are still printed and read with much avidity. Your Solemn Address, and your Orthodoxy and Charity United, I have read with great pleasure and profit. We often sing your Indian Philosopher, and sympathize with that sorrow, which, we imagine, was the occasion of it. Some of your hymns are in the Roman Catholic Manual. We all get something from you. I trust you are now reaping the rich reward of your humble piety, and your very useful life.

'I am hoping to have the privilege, some time of seeing you, where I can tell you much better, than I can now, with what high and affectionate regards I am your friend.'

* 'See his poem on Mr. Locke's "Annotations upon Several Parts of the New Testament." I allude to these lines —

"Sister of faith, fair charity,

Show me the wondrous man on high" —

implying much doubt, whether that excellent man was in heaven; and that doubt was occasioned by a supposed error in Mr. Locke's faith.'

WE think our readers will agree with us, that the extracts we have laid before them are patterns of a fabric, which, though without the gloss of more finished and delicate goods, may be approved as stout, serviceable, and by no means coarse homespun, which promises to wear well.

ART. III. — *Essais Théologiques. — Du Système Théologique de la Trinité.* Par M. CHENEVIÈRE, Pasteur et Professeur, à Genève. *Premier Essai.*
Theological Essays. — Essay First, on the Trinity. By M. CHENEVIÈRE, Pastor and Professor at Geneva. Geneva and Paris. 1831. 8vo. pp. 259.

WE referred to this work in our last number but one, and intimated our design to give a more particular account of it. It is deserving of attention as being the first serious attempt on the part of one of the clergy of Geneva to assail the hereditary doctrines of the Orthodox church. These doctrines, as we have had occasion to say before, disappeared from the Genevan standard, and for a long series of years have been maintained only by a small minority in that communion. Yet they have not been assailed. They have not been made the subject of public controversy. It is only recently that the attempts to revive Calvinism, and to destroy the reputation of the established ministry, have seemed to render necessary a departure from the anti-controversial policy, which has been so long the settled course of that body. The first considerable publication with this view was the 'Examination of the Doctrine of the Scriptures concerning the Person of Jesus Christ, Redemption, and Original Sin,' by M. de Luc, an aged layman, son of the celebrated naturalist of this name, who with great zeal has devoted the powers of his cultivated and mature mind to religious inquiry. The work of M. Chenevière is of a more extended and elaborate character, being designed to appear in successive parts, or small volumes, each treating in a systematic way some one of the leading doctrines of controversial theology. To do this the author is well qualified by his excellent clearness and soundness of mind, and his extensive scholarship; and we think that the works which he may

produce must prove worthy of attention, as well from the character and skill of their author, as from the extremely interesting circumstances which have called them forth.

The circumstances which have called them forth are briefly explained in the Preface. For the last fifteen years, the writer says, religious journals and other works have been greatly multiplied on the Continent, and, with two or three exceptions, have been devoted with one spirit to an exclusive faith, and the propagation of a few dogmas about which men have been disputing for fourteen centuries. If these were merely points of theory and speculation, the discussion of which would end in the adoption of one or another opinion, it would hardly be worth while to interfere; but in his view they are points which misrepresent and disfigure the religion of Christ, and hinder the progress of the Reformation. They tend to disgust and alienate inquiring Catholics, who are dissatisfied with their own church and would gladly join a rational Protestantism; and they drive inquiring Protestants into infidelity, by representing that to be Christianity which they can neither comprehend nor approve. It is on this account that M. Chenevière takes up his pen. 'I accuse no one, and I respect motives. My sincere desire is to ascertain the truth; and to bring back to Christianity any who may have been repelled from it, by painting it in its true colors, such as it is, the best gift of Heaven to man.'

To the doctrine of the Trinity, which presents itself first for consideration, he thinks that a greater importance has been attributed than is its due; in which opinion we perhaps agree with him in the main; and yet, while it is a dogma esteemed essential by those who hold it, and maintaining such a position in their system of error that a fatal blow here will be the destruction of the system itself, it seems to be right and wise to make this the point of assault. It is not however the only point, and M. Chenevière himself is engaged in attacking other positions as well as this.

M. Chenevière divides his subject into three parts; containing respectively the arguments from history, from reason, and from Scripture.

In the first part, it is his object to show that the doctrine of the Trinity was unknown to the primitive church. There were, it is true, certain Christian believers and writers after the year 150, who were fond of exalting the person of the

Saviour; but-until after the Council of Nice in 325, the great body of Christians by no means held Jesus to be equal, consubstantial, and coëssential with the Father. It was only at the Council of Constantinople in 381, that the doctrine was put into this form. And this was the result of violent and long discussions, during which it is easy to trace the manner in which this dogma grew up, one step after another, by a gradual but visible departure from the original belief of the Christian world. The whole doctrinal history of this period, it has always seemed to us, is to be found comprized, as in a summary abridgment, in the three well known creeds, called the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian. Each of these records and marks the state opinion at the time when it was compiled; and by comparing them with each other we discern the changes which took place from time to time in the received doctrine. The comparison is a very edifying one, and has all the force of demonstration. The Apostles' creed its strictly and unequivocally unitarian, and its formation and reception at that early day proves, as decidedly as any document can do, that the doctrine of the Trinity was not then the doctrine of the believers; because, if it had been, it must have found a place in that summary of the faith. The Nicene creed is Arian;* and being framed for the purpose of settling the violent disputes which had been raging respecting the person of Christ by an authoritative declaration of the truth, must undoubtedly record the doctrine then held by the church. And it is by no means that of the Trinity. So that here is another public manifesto of the church, as late as the year 325, proving that at that date the doctrine of the Trinity was not the faith of the church. But the decision at Nice did not prevent the continuance of discussion. The controversy went on; and in 381 another Council at Constantinople put

* The remark of Mr. Harris of Glasgow, that this creed, 'though meant to condemn the doctrines of Arius, is in fact their confirmation,' is perfectly just. There is nothing like the Trinity to be found in it. Dr. Adam Clarke speaks to the purpose on this point. 'It is said that Arius subscribed this creed; and well he might, and so may every Arian in the universe, and be an Arian still. But a genuine Trinitarian, who believes in the infinite and eternal godhead of Christ, and who properly considers the import of the terms made use of by the Council, could not, in my opinion, subscribe it either for peace or conscience' sake.' We are much of the same mind. See *Harris's 'Antichrist, what it is, and what it is not.'* 2nd Ed. p. 23.

the 'finishing touch,' as Mosheim calls it, to the doctrine of the Trinity. From this date, and not before, it became the doctrine of the church. In the year 440 it had become so established, that the Doxology, which had been hitherto, like those of Scripture, an ascription to the one God, the Father, took the unscriptural form in which it has since passed down through the Romish to the English and other Orthodox churches; perpetuating, by its incessant repetition and its alliance with music, the error which it so sonorously set forth. At length, in the fifth century was fabricated the Athanasian creed, we know not by what ruffian hand, certainly not by that of Athanasius, — Vigilius of Thapsus has the credit of it, — which excelled all previous annunciations of the mysterious dogma in the ingenious variations of its paradoxical assertions, and in the heartiness of its unqualified anathemas. Now we say, that if all history were silent, if no record had come down to us respecting the faith of the first centuries, these creeds themselves would furnish incontrovertible evidence that the doctrine of the Trinity did not exist prior to the middle of the fourth century, and that it was a corruption, gradually introduced, of the true original doctrine.

M. Chenevière, however, examines the historical documents of the times, and collects from them the proof of the same fact. He shows that there is ample reason to believe that the earliest converts, both Jewish and Gentile, held to the simple doctrine of the divine unity, and that such was the opinion of the Fathers prior to the Council of Nice. He then gives the history of the manner in which the doctrine was introduced, its origin among the Platonists, and the circumstances under which it was borrowed from them and made prevalent in the church. The chapter closes with a sketch of the history of the doctrine down to the present time.

The Second Part of the Essay is employed upon the argument from reason; showing that the doctrine in question is contrary to reason, by what he calls proofs direct, and proofs indirect.

He begins by setting aside the plea that this doctrine is a mystery, above reason, and therefore not to be judged by reason. What he says on this head is brief, but forcible.

'We know that there are mysteries in the gospel, which present difficulties impossible to be resolved, and yet we are by no means to reject them on that account; for they are expressly

taught, and they in no degree contravene the acknowledged laws of reason, though they pass its reach. It is sufficient to say,—a mystery revealed by God in the gospel may remain impenetrably obscure in all that regards the nature of the object, the manner of its existence, and any of the elements of which it is composed;—but it must always have a precise meaning, and represent clear and exact ideas; we must be able to separate the different ideas which compose it, so as to leave a distinct notion in the mind. Thus, the eternity of God surpasses my comprehension; no one can explain it. I admit it however, because, in decomposing it, I arrive at this distinct and true notion,—birth and death cannot be predicated of God. I know what is meant by the term. There is no contradiction to my reason, though it is beyond my reason to comprehend it. But when I perceive in a proposition an evident contradiction between the ideas which compose it, so that I cannot state them without immediately provoking reasonable and unanswerable opposition, then I say rightly, that it is a contradictory proposition, and not a mystery. The Trinity is of this character.

He then proceeds to show, that in whichever of the various senses that have been given to them, you understand the terms *person*, *substance*, *essence*, *hypostasis*, &c., the proposition that there are three persons in one God involves inextricable contradictions. For example, as regards the word *person*, he shows that if it be understood in its usual sense, as intending a living substance which possesses consciousness of existence and is endowed with intelligence and will,—then there must be three Gods, and Trinitarians are Tritheists. If any other definition be adopted, then there will be only one God, but there will be no Trinity. Nothing can be clearer than this; and hence professed Trinitarianism amounts to no more, in almost all cases, than a recognition of God under three different characters.

Amongst other instances of the perplexity created by the different interpretations put on the leading words in this controversy, he cites Calvin's sense of the word *essence*. That Reformer used it as synonymous with *substance*. But thus, says our author, 'the doctrine becomes more and more complicated. For if God, who embraces Father, Son, and Spirit, is one substance or being; if the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are each of them a substance or person; then it follows, that, of four substances, that which comprises three others is not a simple substance; that there are four divine

persons instead of three, and that the Trinity becomes a quaternity, — as Gentilis proved to Calvin; and, as no solid answer could be given to this theologian, *he was burnt.*'

The *indirect* proofs of the unreasonableness of the doctrine are drawn from the efforts made by Trinitarians to reconcile the contradictions which exist in their system. M. Chenevière examines the explanations and illustrations which have been given by Saurin, Leibnitz, and others, and shows how utterly unable they have been, after the most anxious attempts, to place the doctrine upon any ground consistent with reason. Its present advocates, he remarks, grown wise by the failure of their predecessors, have abandoned the attempt; they do not pretend to explain it, or to prove its reasonableness; they satisfy themselves with saying, that it is to be found in certain passages of Scripture, and is for that cause alone to be received. He proceeds therefore to an examination of these passages. This constitutes the first chapter of the Third Part of his Essay.

He begins with remarking a fact, which he justly says has great weight in it, — that there is not one of the passages in question, excepting the first fourteen verses of John's Gospel, which has not been given up as proving nothing by some one of the Trinitarian divines, even though esteemed decisive by others. This is by no means the case with the passages cited in proof on the other side. Now what is to be thought of an argument, every link of which has been declared by some of its friends to be unsound?

Having discussed these several passages, he states, in the next chapter, 'the teaching of the Scriptures respecting the person of Jesus Christ.' His first proposition is, 'Jesus existed in heaven before his appearance on earth.' The discussion is introduced with this remark.

'I have read and meditated all that the English Unitarians and theologians of different nations have written in opposition to the position I support. I do not deny the force of some of their arguments; but I believe in the preëxistence of Christ, because of certain passages, well known, often attacked, but which seem to me to receive a forced and unsatisfactory explanation, when interpreted according to a system opposed to my own.'

The next chapter discusses the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, examining the several senses in which the word *spirit* is used in the Bible, and showing that its separate personality is not

taught in the New Testament. The work concludes {with two sections, the first of which is designed to evince that the doctrine of the Trinity, instead of being, as is pretended, fundamental and essential to the religion, is in fact a hindrance to its prevalence in the world. By removing it, we remove a stumbling-block in the way of faith, and render the religion more credible by making it more rational; and as for any apparent difficulties on the subject which the language of the Bible may present, it is more credible that this language has been altered, erroneously understood, or wrongly translated, than that the Scriptures, inspired by the God of truth, contain contradictory propositions.

‘The Protestant theologians, who hold the doctrine of the Trinity, and urge it in their sermons, instructions, and books, cannot be aware, either of the mischief they are doing, or of their own inconsistency. They do not know how many persons, little educated, but of good sense, they alienate from the religion of Christ, by maintaining that it teaches that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, and yet that there is but one God. I have often conversed with unbelievers, and I have sighed when I have found them rejecters of Christianity because it had been presented to them in a false view, and because they had been required to receive theological propositions which are not in the gospel. When I have said to them, — “But you are deceived; what you cite to me is the Christianity of your curate or your pastor, not that of Jesus Christ;” — I have clearly seen by the manner in which they listened, that if they had been sooner set right on the subject, if their contempt of all which purports to be revelation had not become inveterate from long habit, and through the prejudices which wrong instruction had rooted in them, they would have opened their souls to the real truths of the gospel, and perhaps have become disciples of him, whom they now refuse to hear. Who is responsible before God for the lot of these souls? Is it not the human teacher who has shut against them the door which his Master had charged him to open, and represented as obscure and embarrassed with thorny and difficult questions a doctrine, which the celestial Teacher exhibited as so attractive and persuasive at Jerusalem? Read the sermon on the mount, the last discourses of Jesus with his Apostles; compare with them the symbols of Athanasius or of Bullinger; — and then decide.’

The final section returns to the thought with which the Essay commenced, — that this much contested doctrine is

not to be regarded as essential to salvation. We must select from it one paragraph.

'I cannot repeat too often, or with too strong emphasis, that these obscure doctrines do not concern what is essential to salvation. The essential doctrines, which have influence on the heart and soul and conduct of the Christian, have been so clearly taught and in so express terms, that there is scarcely any controversy respecting them, and from the beginning they have been universally admitted by all the Christian churches throughout the world. * * And this, because the Apostles and Evangelists in all their writings have taught them in formal and express language, and insisted upon them strenuously. And they did so, because these are the vital principles of Christianity, powerful to touch the heart and to direct the life. But where do we find that Jesus and the Apostles exacted of those who embraced the new religion, the profession of one God in three persons of the same essence? Does the book of Acts mention it? In the 'Apologies,' which Irenæus and Tertullian presented to the emperors in order to give them a correct idea of the Christian faith, do we find this doctrine inserted among the sacred verities of the infant and growing church? Not at all. Does the Apostles' Creed, which has preserved the principal heads of the doctrine of the church from the first years of its foundation until the fourth century, does it speak to us of a Trinity, of God the Son, God the Holy Ghost, God-man, God incarnate, &c.? Not at all. The gospel is represented as teaching a practical religion, which is to sanctify the life, and not a speculative science, bristling with metaphysical questions.

'Opinions have greatly varied on this point, and even Trinitarians have not been agreed respecting the importance and necessity of faith in this system. Melancthon, who lived at the time of the Reformation, — Mosheim, a Trinitarian of the eighteenth century, did not feel themselves bound to condemn and to exclude from salvation those who cannot find this doctrine in the Scriptures. Melancthon, though surrounded by austere doctors, was inclined to indulgence, because, like us, he could find no definition which was not with reason liable to the charge of either Tritheism or Sabellianism. There were then, and, what is surprising, there are still in our own days, a goodly number of theologians who censure this moderation, and who deem that those are excluded from salvation, cut off from the promises, and reserved to everlasting fire, who do not profess the doctrine of the Trinity, even though they admit the divinity of Christianity, the authority of Jesus, the worth of his sacrifice, and the necessity of obedience to his laws. The Council of Nice,

after establishing the consubstantiality of the Word, terminated its exposition of doctrines with anathemas : ' Such is the Catholic faith ; he who does not faithfully and firmly believe it, cannot be saved.' An Illyrian synod produced the first germs of the decree, which the creed, called Athanasian, sanctioned in the fifth century. It was addressed to the Eastern bishops, A. D. 375. " Let those who do not preach the consubstantial Trinity be accursed ! The kingdom of heaven is prepared for those who preach the consubstantial Trinity. We beseech you therefore, brethren, that you teach nothing else, that you innovate in nothing ; but if you preach always and every where the Trinity, you shall possess the kingdom of God." One can conceive that such narrow and anti-christian notions should enter the head of theologians in the fourth century ; but it is more difficult to comprehend how they should infest those of 1831. Yet there are not wanting in our days, as I very well know, rigid Calvinists, who exalt Fr. Turretin with the highest honors on account of his *famous* apothegm : " Not only those who deny the holy Trinity, but those who have not the knowledge of it, are exposed to eternal damnation." Happily there lies an appeal from the sentence of these theologians ; and reason, common sense, and the gospel hold quite a different language.'

We confess that we have read this little work with great interest, and look with no small expectation to the publications which are to follow it. It is as if a new fountain were opening to us ; and we are curious to compare the mode of discussion and the results at which it may arrive in that distant, peculiar, and insulated community, with those to which other free and inquiring minds have come in a similar process of investigation and controversy. The present specimen is a gratifying one. It is written in a tone of manly and decorous frankness, which commands respect and becomes the subject and the cause. We do not doubt that the succeeding Essays will afford equal gratification. Of the Second we hope to be able to give some account in our next Number.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. IV. — *Oaths, Judicial and Extra-Judicial.*

It is the policy of our laws, as it is of those from which ours are chiefly derived, to secure the performance of almost every civil duty by the obligation of an oath. The administration of justice in all its departments, the official acts of every class of public agents, and the revenue in every stage of its collection, are made mainly to depend on the sanction which this solemnity imposes; so that here, as in England, it may be said without exaggeration, 'that a pound of tea can scarcely travel from the ship to the consumer, without costing half a dozen oaths at the least.'

Every man is liable to the claim, which the laws make on him in this regard, and so too is almost every child. It was indeed formerly considered not to be lawful to administer an oath to a person of tender years, but a better principle has prevailed of late, and any one may be admitted as a witness in a court of justice, whose intellect enables him to understand the nature and obligation of an oath. But what is this nature, and this obligation? How many adults are sensible of their force and effect? How many of the vast multitudes who are daily the subjects of this important and momentous ceremony, know correctly what it means, or feel the sacredness of the claims which it makes? A child, who is on the line where the strength of his capacity is in some degree doubtful, is questioned by the presiding judge, before he is allowed to give testimony, whether he understands the nature and obligation of an oath. The examination thus instituted, is often a painful one, because the knowledge of duty is not always accompanied by the power to explain it, and because very frequently we feel willing to trust to the frankness and ingenuousness of youth, ignorant as it may be of the effect of judicial forms, for a discovery of truth, and we place more confidence in its apparently artless narration, than in the practised and instructed confidence of experienced witnesses. But the question, thus judicially put to a child, might embarrass many, whose age exempts them from the inquiry.

An oath is a civil and a religious obligation binding the

party who takes it to the performance of the promise which it contains.

Thus a juryman's oath to return a true verdict, according to law and the evidence given him, is his promise to render a verdict on such principles, under the civil and religious sanction which the oath contains.

A witness in like manner promises that the evidence to be given by him shall be true. And the importer, who hands to the proper department the invoices or other papers which the laws require, promises that they are true under the sanction of these religious and civil obligations.

What are these obligations? is then the first inquiry. We speak of them as civil and religious, not because a man is not under a religious obligation to perform all his civil duties. We think he is. We think the pervading influence of the religious principle should be felt and have its operation on every condition and connexion of life. A serious, conscientious, and religious man will not be satisfied with a mere eye-service. He will neither be willing to limit the performance of his duties by the line which civil institutions prescribe, nor within that line to feel that these alone are the only or the highest inducements to action; but under a high sense of the necessity and utility of civil institutions in promoting the happiness of mankind, he will constantly feel the power of a religious principle enforcing the duties of a citizen, and aiding in the execution of the public laws. But we speak of the civil and religious obligations of oaths in reference to the manner in which a breach of them is supposed to be punishable; and of the responsibility, of him who takes an oath, to the laws of the land, which society has the means of enforcing, and to the laws of God, which are beyond the power of human administration. Both these combine in every instance of a deliberate oath, and are worthy of a careful consideration.

The law denounces its fearful displeasure against the guilt of perjury. The disgusting catalogue of crimes, enumerated in the penal code, has none more abhorrent and odious, and not many to which a more severe punishment is awarded, than deliberate false swearing. The civil obligation of an oath is therefore the requirement of the law to keep it inviolate, under the penalty of prosecution and conviction, and punishment for its infraction. He who respects the laws of

the land, will, even without other motive, regard the obligation under which they place him, when they impose upon him the solemnity of an oath; and the sanction by which his duty in this respect is enjoined, is that power of coercion, which the law adds to the moral duties connected with it, in preserving this obligation inviolate.

But this power of the law is after all very inconsiderable; and practice proves the utter inadequacy of its severity for the purposes proposed. Its threatnings may possibly prevent some evil, but it does little either to punish or atone for what it cannot restrain. Within the last twenty years the records of all the courts in Massachusetts do not show more than three convictions for the crime of perjury; and yet it would be rather credulity than candor to believe, that many instances do not occur within almost every year.

The law has a very feeble control over the crime of false swearing. Human power is inadequate to detect its existence in a vast majority of the cases in which it occurs. Whether a witness speak truly or falsely, is in very many instances known only to himself. He is called to testify to what he knows, and the call implies that others are ignorant of the facts, or his testimony would not be required. There is no window to his heart. His story may be entirely fictitious. It may be fabricated by envy or malice towards one party, or by partiality to another. It may contain a small portion of truth, with a large infusion of falsehood, and thus be as destructive in a moral point of view, as the most wholesome aliment would be to the body, if poison was mixed with it. Again, the testimony of a witness may in substance be true, but its coloring, its arrangement, its disposition, and its consequences be intentionally false; the lights and shades of the picture may be artfully managed to give false effect, and where the right ends and the wrong begins, may be difficult and perhaps impossible for human casuistry to decide.

And it is this combination of good and evil, this unnatural and yet intimate and forced alliance of truth and falsehood, this 'lie with a circumstance,' that produces infinite mischief. The demon then takes the air and manner and habiliments of truth, and becomes potent for all manner of iniquity, with a facility of locomotion that eludes the grasp of the law. Civil process cannot reach it. The mischief is done, but the agent escapes. If the crime is now and then be fixed on one,

the most that can be done is, not to prevent the guilt, or to atone for it, but to punish one among the agents, and very probably the humblest, by which it was perpetrated.

But the civil obligation of an oath, so far as it is enforced by the sanction of the law, stops short of the moral duty which this solemnity enjoins. The laws, that is to say, our laws, punish only perjury, with an exception as to the breach of the revenue oaths; but there is much false swearing which is not included in the legal definition of that offence.

Perjury is wilful and corrupt false swearing in a matter in the course of justice, in a point material to the issue to be tried. The consequence of this definition is, that the moral delinquency implied in the violation of an oath is not always cognizable by human tribunals. Before the law animadverts on false swearing as a crime, it must be established that the oath was administered in the due administration of justice, and that the allegations of the party accused were made to a point of the case on trial, strictly material to the issue between the parties, and not merely in those collateral and incidental matters which constantly occur in the progress of a judicial examination, and which, though not technically a part of the question to be decided, do in a greater or less degree operate to the prejudice or advantage of one side or the other. Beyond the strict lines, which the close definition we have given has drawn for the enclosing of this offence, the law does not presume to exercise its authority (it being always remembered, that the oaths for securing the revenue are placed on a different basis); so that it is obvious its sanctions fall, in their design, very far short of a complete protection against the offence. But even where it professes to act, its power is exceedingly feeble. The very great difficulty of proof in a matter which may depend on the mere personal knowledge of the witness, is quite obvious. Where this could be had, the exact minuteness of form in the details of an indictment against a party accused of perjury, the necessity of a precise and literal allegation of the objectionable assertions, in which the supposed falsehood is said to exist, an exactness that is almost impossible unless the false testimony was at the time reduced to writing, with a variety of other embarrassments of the most strict professional technicality occurring in the progress of a trial for perjury, render a conviction almost impracticable in cases even of a high and flagrant char-

acter, and make an attempt at conviction in any minor case utterly idle, and almost ridiculous.

We do not adduce this state of the law for the purpose of censuring its provisions in respect to this crime. There are necessary safeguards for innocence, which it might be dangerous to remove in our desire to punish guilt, and there are difficulties to be encountered in any alteration, which would deserve to be considered with very great care before it should be confirmed. Although in this, as in every other branch of the criminal code, a judicious revision is exceedingly desirable, and cannot much longer be delayed with safety to our institutions, yet against the success of any deliberate scheme of perjury we have some security in the open and public administration of justice, in the freedom and ability with which the examination of witnesses is conducted in our judicial trials, and, above all, in the intelligence and fidelity of a jury, bound to exercise their best efforts to detect imposition and to prevent its effects.

From this source we derive an answer to those who inquire how it can be said there is any trifling with the solemnity of an oath, when so few records of convictions can be found. Every man who has had much acquaintance with judicial trials, has seen, in a multitude of cases, direct and positive contradictions, which no ingenuity or good feeling could possibly reconcile. Allowing as much, as the most liberal would require, for mistake, or accident, or opinion, for different position, dissimilar knowledge, imperfect opportunity, and partial examination, no man can doubt that, though an entirely fabricated story may be rare, and the more so because it would be difficult to manage it with address, yet that the intention to deceive, to make erroneous impressions, and to turn the scales of justice by those light weights which are not the less effective for being small, are vastly more common occurrences, than is creditable to the principles and morals of our community. The constant observer is too often pained by the flippancy, the apparent carelessness, and the studied design, with which assertions are made, or facts concealed, by men who pride themselves on their fair fame in the community, and would resent, in every possible mode of indignation, the most distant suspicion that they were not un-deviating devotees to truth.

But the civil sanction, though in strictness of terms it may

be confined to the legal animadversion of the law, on the crime of perjury, is not in our community most operative in that form. There is a more extensive, a more searching, and a higher efficiency in public opinion. The strict obligation of an oath is exacted by public sentiment; and a censorship is thus established, which is more authoritative than the measured sanction of the laws. Whatever power there may be in individuals to escape the penalty of a judicial decision, there is none to escape the merited infamy of false swearing in our intelligent and high-minded community. But it is obvious, that the range of public opinion is also limited. It sways those only, who have character and are known.

The case, too, must be one of some excitement before it awakens the vigilance of the public mind, and must be plain and demonstrable before its penalty would be inflicted. Hence the bar of public opinion is rather the terror of those, who might be otherwise induced to offend, than the place of arraignment for those who have actually transgressed. It is, nevertheless, a most important and useful barrier against the inroads of corruption. It resists the incursions of an enemy, whose progress would make one scene of wild devastation with all our institutions, and take away the possibility of maintaining a republican government. This high moral sense in the body of the people, this detestation, which is felt for the crime and the criminal, should be encouraged and supported and strengthened, that it may supply the deficiency of more positive laws, and prevent occasions for the exercise of what already exist. And it is with the view of putting this sentiment on a surer basis than mere temporary convenience, that we would advert to the higher and more durable and unchanging sanctions derived from the obligation which religion imposes. This, as it is adequate and permanent, so also it never bends to times or occasions, to the state of party or politics, to private speculation or public exigency. It is immutable and imperious.

The religious sanction of an oath is that conviction of personal accountability to God, which is implied in the direct appeal that is made to him in the words of adjuration; 'So help me God.' May God so deal with me, as I deal with the truth.

If the frequency of occasions for the taking of an oath did not diminish the solemn feelings, which such an appeal is cal-

culated to make, it would certainly be considered as one of the most serious and important engagements which a moral and responsible being could be called upon to make. But neither its frequency, nor the comparatively unimportant occasions on which it is required, alter the nature or diminish the force of the act. Its character is not changed; its obligation is not lessened; its weight upon the conscience is the same; and the consequences are the same, whether men choose to consider them or not.

The religious sanction is, however, stronger or weaker, in practice, as men feel with more or less sensibility the weight of this obligation; but the law, which imposes the formality of an oath, supposes that this sensibility exists in a sufficient degree to compel men to the observance of the promise they have made. They certainly, who have no religious feeling, if any such there be, — they who, not speculatively, and for the display of some eccentricity of character, but really are unbelievers in the existence of a Supreme Mind, (if indeed there can be found a rational being who thus debases his faculties,) and they who imagine or persuade themselves that the actions of this life are perfectly immaterial in fixing the condition of the future, pass through an unmeaning ceremony in taking the form of an oath. Such, however, are too few, we trust, to be made account of, in the general regulations of society; and over such, whether few or many, nothing but present personal terror of immediate consequences could have any effect. But in an educated and intelligent community, better sentiments may be supposed to prevail; and over the great majority of our people, surely the religious sanction of an oath may be supposed to be truly felt and duly appreciated. What then, it may be asked, is the cause that it is not universally imperative? How can it be, that although the civil sanction may be evaded, the religious sanction, which can never be evaded, is not completely and universally effectual?

The same questions may be asked, with nearly equal pertinence, in regard to all the moral duties of life, and the same answer may be given in respect to all. The binding obligation is disregarded by carelessness, inconsideration, rashness, insensibility to distant threatenings, and by that expectation of impunity which arises, 'because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily.' The entire Christian world admits the moral obligation of the precepts of the decalogue,

and yet all of them are daily disregarded, in a greater or less degree, in every civil community.

There are circumstances, however, connected with the subject we are considering, which tend, in some respects, to diminish the force of obligation which would otherwise be created by an oath. Among these, we must again advert to their frequency, and the want of a due solemnity in administering them.

The constitutional tendency of the human mind to pass with slight observation the common occurrences of life, needs not to be illustrated. Every day bears witness to the fact; actions seem to become involuntary by habit. Danger even grows familiar; and the siege or the pestilence, which at its commencement struck terror through a community, is, after a little time, and even in the midst of its desolation, regarded almost with apathy by the multitude. No wonder that the same thing occurs in regard to an oath. Men take an oath almost without knowing it. The words pass over their minds without impression. The ceremony becomes a mere form, which hardly engages their attention; and after it is passed, they are left without any strong sense of the condition in which they stand. An oath, indeed, never imposes a new obligation. Its power is only to add a new motive to the performance of an existing obligation, by annexing a new penalty to its violation. Where an obligation is already perfect, it cannot be increased. Now the obligation to speak the truth on grave and solemn occasions, is a perfect one by all the principles of morality. An oath is intended to place the speaker under a strong and imposing sense of this obligation; to awaken his conscience by a solemnity that cannot be evaded; to bring before him the consequences of his conduct, and the force of the rules by which it should be governed. As the confidence to be placed in the speaker, by those who hear, is proportioned to their conviction of the force which he allows to his obligation, the further object of an oath is not only to awaken this sense of obligation in him, but to satisfy others that it is awake, and is active and effectual;—it is to lead them to the certainty that he considers it a serious and solemn thing, and that the form to which he has submitted, the appeal he has made to the Supreme Being, the religious and moral sentiment which is thus recognised, will control his language, and compel the utterance of truth.

Now an oath, if it is so common in its occurrence, so trifling as to its objects, and so simple in its form, that it passes with little or no observation; if, in fact, it fails to rouse the attention of him who takes it, and to satisfy those who are to gain confidence from its power, that it is efficient for its object, is to all intents as no oath to the conscience, and fails of the purposes for which it was designed. Even where an oath may not be treated as a mere nullity, yet, if it fail in such impression on the mind that its force is not realized, not only its proper office for the time is circumscribed, but its power on future occasions is thereby sensibly diminished. This is found to be fact; and to this insensibility, or negligence, or want of suitable excitement, no small part of the disrespect which seems to be paid to an oath, is justly to be attributed, rather than to any deliberate moral delinquency.

We are indulging in no mere theory on this matter. The course of judicial investigation will amply confirm, to a careful observer, the truth of this remark. We do not depend on any trite maxim to prove it; though, being trite, it may be taken by common consent to be true. Every day's practice shows, that when oaths become common things, they are, like other common things, of little estimation. No matter how valuable, or how indispensable, or how serious such common things may be, their power over the mind is weakened even by the very circumstance which ought to increase it.

If there is force in these remarks, they point directly to valuable and practical conclusions. The occasions for administering an oath should be diminished. The act should be more rare, that the observance may be more sacred; and the almost innumerable petty instances in which oaths are now exacted by law, should no longer be tolerated for such purpose.

Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus.

The rule is as true in morals and manners, as in taste. But if there is a propriety, and, as we have endeavoured to show, a strong necessity for curtailing the number of these asseverations required by law, there is a greater need of preventing all such as the law itself does not demand. If judicial oaths should, for the security of the great ends of public justice and pure morals, be limited in their number, extra-judicial oaths, *a fortiori*, ought to be, in a great degree, if not

wholly, restrained. If the solemnity of an oath, by its frequency, even under the eye of the law, loses much of its due reverence, still more will be detracted from its imposing and controlling efficiency, if it may be administered where there is no force of law to restrain the rashness or the folly of the parties who are concerned in it.

We advert to this branch of the subject with no reference to the discussions of the day, but as a necessary corollary from the principles we have stated, and to secure the more general observance of high and solemn duties, which ought not rashly to be assumed. Extra-judicial oaths, more than any others, are liable to be violated. Men of loose principles infringe them without dread of any human power. Men of better principles become their own judges, under what circumstances they may infringe them without guilt; and this high and sacred appeal to the Deity, which on the face of it carries the appearance of resistless obligation, is, as convenience, or inclination, or even worse motives dictate, set at nought in the face of the community, to the great diminution of the public regard to its sanctions, and an evil example to all others upon whom the law has imposed a like formality. An oath, judicial or extra-judicial, taken in a court of justice or a private assembly, before a commissioned magistrate or a private citizen, is a solemn appeal to the Deity, an awful imprecation of his vengeance, a pledge in the face of man of all that religious and moral feeling which forms the cement of civil society. To have this feeling disregarded is offensive to the moral sense of an educated and enlightened people. A man must have a character of the most pure and polished brightness, on whom such a construction of his duty will not leave a stain; and the community in which he dwells, if it does not loathe the baseness of such degeneracy, must be itself less worthy than it would be willing to allow.

But where extra-judicial oaths are permitted, they will be administered on light occasions, or possibly for improper and dangerous objects. Men will afterwards revolt at them, and break them, and avow their act. Some may do this, who, but for such equivocal morality, might stand well with their fellow-citizens. Hence it is, that their good character is put into one scale, and this indescribable conduct in the other, to weigh out the future estimation that is due to them. It is not possible to behold such a state of things without deep regret. It

is not possible to see those, who find themselves in such a situation, earnestly endeavouring to bring others into the same condition, who may have scruples of conscience that should be tenderly treated, without a sorrowful feeling at the consequences that may follow.

It is not possible not to perceive, that the contagion will be communicated beyond the class in which the disease first appeared; and that if an extra-judicial oath may be treated with levity, those which the law ordains, will, with some minds, receive slight regard.

If occasions may arise in which the obligation of an oath should cease, the interest of society demands that they should be as few in number as possible, and under such plain and convincing circumstances as to carry justification on their face. When oaths are not permitted, except by decree of law, such occasions can rarely arise; and the necessity of a breach of them being judicially decided, leaves no stain on private or public character. Bad example would thus be checked, and a most important instrument of civil security be preserved in its proper energy.

There can be no hardship in this. A voluntary association, or a private object, that needs higher security than the honor or the interest of those connected with it, becomes thereby of doubtful utility. Its advantages to individuals or the state must be very great and very apparent, before the state ought to part with a prerogative essential to its security, and chiefly available by being exclusive.

We deem this subject of great importance to the moral character of the community, and to the proper administration of justice; and we think there is demanded, by the force of circumstances, a regard to it, which no local, social, or conventional arrangements ought to obstruct. An amendment is required in the laws of the land to restrain the administering of extra-judicial oaths. We have heard, indeed, and the suggestion came from high authority, that such oaths are already against the law, and that the parties concerned in administering or in taking them are now liable to punishment; but we cannot agree to such a *dictum*. Certainly, there is no statute law that renders the act criminal, and no practice in this country which supports such an opinion at common law. An oath, like any other act, may be indicative of treasonable, seditious, or other unlawful purpose, and thereby

the parties imposing or taking it, be punishable. But the offence would not consist in the oath simply, but the design of which the oath was evidence; and such design, though provable by the fact of the oath, might be punishable where there was no oath, if it could be proved by other evidence. We object not to the purpose for which the oath is taken, but to the ceremony and solemnity itself. It is a sacred and important obligation, not wanted for private purposes of life, but required for the great public duties of the citizen, and materially weakened in its efficacy when too generally used.

An oath is a sanction by which the public are assured of the proper administration of their highest interests; and it cannot be affixed to inferior concerns without diminishing by its commonness the weight of its authority.

The diminution of the number and frequency of oaths would of itself magnify the solemnity of the occasion which still required them; but this should be further increased by a proper regard to the manner in which they are administered.

The form of an oath is no inconsiderable thing. If, as we have before remarked, the obligation to speak the truth is already perfect, an oath can in no case increase the obligation, and its whole use is to bring this obligation strongly, forcibly, and irresistibly to the mind, under a deep sense of the religious and civil responsibility which the duty supposes. An oath is a solemn admonition of this duty. Now, if the form passes over the mind without awakening its attention and sensibilities, or without sufficiently exciting them to the task, it vainly essays to perform its office. It is worse than vain; it wickedly trifles with the name and attributes of Deity.

A suitable occasion, a magistrate, and a set form of words are recognised by our laws as the necessary appendages to an oath. Of the first we have sufficiently expressed our opinion. A magistrate is no otherwise indispensable than to comply with the law. No doubt a solemn oath may be taken by a man's own act, the validity of which is as truly registered in heaven, as if recorded by a human tribunal. But our law wisely requires the intervention of a magistrate, not only because his discretion may properly regulate the time, the place, the occasion, and decide on the competency of the party taking an oath, but because the dignity of an official person and the temporary superiority he possesses are

calculated to produce the effect which has already been suggested, namely, to fix the attention of the party on the nature of the duty he is about to undertake. The form of words, while they should distinctly indicate the obligation, should be pronounced in a manner that is calculated to make a suitable impression. With us there is a further ceremony, that of holding up the right hand. The meaning and origin of this custom are not without uncertainty. It has been said to be a mere acknowledgement of identity, that is, that the person coming to swear, is the same person that is called by name ; thus it would be a branch of the same process, by which a prisoner, arraigned capitally, is required to hold up his right hand as an admission that he is the person intended in the indictment. Another opinion, and we think the better one, is, that it is the appropriate form of invocation, and so intended to mark the appeal which is contained in the conclusion of the declaration, 'So help me God.' A form elsewhere adopted is to lay one hand on the Bible, and afterwards to kiss the book.

It is certain that the essence of the matter is in the asseveration, and not at all in the form ; yet a practical man will not hesitate to conform to the general opinion, notwithstanding that he may wish and endeavour to enlighten it. So great is the influence of form, that men will tell you they do not consider the obligation to be any thing, unless the oath is administered in the manner which their religious tenets require ; and the cases are not few, in which, while the obligation of an oath properly administered is acknowledged to be binding, so that the conscience of the party would not permit him to violate it, yet for the very purpose of speaking an untruth without the guilt of perjury, the true form has been evaded, and a poor evasion made to reconcile falsehood with self-satisfaction. We have known a multitude of cases where persons, to whom an oath was administered without tendering them the Bible to be kissed, have declared that they were not sworn, and might therefore vary a little from the truth for the benefit of a friend. We have been aware that even a Bible, unless it had the symbol of the cross, was not always considered a genuine book, the kiss of which bound the conscience of the party ; and we have heard, and credit the assertion, that persons have pretended to kiss the book, but in fact kissed their own hand only, and felt that this sub-

terfuge prevented their subsequent falsehood 'from laying perjury upon their souls' ! Such acts may be considered the very extravagance of folly, if they are not set down to positive and wilful guilt. But if they occur, if they frequently occur, if they occur with impunity, what is required of those on whom the manners and morals of society depend? 'Teach better principles,' it will be said. But your pupils are either self-willed and cannot learn, or your instructions are counteracted by adverse doctrines. Something must be done.

In the great majority of cases such folly is not supposable. The inattention paid to an oath arises from the want of an imposing ceremony in propounding it. The form of an oath is therefore no inconsiderable thing. Whatever we may think of its importance, we must accommodate ourselves to the condition of those who are around us, and form our rules so as to produce the best effect. It answers no purpose to quarrel with human nature. We must take mankind as we find them ; and until they can be instructed and elevated, we must use the means which are level to their capacity.

An intelligent and conscientious man, called in the course of a public trial to give testimony in a court of justice, and feeling the vast importance to the whole of the concerns of the community, that truth should always be told, and thereby right be done, might well say,

' A cause like this is its own sacrament ;
Truth, justice, reason, love, and liberty,
The eternal links that clasp the world, are in it ;
And he, who breaks their sanction, breaks all law,
And infinite connexion.'

From such a man, oath or no oath, the truth would flow as from a fountain pure and transparent. They who heard his testimony would have that confidence in his veracity, which the weight of his character was calculated to inspire, and might as securely trust his word as his bond. But other men are called to the same task, not perhaps decidedly bad men, but such as have a doubtful character, or one that is not yet known to the jury ; or they are men from whom resistance to truth may be expected, unless their perverse inclination is restrained, and the temptation, that might lead them astray, counteracted by a force which they dare not resist.

One general rule must prevail. There can be no discrimina-

tion, no respect of persons, no departure from common form. The wisdom of the law demands an oath. Let then this same wisdom be cautious, lest by the frequency of its demand it wear off the impression from its seal. Let it be further careful that it does not so hurry the work that the impression be illegible or defaced. Let this duty be considered a solemn thing, and be performed decently and in order.

The administration of justice is of such immense importance to a people, that no means for its security can be neglected without folly bordering on madness. Among our people there is the most perfect confidence, that no man may be despoiled by an edict of mere arbitrary power. Life, liberty, and property, and the dearer jewel, reputation, we hold by the tenure of established laws; and it is not so much our boast that we hold them by this wise and perfect tenure, as our wonder that intelligent beings in any country can consent to put them on any less permanent security. But these laws are to be administered through the agency of men having surely no means of applying them with correctness, but by the information derived from human testimony. There is in this testimony, in its best condition, an inherent imperfection, that often leaves the mind of the most careful and conscientious hearer in a state of painful uncertainty. It is only by the light of truth, by the accurate developement of facts and circumstances, that human judgment can reach the ultimate object which it professes to pursue; and it is obvious, that if it be deluded by false and flickering lights, if it be misled by the artificial and wavering flame which corruption may generate, instead of being guided by the steady star which should direct its course, the wildest and wickedest injustice will be the inevitable penalty. It would be in vain then, to extol our free institutions. Of what consequence is it to an innocent sufferer, whether his ruin be accomplished by the passion of a tyrant or the wilful perjury of a suborned and profligate witness? Of what value is it, that the forms of impartial justice have been carefully observed, and the intention of a magistrate to do right has been steadily manifested, if these forms are perverted and this intention is deceived by a corruption of the very means that are provided for their security? Without a most scrupulous regard to veracity, all the advantages of our institutions over the

government of the most arbitrary despot are but little else than a mockery. Possibly this remark is but a variation of the common maxim, that it is only by the virtue and intelligence of the people that a republic can prosper, but it brings the vagueness of the general sentiment to a definite and distinct point. It should awaken the public feeling. It should rouse the attention and consideration of the community. The public sentiment, which after all, if not the only, is the most efficient sanction of laws and director of manners, should become more sensitive; and the watchmen on the walls of our political fortress should sound an alarm at the most distant movement of a foe, not the less to be regarded because his aim is to sap the foundations instead of assailing the battlements of our freedom.

We do not think there should be a delay of the just expressions of a proper feeling on this subject until specific and particular cases arise, and individual delinquency can be identified. The common course of the law can reach such instances. We have already endeavoured to show that the actual mischief is vastly beyond what the law can grasp; and the effort of the patriot should be directed rather to the prevention of the evil than to its punishment.

If the law against perjury must have exact and positive proof of overt acts, and be certain of the time, the place, and the circumstances, public opinion, dealing with the subject in a wider range, can establish a higher standard of practical morality, may denounce the intention which yet fails in its means of deception, and prevent by its rebuke that practical and injurious discoloration which results from the use of a doubtful phraseology,—that ‘paltering in a double sense,’ which, while it reconciles the speaker to the possible truth of his words, imposes on the hearer a meaning, which he who utters them would not dare decidedly to avow.

Observation should be had of that miserable and degraded class, now happily, by the force of an enlightened public opinion, gradually diminishing, whose intemperate habits cloud their intellect, and render obtuse all moral perceptions.

An habitual drunkard is no fit subject for an oath; and although there might be great difficulty in excluding by law the testimony of such persons, yet what they say, even in their soberest moments, should be received with the most careful allowances.

The habit of intemperance, to a greater or less degree, deprives human character of some of its most valuable properties, not for the time merely, during which the excitement continues, but for all time and under the most favorable subsequent circumstances. To say nothing of that moral obliquity, which is to be expected from the degraded being who voluntarily deprives himself of reason, there is a consequent feebleness of judgment, a sickly and vicious imagination, and an imbecility of accurate recollection, which are painfully perceptible to every one, who is placed in a situation where the testimony of such men is ordinarily adduced; and it is among the most destructive consequences of the vice of which they are guilty, and one, we think, which has not yet been sufficiently regarded, that the poison which has destroyed their own characters is thus thrown off to enter into and contaminate the very aliment of society. It should encourage those, who are concerned in the great work of promoting reformation in this respect, that they are thereby purifying our courts of justice, and thus advancing all those most important interests, which it is the business of society to secure.

The subject assumes a higher character in the eye of the moralist, than even of the patriot. Better, it would seem to him, to abolish all oaths, all form of sacrament, all legalized appeal to the Deity in mere civil concerns, than to multiply occasions for the gross profanation of his name, and accumulate the fearful and debasing crimes which are the consequence. But it is enough to state this, without enlarging upon it. A kind Providence has placed within our reach the remedy for this evil, as well as for others to which we are exposed. We find this remedy in our institutions, in the education of our people, in the diffusion of knowledge, in the care and watchfulness of those who are called to give direction to public feeling and public manners. There is a force in them, which can control the downward tendency of the rash, the inconsiderate, and the deluded. Let us resort to them. Let us do what we may to bring the evil to light, certain that it can flourish only under the covert of darkness, certain that the brightness of knowledge will blast it, certain that when the intellectual and moral faculties of the community are converged upon it, it will wither and decay.

ART. V. — *The History of the Christian Religion and Church during the Three First Centuries.* By Dr. AUGUSTUS NEANDER. Translated from the German, by HENRY JOHN ROSE, B. D. In two volumes. Vol. I. London. 1831. 8vo. pp. xxxii and 392.

NEANDER is regarded by many, as of the highest authority among ecclesiastical historians. We wish that he had fallen into the hands of a better translator. Mr. Rose professes to translate literally, and word for word, when he can; the worst possible mode he could have adopted in regard to the original work, the dark and involved passages of which often appearing, when translated in this way, as little better than confusion worse confounded. In any form, however, this history, though learned and valuable, could hardly become popular as a book for general reading, even with scholars and divines in this country. On the appearance of the second volume we may perhaps go more at length into a discussion of Neander's merits as a historian, the fairness and thoroughness of his investigations, his appreciation of his principal authorities, and the soundness of some of his inferences and reasonings. At present we shall content ourselves with giving a brief analysis of the volume before us, with a few extracts on interesting topics, some of them containing admissions and concessions entitled to more regard on account of the author's known Orthodox predilections.

The Introduction gives a general view of the religious state of the Roman, Grecian, and Jewish world, at the time of the first appearance and early diffusion of Christianity. It is here that the author starts the idea, of which his whole history is little more than the expansion and illustration, that Christianity is 'a leaven,' destined to penetrate, refine, and enoble the whole mass of human nature. He speaks also, and often with great discrimination and power, of a deep want in the human soul of a religion that will accommodate itself to its progressive developements; a want not likely to be long satisfied either with the gross superstitions of the people in Pagan countries, or with the spiritualization of Polytheism attempted by some of the philosophers. Hence, as he observes,

'There were at that time roving about the Roman empire many pretenders to supernatural powers, for whom the existence of such a feeling and desire procured acceptance, men in whom, as is usually the case during such a season of religious excitement, a degree of self-delusion or enthusiasm was mingled with more or less of intentional deceit. Such was that Alexander of Abonoteichos, in Pontus, whose life Lucian has written after his usual satirical manner, a man whose pretended enchantments and predictions found credit all over the world, from Pontus to Rome, one who was honored and consulted as a prophet, even by men who held the highest and most distinguished offices in the Roman state. Among the better men of this sort we must class the Apollonius of Tyana, so celebrated in the apostolic age, who was probably possessed of more extraordinary gifts, and was probably under the influence of the Divine Spirit, although by spiritual pride and vanity he had at least in part destroyed the talent intrusted to him, instead of keeping it pure, and increasing it by faithful and careful use. But it is difficult to judge of this man accurately, from the exceeding paucity of authentic accounts. Those who, like Philostratus, in the third century, have endeavoured to represent him as one of the heroes of the ancient popular religion, have injured him most deeply in the eyes of posterity. He went about to stir up and animate a spirit of religious faith, and furthered fanaticism, while he gave food to that curiosity which inquires after the things of the invisible world. He spoke against superstition, because it served to promote immorality, when men believed that they could buy impunity for crime by sacrifices; and he declared, that without a moral state of the heart and feelings no sacrifice could be well pleasing to the gods. He exclaimed against the cruel custom of shows, of gladiators, for when the Athenians, who were in the habit of exhibiting these shows, invited him to their assembly, he answered that he could not enter a place stained with so much human blood, and that he wondered the goddess did not leave their city. When the president of the Eleusinian mysteries refused to initiate Apollonius of Tyana, it is difficult to determine whether the Hierophant was really in earnest, and thought Apollonius an enchanter, who used forbidden arts, or whether he was not rather jealous of the great influence opposed to priestcraft, which Apollonius exercised on the people, and to such a degree, that many considered intercourse with him of far more consequence than initiation into the mysteries. The concluding formula of all the prayers of Apollonius, which he recommended also to others, who would pray, although opposed to the notions of those who think

the heart of the supplicant of no consequence in prayer, yet shows wherein was his greatest deficiency, a deficiency which might well prove to him the source of most of his self-delusions, I mean the prayer: "*Give me, ye gods, that which I deserve,*" — *Δόλητε μοι τὰ ὀφειλόμενα*: the direct contrary to the prayer, "*Forgive us our debts!*"

'A desire universally displayed itself for a revelation from heaven, which might ensure to the inquiring mind that tranquillity which was neither to be found in the contending systems of ancient philosophy, nor in the antiquated religions, now called back to the world in an age of artificial refinement. Porphyry, that zealous defender of the old religion, himself alludes to this desire, so deeply felt; a desire which, while he supports himself on the authority of the promises of the gods, he endeavoured to satisfy in his collection of old oracular responses, as the groundwork of a system of theology. On this subject he says, "The utility of this work those will best be able to estimate, who, feeling an anxious desire after the truth, have wished that some open vision of the gods might be granted to them, and set them free from their doubts." — pp. 27–29.

He then begins the history of the Christian Religion with an able and full account of its early propagation, of the obstacles which opposed it in its first stages, and of the means, causes, and spirit, with which this opposition was met and overcome. The following is the construction which Neander puts on the testimony of the early Fathers to the continuance of miraculous powers in the church during the first three centuries, especially in regard to exorcisms.

'There were besides, in these times of ferment, when the bonds of spiritual and moral life were torn in sunder, a multitude of persons, sick in body and in mind, who found their inward spirits utterly convulsed — persons who felt themselves seized by a strange power, to which their wills were subjected, and, blindly impelled hither and thither, they were agitated by an anxiety of which they could give no just account. All the powers, therefore, of darkness and destruction, would bestir themselves, where the power of healing godliness ought to enter, and distraction in man's nature, with all its terrible consequences, would naturally there ensue, and rise to the highest pitch, where, in man's nature, the peace of heaven, which brings all things into harmony, ought to be revealed. The unhappy man believed himself possessed by evil spirits, and it was then the usually received opinion, that they were the cause of such convulsions. There were many among the heathen and Jews, who

pretended, through the means of incense, anointings, simples, amulets, and invocations of the evil spirits, in enigmatical and high-sounding forms of words, to be able to exorcise them. Sometimes such means as had a natural efficacy in healing, sometimes such as, through power over the imagination, which has such influence in these cases, cured the patient of his fancy for the moment, or repressed it by promises for the future. In every case these people only did injury, while they strengthened men in their superstition, and in their whole course of ungodly existence; while they fought against the kingdom of lies only by the power of lies, and drove out one evil spirit by another. Their imposture was unable to touch the inward source of evil, which lay deeper, and by which alone any real cure could be effected. Our Saviour said of such cases:—"How shall one go into a strong man's house and rob him of his goods, unless he first bind the strong man, and then rob his house." How much credit such exorcists then obtained, we may judge from the thanks which Marcus Aurelius offers up to the gods, because he had been taught by a philosopher not to trust those tales of miracles and incantations which were related of exorcists. An unhappy man of this kind, after seeking help in vain at the hands of these impostors, comes to a Christian, the Christian considers him possessed, and feels no desire to inquire more precisely into the actual cause of the malady. He knows that his Redeemer had overcome the power of the prince of this world, and that to him all the powers of evil must yield, in what way soever they show themselves. He calls upon him, and on the power of the Holy Spirit which is in him; his prayer which calls down the power of heaven works deeply on the distracted heart of the patient. Inward peace follows the turbulent tide which agitated him before, and conducted by this experience of the influence of Christianity on himself to a belief in it, he becomes now, in every sense, for the first time freed from evil spirits, and healed through the enlightening and healing power of truth so thoroughly and for ever, that the evil spirit returned not to his house, to find it swept and garnished for him.'—pp. 65, 66.

Neander manifests more solicitude, than most ecclesiastical historians, to do justice to the virtues of the heathen Emperors, and even of those who were forward and rigorous in persecuting the Christians; and endeavours to trace these persecutions to their true origin in what was probably accounted at the time, in some instance at least, a wise and just policy. He also shows that these persecutions were often met and

endured, not only by men, but by women and young children, with a heroism and magnanimity to which history presents few parallels ; but to this conduct, he acknowledges, there were frequent and melancholy exceptions.

He goes on in the Second Section to give the history of the formation of the Church, and of church discipline, and church divisions, meaning by church divisions, schisms and not heresies. Under this head he not only denies the Apostolic institution of episcopacy, but even of priests as a distinct cast or profession, having peculiar rights or prerogatives. His words are,

‘The formation of the Christian Church, being derived from the peculiarities of Christianity, must essentially differ from that of all other religious unions. A class of priests, who were to guide all other men under an assumption of their incompetence in religious matters, whose business it was exclusively to provide for the satisfaction of the religious wants of the rest of mankind, and to form a link between them and God, and godly things ; such a class of priests could find no place in Christianity. While the Gospel put away that which separated man from God, by bringing all men into the same communion with God through Christ ; it also removed that partition-wall which separated one man from his fellows, in regard to his more elevated interests. The same High Priest and Mediator for all, by whom all being reconciled and united with God, become themselves a priestly and spiritual race ! One heavenly King, Guide, and Teacher, through whom all are taught from God ! one faith ! one hope ! one Spirit, which must animate all ! one oracle in the hearts of all ! — the voice of the Spirit which proceeds from God ! and all citizens of one heavenly kingdom, with whose heavenly powers they have already been sent forth, as strangers in the world ! When the Apostles introduced the notion of a priest which is found in the Old Testament into Christianity, it was always only with the intention of showing, that no such visible distinct priesthood, as existed in the economy of the Old Testament, could find admittance into that of the New ; that, inasmuch as free access to God and to heaven was once for all opened to the faithful by the one high priest, Christ, they had become, by union with him himself, a holy and spiritual people, and their calling was only this, namely, to consecrate their whole life, as a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the mercy of God’s redemption, and to preach the power and grace of Him, who had called them from the kingdom of darkness into his wonderful light, and their whole life was to be a continued priesthood,

a spiritual serving of God, proceeding from the affections of a faith working by love, and also a continued witness of their Redeemer. Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 9. Rom. xii. 1. and the spirit and connexion of ideas, throughout the whole Epistle to the Hebrews.' — pp. 180–182.

Again he says :

'At the time of Tertullian, who stands on the boundary between two different epochs in the development of the Church, we still find more definite traces of the powerful opposition, which the original Christian feeling of the universal and spiritual priesthood, and of the Christian rights founded thereon, made to the hierarchy, which was establishing itself. In his work on Baptism, which he wrote before his conversion to Montanism, Tertullian, in regard to the use of the general rights of the priesthood by all Christians, declares the true principle by which Divine right and human order should be maintained. "As far as the thing itself is concerned, the laity have the right to administer the sacraments, and to teach in the Churches. The word of God and the sacraments were communicated by God's grace to all Christians, and may therefore be communicated by all Christians, as instruments of God's grace. But the inquiry is here not merely, what is lawful in general, but also, what is convenient under existing circumstances. We must here apply the declaration of St. Paul, 'all things, which are lawful, are not convenient.' With a view, therefore, to the maintenance of that order which is necessary in the Church, the laity should make use of their priestly rights as to the administration of the sacraments only where time and circumstances require it." — pp. 199, 200.

The Third and only remaining Section in this volume is on the Christian Life and Worship ; — the history of Christianity, considered as a sanctifying power. We copy in this connexion the view taken by our author of the moral condition of the world at the first publication of the gospel.

'On the one hand, stood the spirit of polytheism, deifying all the powers of nature, and, under their influence, with fresh and vigorous feelings abandoning itself to all the pleasures which the natural life is capable of deriving from individual objects ; on the other, the dark, proud spirit of pantheism, despising all that is individual, together with all the energies and pleasures which are derived from it, as mere false appearances, as a delusion which carries man away captive, and as a narrow limit which cramps his views — a spirit which only sought by

serious abstract contemplation to unite itself with that one substantive Being, which hides itself under the deceitful guise of these individualities. The first was certainly the prevailing spirit in the Roman and Grecian heathenism; but, nevertheless, as the youthful life of the old world was daily waning away, as every thing grew old and died, the latter spirit constantly gained ground; and besides this, during these times of powerful intellectual excitement, and lively intercourse between the Western world, and the distant East, the theosophic and ascetic spirit of the latter had extended itself also widely over the West. Christianity, on the contrary, universally raised up a new life out of death, and only killed, in order that a nobler life might have power to rise up. As soon as it had brought man to the consciousness, that the source of evil and impurity was not without, that it was not to be sought in nature, or in sense and matter, but in his own inward heart, in sin; that to the impure all things are impure, and to the pure all things are pure; and as soon as it had freed him from this oppressive consciousness of guilt and uncleanness, by faith in the Redeemer, it restored to him the universal range of nature, as a purified and ennobled temple of God, where the redeemed must glorify his God. The fruits of the Spirit, of which St. Paul speaks, are not a dark and haughty moodiness, but love, joy, and friendship. It is joy in the Holy Spirit, to which he appeals so often, as the characteristic of the Christian life.' — pp. 305, 306.

It would give us pleasure, if our limits would permit, to follow Neander in his account of the gradual efficacy of Christianity in changing existing institutions, and of the errors and abuses of a moral nature or tendency, which sprang up and spread themselves in the church. The work, likewise, contains much useful and authentic information respecting the conduct of the early Christians in regard to the laws of the state, in regard to holding civil or military offices, in regard to slavery, in regard to forbidden trades and amusements, in regard to dress and domestic life generally.

Neander rejects altogether the doctrine of the divine institution of the Lord's Day as a Christian Sabbath.

'The laws of the Sabbath, like all the rest of the ceremonial laws of the Jews, could only arise again in Christianity, by being spiritualised and ennobled, inasmuch as every day was now to be sanctified by the dependence of the whole life on God through Christ, on every day, and by the sanctification which the prayers of the heart shed over the whole of a Christian day. Inasmuch

as the Christian every day pursued the calling entrusted to him by God, with godly feelings, preserving his heart in purity from all inward contact with what is ungodly, and seeking constantly to keep holy the name of his Lord in thought, word, and deed — every day was to be a true Sabbath to him. St. Paul expressly declares all sanctifying of certain seasons, as far as men deduced this from the Divine command, to be Jewish and unevangelical, and to be like returning to the slavery of the law, and to captivity to outward precepts. Such was the opinion of the early Church. At first the Churches assembled every day, as for instance, the first Church of Jerusalem, which assembled daily for prayer in common, and for the public consideration of the Divine word, for the common celebration of the Lord's Supper and the agapæ, as well as to maintain the connexion between the common head of the spiritual body of the Church and themselves, and between one another as members of this body. Traces of this are also found in later times, in the daily assembling of the Churches for the purpose of hearing the Scriptures read, and of celebrating the communion. Although, in order to meet the wants of human nature generally, consisting as it does of sense as well as soul, and those of a large body of Christians in particular, who were only in a state of education, and were to be brought up to the ripeness of Christian manhood, men soon selected definite times for religious admonitions, and to consecrate them to a fuller occupation with religious things, as well as to public devotion, with the intention, that the influence of these definite times should animate and sanctify the rest of their lives, and that Christians who withdrew themselves from the distractions of business on these days, and collected their hearts before God in the stillness of solitude, as well as in public devotion, might make these seasons of service to the other parts of their life; — yet this was in itself, and of itself, nothing unevangelic. It was only a dropping down from the purely spiritual point of view, on which even the Christian, as he still carries about two natures in himself, cannot always maintain himself, to the carnal; a dropping down, which became constantly more necessary, the more the fire of the first animation, and the warmth of the first love of the Christians, died away. It was no more unevangelic than the gradual limitation of the exercise of many rights, belonging to the common priesthood of all Christians, to a certain class in the Church, which circumstances rendered necessary. But just as the unevangelic made its appearance, when men supposed the existence of a separate caste of priests in the Church, which stood upon Divine right, when they forgot the common Christian

priesthood in the consideration of this peculiar caste of priests, when they introduced a contrast between secular and spiritual persons among Christians, so also, in this matter, the unevangelic appeared, when men supposed certain days distinguished from others and hallowed by Divine right, when they introduced a distinction between holy and common days into the life of the Christian, and in this distinction forgot his calling to sanctify all days alike. The confusion between the Old and the New Testament notions manifested itself here in the same manner and at the same time, as that which relates to the priesthood.' — pp. 334–336.

Farther on he accounts, as follows, for the introduction of the present practice.

'Opposition to Judaism introduced the particular festival of Sunday very early indeed into the place of the Sabbath; the first trace of this custom is in the Acts xx. 7, where we find the Church assembled together on the first day in the week, and again somewhat later, in Rev. i. 10, where it is hardly possible to understand the day of judgment by the words "the Lord's day." Allusion is also made to the festival of Sunday, as a symbol of a new life, consecrated to the Lord, in opposition to the old Sabbath, in the epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians. "If they who were brought up under the Old Testament have attained to a new hope, and no longer keep Sabbaths holy, but have consecrated their life to the day of the Lord, on which also our life rose up in him, how shall we be able to live without him?" Sunday was distinguished as a day of joy by the circumstances, that men did not fast upon it, and that they prayed standing up and not kneeling, as Christ had raised up fallen man to heaven again through his resurrection. The festival of Sunday, like all other festivals, was always only a human ordinance, and it was far from the intentions of the apostles to establish a Divine command in this respect, far from them and from the early apostolic Church, to transfer the laws of the Sabbath to Sunday. Perhaps at the end of the second century a false application of this kind had begun to take place, for men appear by that time to have considered laboring on Sunday as a sin.' — p. 337.

The first Christians were admitted to the visible church by Baptism. Originally, as Neander concedes, it was administered to all among the Jews, who acknowledged their belief in Jesus as the Messiah, and to all among the heathen, who acknowledged their belief in the one God, and in Jesus the

Messiah. Afterwards a confession of faith was required, including the essentials of Christianity, as held by all churches; but for this purpose, during the first three centuries they never went beyond the Apostles' Creed, as it is called,—a creed, as our readers are aware, which contains not one of the distinguishing doctrines of modern orthodoxy. The following paragraphs on the original mode of baptism, and the introduction of infant baptism, are too remarkable to be omitted or abridged.

'Baptism was originally administered by immersion, and many of the comparisons of St. Paul allude to this form of its administration: the immersion is a symbol of death, of being buried with Christ; the coming forth from the water is a symbol of a resurrection with Christ, and both taken together represent the second birth, the death of the old man and a resurrection to a new life. An exception was made only in the case of sick persons, which was necessary, and they received baptism by sprinkling. Many superstitious persons imagined, from attaching too much importance to externals, that baptism by sprinkling was not valid, and therefore they distinguished those who were so baptized from other Christians, by the means of "clitici." Cyprian expresses himself strongly against this fancy: "The heart of the believer is washed in one way, and the soul of man is purified by the merit of faith in another. In the sacraments of salvation, when necessity compels and God gives permission, the Divine service, though abridged, confers its whole efficacy on the believer. . . . Or if any one supposes that they have obtained nothing because they have only been sprinkled with the water of salvation, let them not be deceived so far as to be baptized again, if they recover their health. But if those, who have already been sanctified by the baptism of the Church, are not to be baptized again, why should their faith be troubled, and the grace of God made a reproach to them. Have they, then, obtained the grace of God, but obtained it with a shorter and a deficient measure of the gift of God and of the Holy Spirit, so that they may be reckoned as Christians, but not placed on the same footing with the rest? Nay, then, the Holy Spirit is not given by measure, but is shed on the believer in its whole fullness. For if the day dawns on all alike, and the sun sheds an equal light on all, how much more does Christ, the true sun and the true day, impart to all in his Church the light of eternal life with impartial equality."

'As faith and baptism are constantly so closely connected together in the New Testament, an opinion was likely to arise,

that, where there could be no faith, there could also be no baptism. It is certain that Christ did not ordain infant baptism; he left indeed much, which was not needful for salvation, to the free developement of the Christian spirit, without here appointing binding laws. We cannot prove that the apostles ordained infant baptism; from those places where the baptism of a whole family is mentioned, as in Acts xvi. 33; 1 Cor. i. 16, we can draw no such conclusion, because the inquiry is still to be made, whether there were any children in these families of such an age, that they were not capable of any intelligent reception of Christianity, for this is the only point on which the case turns. From the deficiency of historical documents of the first half of this period, we must also avow that the want of any positive testimony to the custom cannot be brought as an argument against its antiquity. The first passage which appears expressly to point to this matter, is found in Irenæus. We shall consider the whole of this remarkable passage with some degree of accuracy. Irenæus is endeavouring to show, that Christ did not stop the progress of the developement of human nature, which was to be sanctified by him, but that he sanctified it, in all its successive stages, in conformity to its essential qualities in each: "He came to redeem all by himself; all I say, who are born again into God through him, infants, children, boys, youths, and the old. Therefore he passed through every age, and became an infant to infants, sanctifying infants; he became a child among children, to sanctify those of this age, giving them at the same time an example of piety, of justice, and obedience; and for young men he became a young man, to set them an example, and to sanctify them to the Lord." It is here of consequence to remark particularly, that infants (*infantes*) are expressly distinguished from children (*parvuli*), to whom Christ can serve as an example, and that these infants are represented as being only capable of receiving an objective salvation from Christ, who appeared in an age and condition similar to theirs. This salvation is imparted to them in consideration of their being born again in reference to God, through Christ. In Irenæus the new birth and baptism are intimately connected, and it would be difficult for one to imagine any thing else than baptism as meant by the new birth, when used in reference to this age. Infant baptism also here appears the means by which the principle imparted through Christ to human nature from its very earliest developement, might be appropriated to the salvation of children. We find here the essentially Christian notion, from which infant baptism would derive itself spontaneously, the more Christianity penetrated into domestic

life; namely, that Christ, by means of that Divine life, which he communicated to human nature, and revealed in it, has sanctified that nature from the very first seed of its development. If every thing was as it ought to be, the child born in a Christian family would have this advantage, that he did not first come to Christianity from heathenism, or from a natural life of sin, but that he would grow up, from the first dawning of conscience, under the imperceptible and preventing influence of a sanctifying and ennobling Christianity; with the very first seeds of consciousness in the natural life, a Divine principle, ennobling nature, would be near him, by which the diviner portion of his nature might be attracted and strengthened, before its ungodliness could come into full activity; and this latter evil spirit would here find itself overmatched by its counterpoise. In such a life the new birth would form no division, that began at any one particular moment, but it would begin imperceptibly, and so continue its progress through the whole life. Therefore the visible token of the new birth, that is, baptism, was to be given to the child from its earliest hours, and he was to be consecrated to his Saviour from the very first.' — pp. 359–361.

Neander closes his account of the controversy respecting the Baptism of Heretics by an illustration taken from real life.

'Dionysius of Alexandria relates a remarkable case, which touches on these points: There was a converted heretic in the Alexandrian Church, who for many years had lived as a member of the Church, and had taken part in the worship of God in the Church. Having attended the baptism of some of the catechumens, he remembered that the baptism which he had received in the sect (probably a Gnostic sect) from which he had been converted, was entirely unlike that which he then witnessed. Had he known that he, who has Christ in faith, has every thing which is needful for his advantage and his salvation, this would not have given him so much uneasiness. But as this was not clear to him, he doubted whether he could look upon himself as a real Christian, and he fell into a state of great anxiety and disquietude, because he thought that he was without true baptism, and without the grace of baptism. He fell down at the feet of the bishop in tears, and prayed him to give him baptism. The bishop sought to tranquillize him, and told him that he could not now first be baptized afresh, after he had so long been a partaker in the body and blood of our Lord. He told him that his having lived so long in the communion of the Church

ought to satisfy him, and that he should come with a steadfast faith and a good conscience to the holy supper of the Lord. But the wretched man was unable to overcome his scruples and his unhappiness. Here was an instance of the unhappy effects of holding too fast by outward things, and of the mischief which arises when men know not how to raise themselves with proper freedom to the things of the Spirit, which the inward man embraces through faith.' — pp. 377, 378.

We have room for but one extract on the institution and early history of the Lord's Supper. After speaking of the gradual introduction of the idea of a sacrifice in the celebration of this ordinance, Neander observes,

'The usual sort of bread, which was brought by the members of the Church, was used for the Supper of the Lord. Justin Martyr calls it expressly, "common bread," (*κοινος αβρος*); those who went on the supposition that Christ celebrated the festival of the Passover a day earlier than usual, had no reason at all to use any thing but the common sort of bread in the celebration of the Lord's Supper; and even those who were of a different opinion, did not think the use of unleavened bread an essential part of the performance of this rite. We find, however, one exception in the case of some Judaizing Christians,* which arose from the very nature of the case; for as they kept a festival once a year at the Passover, in commemoration of that Last Supper of our Lord, it naturally happened that, as Christians who were continuing in the observance of the Jewish ceremonial law, they would eat unleavened bread. As, among the ancients, and especially in the East, it was not customary to drink pure wine, unmixed with water, at meal times, it was hence supposed that Christ also used wine mixed with water. The taste for higher and mysterious meanings, however, did not content itself with the simple, but apparently too trivial, explanation of this custom, which had become general. The mixture of the water and the wine, was to represent the union of the Church with Christ.

'Originally, the general celebration of the Supper of the Lord, united with the celebration of the love-feast, was a mark of daily Christian communion. When these daily assemblies could no longer take place, the Supper of the Lord became an essential part of the Sunday worship, as it appears in Justin Martyr, and

* Epiphanius (*Hæres.* xxx. § 16.) says of the Ebionites of his time, that they celebrated the Communion once a year with unleavened bread and water. (The latter was because their ascetic habits would not allow of the use of wine.)

the whole congregation took part in the communion, as they had responded to the preceding prayer by their Amen. The deacons brought the bread and wine to each of the assembly in order. It was held necessary that all the Christians resident in the town should constantly continue in union with the Lord and with his Church, by partaking of this communion; and the deacons, therefore, carried a portion of the consecrated bread and wine to the strangers, the sick, or the prisoners, who were prevented from attending the congregation."—pp. 386, 387.

The work, from which these extracts are taken, as our readers will perceive, is one of no ordinary merit. Without feeling ourselves obliged or inclined to concur in all the author's statements, much less to adopt all his inferences and conclusions, we are impressed with, and it gives us pleasure to acknowledge, his profound learning, his patient and thorough investigations, and his deep and serious, though somewhat mystical, philosophy. This volume appeared in England last August, with an intimation in the Advertisement that the second, containing a history of the Christian doctrines and heresies, might be expected about the end of the year.

ART. VI. — *The Bravo: a Tale.* By the Author of 'The Spy,' 'The Red Rover,' 'The Water Witch,' &c. In 2 Vols. Philadelphia. Cary & Lea. 12mo.

WE are not among Mr. Cooper's ardent admirers, but we are very willing to be among those who admit him to be a very powerful writer in the department of modern, common-sense fiction. He has taken good lessons from the illustrious founder of the modern school of novelists; but it is a great misfortune for his fame that he should be compared with Scott, or ever be called, as some of his admirers would have him, 'the Scott of America.' The grandeur of the title is too much for our countryman to bear off with credit to himself, and, we must charitably believe, is as distasteful to him, as it is to his best friends.

Mr. Cooper's *forte* lies in scenes and situations of a certain description; the whole 'walk of fiction,' the whole breadth of human feeling and action, is not opened to him. A boat-

race, as in the novel before us ; a battle ; an Indian ambush or pursuit upon an Indian trail ; a prairie on fire ; a sea-fight, or a chase at sea ; any perilous and agitating situation, in fine, he describes powerfully. He interests us in 'hair-breadth 'scapes,' beyond any other writer. His genius stands in no need of supernatural terrors, for he is able to work up ordinary perils into very fearful and agitating exigences. We must allow too, that he has a strong feeling of the beauty of nature. There are descriptions of Venice in his last work, which are exceedingly graphic, and overspread with the richest haze of fancy. But in all the finer discriminations of life, manners, character, sensibility, and especially of female sensibility, he fails, almost as signally, as he succeeds in the more palpably exciting and stirring scenes of his novels. We know of no books more fitted to make up a volume of extracts, whether for the credit of the author, or the success of the publisher. We could not, indeed, call them '*elegant extracts*,' 'the *beauties* of Cooper.' But we would call them 'the *chefs-d'œuvre* of Cooper,' and we are willing to say, by way of set-off to our general lukewarmness, that in our opinion there are not more than three or four novelists of the present age, whose writings could furnish passages of equal power.

We should not like to say, indicative of equal genius. There is expressed by that word, to our apprehension, a fullness of perfection a moral as well as intellectual grandeur, a beauty of mind, an instinctive sympathy with all that is beautiful, lovely, and glorious, a tenderness as well as intensity of feeling, a penetrating insight into the fairest forms and divinest proportions of things, a power, at once, to soar to 'the highest heaven of invention,' and to sound the profoundest depths of the human heart, a soul thrilling to all the grandest harmonies and slightest tones of nature and of life, which we cannot ascribe to Mr. Cooper. And we say this, not because we feel any ill-will to Mr. Cooper, but because, to our humble apprehension of the matter, this word, *genius*, and some others of kindred import, are lavished among us with a freedom that degrades them, and makes the 'prize of their high calling' altogether too low an object. That Dedication of Mr. Cooper's to his publisher, almost at the outset of his career, seemed to us, at the time, a bad augury, and we have not

been much disappointed since. He tells his publisher, in substance, that provided the amount in his ledger stands fair, he does not care for the critics. That is to say, if the books sell well, he is satisfied. But is this enough to satisfy a man of genius? If these pages should chance to meet the eye of our far-famed countryman, it is very likely he will call to mind the proverb about the prophet's fate 'in his own country,' and will think of England and France and Germany! But we suspect that the reception of his works abroad is owing, in the first place, full as much to astonishment, as to admiration, and yet more, in the next place, to the novelty of the scenes that are drawn in them.

For the vigor of imagination which Mr. Cooper displays, there is a want of versatility and invention, which, we must confess, often, as we read on, puts us sadly out of temper. The same epithets descriptive of person or manner answer for the same individual throughout, and sometimes for the whole *dramatis personæ*. Thus, in the work before us, the Carmelite's features are always 'mortified features,' and he is always sending out 'uneasy looks' from beneath his cowl. The 'Bravo' never appears, but we are told that his face is very 'pale,' and his strong emotions are constantly indicated by 'hard breathing.' And whoever looks a little askance, is sure to cast 'furtive glances' around. They cannot be sinister looks, or stealthy glances, but always 'furtive glances.' It is singular that Mr. Cooper should select such vague phrases and descriptions for his favorite ones. He is a powerful writer in his way, and, what he cares more for, he is a popular writer; but that he should be regarded, at home or abroad, as satisfying the taste or obtaining the unqualified admiration of all among us, is what we would be at some pains to prevent, and to this end we have entered our humble protest.

Having done so, desiring our readers to take note, from this brief criticism, that we do not always make our office a sinecure, we shall proceed to offer some remarks on a subject, which seems to us one of great and increasing importance.

The present, beyond all former times, deserves to be called the age of reading. And yet we suppose there never was so much reading, which so little answered the great purpose of reading, as that which is now occupying the leisure hours of mil-

lions in the civilized world. We say of millions, and indeed the time employed in this way has become so great, the business of reading has become so vast a business, that, like other great employments, it deserves to attract the attention of the moralist. And truly we know not why there should be a recognised duty in regard to the use of property and the government of the senses, and not a recognised duty in relation to the employment of time and the direction of the thoughts; why waste and dissipation are to be regarded as trifling evils or venial errors, because they touch, not our incomes or estates, but the inherent interests, the very talents and treasures of the mind.

Nay, there is given to every human being a mind; there is given to him this brightest treasure of existence, with the express design that he should improve it. The gift possesses its most essential distinction in the capability of being improved; it may be every thing with improvement, and can be nothing without it; so that he who neglects to cultivate his mind, can scarcely be said to receive it; he is scarcely less than guilty of the folly and ingratitude of rejecting the proffered gift; and that too, be it said with reverence, the highest gift in the hand of Heaven to bestow. It is, therefore, the first and most imperative duty of every human being, it is a duty like that of self-preservation, to cultivate his mind, his whole rational and moral nature. We say not, by reading necessarily; there is not always leisure nor education for this; but by all the means that are given, by all the discipline of life, by all the tasks that are set for our sense and virtue. Yet, we none the less say, to those who have the requisite leisure and ability — by reading.

Let us be pardoned if we shall seem to be preaching, and especially from such a text as that which we have placed at the head of this article. The truth is that nothing tends to awaken a feeling of seriousness more than extreme frivolity; and, it is upon this principle, that from the publication of one of the most popular novels of the day, we have taken our hint to say some grave things about reading.

It is a signal and unprecedented privilege which thousands and millions in the world now enjoy, to spend some hours of every day or week in reading. The education of the mass, even of one people, so limited an education, indeed, as that which gives them the bare ability to read, con-

stitutes a new era in the history of mankind. Ignorance, to say nothing of the rarity and costliness of books, has, in former times, cut off the multitude from this great privilege. The heavy and dull hours came to them as to us, the unoccupied intervals between business and recreation laid a burthen of languor upon the spirits then as now, leisure pressed harder than toil, upon the craving and active mind; but to take from the shelf that silent and never-offending companion, a book, to spell out wisdom and interpret wit from the once mystic characters inscribed upon its manifold page, to charm away the hours of the winter's evening or of the summer's noontide by listening to the words of science and genius, — this is a resource, which was unknown, unless we speak of the learned few, to the Hindoo and the Arabian, to the Greek and the Roman, and to millions of later times.

It was in their condition a feature of great discouragement; and so it is still, in the condition of many nations; and so it is habitually regarded and represented by those who look with distrust upon the chances of any great and popular improvement in the world. 'What is the prospect,' say they, 'that the mass of mankind, poor and ignorant, ground down under the weight of toil, and pressed for a livelihood to the uttermost exertion of their faculties, will ever rise to the dignity of knowledge and freedom, and to the happiness of a highly improved social condition?' It is for a people like ourselves, to whom such a discouraging description does not apply, whose citizens are all educated in the rudiments of learning, whose laborers are not yet turned into machines, and we trust never will be, whose men of business have, multitudes of them, leisure for some mental improvement, whose daughters, the mothers of a coming generation, are, multitudes of them, well educated, and have still greater leisure to profit by it, — it is for such a nation, where the poor read, and in almost the humblest of whose dwellings may be seen the annually increasing little collection of books, to remove some portion of this long abiding discouragement from the doubtful fortunes of the world — to show that men can improve, that human nature can rise, by opportunities such as ours.

We must be allowed to say, with these views, that the subject on which we are commenting, — that of reading wisely and profitably, — rises into great importance. And we ask

therefore with corresponding interest, to what account are the reading habits of our people turned?

Now to this question we are about to give a strong answer, because we feel strongly; and if our language shall appear too strong, we trust that something will be forgiven to the strength of the feeling. But the truth is, in our apprehension, that the common reading, the popular reading, almost the whole reading, — when you go beyond newspapers and pamphlets, — almost the whole book-reading of this country, that which is pursued by multitudes at least as serious business, is novel-reading. This, if not literally, is virtually true. Four fifths of the books, which are perused by the generality of readers, are literally novels. But what is not literal novel-reading, is very like it, and answers little better purpose; it is reading, not for improvement, but for entertainment, and for entertainment of the lowest kind, that of the moment, that of the fancy or curiosity. The children's reading is all virtually novel-reading, and cannot perhaps be much else. That of multitudes of young ladies and easy gentlemen goes scarcely beyond the child's task. And as for professional men and *soi-disant* scholars, what many of *them* do — tell it not in Germany! publish it not among the *savans* of Paris! At any rate, thousands of minds of considerable cultivation, thousands and ten thousands of men and women very well educated, nay, (for we must make a case of it,) the vast majority of readers in the country spend almost all their reading hours, if not in literally reading novels, — that we suspect is, with many, not far from the truth after all, — yet in reading without any plan or project, or thought or imagination, of self-improvement. This may seem to be a slight evil, and not deserving of such serious notice among so many evils that are greater; and yet we have a sort of odd and uncomfortable morality about us, that will not allow us to think this either right, or reasonable, or wise, or worthy of rational beings. We cannot rid ourselves of the impression, that beings, who are endowed with a mind, have something to do with it, besides letting it run to waste, or merely providing for its amusement. Other things they are desirous to improve, — their estates, for instance, and the methods of acquiring property, their manufactures, their modes of tillage, their ships, their houses; yes, they have plans and projects for improving these; it is not enough to be amused with them; it

will not do to be entertained with bargains, or to make sport of merchandise ; — but to improve that mind, in which are centered and summed up the whole value, interest, dignity, happiness, and design of our existence ; to add, with sedulous care, to that inward wealth, is a project which, so far from being considered as a duty, is held to be too visionary and Utopian to discuss, even as a matter of speculation.

In complaining of the reading of the day, as, to a great extent, novel-reading, we do not intend to speak disrespectfully of that great department of fictitious writing, which, of late years, is so abundantly supplying the public demand. It is the vehicle of much pure morality and of much exalted and refined sentiment, though it is sometimes (yet how much less frequently than in former days ?) perverted to other purposes. It is the field which modern genius has chosen for many of its most splendid efforts ; and fair honors have been won in it, by competitors of our own country.

Nor do we object to the *perusal* of these writings, in its proper place and measure. Those who do, may be reminded that almost the entire mass of poetry is fictitious writing ; that 'The Pilgrim's Progress' is nothing but a novel ; that the very parables of Holy Writ are relations, not of real events, but of circumstances, imagined and arbitrarily adopted to convey moral truth. It is not the fictitious character of any composition, then, that is to set upon it the mark of exclusion ; but the moral character, or the effect upon the mind, must be the test. On these points, it will be easily seen, we are sufficiently disposed to be strict ; but to proscribe a whole class of writings, for the faults of some, or the faulty manner of reading others, is the part neither of sense nor of piety.

Neither do we object to the reasonable desire or pursuit of mere entertainment in reading. Let that be an object as far as it deserves to be, and as far as circumstances warrant. There are times of languor or weariness either of the body or of the mind, or of both, when there is scarcely ability for any thing but to be entertained. There are times when the mind must resign itself to amusement, or to stupor and sleep. Reading is then to be regarded as a recreation, and to be indulged in for the same purposes, and under the same regulations, as any other recreation.

But the principle which we contend for, having made these qualifications, is this ; that reading, as a general pursuit, should

have some object beyond mere recreation, beyond mere entertainment; that it should have, for its distinct and leading object, the improvement of the mind. To become wiser and more intelligent beings; to know more and more of all that our Creator has given us the power to know, of nature, of the mind, of the eternal principles of truth and virtue; to add continually to the stock of just and valuable ideas, and to the power of just reasoning upon them; to cultivate all our faculties, throughout the whole of life, as if it were a school to fit us for a nobler action and a higher advancement in some loftier sphere, — this should be the object. And to accomplish this, there should be a settled and serious design, we believe, if not a definite plan. A definite plan, indeed, a course of studies for this purpose, is what many have ability and opportunity to mark out and pursue. But all may entertain a settled design of this nature, which would prevent them from giving up their minds to waste, or indolence, or mere amusement.

We presume that we lay down the law of all intellectual, and, also, of all moral improvement, when we say, that to this end the powers of our nature must be tasked; more than amused, more than employed, that they must be tasked. The heart, in this progress, must overcome temptations; the mind must overcome difficulties. To do what we did yesterday is only to confirm ourselves in the position then taken. To advance, we must do more than we did yesterday. The first process, the process of repetition, is doubtless important. It strengthens habit; it fixes the acquisitions of knowledge and the perceptions of truth. But to recall the same ideas, or to repeat the same efforts for ever, would not be to advance. One may *read* for ever, and if his mind passively resigns itself to the same entertainment, or mechanically runs the round of the same ideas, he will be growing none the wiser, nor stronger; he will be, for all his reading, as really stationary, as if he had slept through the years or the ages. There must be a grappling with new thoughts, and new forms of thought, in order to become intellectual and to grow strong in intellect. There must be something studied; something searched out, that is not at first obvious; something investigated, that will task the powers of reasoning; something, on which the mind will feel that it must pause and concentrate its utmost efforts. Labor like this must come in among

lighter employments of the mind, or we would not give much for any man's reading. We would not give much for it, that is, as a means of mental progress. It may answer other purposes, but these we are not considering. The question before us is, How shall the mind be strengthened and improved? And we know of nothing that will answer this end, but action, strong action; action, not passion; and there is a great difference. There may be a passion of feeling about a book, and yet no action of mind whatever.

We have sometimes had this question, How shall we improve? put to us by the young; and none could be more interesting or put in more interesting circumstances, having reference, as it often has, both to mental and moral progress, and that too, on the very threshold of its great career. We have given the best answer we are able to give; — 'You must make effort. You must resolutely address your heart to the task and trial of virtue. It is no well-devised scheme of moral discipline, well as it may be in its place, it is no institution nor book, it is no moralist nor preacher, that will save you; it is yourself, with God's help, that must save you. The discipline, the book, the preacher, may arouse and guide, but the *work* you must do yourself.' And for mental culture, of which it is our special business, at present, to treat, we say, you must set the mind to work. And we repeat this answer, for the sake of adding, that neither the subjects nor the books for this purpose are wanting. The philosophy of mind, of morals, of government, of trade; the mathematics, the natural sciences, some or other of these subjects will furnish tasks, and there are books in all these departments, which are generally accessible. The rage for publishing 'Libraries,' as they are called, is putting every thing in our way. Nobody, who reads at all, can fail to find something upon which to try the powers of his mind. This, then, is the point we urge. } Read something every now and then, we say, that will task you. } We will not venture to recommend books, for reviewers cannot help showing a little modesty sometimes, though they are apt to get not much credit for it; but we will venture to say, } 'Read something, any thing, that will put your mind to an effort and stretch to follow it out.'

We may be thought singular in recommending such a course to general readers, and to young readers, but we do it

most advisedly and seriously. We believe that the immense reading of the day does not yield half the results it might, for the want of a settled purpose of self-improvement; and we see no way in which this improvement is to be gained, but by some voluntary efforts at thinking; and it does not appear to us that even the reading of history, much less that of voyages and travels, is likely to awaken this effort. But to sink still further below the point of intellectual activity, to throw one's self into the current of an all-absorbing tale, to be borne in dreary listlessness or with hurrying speed upon its bosom, to make no other intellectual excursions than these, and to make these from day to day, or from week to week, never a whit wiser at the end than at the beginning, never making any progress of thought, never the more prepared either for this world or another, — this is a folly and sin, against which we think it is time loudly to protest. It is but one step from that absorption in card-playing and other games, which occupied so many hours in the social and domestic circles of the last century. The objection to excess in all these cases is the same; it is, that time and talents are wasted, — not merely taken up with recreation, when recreation is fit, — but wasted, when they might be devoted to nobler ends.

It is for the young, to whom we have already had reference, that we most feel the importance of this subject. We feel it as parents, and we cannot help regarding it as eminently deserving of the attention of all parents. Much is said, at this day, about the great advantages that are enjoyed for education; and nothing is more frequently pointed to in proof of this, than the children's book-shelves. Now we confess that we look upon this multiplication of books, or, to speak more accurately, upon the use which is made of them, with more distrust and doubt than upon any other department of early discipline. Discipline — did we say? These books are the very foes of discipline. They are the most of them novels, and nothing else but novels. The reading of them, as we have already said, is novel-reading. And there are as jaded, and almost as listless novel-readers in the ten thousand nurseries of the land, as there are stretched upon the parlour couches, — not to say, in the study easy-chairs. Children too much indulged in this way, — and that may happen long enough before the parent is aware of it, — acquire an

almost inveterate hostility to all severe application of mind. There are thousands of such, who need to be put, without delay, upon a dispensation of hard study, to save them from utter ruin. Alas! for those, whose parents, instead of offering any counteraction to this mighty power of the press, resolve that their children shall have nothing but a lot of ease and gratification, that they shall be urged with no tasks, that they shall be lead in none but inviting and flowery paths, to the heights of knowledge and power. It is all mistake; and utter mistake. There are no steps to those heights, but rugged steps. There is no way of intellectual advancement, but the way of strenuous effort and patient toil.

The subject has wider bearings. It concerns the national character, that a healthful and manly taste be cultivated. It concerns the national literature. Authors write to be read; and if nothing will be read but what is easy and amusing, or if the prevailing and craving demand is for that species of composition, if profound disquisitions of learning stand but a poor chance with the people, if all science must be brought within the compass of 'Libraries of Entertaining Knowledge,' if the deeper meditations of genius must give place to the light and flashy productions of extemporaneous wit and fancy, it is not difficult to predict the result. We shall have a light and trifling literature. We shall have the songs of the Troubadours back upon us. We shall hear again that flagitious reasoning, as abandoned in morals as in taste, that talks of soft and voluptuous forms and features, from which severe intellect is banished, as the forms and features of beauty. We shall hear of that light and graceful drapery wherewith imagination clothes its creations, and which cannot bear the eye of reason. We shall become excessively afraid of good sense, and account that dull, which is, if it can be understood, the grand and predominant quality of real genius. Heaven avert the plague from our young and rising literature!

The truth is, that the same law obtains in the cultivation of the mind that governs all other success, — the law of labor. Woe to the young man who thinks to rise to the heights of intellectual power by any easy flight! All the noblest efforts of the mind are intense, laborious, patient efforts. All real genius, all true originality, all lofty poetry, all powerful writing and speaking consist in these, and in nothing else. And the young man, — the professional man, let us say, in

particular, — who spends much of his time in reading Reviews and Romances, and abhors every severe task, though he may be a clever or a respectable man, can never be much more, be his talents what they may.

The rule we have proposed, as one that ought to govern the hours of reading, may be unusual, and may be thought, we are aware, too strict for general application. It may need, therefore, to be defended; and we wish to say a word or two, to objections that may be easily anticipated. Some will think that they are too ignorant, ill-educated, or ordinary; others, that they are too old, to take up the business of improving their minds.

Our answer shall be brief. We ask such objectors if they expect to remain for ever ignorant and ordinary. Nay, we ask then if it is their expectation at all, to live for ever. It is striking to observe how little the great doctrine of immortality has yet entered into most of the practical calculations of this life; how little that sublime truth has yet penetrated into the mass of our actual and governing sentiments and principles. A man says, 'I am ignorant, and cannot learn; I am ill-educated, and have no intellectual habits, and cannot form any; I am ordinary, and cannot improve:' and he who says this, stands upon the threshold of an immortal progress, and may hope to surpass all that angels now are, in the career of improvement. From the opening vision of eternity, that invites him to its high and ever-rising seats of knowledge, he sinks down into supineness and despondency. And why? Because he knows so little now. Strange argument, in itself considered! as if a man should say, 'I am poor, therefore I will not try to better my condition; I am degraded in reputation, therefore I will not attempt to rise; I am miserable, therefore I will not strive to be happy.' But yet stranger is the argument, with the lights of eternity shining upon our path; and worse than strange, it is inadmissible, it is fatal to *all* progress, since so long as there are different degrees of knowledge in the creation, all, that are not at the highest point, may, by the same reasoning, give up in despair. It has been said, that a well-educated school-boy of this day knows more on many subjects, than did Socrates or Cicero. And shall men, — men, who stand on such vantage-ground, conclude that they never can advance? And how are they ever to advance, but by taking, at some time or other, the first step?

If they expected to live some thousands of years on earth, and felt that, without improvement, without being provided with intellectual resources, their minds must pine and perish, would they not consent to begin? But why should they expect any easier rule, because the progress of their being is to lead them to another world?

But there is another sort of objection. 'I am too old to learn. Whatever I might have been, if I had been thoroughly educated, or if I had improved my opportunities, I am too old to change my course now; the time has gone by with me.' And this is often said by one whose years do not number more than forty or fifty. What a strange misconception, we must say again,—what a strange misconception is this for beings with the hope of immortality to bear their thoughts onward! The infinite ages are before us; we have lived fifty or seventy years, and we say, that we are too old to take up the task of self-improvement; that the time is gone by for entering upon that work, for which life and being and immortality are given.

Christianity, if we believe in it, will teach us new views both of time and eternity, both of the mind and of our duty to it. The gift of such faculties as ours will seem vast, and will awaken the most solemn consideration of the means for their improvement. We shall not care for the improvement of any thing more than of this inward and wonderful being. We shall consult it, as a being travelling to eternity, and ask of it as some enshrined and mysterious oracle, how its demands are to be met, its wants satisfied, and its destinies fulfilled. Life will be clothed with fresh and never-dying interest. Its prospect will not be that of leading us through dull years, through tasks rendered wearisome by repetition, through pleasures rendered irksome by familiarity. Its very age will be youthful; the youth of an everlasting life. Its very last hour will be an hour to be improved as connected with endless ages.

Such, then, in the Christian estimate, will be the mind, and such the duty of its improvement; and the hour, whenever it comes, that may be devoted to this end, will not be the sport of every idle vanity, but will be held sacred, as if it were a Sabbath hour,—sacred to the soul, sacred to eternity!

ART. VII. — *The American Common-Place Book of Poetry; with occasional Notes.* By GEORGE B. CHEEVER. Boston. Carter, Hendee, & Babcock. 1831. 12mo. pp. 405.

THE literary rank of a collector of pieces of poetry or prose written by other people, is not very high in the general estimation, because his office is thought to require no talent, and but a very ordinary kind of labor. It appears to us, that this is taking an unfair and superficial view of the matter. We do not contend that it needs high genius to cull elegant extracts and compile a common-place book, but we do assert that not only industry, but good taste, poetic feeling, and a considerable knowledge of books are all necessary in the getting together of a collection of poetry or prose, which shall be worth reading or keeping. The business is quite a different one from that of raking hay. It is not only collection, but selection; and for selection higher qualities are demanded than those of a day-laborer.

These higher qualities, which all such collectors of literature should have, but of which too many have proved themselves destitute, are those which go to form the faculty of discrimination. The collector of a common-place book of poetry, for instance, should have a susceptibility to what is truly beautiful, sublime, and affecting in poetry, that he may be able to discriminate between compositions which possess these characters, and those which only counterfeit them, offering tinsel and gaudiness for beauty, bombast for sublimity, and mawkishness for pathos. He should have an ear for the music of poetry, that he may be able to discriminate between the rugged and the smooth, the harsh and the grateful. He should moreover have a mind as well as an ear, that he may be able to discriminate between that poetry which is merely a pleasant sound, and that which combines sound with sense. He must have all these qualities, or his work will be a wretched patchwork, with good pieces in it here and there, by chance, and because he could not well help finding them among the mass, but with bad and flimsy pieces every where. There is one requisite more which the collector must have, if he intends his work for the eyes of moral and Christian people, — he must have a true and deep respect for religion, or at least for virtue and moral purity, so that he will from

principle avoid the introduction of any tainted composition, however it may be recommended by the venal graces of poetry. The man who will put into a book, which from its character is a family and social book, any thing to offend the serious, or cause modesty to hold its tongue and hide its head, is not so much a subject for criticism, as for the House of Correction.

The 'American Common-Place Book of Poetry' amply denotes that its editor possesses the best qualifications for such a work. We know of no collection of the kind, which seems to us so good, and so well adapted to answer its end. It is made with taste, with judgment, and with religious feeling. It will not only amuse, but edify the leisure hour. It is, besides, a fair representative, and even epitome, of American poetry; for what is the whole body of American poetry but a great common-place book? There is not a poem, worthy of the name, in the whole compass and extent of it. It consists altogether of scraps, — many of them, to be sure, exquisite scraps, — and all our poets, living and dead, however beautifully some of them have written, are only scrap-writers, after all. We say not so in disparagement of them, but merely to state the fact.

Mr. Cheever has fallen into one or two mistakes with regard to the origin of his specimens. This was to have been expected. A great deal of pretty poetry appears only in our newspapers, the editors of which seldom give themselves the trouble of telling us where it comes from, even if they know. A collector of American poetry is thus led into frequent danger of transferring a piece from the corner of a newspaper, as *American*, which had been copied by the editor from some English paper or magazine, in the usual slovenly manner, without note or acknowledgment of any kind. Deceived in this way, probably, Mr. Cheever has given us Charlotte Smith's 'Sonnet to the Moon.' He took it from the 'Massachusetts Spy.' And the way in which it got into the *Spy* we believe to be as follows. The well known Mr. Isaiah Thomas of Worcester printed an edition, many years ago, of Miss Smith's Sonnets. He was also the editor of the *Spy*. It was very natural, therefore, that while the Sonnets were going through the press, he should now and then slide one of them into his *Poet's Corner*, to save trouble, and give his readers a taste of the forthcoming book. We

are surprised, notwithstanding, that Mr. Cheever should not have recognised this familiar sonnet, and we suspect he is surprised himself, for he must have been acquainted with it. Well do we remember that 'Queen of the silver bow!' and how very fine we used to think it; and well do we remember the copperplate engraving which stood opposite to the sonnet in that identical edition, representing a young lady in a sentimental attitude, gazing with all her eyes on an exceedingly bright moon.

The lines entitled 'The Two Homes' sound to us very much like Mrs. Hemans. We will not be positive, however, that they are hers.

We cannot agree with Mr. Cheever in all the estimates which he forms of the comparative merits of our poets. We cannot place Mr. Dana at the head of them, though we should place him high. We cannot go along with him entirely in his admiration of Mr. Carlos Wilcox. We confess that we never saw his name before; but that has nothing to do with the question of his merits. If his life had been spared, he probably would have grown into a poet, for he had the elements of one. Mr. Cheever seems to have been misled in his judgment of him, by a feeling resembling the ardor of a discoverer. We agree that the images in the following lines 'make up a picture,' not indeed '*inimitably* beautiful,' but 'beautiful, and true to nature'; but such lines never could or ought to have been popular, they are so deficient in smoothness, harmony, and ease.

'A sultry noon, not in the summer's prime,
When all is fresh with life, and youth, and bloom,
But near its close, when vegetation stops,
And fruits mature stand ripening in the sun,
Soothes and enervates with its thousand charms,
Its images of silence and of rest,
The melancholy mind. The fields are still;
The husbandman has gone to his repast,
And, that partaken, on the coolest side
Of his abode reclines, in sweet repose.
Deep in the shaded stream the cattle stand,
The flocks beside the fence, with heads all prone,
And panting quick. The fields, for harvest ripe,
No breezes bend in smooth and graceful waves,
While with their motion, dim and bright by turns,
The sunshine seems to move; nor e'en a breath

Brushes along the surface with a shade
 Fleeting and thin, like that of flying smoke.
 The slender stalks their heavy bended heads
 Support as motionless as oaks their tops.
 O'er all the woods the topmost leaves are still;
 E'en the wild poplar leaves, that, pendent hung
 By stems elastic, quiver at a breath,
 Rest in the general calm. The thistle-down,
 Seen high and thick, by gazing up beside
 Some shading object, in a silver shower
 Plumb down, and slower than the slowest snow,
 Through all the sleepy atmosphere descends;
 And where it lights, though on the steepest roof,
 Or smallest spire of grass, remains unmoved.
 White as a fleece, as dense and as distinct
 From the resplendent sky, a single cloud
 On the soft bosom of the air becalmed,
 Drops a lone shadow as distinct and still,
 On the bare plain, or sunny mountain's side;
 Or in the polished mirror of the lake,
 In which the deep reflected sky appears
 A calm, sublime immensity below.' — pp. 68, 69.

We cannot spare room for the whole of the extract as given by Mr. Cheever. The remainder is very good, and very descriptive, but like most of the specimens from Wilcox, it is, owing to a certain ungracefulness of expression and rhythm, hard to read and rather tiresome. In justice to both the gentlemen, we will quote another piece by the same writer, headed 'September,' with which we have no heart to find fault, because it is in the main so beautiful.

'The sultry summer past, September comes,
 Soft twilight of the slow-declining year; —
 All mildness, soothing loneliness and peace;
 The fading season ere the falling come,
 More sober than the buxom blooming May,
 And therefore less the favorite of the world,
 But dearest month of all to pensive minds.
 'Tis now far spent; and the meridian sun,
 Most sweetly smiling with attempered beams,
 Sheds gently down a mild and grateful warmth.
 Beneath its yellow lustre, groves and woods,
 Checkered by one night's frost with various hues,
 While yet no wind has swept a leaf away,
 Shine doubly rich. It were a sad delight

Down the soomth stream to glide, and see it tinged
 Upon each brink with all the gorgeous hues,
 The yellow, red, or purple of the trees,
 That, singly, or in tufts, or forests thick,
 Adorn the shores; to see, perhaps, the side
 Of some high mount reflected far below
 With its bright colors, intermixed with spots
 Of darker green. Yes, it were sweetly sad
 To wander in the open fields, and hear,
 E'en at this hour, the noon-day hardly past,
 The lulling insects of the summer's night;
 To hear, where lately buzzing swarms were heard,
 A lonely bee long roving here and there
 To find a single flower, but all in vain;
 Then, rising quick, and with a louder hum,
 In widening circles round and round his head,
 Straight by the listener flying clear away,
 As if to bid the fields a last adieu;
 To hear, within the woodland's sunny side,
 Late full of music, nothing, save, perhaps,
 The sound of nut-shells, by the squirrel dropped
 From some tall beech, fast falling through the leaves.'

pp. 77, 78.

'Soft twilight of the slow-declining year,' is an exquisite line, and the 'lonely bee' and the 'nutshells by the squirrel dropped,' could only have been introduced by one who looked on nature with the eyes of a poet.

Now that we are upon the subject of autumn, and squirrels, and bees, we cannot refrain from quoting, though we know that almost every body has read it, Mr. Bryant's 'Death of the Flowers.' Here is description, here is feeling, and here is music too, music of the most tender, soul-subduing kind. Ever since it first was published by its author, the woods and flowers of autumn have seemed to sing it to us every time the season came round, and we could walk out into the country to enjoy it.

'The melancholy days are come, the saddest of the year,
 Of wailing winds, and naked woods, and meadows brown and
 sere.

Heap'd in the hollows of the grove, the wither'd leaves lie dead;
 They rustle to the eddying gust, and to the rabbit's tread.
 The robin and the wren are flown, and from the shrub the jay,
 And from the wood-top calls the crow, through all the gloomy
 day.

Where are the flowers, the fair young flowers, that lately sprung
and stood

In brighter light and softer airs, a beauteous sisterhood?
Alas! they all are in their graves, the gentle race of flowers
Are lying in their lowly beds, with the fair and good of ours.
The rain is falling where they lie; but the cold November rain
Calls not, from out the gloomy earth, the lovely ones again.

'The wind-flower and the violet, they perish'd long ago,
And the wild-rose and the orchis died amid the summer glow;
But on the hill the golden-rod, and the aster in the wood,
And the yellow sun-flower by the brook in autumn beauty stood,
Till fell the frost from the clear, cold heaven, as falls the plague
on men,
And the brightness of their smile was gone from upland, glade,
and glen.

'And now, when comes the calm, mild day, as still such days
will come,
To call the squirrel and the bee from out their winter home,
When the sound of dropping nuts is heard, though all the trees
are still,
And twinkle in the smoky light the waters of the rill,
The south wind searches for the flowers whose fragrance late he
bore,
And sighs to find them in the wood and by the stream no more.

'And then I think of one who in her youthful beauty died,
The fair, meek blossom that grew up and faded by my side:
In the cold moist earth we laid her when the forest cast the
leaf,
And wept that one so lovely should have a life so brief;
Yet not unmeet it was, that one, like that young friend of ours,
So gentle and so beautiful, should perish with the flowers.'
pp. 35, 36.

This could not, of course, have been omitted in Mr. Cheever's collection. Of this collection we would repeat our hearty recommendation, observing as we close, that the same pure taste which is shown in its pages, is exhibited in two former works of a similar description, his '*Studies in Poetry*,' and his '*American Common-Place Book of Prose*.'

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. VIII. — *A Second Letter, in which the Investigation of the Meanings of Αἰών in Ancient Greek is continued.**

DESIROUS of investigating the habits of *αἰών* in ancient Greek, so far as I might, I have now pursued the inquiry through the *entire* works of Aristotle and Plato, together with the short treatise of Timæus Locrus on the 'Soul of the World.' I have endeavoured to detect every instance of this word and *αἰώνιος* in these writings, and hope to have succeeded in so doing. It is my present purpose to exhibit these instances, with such remarks as may seem appropriate; and with the reservation of the right of being corrected in any involuntary error, I now bear witness to the following facts.

In all the works of Aristotle, excepting those named in my former communication as having been examined, there are only two instances of *αἰών* as used by him originally; none of *αἰώνιος*. The two instances are as follow, — viz.

De Part. Animal. Lib. i. cap. 5. Vol. i. p. 974. D.

Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

'Of those substances which consist by nature, some are ungenerated and incorruptible, through (or with respect to) the *entire* EXISTENCE; but some partake of generation and corruption.

Rhetor. Lib. i. cap. 13. Vol. ii. p. 542. B.

Speaking of laws, he remarks, in substance, that they are deficient from necessity; seeing duties are so many and various, that legislators are sometimes unwilling to enumerate them all; and sometimes they do not perceive them all; and some things cannot be accurately enumerated on account of their infinity; and he adds,

ὑπολείποντες γὰρ δὴ ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντας.

'For EXISTENCE would indeed forsake them enumerating.'

These two instances, after all the former, are of little further use, than as they finish the inquiry in regard to this one author. In the first; *αἰών* may possibly signify *term of existence*; but, it appears to me, that Aristotle intended to represent by it the *integrity*, or *wholeness*, of the existence in question; the *completeness* of a *vital principle*.

* See No. 44, for May, 1831.

In the the second instance, also, the sense of *term of existence* is admissible, with a different translation of *ὑπολείποναι*· but, that of *simple life*, or *principle of existence*, seems rather more consonant to the state of the case. I produce them, more because they complete the inquiry so far Aristotle is concerned, than for any special weight they bear in establishing the meaning of this word; although they do their part for this purpose, among the rest.

Every instance of *αἰών* in Aristotle has now been produced. There is no need of any further comment upon them than has already been made. Simple *EXISTENCE* is the prevailing meaning of this word, both in his definition and usage; and more commonly than otherwise, it signifies an existence which *lives*, or *partakes of vitality*; viewing his expressions with proper reference to the ideas of spiritual existences prevalent in his day. It is not improbable, also, that, in some instances of this word, he had reference to the entire sum of spiritual being, existing as a *whole* in the Divine Mind. In which case, *αἰών* would represent *spirituality*, in the most extensive sense. On this meaning of the word, more will be said, in commenting on its usage in Plato.

In Aristotle's *Physic.* Lib. viii. cap. 1., he introduces an extract from Empedocles, containing this word. Aristotle is discussing the question; 'Whether motion be eternal [*αἰδιος*].' He introduces the opinion of Empedocles, '*that things are sometimes moved, and again are at rest. That they are moved indeed when love makes one from many, or strife makes many from one; and they rest in the intermediate times; speaking thus:—*

ἧ μὲν ἐν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάρθηκε φύεσθαι·
 ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνός, πλεόν' ἐκτελέθουσι,
 τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε, καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών.

'Either, indeed, one attains to be born from many; or again, one being produced, many are completed; and thus they are generated; and *EXISTENCE* is not permanent in them.'

The *αἰών* [existence] of Empedocles, is evidently the same principle of being, as is that of Aristotle, to *εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν*.

There is also a short poem of 168 lines, called *The Sphere*, attributed to Empedocles by many, although the author is doubtful. It is however a very ancient work. It contains one instance of the word in question; and in connexion with the extract just quoted from Empedocles, it may be well to

introduce it. The writer, after having described the constellations, says: '*Whether, therefore, motherless Pallas provides for mortals; or whether the Sun ordained the disposition of the stars, it is the workmanship of Gods; and a human mind is not able to describe it compendiously. Consider then how well nature, her own artificer, hath pervadingly distributed the course of the world and of EXISTENCE.*'

Ἄθρει δὲ κόσμον τοῦ δέ τ' αἰῶνος δρόμον
Ὡς εὖ διεστάθμησεν ἀντοργὸς φύσις.

Certainly αἰὼν is any thing else than *eternity* here; be the work that of whomsoever, and of whatever age, it may.

In all the works of Plato, I have discovered eight instances only of αἰὼν, and five only of αἰώνιος. Διαιώνιος occurs once, and μακράων twice. After a careful examination of every line, I have not detected any other instance of αἰὼν or αἰώνιος, either alone, or in composition; and do not believe there are any more.

In further discussion, I pass by the instances of μακράων, with the single remark, that they mean *long-existent*, in both cases. They occur, the one in De Repub. Lib. ii. Vol ii. p. 383. B.—The other in Epinomis, (Vol. ii. p. 982. A.,) published among Plato's works, although it was probably written by one of his disciples.

Of the thirteen instances of αἰὼν and αἰώνιος, seven are in the Timæus, together with the one of διαίωνιος, and within the compass of seventy pages.

It is my desire, and will be my endeavour, to present these words so, that an English reader may be able to form an accurate estimate of their meaning in the use of the Athenian Sage. I know not how to do this more fairly in regard to αἰὼν, than by uniformly translating it *EXISTENCE*, the word which corresponds with it in an overwhelming majority of the instances already produced, giving, at the same time, an exhibition of the connexion in which it occurs, as nearly as may be. I shall thus leave each reader to judge what *kind* of existence is signified in each particular instance; claiming, also, the liberty of expressing my own opinion as I may.

But what shall we do with αἰώνιος? Here, to all appearance, is a new word. It has not occurred in any one of the consulted writers; although they range through a period of about 600 years of Grecian literature. It is clear, however,

that it bears an adjective relation to *αἰών*. It must, therefore, be understood as expressing the different qualities which belong to that noun. In fairness, then, it ought to be translated by an English word bearing the same relation to the English term *existence*, and expressing the qualities which belong to this English noun. The adjective which most naturally offers itself to be employed in this intention is *existential*; an uncouth and uncommon word, to be sure; but yet not wholly unknown to our language. I should have used it in my former communications, could I have found it any where as an English word; for I dared not employ so strange a term, without some trustworthy authority. I have since seen it introduced in Webster's Dictionary, with Bishop Barrow quoted as using it. It is there defined, merely '*having existence.*' Resting on this evidence for the word as being lawful English, I employ it, in the present discussion, for translating *αἰώνος* believing, that, in so doing, I do not present the English reader with a term of stranger aspect, than *αἰώνος* presented to a Greek, in the days of Plato and Timæus the Locrian; both of whom employ this word, although only in a very few cases. But I must claim the right of considering is as bearing a *full* adjective relation to the noun *existence*; whether this noun be, in any case in hand, a generic name for *that which exists*; or, in other cases, a specific name for some *particular existence* in question; attributing to the English term *existence* every meaning belonging to the Greek *αἰών*.

EXISTENTIAL, therefore, would signify — *having existence*; — *complete* according to its nature, so as to possess an entire principle of existence; — *essentially associated with existence*; — *partaking of the nature of existence*; — *pervading existence*; — *enduring with existence*; — *resembling existence*; — &c. And, with reference to any particular existence at any time in question, it would signify, — *vital*; — *dispensational*; — *relating to a state or order of things*; — *periodical*; — *enduring*; — *spiritual*; — &c. In scriptural usage, other meanings may arise for both the adjective and the noun, from their connexion with the Hebrew עולם. But my present labor is with *classical* Greek; and I name the above, as what I believe to be proper meanings of *αἰώνος* in that language; and what, of course, I consider as comprehended in the English term *existential*, when employed in translating it. And, that every reader may have a fair oppor-

tunity of judging for himself, in the present inquiry, αἰὼν will, in every case, be rendered EXISTENCE, and αἰώνιος EXISTENTIAL. This, at least, will be admitted to be fair dealing.

The instances in Plato are as follow : —

Protagoras, Vol. I. p. 345. C. *Wherefore, I will not consume my lot of EXISTENCE* [μοῖραν αἰῶνος] [measure of human life,] *seeking what is impossible to be, the vain and idle hope, an immaculate man.* — Plato is here quoting Simonides; I believe, his very words. It may be reckoned, however, among the instances occurring in Plato. There cannot be much, if any, difference in the meaning of αἰὼν, be the words, in the sentence, those of the one or the other.

Gorgias, p. 448. C. *Prudence makes our EXISTENCE* [τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν] *proceed according to rule; imprudence, according to chance.*

De Legib. Lib. iii. Vol. II. p. 701. C.

Leading an EXISTENCE involved in troubles [χαλεπὸν αἰῶνα]; — *a wretched life.*

The obvious meaning of αἰὼν in these three instances is *human life*; or, *existence*, considered as the *state* of being alive in this world; without reference to a longer or shorter duration of that state.

There is also the following instance in the Axiochus, which may or may not be received as Plato's work.

Axioch. Vol. III. p. 370. C. — *Could human nature have seen that the received conditions of the world are associated unto EXISTENCE* [COMPLETENESS] [εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα], *unless there were some spirit truly divine in the soul, by which it has an understanding and knowledge of such things?* — I name *completeness*, as the proper meaning of αἰὼν in this place, because the reference is so plain to the action of the human mind, in discovering a complete or perfect system of harmonizing laws in nature, by a careful observation of the phenomena of the universe. It is impossible, the writer could have meant *eternity* by αἰὼν for he could not have said, that man, by his intellectual powers, could ascertain of a surety, that the world should endure for ever. It is possible, however, that he might have had reference to the original *idea*, or *spiritual form*, or *existence* in God, according to which Plato and his disciples believed the universe to have been formed; and with which, they believed all things to be mysteriously associated. Perhaps it was with some such reference as this, that he called what I

have translated *received conditions*, *παθήματα*. If it were so, the sentence would read, 'that the *received conditions of the world are associated according to the spiritual existence in God*,' by the flowing forth of which the universe and all things in it were generated. On the use of *αἰών* in the sense here alluded to, more will yet be said. But I think the sense of *completeness* more consonant, on the whole, to the tenor of the present sentence, and, therefore, translate it so.

The foregoing are all the instances of *αἰών* in Plato; excepting those in the *Timæus*, which will be produced hereafter in one quotation. On those above, no further comment is needed.

There are, likewise, two instances of *αἰώνιος*, besides what occur in the *Timæus*; as follows:—

De Repub. Lib. ii. Vol. II. p. 363. D.

Having stated, what providential favors Homer and Hesiod affirm that the gods grant the just, in this life; he proceeds to state, in substance, that Musæus, and his son, proclaim for them greater favors from the Gods than these, for carrying them to Hades by the word, *τῷ λόγῳ*, [probably their *doctrine*,] and giving them repose, and preparing the banquet of the holy ones, they make them, crowned, spend all the time continually intoxicated;—

Esteeming the best recompense of virtue to be EXISTENTIAL intoxication [*μέθην αἰώνιον*]; i. e. an intoxication pervading the whole person, and absorbing all his faculties, or whole self. A state, which, should it take place on this side of Hades, might, in coarse English, be called being *dead drunk*. And, verily, there seem to be some of our race, whose opinion of supreme felicity appears too much like that of Musæus and his son. Nor will it be denied, that some of the ideas of the ancients, concerning the condition and employment of souls in Hades, were not far removed from those of the rudest of mankind.

Perhaps, as the reference is to souls in Hades, you may think the expression ought to have a *spiritual* rendering. If so, you can say, *spiritual intoxication*. And if you doubt whether such a thing can be, you need only go into some of the assemblies of modern fanatics; observe the movements there taking place, the springings up and fallings down; see the contortions; hear the screams; and witness the feelings exhibited; and, I think you will not doubt that *soul*, as well

as body, may be intoxicated ; and the whole being, for the present time, be absorbed in the *complete intoxication* [μέθη αἰώνιον.]

In any case, it can hardly be possible, that the author was contemplating the *duration*, but the nature and quality and extent of that, which constituted the supreme felicity in view. He represents it as *constant* [τὸν ἀπαρα χρόνον ἤδη, per omne jam tempus, *all the time constantly*]; and its *completeness*, absorbing the subject, is represented under the term αἰώνιον [existential.]

Also, Plato informs us, — ‘T is a very ancient opinion that souls quitting this world, repair to the infernal regions, and return after that, to live in this world.’* So, that, if αἰώνιος refer to the duration of the soul’s state in Hades, it would still be a temporary and not an eternal state. But I see no reason to refer it to *endurance*, in any sense.

De Legib. Lib. x. Vol. II. p. 904. A.

‘When our king beheld all works being animate, and much virtue being in them, and much vice, and that which was generated being soul and body, indestructible, but not EXISTENTIAL, [ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὃν γινόμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα,] as the Gods according to law are ; (for there would never be any generation of animals if either of these were destroyed ;) and he perceived, that whatever of soul was good, was naturally disposed to benefit, but the evil to injure ; seeing all these things together, he contrived so to place each of the parts, that he would have virtue conquering, and vice conquered in the universe, to the greatest extent, and in the easiest and best mode.

I have quoted the passage at large, in order to exhibit more clearly the connexion in which this αἰώνιον occurs. It cannot mean *eternal*, inasmuch as it stands in direct contrast with ἀνώλεθρον, indestructible. Had Plato been contemplating *duration* of any kind under the term αἰώνιον, it must have been only *future duration* ; for the very idea of a being as

* *Phædon*. — In the same dialogue, among the last words of Socrates, it is taught, that some souls, in Hades, having suffered punishment proportional to their crimes, and being cleansed of their sins, are set at liberty, and receive the recompense of their good actions ; and those only whose sins are incurable are doomed to perpetual imprisonment. How does this affect Prof. Stuart’s assertion (p. 57.) that the Greeks and Romans notoriously held ‘to the *eternity* of future punishments?’

generated, implies a beginning of its being, and he would never have taken pains to say that a being had not *endured*, either for ever, or for any term, before it begun to be. But then, had he been contemplating *future* duration, his words would be the same as saying, that the generated thing was *indestructible*, and yet should not *endure* either for a long term, or for ever; — too great an inconsistency to have been committed by Plato.

If then *αἰώνιον* expresses neither past nor future duration, it expresses no *duration* at all. It must have implied something different from *enduring* in any sense.

The meaning seems to be that of *completeness* as an *unit*,* or *monad*, more than otherwise; that which is, in itself, a complete and indivisible being, and does not depend, for its *existence*, on the union of different and distinct parts; a fixed *existence*. This quality of completeness, or fixedness in an indivisible unity, cannot, as Plato elsewhere affirms, belong, properly, to that which he calls *generated*; for, whatever is generated is, according to his ideas, a compound. So Proclus remarks, in commenting on a passage in the *Timæus*; — ‘That is denominated generated, which has not the whole of its essence or energy abiding in one, so as to be perfectly immutable. And of this kind are this sensible world, time in things moved,’ &c.†

Man, and probably the mundane Gods, are the beings contemplated by Plato, as the *γενόμενον* [*generated*] in the present passage. But all these, in his view, are body and soul. To be sure, he believed these Gods to be generated with a body different from ours; and such an one as we may have after death; like that perhaps, which St. Paul calls *σῶμα πνευματικόν* by which, possibly, he intended something not very different from what might be termed an *aërial*, or *ethereal*, or, if you prefer it, a *spiritual* body, i. e. a body adapted to a spiritual mode of being. But, still, in Plato’s view, both these gods and men, in whatever world, were composite. Soul and body went together, to make up man, or a god, in this sense. This composite he speaks of as a being *indestructible*, (as he elsewhere teaches, by the will of its Creator,) but not possessing that *completeness* of existence in an unity, which ‘the

* See also in comment on *Timæus*, *infra*.

† Taylor’s *Plato*, p. 473. Note.

Gods according to law ' possess, and which is necessary in order to make a thing EXISTENTIAL [*αἰώνιον*].

'The Gods according to law,' signify, without any doubt, the purely *spiritual* Divinities, * immediate emanations from the Deity ; in contradiction to the mundane Gods, who were subjects of a Theogonical generation, and, to a certain extent, were soul and body, like men. To those entirely *spiritual* Divinities, alone, could the term EXISTENTIAL [*αἰώνιος*] be properly applied ; as it seems from what Plato says. Generated beings might *endure* for ever ; but being compounded, they could not possess a fixed and changeless existence in an unity. They, therefore, could change ; and might be made better or worse by alteration, although they were indestructible. But that quality called *αἰώνιος* [*existential*] was something totally different from *enduring* ; and was something appropriate to unmingled, *spiritual* beings alone, like the Gods according to law.

How far this goes towards maintaining the sense *spiritual* in *αἰώνιος*, I leave to the reader's judgment. But it certainly bears that way, with no little weight. And, in truth, no violence would be done to the sentence, should it be translated, — '*When our king saw all works being animate and that which was generated being soul and body, indestructible but not SPIRITUAL, as the Gods according to law are.*' — I would not translate it so, lest it might seem like being desirous of forcing evidence. But after the foregoing comment, I deem it no more than fair, to present this latter view of the sentence ; which can be compared with the former, by any so disposed: And it is willingly submitted to their judgment whether this *αἰώνιος* [*existential*] does not sustain a *spiritual* sense.

The above are all the instances of either word in Plato, excepting what occur in the *Timæus* ; which, requiring comment at some length, I reserve for a future communication.

Yours in good will,

E. S. G.

Sandwich, Dec. 1, 1831.

* They are called by this name, likewise, in the 'Golden Verses' of Pythagoras.

ART. IX. — *An Essay on Demonology, Ghosts, and Apparitions, and Popular Superstitions; also an Account of the Witchcraft Delusion at Salem in 1692.* By JAMES THACHER, M. D., A. A. S. Boston. Carter & Hendee. 1831. 24mo. pp. 234.

WHILST all Christians agree in the future existence of the soul, they differ materially in the views which they take of the manner of this existence; and, without concerning ourselves about minute differences, we may observe, that there are two views of a general nature, which divide their opinions. One class hold that the spirit after death remains inactive till the period of a general judgment, when all the dead, awakening at once, shall meet before the throne of the Ruler of the universe, to receive the sentence, whether for good or evil, which has been merited by the deeds done in the body. The opinion of others is, that the soul after the decease of the body continues still in action in another sphere; that death, in short, is a mere change of state, an immediate removal of the spirit from its earthly integument to some other locality of action, and not a long sleep, to be broken only by the sound of the last trumpet.

Of the latter, some imagine that the spirits of the dead have no longer any connexion with or interest in those, which still remain in the flesh; while others believe, that they are still interested in the weal or woe of those whom they have left behind them, and that the spirits of our departed friends still mingle to a certain degree in our joys and sorrows, sympathize in our exertions to become wiser and better, and mourn over our aberrations from the paths of virtue and peace. This notion has probably always been the most common. It is agreeable to the kindlier affections of our nature, and when it cannot recommend itself to any one's reason, makes a strong appeal to his heart.

With one class of Christians indeed, the Swedenborgians,* it is an important article in their peculiar system of religion. The numerous saints of the Roman Catholic world imply also this form of belief. To this persuasion also is to be

* We use this term as the most convenient designation of the members of the New Jerusalem church. We know not whether they admit its propriety, but we trust that no offence will be taken, when none is intended.

traced the readiness of mankind to place credit in the accounts of ghosts and apparitions, which have at all times excited the interest, if they have not always commanded the faith, of their hearers. Tales of this sort, notwithstanding all attempts to confine them to the nursery, have kept their ground even in the parlours of the gay and the studies of the grave; very often affecting the nerves, and sometimes confounding the judgment and shaking the skepticism, of the most philosophic.

The evidence of many of these accounts is so strong, while the reasons for so important a deviation from the order of nature seem so trivial, that the wisest have been at a loss how to decide concerning them. To the physiologist there is little difficulty in these cases; but physiology, which one would naturally suppose likely to be the most interesting of all the sciences to the man of general knowledge, seems to have been strangely confined to that most industrious and philosophic class, the physicians; the rest of mankind have appeared to take it for granted, that faith, and not reason or knowledge, was concerned about the operations of living bodies, and have depended for any explanation of a particular result upon the *ipse dixit* of any one, who chose to pronounce it, rather than upon any attention to the general laws which regulate the operations of this class of the objects of the material world.

Works on withcraft, demonology, and spectres have accordingly in most cases been little better than collections of these accounts, with some examination of the evidence of each, and perhaps an attempt to select those, which are best entitled to credit. Or one author, in the plenitude of his skepticism, scouts the whole, while another in the fulness of faith, 'holds each strange tale devoutly true.' The subject of late seems to have received considerable attention, and several works, intended for general reading, have made their appearance. The one, of which we have placed the title at the head of this article, contains a full detail of many of the most remarkable stories of this kind. Most of them are interesting, and one particularly so, since it is one of the most unexceptionable accounts for our purpose, of a spectral illusion, which we have ever met with. Our limits will not permit us to extract the whole narration, for which we refer

our readers to the book itself. The following portion is sufficient for our present purpose.

‘The following article is contained in the *Edinburgh Journal of Science*, conducted by Dr. Brewster, who says of the narrator of the case, that “his station in society and as a man of science, would authenticate the minutest particulars in his narrative, and satisfy the most scrupulous reader that the case has been philosophically as well as faithfully described.” The narrator is in fact the husband of the lady who was the subject of the disease.

“On the twenty-sixth of December, 1829, about half past four o’clock in the afternoon, Mrs. B. was standing near the fire in the hall, and on the point of going up stairs to dress, when she heard, as she supposed, my voice calling her by name,—‘Come here, come to me!’ She imagined that I was calling at the door to have it opened, went to it, and was surprised on opening it to find no one. She returned towards the fire, and again heard the same voice, calling very distinctly and loud,—‘Come, come here.’ She then opened two other doors of the same room, but seeing no one, she returned to the fire-place. After a few minutes, she heard the same voice, still calling,—‘Come to me, come, come away;’ this time in a loud, plaintive, and somewhat impatient tone. She answered as loudly—‘Where are you? I don’t know where you are’—still imagining that I was somewhere in search of her; but receiving no answer, she shortly went up stairs. On my return to the house about half an hour afterwards, she inquired why I had called to her so often, and where I was; and was of course surprised to hear I had not been near the house at the time.

“On the 30th of the same month, at about four o’clock, P. M., Mrs. B. came down stairs into the drawing-room, which she had quitted a few minutes before, and on entering the room, saw me, as she supposed, standing with my back to the fire. She addressed me, asking how it was I had returned so soon. (I had left the house for a walk half an hour before.) She said I looked fixedly at her with a serious and thoughtful expression of countenance, but did not speak. She supposed I was busied in thought, and sat down in an arm-chair near the fire, and within a couple of feet at most of the figure she still saw standing before her. As, however, the eyes still continued to be fixed upon her, after a few moments she said—‘Why don’t you speak—?’ The figure upon this moved off towards the window at the farther end of the room . . . and disappeared there. The lady followed, shook the curtains, and tried the windows, being still loth to believe it was not a reality, so distinct and forcible was the impression. Finding, however, that there was no natural means

of egress, she became convinced of having seen a spectral apparition, such as are recorded in Dr. Hibbert's work, and consequently felt no alarm or agitation. The appearance lasted four or five minutes. It was bright daylight, and Mrs. B. is confident that the apparition was fully as vivid as the reality; and when standing close to her, it concealed, of course, the real objects behind it. Upon being told of this my visible appearance in the spirit, having been only *audible* a few days before, I was, as you may imagine, more alarmed for the health of the lady, than for my own approaching death, or any other fatality the vision might be supposed to forebode. Still both the stories were so very much *en règle* as ghost stories, the three calls of the plaintive voice, each one louder than the preceding, the fixed eye and mournful expression of the phantom, its noiseless step and spirit-like vanishing, were so characteristic of the wraith, that I might have been unable to shake off some disagreeable fancies, such as a mind once deeply saturated with the poison of nursery-tales cannot altogether banish, had it not been for a third apparition, at whose visit I myself assisted, a few days afterwards, and which I think is the key-stone of the case, rendering it as complete as could be wished.

“On the 4th of this month, January, 1830, five days after the last apparition, at about ten o'clock at night, I was sitting in the drawing-room with Mrs. B. and in the act of stirring the fire, when she exclaimed 'Why, there's the cat in the room!' I asked, 'Where?' She replied, 'There, close to you.' 'Where?' I repeated. 'Why, on the rug, to be sure, between yourself and the coal-scuttle.' I had the poker in my hand, and I pushed in the direction mentioned. 'Take care,' she cried out, 'take care, you are hitting her with the poker.' I again asked her to point out exactly where she saw the cat. She replied, 'Why, sitting up there close to your feet, on the rug:—she is looking at me. It is Kitty; come here, Kitty.' There are two cats in the house, one of which went by this name. They are rarely, if ever, in the drawing-room. At this time Mrs. B. had certainly no idea that the sight of the cat was an illusion. I asked her to touch it. She got up for the purpose, and seemed, too, as if she was pursuing something which moved away. She followed a few steps, and then said,— 'It has gone under that chair.' I told her it was an illusion. She would not believe it. I lifted up the chair; there was nothing there, nor did Mrs. B. see any thing more of it. I searched the room all over and found nothing. There was a dog lying on the hearth, who would have betrayed great uneasiness had a cat been in the room. He was perfectly quiet. In order to be quite certain,

I rung the bell and and sent for the cats. They were both found in the housekeeper's room. The most superstitious person could now doubt no longer as to the real character of all these illusory appearances, and the case is so complete, that I hope there will be no renewal of them, symptomatic as they of course are of a disordered state of the body. Mrs. B. has naturally a morbidly sensitive imagination, so strongly affecting her corporeal impressions, that the story of any person having severe pain by accident, or otherwise, will occasionally produce acute twinges of pain. in the correspondent part in her own person. An account, for instance, of the amputation of an arm, will produce an instantaneous and severe sense of pain in her own arm ; and so of other relations. She is subject to talk in her sleep, with great fluency ; to repeat poetry very much at length, particularly when unwell, and even *cap verses* for half an hour together, never failing to quote lines beginning with the final letter of the preceding till her memory is exhausted. "'

pp. 36 - 42.

Physiology teaches that one link in the chain of antecedents and consequents, which intervene between the object of our ideas and the corresponding impression on the mind, is a change of some hitherto unexplained character in the nervous apparatus of the cranium ; and that a similar change and one which is followed by a similar impression may be, and frequently has been, produced without the presence of any external prototype.

This is not to be confounded with delirium or insanity, with which it has nothing to do, unless we use the term *insanity* in a very general and unphilosophical sense, to express every false impression. Thus on whirling round a torch we see a continued circle of fire, but we know that there is no such circle existing. We may whirl ourselves round, till every surrounding object seems to be in rapid motion ; but we know that they are stationary, and that the deception arises from a derangement of our organs. One may in like manner see a spectral form, but he may know and believe that no such form is present ; or he may believe that it is present, without being insane ; since any other explanation of so unusual appearance may not be known to him. And though he may be amazed, he cannot avoid a belief forced upon him by the evidence of sense. For proof that we may have such impressions, or in other words may see spectres perfectly, without any touch of what can be called insanity, it

is not necessary to go to the case of Nicolai, or the very distinct and particular one, narrated in the above extract. Many of us in the course of our lives have had the misfortune to suffer from fever and other debilitating diseases, and may remember even long after, with feelings of dread, the horrid forms, which at intervals, during slow recovery, have grinned and chattered round our beds, advancing, receding, diminishing, or expanding with frightful distinctness; forms of the reality of which we had never the least suspicion, but which were not on that account the less disagreeable. We can speak for ourselves, since fifteen years of health have not effaced the remembrance of one terrific face, which haunted us on such an occasion. We do not of course speak now of the delirium of fever, which is akin to insanity, and seldom leaves any traces on the memory, — but of that state of debilitated organization, which is perfectly consistent with sanity of judgment, though not with vigor of mind.

And this is the point, which it is necessary to keep in view in considering any of the remarkable cases of apparitions. Let us for instance take the visions of Baron Swedenborg. The common caviller treats the accounts with ridicule. The man was insane, and there is an end of the matter. But the Swedenborgian replies, and with justice, 'You must bring some other proof of this insanity. The person in question was a writer of admitted ability on many subjects; and though his peculiar doctrines may seem to you absurd, they appear to us rational and natural. You cannot therefore expect us to consider him insane, unless the fact of his believing himself to have seen the objects he describes, is a proof of insanity. Having satisfactory evidence both of his veracity and sanity as to all other matters, we are disposed to believe he saw, as he says he did, the appearances in question.'

But the true question is not at all, whether Baron Swedenborg, or any other person, being at the time of sane mind, has seen, or more properly has had the distinct impression, of the apparition of a departed friend, or any other spiritual being, but simply whether such an apparition existed in a substantial form, so as to become an object of sense. And we take the negative of this question, simply because we find no evidence of the affirmative. All the evidence goes merely to prove the reality of the impression, and we know that impressions of this sort are frequently produced without any external

prototype, and that their occurrence may be in the regular course of nature. Our ideas concerning a fact of this kind in short belong to an old and familiar bundle. But to suppose the reality of the apparition is to begin to form a new one, to suppose an occasional creation and extinction of matter, or at least a new and strange combination of elements. For what is the substance of the apparition? Is it air, gifted for the occasion with a new property, that of being visible? Is it a liquid of any kind? It may be said that it is a spiritual body. But, as the definition of *spirit* is 'that which is not matter,' and as we know nothing of matter but its sensible properties, and this spiritual body by definition must be without them, of course it must be something else, a sort of *tertium quid*, to use the language of the schools. Thus we only bewilder ourselves; but on the other hand we find no difficulty. We can hear of spectral apparitions, without believing in the real presence of the spectre, or without taking the narrator, whose sense and sanity we have no other reason to doubt, to be an impostor, a fool, or a madman. Common testimony is sufficient to satisfy us, as to the impression; no human testimony is sufficient to satisfy us of any thing more. Should the man, we most respect in the world, say to us, 'I see a hand you cannot see,' we should feel perfectly satisfied that we did not see it only because it was not present. We have particularized the visions of Swedenborg, because an inference is attempted to be drawn from them in favor of the peculiar doctrines of that writer. It is argued, that since he was gifted with so unusual a faculty, as that of seeing and holding communication with spiritual beings, his doctrines are not to be considered so much his own, as communications from the world of spirits. Now to deny the presence of spirits in a sensible form, is not to deny his communication with them, since it is quite obvious that it is as easy, and a much more probable supposition, that the necessary impression should have been effected upon the mind of Swedenborg directly, than by the mediate, not to call it clumsy, arrangement of a created form. But in this case the visions are resolved into a form or mode of inspiration, and can add nothing to the evidence of his doctrines. If the doctrines themselves, and the character and conduct of the person, are such as to induce any one to believe him inspired, it is well; but to say that his having visions of such a character adds any

thing to the evidence, is reasoning in a circle. It is to say that the fact of his inspiration proves his having been inspired.

It may be thought by some that this point would hardly require so many words. And we should have thought so ourselves, had we not occasionally heard persons, whose good sense and judgment we have reason to respect, seriously urging the well attested character of the visions of Swedenborg as an argument for the truth of his peculiar doctrines. Nothing seems to us clearer, or more in accordance with well-known phenomena, than that this writer, in common with many others, having adopted the opinion, that the spirits of the departed still continue to be interested in those whom they have left behind them, and having his bodily organs by habits of study and meditation brought into a state favorable for morbid impressions, found the forms, which had long haunted his imagination, at length assume the distinctness of reality; and that the intellectual panorama, which thus surrounded him, was as much the reflection of his own mind, as his image in a mirror would have been that of his body.* Nor do either the opinions, or the effects surprise us.

* It may seem like pointing artillery at insects to argue against any faith in the supernatural character of dreams; but a vague superstition of this kind certainly has some ground in the community, and it is very lately that we have noticed in a respectable periodical journal, a remark that the connexion of some dreams with after events cannot be considered accidental. Now it seems to us, that the opposite conclusion is most logical. For if we allow one dream a month to each of the inhabitants of the state of Massachusetts, (and certainly if we take the whole population, young and old, sick and well, male and female, it is a small allowance,) we shall have about six millions of dreams per annum. If again we extend this to the civilized world, and to the last century, the amount will pass the ordinary bounds of the numeration table; and in all this extent of space and time, how few dreams have been recorded as remarkable for their apparent connexion with the events of the world. It is only surprising that there are so few coincidences under the ordinary doctrine of chances. But some good and pious persons seem to look upon skepticism in this matter, as a covert argument or inference against the doctrine of a particular providence. Now the doctrine of a particular providence is taught very expressly in the Scriptures, and moreover is a necessary inference from the attributes of the Deity; and the notion of a general, as distinguished from a particular providence, has arisen merely from the limited character of our own powers, which oblige us to act in relation to any extended concern, upon a certain prearranged system, and by means of subordinate agents, all which

The latter are sufficiently explicable, on the principles already detailed ; and as to the opinions, they are such as seem to us in the highest degree attractive to the philosophic mind, as well as the affectionate heart. To the affections indeed they are uncommonly delightful. 'To have lost a friend by death,' says the most exquisite of modern writers, 'while the mutual regard was warm and unchilled, while the tear can drop unembittered by any painful recollection of coldness or distrust or treachery, is perhaps an escape from a more heavy dispensation. How few do we see grow old in the affections of those with whom their early friendships were formed ; our sources of common pleasure gradually dry up as we journey on through the vale of Baca ; and we hew out to ourselves other reservoirs, from which the first companions of our pilgrimage are excluded ; jealousies, rivalries, envy, intervene to separate others from our side, until none remain but those who are connected with us rather by habit than predilection, or who, allied more in blood than in disposition, keep the old man company in his life, that they may not be forgotten at his death.' But it is not only in the 'chill, cloudy, and comfortless evening of life,' that we feel the melancholy truths of the Antiquary's philosophy. We need not wait till we find ourselves descending the hill of life ; we have hardly reached the table-land of existence before we find our little bevy of companions sadly diminished, and feel that the breaches can never in this world be repaired. Friendship is a plant too delicate for any but the soil of youth, and of too slow growth for the afternoon of life ; it cannot, like the gourd of the prophet, spring up in a night ; and the places of the friends of our youth, once vacated, are never filled again. What consideration can be more gratifying than that which per-

are of course unnecessary to omniscience or omnipotence. Still, the minds which are given to human beings would be useless to them, unless the events of the universe, as far as they come under their cognizance, proceeded with that uniformity and apparent dependence, which we term the effects of general laws. 'If your Alexandrian books,' said Omar, 'agree with the Koran, they are superfluous ; if otherwise, they must be hurtful.' If the dream points out any course of action different from that, which the reason and revelation that all admit to be of divine origin, would recommend, its authority is doubtful, and its influence dangerous ; and while we have these, neither ghost nor dream is wanted to teach us lessons either of wisdom or virtue.

suades us that death draws but a thin veil of separation between us and those whom we have loved from early life ; that they are still with us and around us, sympathizing with our happiness, and cheering our adversity ; that we do not ' inhabit this cold world alone.'

It seems accordant also with the dictates of the philosophy of mind, to any one who observes how much of the attention of middle and advanced life is devoted to the rising generation. We live as much or more for our children, than for ourselves ; and take as much pleasure in teaching them important truths, as we did in learning them ourselves. Now the spirits of the departed, supposing them still to know and observe the affairs of this world, must stand, as it were, *in loco parentis* to those of their friends who remain in it, and must be sensible of a high degree of gratification on observing the advances of their former associates in wisdom and virtue. Nor is it to be supposed, that misfortunes, which disturb the serenity of mortals, can be sources of trouble to spiritual observers. The sum of the good is so much beyond that of the evil of life, that to an observer who may be supposed to take a wide view, these misfortunes must be often as unimportant as those which affect the childish mind appear to us ; ' the tear forgot as soon as shed.' To those however, whose pursuits and associates have been low and sensual, as little pleasure can be derived from the consideration of the employment of their former companions, as from the retrospect of their own ; to throw light upon the path of evil, serves only to discover its foulness.

But, whatever may be the mode of our existence hereafter, it is clear that it implies consciousness of our identity, which as necessarily implies the same general character of mind. It is obvious, therefore, that whatever vague notions we may get up about reward and punishment, these can be no other than the consequents of our own good or evil dispositions, exalted indeed in degree and intensity, in proportion to the expansion of our views and the extension of our experience. Many years since we happened to visit an exhibition of curious automata. Among others was the figure of a conjurer, who returned answers to any of a series of questions, which might be addressed to him. Of these, curiosity led us to offer the following ; ' Are there any women in heaven ?' The reply was, ' There would be no heaven without them.' This quaint

evasion excited a smile at the time ; but a use, if we may employ this antiquated phrase, may be drawn from so trivial an observation. It is this ; that many who think they are meriting some undefined reward in a future state by their conduct in this, will do well to consider, whether they are cultivating those affections and dispositions, which produce true happiness here, since nothing is more susceptible of demonstration, than that there can be no heaven without them.

ART. X. — MR. TUCKERMAN'S *Eighth Semi-Annual Report of his Service as a Minister at Large in Boston*.
Printed for the American Unitarian Association. Boston.
Gray & Bowen. 1831. 12mo. pp. 48.

DR. TUCKERMAN'S reports to the American Unitarian Association have, most of them, been valuable and interesting documents. They have contained many important facts, strongly stated ; and they have served the very useful purpose of calling attention to those facts on the part of many who would, otherwise, have been either ignorant or regardless of them. The subject treated in these reports is of such vast interest and extent, that it may well excite the attention of every reflecting mind ; and it is not wonderful that it should have caused the most vivid enthusiasm in those who, like Dr. Tuckerman, have devoted themselves to the consideration of it. The causes of pauperism and crime are so mingled and combined with the vices and imperfections of men, and with the operation of God's providence, that it may be impossible to enumerate them with distinctness, as it certainly is to apply an adequate remedy. The words *pauperism* and *crime* however are so constantly placed by the side of each other by writers on those subjects, that the public is in great danger of becoming impressed with the idea that there is a necessary connexion between them, and that they are not only reciprocally cause and effect, but that they are almost exclusively so, and that by preventing one, the other may be also in a great measure removed. It would be at least as true, and, we are even inclined to believe, much nearer the truth, to say, that there is a stronger and more direct connexion between

vice and wealth, than between crime and poverty. If the laws of society were directed with as much severity against those violations of right that are injurious to ourselves, as against those which affect our neighbour, there can be little doubt that their operation would be as severely felt by the one class as the other. But it is not so easy to prove when a man is 'gluttonous and a wine-bibber,' as it is to show when he becomes a thief; and as it is thought expedient to leave the punishment of merely personal vices to their natural or providential consequences, the temptations and sins of one class are hidden in domestic privacy, while the trials and errors of the other are brought before the world in the records of the police, in the threats of the law, and the sentences of its courts. He would show himself to be very superficially acquainted with human nature, who should think that men's worst vices arise from poverty, or that those upon whom the laws inflict punishment are always the worst members of society. If we observe the bad passions and corrupt propensities indulged, the falsehood, malignity, revenge, and treachery, which are to be found in all classes, we shall have some reason to doubt whether the temptations of poverty are, after all, the severest to which we may be exposed. We shall be inclined to believe, that he who is obliged to labor for his daily bread is both happier and safer than he who is lounging in the unoccupied security of a comfortable competence.

Neither is it true that vice naturally leads to poverty. Some vices have doubtless that tendency; but there are others which are very often found to thrive in worldly prosperity. We have all seen the miser hoarding his wealth with the most hard-hearted penuriousness; the fraudulent bankrupt selfishly using the property of those whom he may have ruined; and others who accumulate possessions by their skill in deceiving the ignorant and unwary. Poverty and riches are not of so much consequence in the divine estimate, it has been truly said, as to be always, or most commonly attendant upon vice and virtue respectively; and we are quite sure that of the excellent persons we have known, at least as many have been in the humble sphere of poverty, as have been raised above the fear of want. The temptations to crime then are not necessarily increased by poverty; and the difficulties to be encountered in our attempts to prevent it can-

not be fairly met, till we have given up the idea of any peculiar or necessary connexion between pauperism and crime. Poverty is as often the consequence of inefficiency or thriftlessness of character, as of vice; but crime, as we conceive, is always produced by ill-controlled passions or desires. Very different means, therefore, must be resorted to, to prevent the evils of poverty and criminality. For the one purpose a new stimulus derived from an increase of knowledge, or from accidental circumstances, may often be sufficient; for the other, the whole force of moral influence from precept and example, from fear of punishment and hope of reward, will not be more than enough. The prevention of crime then and the prevention of pauperism are to be treated as two distinct subjects. We ought carefully to avoid the unhappy inaccuracy of ideas that often confounds the causes and cures of both.

As the peace and security of society are the essential objects of all government, a large apparatus has, in all civilized countries, been prepared for their preservation; and by nothing is the progress of society more decidedly marked, than by the means used in the common course of the police. Wherever it has been tried, the effect of universal instruction has been found far superior to that of force, and it is to that we must now look as the principal source of the security we may hope to enjoy in our own community. We have been accustomed to believe that the means of religious and intellectual instruction among us are uncommonly large; and we are pleased to find, from the statements contained in Dr. Tuckerman's reports, that we have not been mistaken. The means of, at least, a common-school education, the attainment of those rudiments of knowledge which enable the individual to advance farther according to his opportunities and inclinations, are within the reach of every one; and the number of those who, either through ignorance of these advantages, or through wilful perverseness, neglect them, is remarkably small. Dr. Tuckerman says that, including truants, the number of children, 'between five and fourteen years of age, who go to no school, is little short of four hundred.' Now considering that, in all probability, the greater part of this number are occasional truants, and that there are more than 12,000 children regularly enjoying the advantages of elementary education in the city, we cannot but congratulate ourselves upon the extent

to which this important agent of our police is exerting its power. No city in the world has done more ; and while we respect the zeal, in this noble cause, which thinks nothing done while aught remains to do, we may be allowed to feel and to express an honest pride in the honorable distinction our native city has attained. In this particular we really are unable to perceive that the city, in its municipal capacity, has fallen short of its duty. What can be done more or better than to offer to all parents the means of instructing their children ? Can they be compelled to avail themselves of the offer ? Can they be obliged to forego the exercise of that discretionary authority for which God has made them responsible to him ? We are strongly inclined to the opinion that no other kind of authority could be advantageously substituted for it ; and we regretted the suggestion, made by Dr. Tuckerman, that an officer should be appointed by the city, with power to send all truant and idle children to some school, and to see that they were regular in their attendance. We fear that the existence of any such authority would cause a spirit of resistance, on all accounts to be lamented ; and if it should not produce that effect, it might create a feeling of security that their children would be taken care of, which would remove one of the most powerful holds that society can have upon the parents. The desire to secure some advantages for their children is one of the strongest and most divine influences in the hearts of the virtuous poor ; and it is one of the last which gives way in the breast of the most profligate. Many an abandoned wretch has been absolutely reclaimed by the horror he has felt at the idea of his child becoming such a one as himself. And these are feelings which ought not to be interfered with. Every thing should be done to extend the means of universal education, and every inducement should be offered to the parent to avail himself of the means within his reach ; but no authority should be allowed to take the place of his ; and no care, however kind, should relieve him from his just responsibility.

What then is to be done, it may be asked, with those unfortunate beings, whose education and circumstances are training them up in a way which cannot be mistaken, who are in the broad road to vice and misery here, if not to destruction hereafter ? They must be left, under the care of God's providence, to the benevolent exertions of individuals ; to the

moral influences which may be felt in a Christian community ; to the kind persuasions of those who have no other authority than a benevolent interest in their fellow-men can give them. This is one of the forms of charity which cannot be exercised by masses of men ; and we are not desirous of seeing every thing done by municipal regulations. Individual efforts are the best. They bind man to man in a way that no wholesale charity can ever effect ; and while we rejoice to see every thing performed by the community which it can best do, we shall also be gratified to find that it does not undertake that which can be best accomplished by private efforts.

But after all the labors both of private and public munificence, education will not be universal ; and if it could be made so, it would not prove a sufficient preventive of crime. Fraud in its thousand forms would still be committed, as it has been, by the skilful and well instructed ; and crime of every degree would be perpetrated, as it has been, by those who could not plead ignorance in excuse. Against such, as well as against the more ignorant, the fear of punishment must be directed in such manner and degree as society has the right to inflict it. The extent of this right is a subject of profound investigation, which we do not propose to examine ; but we may be allowed to state an axiom, which, if it be trite, has consequences that have been little regarded. As the prevention of crime, not merely by the dread of suffering, but by the reformation of the criminal, is the object of all punishment, it is the duty of society to take care that its modes of punishment be of such a character as will tend to the diminution of crime. Have the species of punishment heretofore in general use been of that character ? The necessary answer to this question is, that they have, for the most part, been the very reverse. The prisons, penitentiaries, houses of correction, &c., which have abounded among us, as well as in other civilized countries, so far from having any tendency to prevent crime, have been, and, with some exceptions, are still, the schools, the nurseries, the hot-beds of iniquity. No language is strong enough properly to express the true character of these diabolical seminaries of vice. In them the weak have been perverted, the depraved hardened, and offenders of every degree of guilt reduced to one dreadful level of corruption. Is it by such a system of punishment as this that crime is to be diminished ? Is this the true plan of correctional police ?

A heavy responsibility rests upon those who have the power to remedy these evils; and in this country it is in the mass of the population, in the tone of public opinion, that this power resides. Every step ought to be taken to arouse the public sentiment upon this point; and we are grateful to Dr. Tuckerman for his labors on the subject. No pains can be superfluous, and none will be lost, which have for their object to enlighten and awaken the public feeling in relation to prisons, their construction, and discipline. Much has been done, but much more remains to be accomplished; and we would leave nothing unattempted to excite in others the same strength of feeling with which we are penetrated on this subject. If we wish for personal security, if we wish for the diminution of crime, if we wish to save ourselves from the guilt of aiding in the corruption of those who are exposed to peculiar temptation under our own laws and institutions, our prisons must be altogether reformed. They must be all improved upon the same plan which has been so successfully introduced into some of our state penitentiaries. A partial change will not be effectual. It must be thorough and entire. Our county gaols, at least in large towns, require similar reformation; and we must not suffer ourselves to rest satisfied with our exertions, till the crying sins, the enormous evils of these establishments are, to the extent of our ability, eradicated. Here is an ample field for the zeal of the patriot, the wisdom of the legislator, the skill of the politician, and the ardor of the philanthropist. The efforts of all are required, and can hardly fail to be requited.

Our penal codes, too, require examination and amendment. There has recently been a general excitement on the subject of imprisonment for debt,—an excitement fully justified by the subject. There should be a similar one on imprisonment for crime. It should be seen whether there is a just proportion between the character of a crime and its punishment; and there should be introduced a uniformity which does not now exist in the codes of the different states of this Union. The means of accomplishing this purpose, to a very desirable extent, are not difficult, though it would scarcely be proper for us to suggest them here. It would be highly becoming in our legislature to give to this subject (one of the most important to which their attention can be directed) that

consideration which would show their just sense of its consequence.

Elementary education, however, and judicious punishment are not all that can be done, and therefore not all that ought to be done, for the prevention of crime. Religious instruction can be made to exert at least as powerful and beneficial an influence as either of them; and it would, therefore, be a matter of expediency, if it were not a part of duty, to provide it for those who cannot procure it for themselves. The mode of performing this duty is a subject of great delicacy. No rough or violent methods can be of any avail. People cannot be compelled to be religious by law; nor to avail themselves of the means of becoming so. Nothing but the gentlest and most judicious moral influence will produce the desired effect. Men must be drawn to think seriously and feel deeply, upon their religious relations, by the cords of humanity, kindness, wisdom. In this country, resort to these gentler methods is especially necessary; and we have abundant proof both of their efficacy, and of the inherent strength of the religious principle in human nature, in the number and variety of the associations for religious purposes among us, the general attachment to the institutions and offices of religion, and the liberality which is exercised towards its ministers. We would speak thankfully, rather than boastfully, of the religious privileges we enjoy, and we would do what in us lies to increase and extend them. There are, doubtless, many in this city who cannot, and many more who do not, derive the benefit which might be derived from its religious advantages; and if there be any who are not suitably provided for in the numerous churches of the city, or who are unknown to any one of the parochial clergy, we hope they will be sought out, and put in the way of religious instruction and edification. From those whose characters render them indisposed to receive such benevolent efforts in the spirit of kindness and improvement, little can be expected; but there are, doubtless, many poor who would gladly have the Gospel preached to them, and who would show the effect of it in their lives. With such the right course has been begun, in the establishment of what is called a 'ministry at large,' by which is meant the service of a clergyman who is not attached to a particular parish, but takes under his charge those who

are left to wander in the dangerous paths of the world as sheep without a shepherd. Dr. Tuckerman has the distinguished merit of having originated, with us, this important ministry. Its beneficial effect was not merely anticipated, but was almost immediately perceived; and there can now be no doubt that it is one of the most important and useful services to which the zealous Christian minister can devote himself. The noble example of Dr. Tuckerman, and the obvious good effects which ensued from his labors, have stimulated others to enter upon the same course of honorable toil; and we learn incidentally from the last Report to the American Unitarian Association, that there are now four other persons constantly employed in the same work of truly Christian charity. It is about five years since Dr. Tuckerman began, and the combined effect of precept and example has seldom been more decided or more rapid. It is but a little longer time since the first church for the use of seamen was instituted, and there are now two in different parts of the city. Is it possible to contemplate these things, and not rejoice at the spirit of wise benevolence, of enlarged and discriminating charity, which must pervade the community, as well as animate the immediate laborers in this harvest of blessings? We confess a feeling of exultation,—we hope a justifiable and humble one,—when we see the alacrity with which any judicious measure for the improvement of our fellow-beings is adopted, and the steadiness with which it is pursued in this city of the Pilgrims. We feel such confidence in the disposition of the public to do all that can be done wisely, that we are always inclined to believe there must be some strong reason against any proposition that is not speedily acted upon. Indeed, discretion is more wanted to guide the exercise of benevolence, than kind feeling to stimulate the community to the practice of it; and we should regret to see the strength of the one increased at the expense of the other quality.

We look upon the 'ministry at large' as one of the best steps ever taken towards guiding aright the benevolent impulses which are so abundant, and which so obviously require the direction of those who combine wisdom of character with high Christian attainments. But it must be in the hands of those who are thus distinguished, or it will fail to produce its proper effects. The experience of years must

have given some acquaintance with the bad habits which need correction, and the cunning which will be employed to conceal them, or deception and intrigue will convert even this remedy into an encouragement of the very criminality it is intended to prevent. In no service is a greater portion of that rare quality, practical wisdom, required than in this ; and in none can it produce more beneficial effects. There is no form of the Christian ministry which it is more clearly the duty of the community to support ; we do not mean by public appropriations, but in the way in which we understand it to be now maintained, of private contribution. No man will be the poorer for aiding this charity.

We regard *elementary education*, *judicious punishment*, and *religious instruction*, as the principal remedies upon which we can rely for the diminution and prevention of crime. But it is obvious that they will not be sufficient to prevent the other evil which is so commonly associated with it,—pauperism. Poverty is not a proper subject of punishment ; and although knowledge and good principles are very important aids both in acquiring and preserving the real antidote to it, yet we every day see that they are not always sufficient. Something else is necessary to the alleviation of suffering from poverty. We say alleviation, for that is all which should be either attempted or thought of. The prevention of poverty is impossible ; and in this it is widely distinguished from crime. Poverty is the appointment, the beneficent appointment of God ; crime is the exclusive work of man. We cannot *cure* poverty, therefore, and it will be well for all classes when the idea of doing this is given up. If all were made rich to-day, some would be poor to-morrow ; and nothing but a perpetual miracle, or rather an entire change of the constitution of nature, could prevent the recurrence of the present system.

We call poverty an evil ; but, religiously speaking, why should we call that condition evil, which perhaps is best adapted to fit us for the future state,—the principal object of our present life ; and which sometimes calls forth the exercise of the most delightful feelings, and the most exalted virtues, that ever are or can be displayed by finite beings ? Poverty may be not merely the cause of virtue in those who suffer it, but the source of it in others. It may be made to bless 'him that gives and him that takes.' It may

enable us all, if we are suitably disposed, to be rich, in the only way in which our riches can follow us,—‘rich in good works.’

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. XII. *The Nature and Powers of the Christian Church.*

THERE are many at the present time, who are asking for information respecting the nature and powers of the Christian Church; and it becomes important to answer such inquiries, in order to set conscientious doubts at rest; still more so, to expose the weakness of that pretension by which too many factions attempt, under the name and authority of the Church, to overawe and govern the Christian world. In a nation, that usurpation is most to be dreaded, which professes to respect the forms of freedom; and in the Christian world the same unwearied and grasping spirit is most to be feared, when it desists from its endeavours to gain the state and circumstance of power, and aims at establishing its authority in the hearts of men. Nor is this so difficult an enterprise as many suppose; for the name ‘Christian Church’ carries authority with it; it is respected even more than it is understood: those who know not what it means, regard it with the veneration it deserves, though not of the kind which it deserves; and if any ambitious sect can persuade them that *it* is the Church of Christ, that all who resist it are resisting him, and all who join or sustain it are friends to him, they are almost sure to gain numbers and power. We have sometimes feared that the freedom of the Christian world was owing more to the variety of conflicting parties, each putting down the pretensions of the others, than to any general disposition to stand fast in the liberty where-with Christ hath made them free.

The misapprehension which lies at the foundation of all this error, may be stated in few words. Men regard Christians, or rather the Christian Church, as a body enjoying certain chartered rights, vested in them by the great Source of power. They speak of them as trustees of Christianity, with ample power to appoint their own successors, and, when they leave the stage, to transmit the religion to whatever hands

they will. They suffer no one to question the existence of these claims; they profess to hold them by divine right,—a pretension, which, though exploded in all other subjects, still has power in this. They consider it an affront and injury to have any inquiry made concerning the genuineness of this prescription; and if any one insists upon opening the statute book of our faith to learn the nature of this trust and find the page where it is given, they hold him up to the world as an enemy of all righteousness, and thus render his arm powerless against themselves, however strong it may be. There is no substantial difference between the proceedings of religious and political parties; the moment *power* becomes their object, principle, which would be exceedingly inconvenient to them, is set aside. A Christian sect does not by any means feel obliged to confine itself to Christian ways of extending its influence and numbers; the unworthy object is effected by unworthy arts, and the conscience, which ought to rise like a strong man to oppose their measures, is cheated into unfaithfulness by giving the name 'Christian' to that which Christianity condemns.

It seems to us to be an impression far from uncommon, that to enter a Christian church is like entering one of the lodges of Freemasonry; as taking one of those degrees makes a man a Mason, so whoever is admitted to a local church is regarded as a Christian, henceforth bound by obligations and enjoying privileges far superior to those of other men; and this impression is kept up by the solemnity and preparation with which men are admitted within the mysterious circle. They are persuaded that a supernatural change has taken place in their hearts; they are taught to speak with high disdain of this world,—duties, enjoyments, and all; they learn that it is a crime to differ from them in opinion, and that there is a natural enmity between religion and cheerfulness, day-light and devotion. Lest the ordinary course of life should wake them from this dream, and their reason explain to them the trick of imagination by which all this is effected, they are carried through a regular process of exhaustion, by which the mind is enfeebled, till it loses all wish to be free. They go nightly to the gloomy tabernacle, and with the dim light of sinking lamps,—with the stifling air,—with the ghastly looks, and the deep drawn sighs around them, are subdued to a devotion, which consists in yielding themselves up with a brok-

en spirit, as passive instruments in the hands of the managers of the delusion. In this way they are fitted to join the mystic number of those, who have made sure of salvation already; and when once they have passed the threshold of the church, have nothing more to hope for or to dread. If Christian improvement were the object sought for, it would pass the ingenuity of man to devise a preparation more fatal to religious advancement or even common morality than this, which so entirely removes the restraints and inducements on which morality and improvement depend; but if it be done for the purpose of strengthening a party, it is more powerful in its agency than is commonly imagined; it reaches and holds, by appeals to the senses, many, who would be little moved by any thing addressed to the mind or heart.

This kind of preparation is much more common now than in former days: it has always been used for similar purposes; but in these times is followed up with an energy resembling that of despair. And it has a most unfortunate effect, both in subduing the weak and young to the bondage of a party, which they mistake for submission to the kingdom of heaven, and in disgusting calm observers, who do not understand the subject, but say that, if such are Churches and such is Christianity, the less we have of them the better. There is yet another class who are unhappily affected,—those who believe in the reality of all this, but find their own minds obstinately rational, and their hearts wholly insensible to such impressions, and therefore tremble, lest they never shall be found worthy to commemorate their Saviour's death.

There are undoubtedly many, who would rejoice to do this duty, if they could remove these impressions, which were early received and have been constantly gaining strength. They are rather to be pitied than condemned; for although the Bible is open to them, they go to it under the influence of these impressions, and expect to find in it a constitution drawn up for the Christian Church with articles and provisions defining its immunities, rights, exemptions, and powers. Finding nothing of all this, they suppose that the rules of the Church must be inferences, drawn by minds wiser and better than their own. They feel as if independent thought would be presumption in them; and this, together with a secret satisfaction in the idea of resting their own responsibility on others, keeps them in that undecided state in which they are

more afraid to do, than to neglect, their duty. If they cannot be induced to examine the subject, of course nothing can be done for them; but if they can, let them ask, whether the word of God can teach more on this subject to others, than it teaches them; and whether their spiritual guides have any means of information on this subject, which are not open to all the world. This will be sufficient to show them that they must judge for themselves. And when they speak of the awful weight of obligation which a connexion with the Church would lay upon their souls, let them inquire whether those without, as well as those within the Church, are not bound to be Christians,—as good Christians as they can be; and what possible way there is, in which the obligations of the one class can exceed those of the other. Even with respect to the eating and drinking at the table, if it is an obligation to the one, it is so to the other; the great obligation to carry Christian obedience and devotion as high and far as they are able, rests alike on all who have ever heard of Christianity. With respect to imaginary rights and distinctions, offered as a bounty to those who will make the Christian profession, we know of no such thing. The man who crowns his obedience to the moral commands by observing this memorial, which he believes to be enjoined by the highest authority, has the satisfaction of knowing that he has endeavoured to do *all* his duty,—to ‘fulfil all righteousness,’ as becomes the Christian, leaving nothing deliberately undone. Undoubtedly those who are influenced by these apprehensions, ought to examine the Scriptures, to learn whether these things are so. They would find that they have not done well to take the word of others in preference to that of God; they would find that many of those who undergo the incomprehensible change of which they hear so much, are like children, who break off branches from the trees and set them out in their gardens, thinking that they have saved themselves the labor of planting and years of care: even that verdure does not wither sooner, than the fine promise in the young convert’s breast. They would find, that if it is a duty to make a Christian profession, there can be no conflicting obligation; and they must beware of giving the name of duties to imaginations, asking always, not so much how they shall satisfy themselves, as how they shall fulfil the demands of God.

Those who have been disgusted with the pretensions of Christian Churches are equally under the necessity of ex-

amining the subject in the Scriptures. They will find that nothing could be more unassuming than the Church, as our Saviour left it; and they may be a little surprised to see that whenever Churches put forward such claims, they act against the instructions and the spirit of their religion. It is melancholy to see many, who have the power of knowing better, judging from hasty observations and unfounded impressions, and thus making Christianity responsible for all the abuses and perversions which itself suffers in the hands of men. They say they do not find members of the Church better than other Christians. Why should they expect to find any magical change produced in them by the circumstance of their professing Christianity? They have no more means of instruction than others, — they are exposed to the same temptations as others. It is true that their Master is recalled to their minds by his own memorial service; but this can produce only gradual improvement; and if they expect to find a marked distinction between members of the church and others, their expectation must be founded on the mistaken idea we have just alluded to, — that every one admitted passes through a revolutionary change, and that this change is real and endures, — both which impressions are unsupported by the Scriptures. They also say that they cannot see what benefit would result from associating themselves with the Christian Church: but they should reflect, that if they are satisfied that the duty is enjoined, that point is not left to them to determine; their duty is to obey; and beside, that it is only from experience that they can determine whether it is beneficial or not. They do not hear any one who has made the experiment, saying that it does no good; it is only those who stand at a distance and judge theoretically, who doubt its advantages. If a Christian profession be regarded according to its design; if the service, by attending which men are understood to make the profession, be attended with a view to religious improvement alone; if this high aim be pursued without stooping to the unhappy dissensions of party, — the person who does this, will not be disgusted with the Church or any of its attendant institutions. He will rather discover, that the only way to cure that disgust is to become practically familiar with the subject. In this way he will be able to separate the ordinance of Heaven from the abuses of men;

and the folly of the latter will cease to make him insensible to the use and excellence of the other.

We could hardly expect to make any impression on those who condemn where they have taken no pains to understand; for there is in skepticism even more bigotry than in superstition. But with a view to those who are really desirous to compare opinions on the subject, we shall briefly state what we understand by a Christian Church, and afterwards draw inferences from that statement, tending to define its rights and powers.

And now what is a Christian Church? or, more properly speaking, what is *the* Christian Church? for there is but one. It is a name applied to the great body of those in every region, name, and nation, who have professed their belief in Jesus Christ. He has thought proper to appoint two signs by which men declare this profession, — Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Baptism, or washing (washing in that climate and country being the same with immersion), was made the sign of purity, or, to use the Scripture language, cleanness; and eating and drinking at the table, which, so far from being a merely sensual act, is the daily festival of well-ordered families, was chosen as the sign of intimacy and union. The two services were chosen, doubtless, because they can be observed by those who are not too solicitous respecting the form of a form, wherever a fountain springs or a river flows, wherever a harvest is gathered and a table spread. These two ceremonies, sanctioned by the example of our Saviour and his Apostles, have been regarded as the visible expression of faith in Jesus Christ, from the birth-day of our religion to the present hour. When any one, whether in youth or age, has received the seal of baptism upon his brow, has professed his belief in Jesus Christ, and taken his place at the table, he is a member of the Church, — of the holy Church universal, — he is a member of the same Church with every other Christian. He does not assume new obligations, because he was before bound to be a Christian, and to commemorate his Master's death; and since his profession, he can be nothing more and do no more than this; he only professes to feel those obligations that rest on all to whom Christianity is given. He does not profess himself a good man, — one who has been converted and has attained already; for his object in coming is to be made better, — to be aided in that great endeavour of converting the soul to God, which

begins with the first dawns of intellectual life and does not end at the grave. He does not consider himself as having made sure of salvation ; for that depends, he knows, upon his life and character, which are not fully determined till he dies. He simply confesses Christ before men, because he believes that such an expression of his faith is required ; and even if he could not fully understand the advantages to be derived, the least intimation given by his Master is enough for him. Having thus professed his belief, he is a member of the Church of our Lord Jesus Christ.

But if there be only one Church in the world, why do we hear of leaving one Church and joining another ? — language which certainly implies that there are more than one. What are these local associations, which are called Churches ? They are composed of members of the great Church of Jesus Christ, who happen to reside near each other, and for convenience' sake associate themselves, and provide for the ordinances of religion. They do not associate however, as if they gained a power by their union, which they did not possess when apart ; they do not admit or dismiss others as if they believed that they have authority of their own ; they do not feel as if they had a right to exclude any, except those whose life gives the lie direct to their profession. They act in their individual capacities only. They regard Jesus Christ as the great Head of the Church, and they are governed in all things by his word alone. They insist on no forms which he has not prescribed ; they require no profession beyond what he has enjoined ; they never forget that the man who approaches the table makes his profession, not to them, but to their common Master ; and they, as individuals and friends, welcome him to share the privileges which they themselves enjoy. Such are, or ought to be, the Churches found in our villages, towns, and cities. They consist of members of the great and only Church, who unite to provide for religious services, and who should utterly disclaim all desire to require any conditions, to demand submission to any creeds, to insist on any forms, which they cannot find full warrant for in the word of God.

Such is, in our opinion, the reply to the question, What is a Christian Church ? and what are these Christian Churches ? Christ is not divided. There is but one Church, — one faith, one baptism, one Saviour, one God. We will now at-

tempt to draw some inferences of a practical kind, from the statement just given.

First, we may draw from it the true principle to be observed in admission to the Church. Whoever professes Christianity is not made a member of this Church or that Church, but of the only Church of our Lord Jesus Christ. He becomes a member of that Church by his own act, not by permission of others. He proposes to certain members of that Church to join their number. If those members think it evident that he makes this proposition without sincerity, for the sake of imposing on himself or others, or for any other unworthy reason, they consider it their duty to dissuade him from making a profession, till he can do it with truth and with advantage to his soul. They represent to him that a formal, false, or unmeaning profession cannot be acceptable to their Master. But in all this they assume no power; they do not act nor feel as if he was binding himself to them; and, except in the single case just mentioned, where both common sense and Scripture authorize them to interfere, they do not exert the least authority or constraining influence over others. They know that men must come into the Church on the terms which Jesus Christ has established, because it is his Church and not theirs.

For this reason, it is usurpation in a local Church to require assent to any creed but the Scriptures, which, all allow, contain the whole of our religion. Whoever professes Christ, must of course profess a belief in him, — in his words, — in his religion. So far a profession must, from the nature of the case, extend. The belief in the Scriptures is the simplest form in which the profession can be made. It excludes no sect, bears hard on no conscience, and is evidently the only ground on which all Christians can meet. But when the members of a little Church frame a creed containing their own particular belief, adopted perhaps by accident, and spread by education, sympathy, and example; when they require others to subscribe to these fabrications of their own, on pain of being denied the name and privileges of Christians, — what does this proceeding imply? It is precisely the same as saying, ‘You shall not profess your belief in Jesus Christ, unless you will at the same time profess your belief in us too;’ and thus many, in every part of our land, are kept away from the table, because they are not suffered to do their duty to Christ,

without submitting to the impositions of man, without making a declaration against their conscience and against the truth, without countenancing a system which admits and welcomes the hypocrite, if he comes, and drives the upright and conscientious away. In defence of this unrighteous practice, it is said, that they have a right to form themselves into Churches, with their own conditions and forms, and that Unitarians may do the same if they will. This right we absolutely deny. No doubt they have a right to form lodges and associations, and make whatever conditions they will; but the *Church of our Lord* is already established, on such a foundation and with such conditions, as he thought proper. They can have no rights, no powers, except such as he has expressly given. They say that Unitarians have no right to demand their fellowship. So far as we know, Unitarians never did demand it, nor ask it, nor complain of the want of it. They only demand the right of going to the table of the Lord, wherever it is spread; and they complain, with good reason, of being injured, when the right which he has given is denied by usurping men.

Why will Churches persist in these unfounded pretensions? The world never will submit to them. Men know full well that they cannot claim an inch of power which is not expressly given in the Scriptures, and that there is not a line nor letter in them which gives to a few Christians, accidentally thrown together, a right to insist on these creeds and forms. It may be said that they are useful, solemn, and important. But if this were true, which it is not, still the question returns, Where do they get the right to impose them? If they say it is an ancient and venerable practice, the world will not admit a plea which would make ancient and venerable abuses immortal. They may satisfy themselves that they have this right, but the pretension is so manifestly absurd, that the common sense of mankind will persevere in resisting it, till they have pulled down the last vestige of these walls of exclusion.

It is by thus attempting to divide Christ, by each little Church claiming separate and exclusive jurisdiction, that the Lord's Supper has been made to many a subject of so much dread. Ask that man, who appears so serious, upright, and thoughtful, why he does not perform this duty, while he acknowledges that it is a duty. He will say that he is not

good enough. Did he get this impression from the words of Jesus Christ? No; he said nothing about any particular measure of goodness required. He received this impression from the practice of some Church, which would not admit any who would not confess that he was converted, that is, that he is good; and they ask nothing but his word for it, — the poorest evidence of personal goodness that can possibly be given. They welcome the Pharisee who gives God thanks that he is not like other men, and they reject the Publican, who says, 'God, be merciful to me, a sinner.' Those Churches take an awful responsibility upon themselves. Whatever they may think of it, the law and the testimony are against them. They never can answer it to God.

We shall draw a second inference with respect to dismissal from the Church, as it is called, though the phrase expresses too much; since, to dismiss from the Church of our Lord is not within the duties and powers of men. Whoever comes to the table of a Church, makes his profession to Jesus Christ, and not to them, — becomes a member of His Church, not of theirs; and for them to undertake to dismiss from His Church would be an unauthorized and of course invalid proceeding on their part. It may be asked, have the individuals assembled in a Church no power to keep from their association those who would bring reproach upon it, — no power to remove those whose life shows that their profession is untrue? Certainly they have. Their Master has directed that in case one shall injure another, the injured shall make a private appeal to the conscience and good feeling of the other. In most instances an appeal of this kind will be sufficient to make him penitent for the transgression; but if he refused all redress, the injured party was to take with him witnesses and go to his adversary again, that men not under the excitement of passion might bear testimony to the spirit and manner in which the conference is conducted on both sides. If this produced no effect, it was to be laid before the congregation. If their influence could not induce the offender to do his duty, they were to regard him as a stranger. Such a course of conduct, delicate, considerate, and forbearing, with such variations as it may need to adapt it to the manners of different ages, is recommended by Him, whose word is law. The Church are to act thus in their individual capacities, though they act together. They say that they can

associate with the offender no longer, till his conduct cease to deny his profession ; but their withdrawing from his society can hardly be regarded as a dismission from the Church of Christ. The power conferred does not extend so far ; and if man assumes it, in order to effect his own ambitious purposes, he has no reason to expect, nor others to fear, that his sentence will be affirmed on high.

But, it may be said, we hear of persons dismissed from one Church and admitted to another ; for example, those who change their place of residence, are formally dismissed by the Church which they leave, and readmitted in the place to which they go. If such is the practice, it seems to us to be a needless form ; since, as there is but one Church, whoever is admitted to one is at the same time, and by the same act, a member of every other. In such a case a letter of recommendation is all that is required. He is already a member of the Church in the place to which he goes ; but if he is a stranger there, he needs an introduction ; this is given as a friendly, not an official act ; and this, of course, becomes unnecessary when the party is known.

But a question like this may be proposed ; — Suppose that a member of a local church becomes so dissatisfied with the conduct or doctrines of those with whom he is connected, that he requests a dismission from them, — what are they to do ? They are to explain to him that he misunderstands the nature of the connexion. He joined the Church of Jesus Christ ; from this they have no power to dismiss him ; whatever obligations are contracted in consequence of that profession, bind him to Jesus Christ ; from these they have no power to absolve him. As for his obligations to them, there are none. If their covenant is what it ought to be, he engages to attend the ordinance of religion with them so long as he feels that he can derive improvement from it, and not a moment longer. When the time arrives in which he considers it desirable to connect himself with others in preference to them, let them cheerfully recommend him as a brother and a friend, and let him be contented with this ; for it is all the dismission which they have any right to give.

Since this case is not an uncommon one, we will go on to say, that there are two things which should be distinctly explained to such a person. The first is, that those individuals never considered him as making a profession of belief in them ; so

that if he should be persuaded by others, that their sentiments are dangerous and untrue, it is nothing to him ; he never professed to believe them ; he did not make himself responsible for their opinions ; nor they for his ; all his profession was made to Jesus Christ ; and whether made in company with Barbarian or Scythian, bond or free, if it was made honestly, without hypocrisy or reservation, He will pronounce it good.

The second thing to be impressed on such a person, is that he must have some authority for saying by his conduct, that those with whom he has formerly associated are not worthy of his communion ; for if they are Christians, he is bound to hold communion with them, and he cannot cease to do this without declaring that he does not regard them as Christians. Then they have a right to ask him to show his authority for giving judgment on the characters of other men. Jesus Christ is the only person to whom God has given this power, and it is not known that he has ever delegated it to men. What if their sentiments are, in his opinion, wrong ? He never made himself answerable for their sentiments, by sitting down at their table ; and if they are wrong, this mistake involves no forfeiture of the name and fellowship of Christians. It ought to be proclaimed on the house-top, till the sound reaches bigotry in her darkest caverns, that whoever sits thus in judgment on others, be it an individual or a Church, is guilty of an open and presumptuous sin.

Again ; there are some, who have been dismissed, as it is called, from one Church and have not yet entered another. We have heard it said by those who should know better, that they are not members of any Church at all. Strange ! how little this relation is understood. Members of no Church ! When did they cease to be members of the Church of our Lord Jesus Christ ? They became members of his Church when they first made a profession of faith in Christianity. After that, all Christians were their brethren ; go where they would, they had a right to a place at every table of the Lord. The narrow boundaries of sect, — the warlike liveries of party, — the uncouth names of Catholic and Protestant, Episcopal and Congregational, are nothing to Him. He knows but one church, — the Christian, which is not divided by these differences among men. The man who begins to draw lines about him, — to say that they who will not believe as he does shall not enjoy a privilege which Christ has given freely to

all, — to say that men shall not drink the waters of life except from his own stagnant cistern, — that man may give the name of conscience to his bad passion if he will, — he may babble of a sense of duty, — but his conscience, if he had any, would act within the province which Jesus Christ assigned it, — his sense of duty would be governed by the word of God. His good sense and feeling must be drowned in religious delusion before he can claim civil power for a Church; still more, before he can claim for it that divine power to determine the destinies of others, which belongs to God alone.

We may draw an inference also with respect to excommunication, as it is called. That this power resides in the Church no one denies. When a member continues to deny his profession by persevering immorality, the Scriptures authorize the members of a Church to separate him from their number, and this is done by separating themselves from him. This is the only excommunication known to the gospel, and this is for a corrupt life. We challenge the advocates of exclusion to show us a solitary passage in Scripture, which authorizes them to inflict the least censure on those whose sentiments merely are wrong. But this simple, intelligible, and reasonable practice has been converted into an engine of tremendous power; men have actually been at times persuaded, that others had power to cast them out of the Church; and by the same act to cut off all their hopes of heaven. And by throwing a veil of mystery over the simplest of all simple things; by keeping up the impression that heaven is for them and their own, and hell for all beside; by repeating, till they make men believe it, that God is of their party, that their friends are his friends, and their foes his foes, they have established a kingdom in the world under the counterfeited authority of the King of kings. Men not knowing much about the subject, think it safest to avoid their censures, and the general feeling with respect to them is a mixture of hatred and dread. Excommunication, perverted from its original design, has been the instrument for prolonging the hour and power of darkness in the world.

There is a kind of excommunication frequently practised by narrow and deluded men. We allude to their neglecting the ordinance of the Supper, if they chance to be in Unitarian Churches, by way of casting censure on those whom they deem unsound in the faith. A very little reflection, with a

right understanding of the subject, would show them that this practice, while it is unfelt by those for whom it is intended, is a direct insult to Him, in remembrance of whom the table is spread. They have no concern, in any form, with the profession of others; and to say that they will not 'do this in remembrance of him,' because others, whom they dislike, happen to be present, is the gratification of a spirit as different as possible from his own. It may be well for them to consider, to whom their disrespect is paid.

Without attempting to exhaust this wide subject, we will now point out some unfortunate results flowing from these usurpations on the part of Churches. One consequence is, that the very name of the Church is brought into contempt. Many believe that they are an association of men, who claim to be better than others, who imagine that they gain an accession of personal importance by thus associating together; that they feed their spiritual pride, by looking down on all other men. If the Church did indeed resemble this description, it would be the most unchristian thing in the world. But in our view, the Church is simply composed of those, who believe that Jesus Christ required them to make a profession of their faith in him; who pretend to no superior sanctity; who would gladly welcome all, young and old, to their number; who insist upon keeping the door of the church open continually, day and night; and who would not for the universe straiten the gate, nor put stumbling-blocks in the way that leadeth unto life. But they do consider it a duty to remember their Master in his chosen way; and they will not leave it neglected, to reproach them in the hour, when they shall wish, oh! how fervently! that they had left nothing undone.

Another result of this perversion is seen among ourselves. There are those in all liberal societies who have been kept from this ordinance by the alarming impressions with which men have surrounded it. This renders them afraid to obey our Saviour's last command; and they are so easily persuaded that the gloomy view of every religious subject is the true one, that they do not even examine the Scriptures. But when it is explained to them that these terrors are inventions of men; when you show them what Jesus Christ said, and all that he said concerning it; when you remove every obstacle that prevents their coming, and show them that if they delay it lon-

ger, the difficulty must be in themselves; instead of being grateful for the explanation, they sometimes appear as if sorry to be deprived of an excuse which has quieted their conscience so long; they say that you have divested the ordinance of its solemnity, and cut it down to nothing. The fact is, that there are many in every sect, who have no idea of solemnity apart from forms; they cannot feel realities; take away the show and state, and they say, like Micah, 'Ye have taken away my Gods, and what have I left me?' because they have nothing left but their duty, their Saviour, and their God.

We have endeavoured to show that most of the errors on this subject, and all the reproach, have arisen from the attempts to divide Christ; from the idea, that Churches are distinct and independent associations, having the right to frame their own laws and dictate their own conditions. In opposition to this we have stated the truth, which may be denied, but cannot be disproved, that there is but one Church, consisting of those in every region, who have professed their faith in Christ, and performed the service appointed in remembrance of him; and that the members of this Church can exert no civil or divine power, which is not expressly allowed them by the great Head of the Church, in whom all authority resides. We feel as if it were necessary to state these things with precision, because many, who are liberal in sentiment, are yet thorough Calvinists in their imaginations of the Lord's Supper. They still cling to fancies concerning it, which they do not believe, — do not love, — cannot possibly maintain, and yet are unwilling to surrender. Therefore we are earnest to have them regard it no longer in the light of a form, but to consider it as a plain, simple, solemn, and important duty. We do regard this as a most important subject, and are surprised to see that so little is said or written concerning it; for the abuses we have alluded to seem to us the most entire and enormous of all the corruptions of Christianity. The sign of Christian fellowship is made the sign of disunion; the banner of love is unfurled in unholy strife; all the bands of affection by which Jesus Christ intended to hold together the hearts of his followers are used as lines of party separation. It is impossible to conceive a more complete perversion of his kind purposes than this. It is a subject that needs to be presented often to the attention of men. It is true that they might find in the Scriptures the correct statement of the nature and design of the ordinance thus abused;

but they cannot easily distinguish the impressions they gather from the Scriptures, from those which they derive from other sources; the very counsel of God is darkened by the words without knowledge which they have been used to hear. Whoever will take up this subject and give it a thorough examination, will enlighten many minds which are now anxious and doubting, and would have the honor and satisfaction of rendering a good service to the Christian world.

ART. XII. — *The Child's Book of the Soul.* By T. H. GALLAUDET. Hartford. Cook & Co. 1831. 16mo. pp. 128.

THE object of this pleasing, well executed little work is to convince a child, though quite young, by a process of reasoning, level, as it is believed, to his apprehension, that he has something within him, distinct from the body, unlike it, wonderfully superior to it, and which will survive it after death, and live for ever. It is only by inquiries and investigations of this nature, we are told, that he can be led up to any just and precise conceptions of the Infinite One; — the elements of all our notions of the Father of our spirits being derived from what we know of the emotions, states, and operations of our own spirits. Whatever men may think on the general subject of the utility and effectiveness of such attempts, all will agree that the present one evinces throughout a careful and successful study of the human mind in its first and feeblest efforts, skill in awakening and directing the curiosity, and the command of a style at once clear, simple, and beautiful. The writer deserves commendation, too, for dealing fairly and frankly with the child's understanding, and for keeping himself entirely free from a sectarian spirit and bias. A second part of this publication has appeared, and more are promised, going more into the evidences and great practical principles of Christianity; which, if executed in the same spirit, and with equal ability, we shall be among the readiest to welcome and recommend.

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WE wish we could place at the head of this article a good translation of the Scriptures with a popular commentary. There is absolutely nothing now so much wanted, for the promotion of religious knowledge and improvement, as a work of this nature. Controversy enough we have had; and a great deal more, we are inclined to think, than has been well understood by the body of the people; though we are very well satisfied with the result, as far as their inquiries have gone. But the more we are convinced of the unappropriateness of abstruse discussion for general reading, the higher value do we set upon simple exposition. Indeed an abstruse discussion upon the meaning of language, which is the ultimate resort of all Christian controversy, is the last task of hard reading, and requires, in fact, a degree, not commonly possessed, of learning and of mental accomplishment to do it justice. It is an investigation not of facts and principles only, not of thoughts only, but of the bearing and influence upon them of the most subtle and flexible instrument of thought. It is like the office of the judge, in not only summing up evidence, but in weighing the grains and scruples of the phraseology of the law that is applicable to it.

The translation, which we desire to see, should be accurate and simple, the result of much learning without making any parade of it, not afraid to depart from the language of the received version when the sense requires it, and yet not

ambitious of doing so without good reason. A happy example of this, we think, especially for the Old Testament, where less change is needed, is seen in Mr. Noyes's Translation of the Psalms, and of the Book of Job. The commentary should be the very reverse, in almost every thing, of Dr. Scott's,* — learned, impartial, acute, brief, — never covering up a plain text with a mass of verbiage, never interposing to help the reader but when it is necessary, and then interposing in terms clear, explicit, and satisfactory. If Mr. Noyes will add to his translations a commentary equally acceptable, he will do what is needed for the Old Testament. For the New, we earnestly hope that those labors are in progress, which will give, in an accurate and just translation accompanied by an acute and popular commentary, a more valuable present to the body of the Christian world, than it has yet received from priest or layman, from any university or private study.

Meanwhile as a proof of the growing interest that is felt in spreading just ideas of the Scriptures among the people, we welcome the little work which is named at the beginning of this article. We give all due praise to the editor, that amidst the many and well-known labors of a life devoted to his profession, he finds time for superintending, and, with the help of his friends, sustaining this useful publication. Much of the commentary and many of the discussions are of a very interesting character, and happily fitted to remove those mistakes and obscurities that have so long marred and darkened the holy page. Like mists overhanging the fairest landscape, like earth overlaying the richest mine, popular misconceptions have hidden from most eyes, a world of beauty and wealth. It is, in truth, 'a land where *hidden* beauty lies.'

* The amazing success of this work seems to us to prove, more than it proves any thing else, the great want, the demand, there was in the public mind, for a popular commentary. We have known many, and presume there are thousands, very ill able to afford it, who have bought this diluted mass of second-hand criticism and Calvinistic speculation, because they were willing to go beyond their means to obtain the long and earnestly desired explanation of the book of books — the Bible. The disappointment of many, it need not be said, has been extreme; though a long and constantly lengthening advertisement of recommendations has sufficed to keep up the feeling that this is a great work. And a great work it certainly is!

Indeed, the interest with which the Scriptures should be regarded and read, is the subject on which we now propose to offer some remarks. We say both regarded and read ; for although we intend to direct our observations chiefly to the latter point, the reading of the Bible, we would say something, in the first place, of the want of a due estimation of these writings.

There are those, doubtless, who think too much of the Bible as a mere book, who give their reverence too much to the very phraseology and form of the book, who forget that the letter killeth and that it is the spirit which maketh alive, — that they should go beyond the form in this as in every thing else, beyond the form of words, as they should beyond the form of ceremonies and rites ; who forget that the love of the Scriptures is the means, in short, and not the end. A man should no more say, ‘ How much I love the Scriptures ! ’ and stop short, content with that, than he should be content with admiring a book upon husbandry, or upon any art or trade, which it is his business to pursue. He should turn all he reads to account. He should go in the way to which the guide points, and not rest in admiration of the guide.

But admiration, barely so much as admiration, is, we fear, an unusual sentiment to be entertained about the Bible. The common feeling, it must be suspected, is one of considerable indifference, and would be one of much greater indifference, if it were not regarded with apprehension as a dark sign, in the experience of those who feel it. There are many who, but for this reason, would probably drop all reading of the Scriptures. There are some who do not read them, and who must defend their neglect on the ground, — to state it plainly, — that they do not think them worth reading. Their judgment, in fact, and a most ignorant and childish judgment it is, amounts to that. They have never given any intelligent attention to the Bible. They have no just comprehension of this most wonderful book, — most wonderful, whether considered as inspired or not inspired. A book containing the most ancient and authentic history and literature in the world ; a book, whose records, — the fragments, at least, of whose records, — have come down to us from the oldest homes of the human race ; a book which lifted up, amidst the debasement of universal idolatry, such lofty strains of devotion as have fed the

piety of the most refined ages; a book which gives us an account of the freest institutions of ancient times; a book filled with the most sublime and beautiful poetry that has ever been given to the world; a book in fine, marked, in its later records, with a moral grandeur, and sanctity, whose expression wrested from listening and even hostile auditories the exclamation, 'Never man spake like this man!' — such a book is the Bible! And now what is the conception which many, and some, too, who think themselves very wise in the matter, entertain of it? Why, it is a book, — we must speak with a freedom that pains our reverence for it, — it is a book, they think, they venture perhaps to say, of 'old wives' fables' and childish legends; a book about things long gone by, and dull, and indifferent; a book not worth reading. They have a confused impression that it is all about a weary journey in the wilderness, and about useless ceremonies, and fighting kings perpetrating strange cruelties, and an obstinate people full of vulgar ideas and barbarous usages, and strange stories passing all belief, and half-crazed prophets performing eccentric deeds and uttering maledictions and mysteries. This, this, we say, is the sort of blind and blundering conception which not a few have of the ancient Scriptures. Whether it is that all this was read much in childhood, or whether the intellect has always remained in a sort of infantile state about it, or whether the simplicity of an ancient style has deceived the people, — why it is, we do not altogether see, but it is certain, that all the venerable and sublime features of this body of ancient history, law, poetry, and prophecy, are brought down to the measure of an amazing childishness. The dignity of these writings is nearly lost to the mass of the people. Nor can we allow that a much wiser judgment is formed of the New Testament. Many suppose that the whole wisdom and weight of it lie in the more abstruse and obscure parts of the book; which, as they do not understand, they cannot really and heartily admire and honor; while they just as falsely imagine, that the more simple and practical portions of the record, the teachings of our Saviour, are so obvious, and already so well understood, as not to need much of their attention. And thus it comes to pass, for one reason or another, that the whole book is by many, not only not attentively read, but not looked upon as intrinsically deserving such regard.

We must pardon much to the unfortunate influences of education, much to want of knowledge. And this leads us to repeat, and we shall yet again reiterate, the call for popular exposition. If any one would write a book, — we do not now speak of a regular commentary, — but a book of disquisitions or lectures on the Old Testament, which should not be too learned, and yet the fruit of much learning, which should relieve the popular difficulties about such subjects as the creation, and the flood, and the building of Babel, and the age of the antediluvians, and the destruction of the Canaanites, and many things in the conduct of the patriarchs, he would do a most important service to the cause of religion. How often is an objection made with a very grave and ominous air of superior wisdom, to the inebriety of Noah, the treachery of Jacob, the anger of Moses, the wickedness of David, and even to the incorrigible obstinacy and folly of the whole nation of the Israelites, as if it concerned any body on earth, to defend them in those respects! How many things, too numerous here to mention, are referred to, as bearing an aspect of inconsistency, extravagance, or absolute incredibility, which are capable of easy explanation, from the customs of those ancient ages, or the natural history of those remote countries, or the peculiarities of their language! And how common is it, instead of looking upon these writings as an historical account of God's moral interpositions in behalf of men, to regard them, in substance and detail, as the express dictates and suggestions of divine wisdom, and therefore to regard that wisdom as responsible for every sentence and word, that is written in the Bible! Truly, armed with such a theory as this, 'the letter killeth.' It would kill all faith.

But we must not dwell longer on this depreciating estimate of the Bible, but proceed to take up a subject which is one, we think, of great practical importance, *the reading of the Scriptures*. In doing this, we propose to speak freely of the difficulties that attend it, and of their character, causes, and remedy.

There is scarcely any subject, we are inclined to believe, which the state of the general mind, at present, more earnestly calls into discussion than this of reading the Scriptures. When the Bible was denied to the laity, or when, in that revulsion of feeling which the Reformation produced,

the reading of it came to be regarded as one of the greatest privileges and duties, and men dared not to acknowledge to themselves, much less to others, that there were any difficulties in the way of the required interest in the Scriptures, the case was different. But in the freedom of thought and of speech which now exists, and which distinguishes our own times from the days of elder Puritanism quite as much as they were distinguished from the reign of the Romish hierarchy, there are not a few who admit to themselves, and some who acknowledge to others, that there are obstacles in their minds, if not distinct feelings of reluctance, to the reading of the Scriptures;—at least, to that extent and with that frequency which are commonly urged by their religious advisers. This feeling is commonly entertained, we believe, with pain, at least, by all serious minds; and we have known it to be entertained by very serious minds. To such it is a subject of regret and apprehension, that they are wanting in that love of the Scriptures, which is commonly stated as one of the most indispensable marks of piety.

There are others by whom a much stronger feeling, a feeling of absolute aversion is felt, and even carelessly felt, who regard their dislike of the Scriptures as one of the many indications of a character, which they have made up their minds to take and acknowledge as their own. Their aversion is founded on very different reasons, from the difficulties of the former class. The difficulties of the former may arise partly from familiarity with the Scriptures; the aversion of the latter arises from worldly neglect, from pride, and from the dislike of all reproof and religious impression.

Again, there are others who look upon both of these states of mind, with equal and unqualified reprobation, who have never been at liberty to reflect freely on this subject, and who therefore brand all deficiency in the enjoyment of the Scriptures, as a sign of spiritual deadness. They have never had the freedom of mind to suspect that such reluctance may have arisen from natural and reasonable causes. Prone to think every thing wrong, they have regarded all obstacles to reading the Bible as only added proofs of the common depravity.

It may therefore be for the benefit of all to enter into

some account of the causes which may have contributed to make the Scriptures less interesting than it is desirable they should be.

Something may undoubtedly be attributed, as a first cause, to the circumstance that in childhood the Scriptures are often read as a task. To a child, the reading of the Scriptures as a whole can scarcely be otherwise than a task. It is impossible that the Bible as a whole should be understood by a child; and therefore the reading of it must always be mechanical and ultimately irksome. The Romish doctrine of the uselessness and injurious tendency of reading the Scriptures, might, with some limitations at least, apply to children. Of what use can it be to them to read such books as Deuteronomy, or Leviticus, the obscure parts of the prophets, or the speculative parts of the Epistles? And how can the perusal of such portions of our sacred books fail to be uninteresting; and if uninteresting, then, a task; and if a task, then, an injury, not only for the time being, but, through the laws of association, an injury for years to come. The Bible, though it has interested the learned, the critical, the intelligently pious, beyond all other writings, comes to be permanently regarded as a dull book. The tasks of childhood become the drudgeries of maturer years, or, more likely, task and drudgery are laid aside, and profit and pleasure are foreclosed and lost, in the habitual neglect of the Scriptures.

But the influence of early association yields, as a cause of indifference to the sacred oracles, to another which we are now to mention; and this is, that men commonly read the Scriptures, without gaining any new, or any clearer ideas from them. Take for an illustration of this difficulty any given chapter of the Bible,—say a chapter of one of the Evangelists. Now here are some passages that are sealed up from the reader in an ancient idiom, in a strange phraseology; they are not understood, and of course are not interesting; nay, they create a distinct feeling of dissatisfaction, as all ignorance must. Again, there are other passages relating to ordinances and usages that have long since passed away, and these passages, therefore, are a dead letter. There is still, however, a part, and probably the greater part, that is intelligible; but this, again, is per-

fectly familiar. The chapter has been read a hundred times. The reader is acquainted beforehand with every word and with every obvious idea ; with every idea, that is, which a cursory and careless reading is likely to give him. Now the Bible is not a magician's wand. It is a rational appeal to man's rational understanding. It is to affect his understanding as any other pious address would, and no otherwise. There is no charm in its words and phrases because they are the words and phrases of Scripture, that will necessarily rescue them from the ordinary effects of familiarity. There is no charm that will necessarily do this ; but there is a habit of mind, as we shall soon undertake to point out, by which it may be voluntarily done. There are objects we know, which familiarity does not render indifferent, and the Bible may be such an object of regard as shall rescue it from all the ordinary effects of familiarity.

A still further cause of difficulty lies in a certain literal, slavish, and superstitious habit of reading the Scriptures ; we know not how otherwise to express it. It is literal. It is a reading of so much ; of so many verses or chapters, as if the merit or advantage of reading consisted in the amount read. It is a reading of so much, stately, with very little regard to the sense, with more regard to the sum than to the sense ; with no design, ever entertained, of pursuing out any one subject in the Bible. It is a slavish habit. It is reading the Scriptures for the sake of reading them, and not distinctly and intelligently for the sake of the advantage to be gained. The feeling of *duty* in this case is slavish. It is blindly submissive to a rule. The rule is,—the rule set up by all religious bodies, is,—that every Christian, every good man must read the Scriptures. He who would be a good man, then, feels that he must read them. It is a part, as he considers it, of his very profession and business, and a condition of his very hope, to read them. Now, the difficulty is, that he is too apt to rest in this simple feeling and the correspondent practice, without looking sufficiently to the ultimate objects and advantages, and without sufficiently considering how he is to secure those objects and advantages. And there are two feelings, let it be remembered, which can never enter into collision without difficulty ; the feel-

ing that a duty is binding on the conscience, and the feeling that there is no good reason for it, — no sufficient object to be answered by it. We confess that we had rather remove the feeling of duty from the question of reading the Bible, than have it stand as a taskmaster to enforce a reluctant service. Such a service, in fine, must become superstitious; and it will bear that fatal mark of superstition, the substitution of the means for the end. The reading of the Bible will become, not a great means of piety, but itself a great work of piety; and thus perverted from its true and proper character, it must be, at length, despite of the zeal of superstition, a dull and irksome employment.

We have before referred to the case of moral aversion, — the hostility of a bad heart to the truths, the reproofs, and the warnings of the Bible; but it is unnecessary more particularly to dwell on this obvious state of feeling, since it is our purpose rather to address good and serious minds on this subject, — to address those whom we do not desire to reproach with any heinous wickedness, but to whom the duty we have to propose is that of surmounting a difficulty and of correcting an error.

The first remedy to be proposed is knowledge; knowledge, we mean, as including an understanding not only of the value and dignity of the sacred writings, of which we have already spoken, but of their general character, a distinct perception also of the ends for which they should be read, and an intelligent use of the necessary helps to a right comprehension of their meaning.

He who would read the Scriptures profitably would do well to reflect, in the first place, upon the kind of writings that claim his attention. The book before him is not, as the division into verses might lead him to suppose it is, — it is not a body of aphorisms, or of sententious paragraphs, where every verse or chapter by itself contains a complete sense, and where a single glance suffices to detect the meaning, or a few moments' reading, to master the subject. Neither does it consist, on the other hand, of a series of logical inductions, like the sections or chapters of a book of moral philosophy. There is philosophy in the Bible; the philosophy of human nature and of the nature that is divine; at once the most profound in its principles,

and simple in its precepts; the deep-founded and everlasting truth is there; but it is not philosophically developed; it has not the form of philosophy. On the contrary, the Bible is a collection of writings the most miscellaneous and desultory; of a cast as free and popular as that of any writings in the world. And while it thus gives the widest scope to all the peculiarities of mind and style, we are to remember, that the several ages which have so freely stamped their character upon the book are all ancient; that the manners, customs, and circumstances, which give their complexion to it, are those of distant nations; that the writers are all Oriental, foreign to us, — strange to us, in the aspect of some of their thoughts, and many of their modes of communication. While the substance of the communication is, indeed, sacred truth, and truth, as coming from God, of supreme interest, it is, nevertheless, mixed up with the history of various nations, with narratives of personal experience, details of ritual usages, allusions to contemporaneous events and circumstances; and from all these, the substance of the communication is to be extracted. It is not to be identified with them; still less is it committed by them, or pledged for their accuracy or propriety. Let it only be admitted that there have been interpositions of God for the moral guidance of an ancient people, that a light has thus been lifted up and borne onward amidst the nations, that the way of past generations has thus been marked with the pillar of cloud and the pillar of fire, and it matters little with what circumstances and facts the record of all this blended. The interposition surely is not, in the least, responsible for the conduct of those, for whom it was made. It is none the less certain or divine because it was surrounded by human errors and follies. As well deny the course of the sun through the heavens, or disparage its gladdening light, because mists and clouds rise up from the earth and sometimes obscure its path. Grant that the Bible contains accounts of bad men and of bad actions, of foolish and absurd superstitions, of vulgar prejudices and now useless ceremonies, of gross misdeeds, the relation of which may offend the taste of more refined ages; what is all this to the great manifestation, — the manifestation of one God of infinite perfection, and of his paternal interest for his hu-

man family! This bare fact admitted, we know not how it may be with others, but with us, this bare fact is one that sinks every thing else, in the history of all past times, to comparative insignificance. It is a fact which, admitted or even suspected, would lead us to open the Scriptures with sacred curiosity and profound reverence. We should 'ask for those old ways,' and for the footsteps of God in them, with far more eager inquiry than for all the treasures of ancient art and learning.

These views, we think, are needed as preliminary to an intelligent reading of the Scriptures. A blind veneration for them, which asks no questions, a superstitious and slavish reading of this book because it is the Bible, may not stand in need of any such views. As it seeks no sense, and has none, it may not require any to help it out. But he who would intelligently peruse this volume, must make this discrimination between the substance and the form. And, fairly making it, he will be neither disappointed nor offended at what he meets with; he will not find stumbling-blocks at every step. He will not wonder that the prophet, after having declared that 'the Lord said' thus and thus to him, should then go on and use language that appears to be low or familiar, or unworthy of the Infinite Majesty in whose name he speaks. He will not wonder at this, because he will understand that while the prophet delivers a message from heaven, he clothes it in a language of his own choosing, and for which his taste alone is responsible. He will not be shocked at those freedoms of an ancient and Oriental style, by which God's displeasure against the wicked is compared to an animal's rage or a man's revenge; by which it is set forth in a tone of menace, and even of pointed irony; he will not be shocked at this, because he will be aware that all this is mere style, and, as such, is human, and is designed to be considered as human and not as divine.

But we proceed to observe, that the general views which have been presented of the Scriptures will open to the intelligent reader another kind of discrimination; and that is of the different objects and ends for which they are to be read.

The light of revelation which seems to be sometimes obscured, as in the narrative of the historian or the dim visions of the seer, at other times shines forth clearly, as

in the devout meditations of the Psalmist, and in those sublime representations of God that break forth amidst the dark sayings of prophecy. These may be read for the mere purpose of devotional excitement. They are comparatively easy to be understood. Their general import may be comprehended without much labor of criticism, or protracted attention to the series of discourse. There are, in the Bible, golden sentences to meditate upon ; a few of which will be sufficient to fill the mind with rich and holy themes, with bright and glorious thoughts. Doubtless there is something in the simplest passages that requires explanation. But we may take the sense, though the drapery of figure and illustration that clothes it, is not always simple nor easily unfolded. We may pluck the fruit, though the foliage of an eastern clime waves in rich and almost overshadowing luxuriance around it.

One part of the Scripture, then, — and in this we are to include the practical portions of the New Testament, — is comparatively plain. He that runs may read. He may read all that is essential to guide his course to heaven. But there is another portion which is not plain. And here the object in reading must be to investigate the sense ; to gather the intent of the inspired teacher from the narratives, discussions, and descriptions of ancient ceremonies and institutions with which it is bound up. The investigation is to be pursued with patient attention to the course, whether of the history or of the argument, and the reader must avail himself of the helps which learning offers him.

And this brings us to the final and principal suggestion under the head of knowledge, as a means of remedying the difficulties that prevail with regard to the reading of the Bible, — the use of helps. It is impossible to understand considerable portions of the Epistles, of the prophecies, and even of the historical narratives of Scripture, without assistance from the labors of learned men, and a good deal of study besides. And we should not hesitate to recommend to those who cannot or will not use these means, to give their exclusive attention to the more simple portions of the sacred volume. There are such portions, doubtless, even in the more obscure books ; as in the writings of the Prophets and in the Apostolic letters ; here and there a chapter is practical. But, beyond these, a slight and cursory reading can-

not go into those books with any advantage. It is better to stop short. What lies beyond is out of the reach of the general and cursory reader, and we think he cannot be told so too soon or too plainly. Plato is scarcely harder to be understood than Paul. There are no moral disquisitions of ancient times, that are mixed up with circumstances so peculiar and so likely to involve them in obscurity to modern eyes, as the letters of the Apostles. And yet they are constantly read, with as little resort to means and helps for understanding them, as letters addressed to the American churches but yesterday would be, or as the yearly Epistles of the Friends are. Nay, even in these cases, one of another country or of another sect, would find a good many peculiarities in the turn of thought or of expression, that would require explanation. But what shades of obscurity must intervening ages have added to all such peculiarities! Thus, again, and still more emphatically, with regard to the Old Testament; it certainly would be as absurd to expect to understand the Justinian code without study, as to expect to understand the Mosaic code without study. The Commentaries of Michaelis on Jewish law are, at least, as necessary to be read for the comprehension of it, as the Commentaries of Blackstone on English law are for a like purpose. And yet, law, political economy, history, geography, poetry, philosophy, every thing, do men expect to understand, without any labor or preparation, because, forsooth, it is in the Bible!

It is better at once to confess the simple truth, and let the Papist on the one hand, and the unbeliever on the other, make what they can of it. Here is a body of writings, embracing momentous communications from God; this we believe; but there are dark passages, and clouds of obscurity in it, as there are in the other works of God. We may travel through the one as through the other, through the field of revelation as through the field of nature, by a clear and certain light; by a light that is poured down from heaven upon the whole land through which our journey leads; and if we would turn aside, as well we may, without the distrust of the Catholic, or the disbelief of the infidel, — if we would turn aside to examine the dark passage, or to penetrate the cloud of obscurity, we must apply ourselves as to a task, and employ the aids necessary to bring the in-

vestigation to a successful issue. If any one shall say, 'Why these obscurities?' it is sufficient to answer, that they are, from the very nature of the case, unavoidable. Moral teachings could not have been given to successive ages, adapted to their special wants, without becoming, in some particulars, obscure, as they become old. It might just as well be asked, why one language was not made universal and perpetual, and why the circumstances of all men in all ages were not made to be the same. If the successive revelations from Heaven were to contribute to the moral education of the world, they must have been just what they are.

But the difficulties, let us add, the most of them at any rate, are not insuperable. If we cannot find commentaries such in all respects as are to be desired, we can at least use such as we have. An ordinary exposition would impart much valuable information to the general reader; and the Commentaries of Locke, Bishop Pearce, and Kenrick,* all of them together less voluminous than the single Exposition of Scott, are not ordinary, and could not fail to be useful.

Some general reading too of the proper books would clear up a multitude of passages, which to many are now worse than useless and uninteresting. It would be impossible, we think, to read such a work as Lowth's '*Lectures on Hebrew Poetry*,' without taking a new interest in the Psalms and the finest portions of the prophetic writings; or such a work as '*Campbell's Dissertations*,' prefixed to his Translation, without seeing new light and beauty in the Gospels; or any good treatise on Oriental customs and antiquities without feeling a new acquaintance with the Scriptures at large. And some of this reading is indispensable to any tolerable understanding of them.

We put it to the consistency, then, of those who profess a desire to be better acquainted with the Scriptures and

* We are less acquainted with Kenrick than with Locke and Pearce among the English expositors (upon whom, of course, we draw for instances), but we would not say any thing to the prejudice of what we understand to be a valuable commentary. In calling for a new commentary, we have had in view one which should be complete, and embrace a new translation, which Kenrick's work does not, and one especially that should cover the ground which his does not, where the principal difficulties and obscurities offer themselves to the unlearned reader.

more deeply interested in them, that they are bound to proceed more rationally and intelligently in this matter. How can they be thoroughly interested in what they but half understand! They ought to be willing to afford a little time and expense for purchasing and perusing those books, which will tend to illustrate the sacred oracles. They ought to give some of their reading hours to these subjects. They ought, at least, to employ in this manner some of the leisure hours of the Sabbath. If they could be induced to do this, they would find, in the very action of their minds, and in the enlargement of their knowledge, that the obscurities of Scripture had not been without advantage to them. They might come to think it was well and wisely ordered that in studying the records of their faith they should gain such an extensive acquaintance with the poetry and history, the philosophy and the arts, of the ancient world. It is time that we went beyond the measure of the old, technical, and almost childish ideas on this subject. We have got beyond authoritative restrictions on the use of the sacred volume. We are getting beyond superstition; and knowledge must come. The age demands it; the Bible demands it; religion demands it; and it will not be always withheld.

Knowledge, if not the chief remedy against indifference towards the Scriptures, is the one, nevertheless, which we have thought chiefly needing to be dwelt upon. The further suggestions to this end, which we have to offer, must be restricted in this article to a much narrower space.

Next in the natural order of means for reading the Bible with interest is *meditation*. Meditation upon the meaning of Scripture would open to us new views even of the most intelligible, practical, devotional parts of the Bible. Let this be illustrated in the simple instance of a passage which every one supposes himself fully to understand, — ‘God is love.’ The most hasty, careless, formal reader comprehends this passage, — that is, he comprehends one general idea, namely, that God is good. But to the contemplative and devout mind, in how many forms does this idea present itself, in how many relations! What grandeur and tenderness seem to him to belong to it! How does it spread itself out into thoughts of all the mercies of God! How does it connect itself with all things about him, and stretch to immensity and to eternity! Again, the negligent

reader finds it said, that man is prone to evil, and he admits the general fact of human sinfulness. But the mind that meditates, that thinks of its offences, carries this general truth into its many and humbling applications ; and to such a mind the Bible seems to speak a new language. And thus, also, the precepts inculcating kindness, forbearance, meekness, are ever suggesting something new to the mind that really thinks of them. The language is the same, the truth is the same, but it appears in new aspects and relations.

And let it be observed, that it is in this way principally that we get new ideas on all subjects, especially on all moral subjects. The primary ideas are few, and are possessed by all. It is by new combinations of old ideas, it is by seeing new relations among them, by comparison, by illustration, that our knowledge advances. If it be asked why this progress may not be made by simply contemplating the ideas we have, the answer is, that reading the Scriptures is contemplating them, and that, too, with the best of aids, — that it is a means of presenting religious ideas (which is all that any book can do), that it gives us, moreover, the advantage of a guide. What else is to be said on this point resolves itself into the expediency of reading books of devotion ; and of this, to most persons, we presume that there can be no doubt. Unless we are wiser and more devout than all those who have written upon religion, they certainly can teach us something. Nor would it be without advantage to read them, even if they did not ; for one, and often the greatest, advantage of reading is, that it draws our mind to the subject. If it is expedient at all to read devotional works, then we maintain that the Bible is a better book of devotion than any other. And this, too, is the fountain of that light which shines through all others.

We revert, in this connexion, to one of the causes of indifference before stated. Men do not receive new ideas from reading the Bible. This, though not to be alleged as a positive and heinous transgression, is, nevertheless, a very serious mistake. It is a mistake about the proper manner and object of perusing the sacred volume. We read it cursorily, carelessly, perhaps. We read it, as has been already implied, as if reading were the great object ; whereas meditating is the great object. We read it as a creed, as a set of dogmas, or a collection of curiosities ; or we read it to

satisfy our conscience ; or we read it to see what it will say ; — but we know what it will say ; that is, we know all that it will say to the careless and negligent reader. If we were reading for the first or the fifth time, the case would be different ; but now we are acquainted with the general import of the Bible, at least with the general contents in its practical parts, and unless we meditate upon it, if we read only, we shall gain nothing farther of mere information. Our object, therefore, when we do not read as critics, is to make the Bible a book of devotion, to commune with its spirit, to reflect upon it, to consider and apply its sacred truths. Unless we do this, it will not be strange if we gain no new ideas. And if we gain no new ideas, or if the ideas we do receive are careless and negligent ideas, it will be still less strange that the perusal is irksome. From the very constitution of our minds, a recurrence of such ideas, without any variation, is tedious and wearisome.

We must briefly add, as a final means of acquiring a proper interest in the Scriptures, that they must be read not only with meditation, but with a feeling, an *experience* of those truths which they deliver. This is true, because the Bible addresses not the understanding, not the imagination only, but more especially the heart.

To the proper interest in the Scriptures, knowledge and reflection will contribute, but they will not necessarily produce it. There must be a feeling of our sinfulness, of our wants, of our dangers, — there must be sympathy in the expression of devout and grateful emotions, there must be a deep sense of what is spiritual and eternal, or the book that is wholly occupied and concerned with these things will be indifferent to us. This is the critical and the turning point in the whole matter. If we read the Scriptures with feeling, they will become more and more interesting to us, by the same law of association which makes them more and more indifferent to the dull and careless. It is just in this case, as it is with the use of prayer-books. The truly devout and earnest Catholic or Episcopalian will tell us, that his interest and pleasure in the Liturgy constantly increases, while the negligent and the formal find in the same service an increasing burden and weariness. We know it is common to say, that what is often seen is less felt. But this is not true of those things which deeply and permanently interest us. It

may be true of shows and sports, and passing novelties. But it is not true of our dwellings, of our families, of our friends. It is not true of any thing that enlists our strongest emotions. The miser is not less attracted by his gold the oftener he sees it. It does not weary him to count his treasures, piece by piece, though he is made not a whit richer by it. The merchant does not see with less pleasure his good ship that comes the twentieth time laden with a fortune for her freight; he does not rejoice in her less as she discloses her well known signal and form, in the distant horizon, and spreads her sail for the welcome haven. The father, the patriot, do not grow dull to the objects of their long solicitude and love. Our native soil and our homes become more dear to us, the more familiar they are. And he who has found the seeds of immortal life springing from the soil of holy truth, who, in the bosom of that blessed truth, has made the home of his affections, cannot be indifferent to the outward receptacle and structure, where the wealth and treasure of his heart are garnered up. No matter how rude the structure may seem in some of its parts, how various the forms and styles which the taste of different ages has given it, how venerable the marks of decay, the footprints of time upon its storied walls and in its hallowed recesses, — it will still be the dwelling of the soul, the abode of wisdom, the habitation of hope, the threshold of eternity.

We had intended here to close our observations. But it occurs to us, that it may appear to some of our readers, as if we had recommended a good deal of reading of the Scriptures, and considerable study too, and quite an apparatus of means for understanding them, without distinctly enough pointing out any sufficient and ultimate object. 'Why, after all, should we read them much,' it may be said. 'We have no objection to reading a chapter occasionally, once in a week or once in a month; but why should we do any thing more? We already know and believe the great doctrines of revelation; they are continually taught from our pulpits; the Bible is not yet to reveal them to us; why then should we read it? It has already done its work for us; it has already announced its inspired message; why ask it to do more? The messenger has spoken; he has fulfilled his commission; why detain him?'

We answer, in the first place, because you do but half understand him. The message is, as yet, but half received into the hearts of men. There is deep wisdom still to be learned from the holy page. There is more light to break forth from it; the light not only of speculative truth, but of moral illumination. Now if the Bible be, indeed, God's message to the world, and that message is not fully understood, if its meaning is not entirely exhausted, can a word more be necessary to turn the believer's attention to it? He studies nature to learn the character of its Author; why shall he not peruse the Scriptures for the same purpose? As a scholar, he will study Homer and Plato; he sees reason enough for it; he looks upon it as a praiseworthy employment; why, as a religious man, shall he not study David and Isaiah? — why, as a Christian especially, shall he not commune frequently and familiarly with the instructions of that great Master, to the beauty of whose life, and the wisdom of whose teaching, no philosophy nor imagined excellence of the ancient world, ever approached near enough to bear one moment's comparison. Few readers of the New Testament, if any, yet understand the character of this wonderful being. Few or none yet comprehend all the wisdom, loveliness, harmony, perfection of attributes, that was in him, who is styled 'the brightness of God's glory and the express image of his person'; who is, therefore, himself a revelation of God. The man who could worthily and adequately speak of Jesus Christ, or who could speak more worthily and adequately of him than any other man, would draw from us an admiration and reverence such as we could give to no other man. And if this be not speaking extravagantly, if the revelation of God in the person and in the Gospel of Jesus Christ be not fully understood, surely it is not yet time to think of having read enough.

This, then, is the main answer to those who demand a reason for frequent reading of the Bible. It is God's revelation, and there is yet much to learn from it.

But there are two suggestions of secondary importance on which we wish to dwell a moment.

One will relate to the means by which the feeling of religion is to be made permanent and practical. And to this end, we say, that feeling must, if wisely directed, be attached to something besides abstract excellence. To love reli-

gion, to love virtue in the abstract, — this will not do for beings constituted as we are. Feeling, so directed, would be almost certain to die away. It wants something visible and tangible ; something outward to excite it to action, or to remind it of its duty ; something to be a representative or a memento of that which is loved. Friendship, for instance, could not easily sustain itself through years, without the countenance of a friend ; or without messages or letters from him ; or without those mournful relicts, through which, though dead, he yet speaketh. Our minds, in short, converse much with their objects through images, through symbols. The universe in which we are placed is one vast system of representation. All truth, though not originated in us, yet is mainly impressed upon us by emblems. The senses are thus indispensable helpers of the soul. Now, the chief signs of thought are words ; and he who would have certain thoughts often suggested or revived to him, would do well often to resort to the words that teach them. Such, to the religious man, are the words of Scripture. Such, too, are other books of religious admonition and devotion. Now it cannot well be doubted that he who should daily spread before him those words of holy teaching and exhortation, would be more likely to be reminded of his duties ; would be more likely to meditate, and to have all those great themes revived in his mind, which, as a religious being, he must so much desire to keep vigorous and vivid within him. The strongest sensibility about religion, without some culture of this sort, would be extremely apt to be dissipated into vagueness and vacancy. It would not be sufficiently brought to the point of distinct contemplation and direct action. How would it be with knowledge, we pray, if there were no reading ? What would become of the general intelligence of the community, whether it relates to the history, literature, geography, or general affairs of the world, if all newspapers and books were banished from our houses, or if they remained in them, only to lie unused upon the dusty shelf ? The general intelligence would remain for a while, but how vague would it soon become ; how little would it tend to the improvement of the mind ; how little would it prepare men to act on those great questions that concern the welfare of the world ! All this, it is evident, applies still more strongly to religion. And he who habitually, and

upon a set plan, neglects all religious books, the Bible included, ought, in consistency, to say that his religious improvement, his moral happiness, his highest dignity is a matter of no consequence; or he ought, by the same rule, to neglect all reading, and to care no more for knowledge, than he does for religion.

Possibly, some neglecter of the Scriptures will say that we have not touched the point of his defence at all; that we have not struck a blow upon the citadel that guards him; that the simple truth of the matter is, 'that his conscience is sufficient for his guidance, that if he will only follow that, it will be doing well enough, that religion is not in a book; that all religion, in fact, is within him.' Then shall we simply answer, that we desire to see some of this religion out of him. We are tired of hearing so much of this secret, this invisible religion, as an apology for the neglect of the outward means. A man might as well say that he has got life within him, and therefore will take no food. Is conscience, because it is an inward principle, therefore not to be cultivated, nor guided, nor strengthened? So is reason, so is memory, so is imagination an inward principle. Take now the case of reason, and see what the neglecter of its cultivation, on the ground of our objector, might say for himself. Why, 'that his knowledge is sufficient for his guidance; that if he will only follow that, it will be doing well enough; that reason is not in a book; that all reason, in fact, is within him!' What follows? Why, destroy the schools; destroy all books; destroy the press; and destroy, too, all the moral and intellectual hopes of the world.

But we must hasten to the other observation we intended to make; and that is, that a merely literary and critical attention to the Scriptures could not fail to have the happiest influence in refining, softening, and purifying the public taste, and the whole mind of a people. Some respectable writers have gone so far as to maintain that Hebrew literature ought to be introduced into our schools in place of the Greek and Roman classics. Without yielding to this opinion, we may at least say, that the literature of the Hebrews is, every way and eminently, deserving of attention. Such attention might be fairly excited by the fact, that a language, so ancient, so meagre in its vocabulary, of a people so rude and uncultivated, and whose whole remaining literature is

bound up in a single volume of moderate size, — that such a language, under such circumstances, should have produced the most sublime and beautiful poetry, the most striking and touching descriptions of nature, the most moving strains of human joy and sorrow that are to be found in the world.

But there are marked peculiarities in the Hebrew writings which commend them, even as literary compositions, still farther to our regard. There is a loftiness of moral conception, a purity of thought in them; there is a perpetual recognition of man's relation to his Maker, making every song of victory a song of praise, and filling every strain of lamentation with the breathings of gentleness and submission; there is especially a tenderness pervading the compositions of the Hebrew poets, a desolate grandeur of sorrow for their suffering country, a pathetic mournfulness of pity for the woes which they denounced or described; a tone of affection too, a communion of heart with all the heroism and meekness of the highest and the humblest emotions; in short, there is throughout a character of moral sympathy, which must touch and kindle all the higher and purer feelings of him who partakes of it, and communes with it. Let us be told of any one, that he understands and feels the peculiar beauties of Isaiah, or of the Psalms, and we should set it down as one distinct pledge for his intellectual elevation and refinement.

It is full time, we are aware, that our remarks should be brought to a close. Our object has been one of humble pretensions; not to dilate upon the beauties of Scripture, which would have been a more attractive and exciting theme, but patiently, and with a careful hand, to remove something from that mass of misconceptions and prejudices which hide from most persons more than half of the glory of those venerable and sacred writings. It is an occasion for the most unaffected grief, if not astonishment, that ideas should prevail concerning these writings, so low, tame, and dull, so childish in fact and in fine, and in every way so utterly unworthy of them. May the time soon come when 'they shall read in the book, in the law of God distinctly, and give the sense, and cause the reading thereof to be understood.'

ART. II. — *History of Scituate, Massachusetts, from its First Settlement to 1831.* By SAMUEL DEANE. Boston. James Loring. 1831. 8vo. pp. 408.

THIS is one of the fullest and most minute town histories that have come under our notice ; so full and minute, indeed, that some have objected to it on this account. They forget, however, that those who do not want such a history of Scituate, do not probably want any. It is a repository of facts and dates, and family sketches, and curious reminiscences, which will afford much pleasure and satisfaction to antiquaries, supply important materials to the future historian, and always be referred to as a book of authority on the subject, evincing extraordinary patience and diligence in its investigations, and a sound and unbiassed judgment in its conclusions. To the inhabitants of this ancient town, and to all who feel a personal interest in it, either from their vicinity, or because it was their birthplace, or that of their ancestors, such a work must be invaluable.

The following brief notices, collected from different parts of the volume, will help us to form some idea of the character, manners, and progress of the settlement.

'In 1667, "The Town did enact, that if any person should entertayn any stranger, after being admonished by a committee chosen for such purpose, he should forfeit and pay 10s. for each week." The preamble of this law runs thus : "Whereas some persons out of their owne sinister endes and by-respects, have too aptly been harborers or entertayners of strangers coming from other townes, by which meanes the Towne cometh to be burdened, &c." At the same meeting the Town declared by their votes, "that Mr. Black should depart the Towne presently." In what manner he had become burdensome or dangerous does not appear. We believe he was a preacher.

'In 1670, "The Town did agree that the Selectmen should be moderators in the Town meetings the present year; and if any person shall speake after silence is commanded, without leave from any two of the moderators, he shall forfeit 6d. for each offence."

'In 1665, "Whereas the Court did require, that every Town should have two wolf Traps, and the Town did conceive that there were Traps in the Town that would answer the Court's order, therefore the Town did agree with Thomas

Woodworth to tend them, and Thomas Woodworth did agree to baite them and tend them according as the Order of the Court doth require, and the Town is to allow him 10s. for this year besides the pay for the wolves there killed."

'In 1668, "The Town did agree and conclude that if any man did cut any thatch on the North River flats, before the 15th day of August, he should forfeit 10s. per day or part of a day to the Town's use;" also, "The Town did agree and conclude that if any man did cut more thatch in one day than would load three canoes, he should forfeit 40s. to the Town's use." It is probable that many buildings and perhaps some dwelling-houses were covered with the sedges of the flats at this date.

'In 1690, the Town chose Thomas Woodworth "Clerk of the market," and annually to the same office till 1711. In 1712, the same person was chosen "sealer of weights and measures," which we therefore understand to be but another name for the same office.

'In 1696, "The Town did enact, that every householder should kill and bring in six black birds yearly, between the 12th and the last day of May, on the penalty of forfeiting for the Town's use 6d. for every bird short of that number."

'In 1728, "The Town allowed as a bounty for each full-grown wild cat killed within the Town, 30s., and for each young one 10s." John Dwelly and David Hatch received the bounty that year.

'In 1739, "The Town chose Capt. John Clap and Samuel Clap to prosecute the law relative to the preservation and increase of deer." Capt. John Clap was chosen annually for the same purpose until 1775 — and Constant Clap was chosen annually afterward until 1784.' — pp. 110, 111.

'August 1709, we find the following vote: "The Society impowered Mr Joseph Otis to finish the meeting house by pewing of it, and also to appoint two and two to a pew (*where they do not agree to couple themselves*) each couple paying the cost of building the pew." We believe this house was not plastered, for the following item appears in the parish accounts that year: "Allowed Joseph Bates 12s. for filling chinks in the meeting house." — p. 31.

'Slavery was practised to a considerable extent; but they had no occasion to import servants of this description, for they won them "with their sword and their bow." The wills of the first generation often make provision for Indian servants, but rarely mention an African slave. We have seen but one instance of this kind previous to 1690. Subsequently to 1700,

African slaves had pretty generally been purchased by the wealthy families: and the posterity of that race is now more numerous in this town, than in any other town of the ancient Colony.' — p. 151.

We copy the character given of Mr. Eells, as a favorable specimen of the New England clergy in the first half of the last century.

'There are a few aged people now living who remember him. They describe his person to have been of a stature rather above mediocrity, of broad chest and muscular proportions, remarkably erect, somewhat corpulent in his later years, of dark complexion, with large black eyes and brows, and of general manners rather dignified and commanding than sprightly and pleasing. He had an influence and authority amongst his people that none of his successors have exercised, and which may have been in some measure a peculiarity of earlier times than these. The controversy with which his predecessors had been agitated had ceased. The Quakers, by not being persecuted here, had become quiescent. Whitfield's New light, and his spirit of denunciation had been kept out of his society, by the determined stand which he took against him; and the times were prosperous and happy. His people were delighted to see him at their doors, as he rode up on horseback to inquire after their health, and to hand his pipe to be lighted. We mean no satire by recording this trifle; for he was a venerable man, and so beloved, that every parishioner would take pleasure in performing such an office for him. He was also a leader amongst the neighbouring clergy,—well acquainted with the constitution and usages of the Churches, weighty in counsel, and often called to distant parts of the State, and to other States on Ecclesiastical Councils. As a preacher, there is reason to believe that he did not so much excel as in his dignity of character and soundness of understanding. We have seen a volume in manuscript of nearly an hundred sermons, which he used to carry with him when he travelled abroad. They embrace a considerable variety of subjects, and enabled him to preach at any time and on any occasion. They begin with his own ordination sermon, which he himself preached, according to ancient custom, and include the sermons which he composed during the few first years of his ministry. Were we to judge of his talents from these alone, we should not do him justice. There are a few discourses in print which are very respectable productions, and in particular those delivered

at the ordinations of his two sons. He preached the Election sermon in 1743, (Deut. xxxii. 47.)

'His sentiments were the moderate Calvinism of that day; we have seen one sermon on the doctrine of election, which had many explanations closely bordering on Arminianism. In the latter part of his life he continued to speak of Arminian free will as an error, but with no asperity. Mr. Lemuel Bryant of Quincy, who had gone somewhat before the age in liberal speculations, preached for him on a certain day, and delivered a sermon which he afterwards printed, (on the text, "All our righteousnesses are filthy rags,") and explained the text in the manner which would now be generally acceptable, showing that the formalities of a corrupt generation of the Jews were therein described, and not the moral virtues of true worshippers, which led Mr. Eells to say, "Alas! Sir, you have undone to-day, all that I have been doing for forty years," and Bryant with his accustomed wit and courtesy replied, "Sir, you do me too much honor in saying, that I could undo in one sermon, the labors of your long and useful life." An aged and highly intelligent gentleman, who related this anecdote to us twenty years since, also remarked that Mr. Eells preached a series of sermons afterward, with a view to correct Mr. Bryant's errors, but it was not easy, remarked the same gentleman, to discern much difference between his doctrine and that of Mr. Bryant. On the whole, we believe there has rarely been known a ministry of forty-six years, which so many circumstances conspired to render successful and happy. There are a few now living that remember the solemn day of fasting and prayer, kept by his people, on account of his death.' — pp. 198, — 200.

A particular and interesting account is given of Dr. Barnes, Mr. Deane's immediate predecessor, from which we give a single extract.

'His ministry continued in a good degree of quiet from the troubles of religious dissensions almost to the last. A short time before his death, the spirit of fault-finding began to move, and a stricter mode of Calvinism began to call for a separation, but had produced no great effect during his life. We believe he was remarkable for his meekness in "instructing those that opposed," and by parables, rather than by direct argument, he was accustomed to converse with such. A neighbour who was a Calvinist of the *straitest sect*, having frequently spent long sittings in arguing with Dr. Barnes, was finally answered by the following parable:

“ You, Sir, are a gentleman, to whom the public feels and acknowledges much obligation for your mechanical skill and inventions. Now we will suppose that your powers should be so far increased that you could make intelligent beings, and that you should produce thousands each day, formed with all the endowments of the human race. Then suppose that your neighbours should inquire, what destination you proposed for these beings; and you should reply, that you had prepared a place of torment to which you proposed to condemn the greater part, — not for any personal offence against you, but because you had made them for that end; and that the remaining few you had destined, in the same arbitrary manner, to another place of perfect happiness, which you had also prepared. Now, Sir, suppose that your neighbours were furnished with the common sense of mankind, concerning justice and goodness in the administration of one being, who has a controlling power over other beings, would they not knock your shop down, and say that such a wicked trade should not go on ? ” — pp. 204, 205.

Scituate has been the birthplace or home of several laymen of distinction, among whom we may mention particularly the venerable Hatherly, its founder and one of its principal benefactors, General Cudworth, Vassall, the Wantons, and the Cushings. The elder Wanton was a strict Quaker; but not so his fiery and adventurous sons, of whom Mr. Deane has collected the following curious memorials.

‘ William (son of Edward) began his distinguished course by stepping out of the rules of his religious sect, and performing some distinguished military exploits; and in the narrative of these exploits the name of his brother John must be associated with that of William. In 1694, when William was at the age of 24, and John at 22, a pirate ship having committed several robberies in the Bay, in which the family property had suffered losses, these two young men headed a party of volunteers, and captured the pirates, and carried them into Newport, where they were executed. Again in 1697, just before the peace of Ryswic, during the troubles with Count Frontenac, Governor of Canada, a French armed ship had taken several prizes in the Bay: and again William and John Wanton fitted out each a vessel from Boston, well manned with high-spirited volunteers, and admirably accomplished their design. It is said that William ran under the stern of the French ship and wedged her rudder, while John and his party boarded. Whether this method of embarrassing the Frenchman were practica-

ble or not, we do not know; we only state that this is a part of the fireside narrative, that has been handed down. It is also said, that the venerable Edward endeavoured to dissuade his sons from this enterprise as unlawful, according to the rules of their church; but on finding their determination fixed, he thus addressed them. "It would be a grief to my spirit to hear that ye had fallen in a military enterprise; but if ye will go, remember that it would be a greater grief to hear that ye were cowards."

'The fame of this exploit reached England, and when the two Wantons went to England in 1702, they were invited to Court, and Queen Anne granted an addition to their family coat of arms, and presented each with two pieces of plate, with proper devices, namely, a silver punch bowl and salver. These pieces of plate are said to have been stolen from their houses at Newport, during the raging of the mobs in the political contest of Hopkins and Ward, with the exception of one piece, which is now said to be extant in Newport.

'We now proceed with William. He left Scituate 1704, and settled in Newport. He had previously married Ruth, the daughter of Deacon John Bryant, senior. To this match, there had been several objections; the Quakers disapproved of his marrying out of the Society, and the Congregationalists of his marrying into theirs, and moreover the woman was very young; however, the sanguine temper of Wanton was not to be foiled, and he is said to have addressed the young woman in the presence of her family in the following words: "Ruth, let us break away from this unreasonable bondage. I will give up my religion, and thou shalt give up thine, and we will go to the church of England, and *go to the Devil together*." They fulfilled this resolution, so far as going to church and marrying, and adhering to the church of England during life.' — pp. 373, 374.

We hope that Mr. Deane's example will be followed by other clergymen living in the interesting and beautiful villages scattered throughout the country. Their education, tastes, and pursuits must be supposed to fit them peculiarly for collecting such historical notices. Above all, however, let them be minute, exact, and full. Our principal objection to the work before us is that so little is said of the natural history of the place, and of its natural capabilities and peculiarities. If it had been necessary, we could have spared for this purpose twenty or thirty pages from the 'Family Sketches.'

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. III. — *Conclusion of the Second Letter on the Meaning of Aiōn in ancient Greek.*

WE now come to the passage in Plato's *Timæus*, containing four instances of *aiōn*, and three of *aiōnios*; also one of *diaiōnios*, which may be allowed to pass among the rest; due regard being had to the prefix *διά*. All these occur in one paragraph, occupying little more than two pages. It was mistakenly printed *seventy* pages in my last; and the error was overlooked, till it was too late to correct it.

There is no fairer way of presenting these words, in their connexion, than by producing, at once, the passage at large in which they appear. This I now do; numbering the instances of either word as they occur, for the sake of more ready reference in commenting upon them, should such reference be necessary.

Plato, having described the formation of soul, and corporeal nature associated with, and pervaded by it, proceeds to say, *Timæus* p. 37 C., *As the generating father contemplated this generated resemblance of the eternal [αἰδίων] Gods, moved and living, he was well pleased; and, being glad, he bent his mind on making it still more perfect according to the paradigm. As that, therefore, is an eternal animal [ζῶον αἰδίων], he took in hand to finish this universe as much like it as possible. But, then, the nature of the animal is EXISTENTIAL [1]; and this, indeed, to the generated, altogether, it was not possible to affix. But, he contrived in mind, to make a certain movable image of EXISTENCE [2]; and, ordaining the heaven, at the same time, he made an EXISTENTIAL [3] image proceeding according to number, of EXISTENCE [4] abiding in one; this which we have now named time; [ἡ μὲν οὖν ζώον φύσις ἐτύχχανεν οὕσα αἰώνιος. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν, οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκόνα δ' ἐπινοεῖ κινήτην τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανόν, πικρῇ, μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνί, κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰούσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δ' ἡ χρόνον ὠνομάξαμεν.] days, also, and nights, and months and years, which were not, before the heaven was generated; and so, at once, with the same constitution, he fabricated their generation. And all these are part of time. And both it WAS, and it WILL BE, the forms of generated time, we ignorantly refer to the eternal [αἰδίων] essence, not correctly.*

For, we say now that it WAS, it IS, and also, it WILL BE. Whereas, it IS, is alone appropriate to it, according to true speech. But, it WAS, and it WILL BE, is proper to be said, concerning a generation proceeding in time. For both are motions. But, that which constantly subsists according to the same [τὸ δὲ αἰὲ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον], immovably, cannot ever be properly made either older or younger. It has neither been already generated, nor will be hereafter. And altogether any generation has affixed nothing to those which are borne in sense. But these are generated forms of time which imitates EXISTENCE [4], and is circularly revolved according to number [ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταυτὰ αἰῶνα τὲ μιμουμένον καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου, γέγονεν εἶδη]. And, with them, still, these things are so; and what has been generated, is what has been generated; and what is now being generated, is what is being generated; and that which will be generated, is what will be generated; and that which is not, is the nonentity; neither of which expressions, is strictly correct. But then concerning these things, there may not be a fair opportunity, at present, to discourse accurately. Time, then was generated together with the heaven; that having been generated together, together also, they might be dissolved; if ever there should be any dissolution of them; and according to the paradigm of the EXISTENTIAL [6] nature, that it might be as much like it as possible. But, truly, that paradigm is a being with respect to entire EXISTENCE [7]; but, this in turn, being generated continually, with respect to entire time, is both being, and being to be, alone [καὶ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς αἰωνίου φύσεως· ἵν' ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα, πάντα αἰῶνα ἐστὶν ὅν· ὁ δ' αὖ διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος ἐστὶ μόνος].

* * * *

According to these things, and for their sake, whatever of the stars were generated moving through the heaven, have turnings; that this might be most like the most perfect and intelligible animal, with the imitation of the PERVADINGLY EXISTENTIAL [8] nature [πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μιμήσιν φύσεως]. And, indeed, the other forms he fabricated unto the generation of time, according to a similitude to that, to which each is assimilated.

Every instance of *αἰών* and *αἰώνιος* in Plato's works has now been produced, On all, excepting those in the paragraph

just quoted from the *Timæus*, sufficient comment has been made. This passage is peculiar on many accounts, and requires observation at large. In remarking upon it, therefore I observe ;—

I. The immediate verbal connexion, in which *αἰὼν* and *αἰώνιος* occur, in the respective sentences, does not very positively mark the precise sense in which the author employed them. Admitting the different meanings of these words [EXISTENCE and EXISTENTIAL], which have already been stated ; we might, in each of these sentences, make use, in translating, of any one out of several of them, without doing great violence to the immediate verbal connexion. So that, if we regard nothing but this single circumstance, little positive dependence could be placed on these few instances alone, for establishing the certain meaning of *αἰὼν* and *αἰώνιος* in ancient Greek.

It, therefore, becomes requisite, to take a more extensive view of the case ; and consider these words with reference to the general subject on which Plato was writing, the known habit of his mind and all the circumstances relating to the treatise in which this paragraph appears. These may afford much help, in ascertaining the particular meaning in question.

It is plain, that Plato employs *αἰὼν* [EXISTENCE], in this particular place, with reference to some subject, different from that, in regard to which he had employed it before. The *existence*, which he here contemplates, is something different from *human life* ; the only subject previously expressed by *αἰὼν*, in his acknowledged works.

It is desirable to ascertain, so far as we may, what this particular subject was, which, in this place, he intended to express by *αἰὼν* [EXISTENCE], and with reference to which, he made use of the adjective *αἰώνιος* [EXISTENTIAL].

I trust it will be admitted, as not only within all rules of philology, but, also, as required by them, that the adjective be considered as depending, entirely, for its meaning, on the noun ; until evidence appears, that it has acquired meanings for itself ; and with proper regard to the nature and character of these parts of speech, severally. I, therefore consider, that *αἰώνιος* [EXISTENTIAL] signifies such relation to *αἰὼν* [EXISTENCE] as the circumstances, in each instance, severally indicate.

The question, therefore is, what was that *existence*, which Plato was here contemplating, under the name *αἰών*?

As in modern days, a sense of *duration*, and particularly of *eternity*, is generally believed to have belonged to this noun, and the meaning, *eternal*, to its adjective, in ancient Greek; respect for public opinion requires the question to be discussed,—whether Plato, in this passage, employed these words in this sense? Therefore

II. I cannot believe, that Plato was contemplating *eternity*, considered as limitless *duration*, under the name *αἰών* [EXISTENCE], nor *eternal* under the name *αἰώνιος* [EXISTENTIAL], for the following reasons;—

a.) We have the whole evidence of seven Greek writers, extending through about six centuries, down to the age of Plato, who make use of *αἰών*, in common with other words; and no one of them ever employs it in the sense of *eternity*. Indeed, it is more than doubtful, whether they ever employ it in any meaning of *duration* at all, saving so far as every *existence* has some kind of endurance. They clearly use this word with reference to the nature of the subject, without particular reference to its duration; never in the sense of eternal duration. It will be recollected, also, that their usage of the word has been produced, not in one or two instances *alone*, but in *every* case in which it occurs in their extant works, saving a few short pieces or fragments of some of them. We have, therefore, not only their evidence, but, it may be said, their *whole* evidence. And, so far as negative testimony avails, it is conclusive evidence, that there was no such meaning in the word. It is not to be supposed then, that Plato should have used it in that sense; if he intended, as he doubtless did, to be understood by his readers. We are under obligation to look in his writings for a meaning in *αἰών* relating to the nature or state of the subject, before we can be justified in admitting one, that relates only to its *duration*; still less can we, without manifest necessity, admit a sense of duration so immense as that of *eternity*.

b.) Aristotle defines this word at much length; and assigns it, as a general meaning, EXISTENCE, and also LIFE; or, *that which exists*, and *that also which lives*. He teaches also, that *human life* is *αἰών* and that the *completeness* of the universe is *αἰών* [an EXISTENCE]; comprehending, indeed,

the term of duration, among the other qualities of the αἰὼν [EXISTENCE] in question ; but having no more special reference to that quality than to any other.

Had this word contained, in itself, so important a meaning as *eternity*, he could not have so passed it by. His silence on this head, together with his positive assertions in other respects, makes it clear, that this word, in his age, did not express *eternity* ; but merely, an *existence* of any sort.

Now, Aristotle was the cotemporary of Plato, and had been his personal disciple. Had his master employed this word in the important sense of *eternity*, he could not in common fairness, have failed to notice it. Neither could Plato have been justified, in making use of the word in a sense before unknown, without giving information of the new meaning he was attaching to it. He was too honest to do this ; and I do not believe that he did it.

c.) Plato himself employs αἰὼν, elsewhere, in the sense of human *life* ; precisely as we often do the English word *existence* ; and in no other senses, unless the Axiochus be admitted as his work ; in which latter case, it may be said, that he employs this term, in the sense of human *life*, and of *completeness*, and in none other. It is inconceivable, then, that, in this single paragraph, he should have intended to express *eternal duration*, by a term, which he, every where else, employs in the simple sense of *existence*, or *life*, or a *completeness*, without reference to any *duration* at all.

d.) Plato employs the adjective αἰώνιος [EXISTENTIAL], elsewhere, twice. The first of these instances independently of the connexion of this adjective with its noun, affords no precise testimony as to what the term may or may not mean. But taken in connexion with the parent noun, and with the circumstances of the case, it seems to refer, much more aptly, to the *complete* and *absorbing* nature of the subject, than to its *duration*.

In the second of those instances, he sets the αἰώνιον [EXISTENTIAL] in contradistinction to the ἀνώλεθρον [INDESTRUCTIBLE]. This he could not have done, had he understood αἰώνιος to signify *eternal*. The indestructible is, certainly, the *eternal*, at least, a *parte post* ; which is the most, as to duration, to which the sentence can be understood as referring. It follows, of course, that the opposite of the indestructible cannot be the eternal. And so, this second instance helps

to establish the meaning of the first. The sense of *completeness* answers the context well in either case ; but that of *eternity* would be incongruous in the one, and therefore is not to be admitted in the other.

If, then, he employed this adjective in these non-*eternal* meanings, every where else, it is not to be imagined, that in the solitary paragraph in the *Timæus*, he meant it should express eternal. In truth, in neither of the other cases, does it seem, fairly, to signify any *duration* ; and there is no reason why it should be understood as signifying any *duration* here.

e.) Plato, in the very paragraph in question, calls *χρόνος* [*Chronos*] commonly translated *Time*, 'an *EXISTENTIAL* image of *EXISTENCE*', [*αἰῶνος αἰώνιον εἰκόνα*]. Did he mean to say, that time is an *eternal* image of eternity ? — Time, in the common meaning of the word, is the opposite, and not the image of eternity. He must have understood something different from eternity by *αἰών*, when he called *χρόνος* its image.

I think, however, that by *χρόνος*, he did not understand *time*, considered as *lapse of duration* ; *measured duration* ; or the *measure of duration* ; but, created or generated *being*, considered as *in apparent order of succession* ; as we sometimes do when we speak of *time*, and mean by it the sum of those things which are born and die, rise and fall, appear and vanish away, seemingly to us one after another ; not possessing a *constant* existence, [*οὐ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών*]. But, in this sense, likewise, it would be inconsistent to call *Time* an '*eternal* image of eternity' ; although it may properly be called an image of that *existence* which Plato was contemplating under the name *αἰών*. On this I may say more hereafter. But, at present, I must consider the sentence as decisive, that *αἰώνιος* does not mean *eternal*, nor *αἰών* *eternity*.

f.) The context, in no case, requires a sense of *eternity*, nor even of *duration* of any kind to be attached to either of these words. The most that can be argued in favor of such a rendering would be a bare possibility, that, in *some* of the instances, such a meaning might not be inconsistent with the immediate verbal connexion, in which the words occur ; although, in other instances, it would be incongruous.

Now, after the foregoing '*copious*' exhibition of the habits of *αἰών* in ancient Greek, something more than a bare possi-

bility must appear, before we can assign to these words, in either of these cases, a meaning, which nowhere else belongs to them ; which the context, in these cases, does not require ; and which the context, in associated instances, positively forbids. 'It is a sound rule in philology, "never to depart from the *ordinary* sense of a word, unless the context imperiously demands it."' * By the *ordinary*, I understand the *habitual* meaning of a word in the age of the writer under consideration. The *habitual* meaning of αἰών, in ancient Greek, has already been shown, in *propria personâ*, so far as the present examination extends. That *habitual* meaning is *existence* and *life*. And there is nothing in the context in this paragraph which requires a departure from this habitual meaning of this word, or the affixing to it the then *unknown* sense of *eternity*. Contrariwise, there are instances in the paragraph itself, in which such a meaning would be altogether inconsistent with the context. It is, therefore, a plain duty not to depart from the habitual sense of αἰών, already ascertained, nor to adopt this new and hitherto unknown one. It would be changing the whole habit of the word without necessity ; without a right to do so ; and in contradiction to the evidence of the very paragraph in hand.

g.) The habitual meaning *existence*, in one or another of its forms and modes of import, corresponds well to αἰών, in every instance, in this paragraph ; and a sense of *reference to the EXISTENCE* intended, in some form or other, corresponds equally well to αἰώνιος, in each of these cases. We may adopt any one out of several of the meanings of these terms, *existence* and *existential*, and use it consistently, in translating these Greek terms.

I am, therefore, in duty bound to reject a meaning in these words so incongruous as that of *eternity*, with the *habitual* usage of αἰών in Plato's age ; with the definition of this word by Aristotle, his cotemporary ; with the plain sense of the term in other parts of Plato's works ; and with some of the instances in this very paragraph. And this the more especially, when the then ordinary meaning of αἰών [*EXISTENCE*] corresponds to the context without effort.

Still, as has already been remarked, it is exceedingly

* Stuart's Appendix, p. 154.

desirable to ascertain, so far as we can, the particular subject, or the *kind of existence*, which Plato was here contemplating ; and which, in this singular paragraph, he intended to express by *αἰών* [EXISTENCE] ; with reference to which, also, he made use of the adjective *αἰώνιος* [EXISTENTIAL]. The opinion of an insulated individual is of no great consequence, on such a subject, I know. Nevertheless, one may be allowed to say what he thinks ; and, therefore,

III. I believe that Plato, in this place, understood by *αἰών*, that which vitally comprehends, as one, those subjects which he calls, at different times, by the name *ἰδέα, εἶδος, ὄν, αἰεὶ ὄν, τὸ κατὰ ταύτῃ καὶ ὁμοαὐτως ἔχον, κ. τ. λ.*—*idea, image, being, constant being, that which subsists according to sameness and in the same manner, &c.* ; considering the comprising existence as a vital monad or unit ; not as being *composed* by means of their collective multitude, but as embracing them, and being present to them ; the comprehensive principle of their subsistence, uniting and holding them as one ; an all-embracing vital completeness.

How near this comes, in our apprehension, to the Divine Being himself, I will not say. But Plato meant something different by it. He meant, rather, what may be called *spirituality*, with more propriety than by any other name. It is the *spiritual receptacle*, or *vital realm*, the *spiritual dwelling* of all that may be considered as *constant being* ; and he considered no being as *constant* [αἰεὶ], excepting those spiritual subjects which he styles *ἰδέα, κ. τ. λ.* That which vitally comprises the wholeness of these as one, he calls, by way of eminence, in this place, *αἰών* [EXISTENCE] ; and, in order to express reference to this monadic *spirituality*, he employs the adjective *αἰώνιος* [EXISTENTIAL].*

* '*Αἰών*' [EXISTENCE], says Proclus, commenting on Plato, (if I apprehend him right through Taylor's translation,) 'is infinite life, at once total and full, or the whole of which is ever present to itself.'

Harris, in his *Hermes*, Book ii. Chap. 5, presents an idea, which may help to elucidate the sense in which I here employ the term *spirituality* ; 'God is, and lives. So we are assured from the Scripture itself. What then may we suppose the DIVINE LIFE to be? Not a life of sleep as fables tell us of Endymion. If we may be allowed then to conjecture, with becoming reverence, what more likely than A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST ALL-COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTELLECTION ITSELF, WHICH OBJECTS

Precisely what Plato understood, in the names beforementioned, has been made, and still remains a question among the learned; some conceiving he meant one thing and some another. But the different suppositions of his meaning, which have obtained any considerable currency, may be reduced to the following;—

1. *Abstract ideas*, or *intellectual images* of that which is essential to constitute species. The *idea*, or *intellectual form*, of that which every individual of a certain species must have in order to be one of that species; and which if any individual have, it is, thereby, one of that species.*

Take, for instance, the abstract idea of *sphere*. Individual spheres may be large, small, diaphanous, opaque, hard, or soft; they may vary in color, and in many other modes; but they must all possess the one same thing which the mind conceives as *sphere*. This intellectual image, or abstract idea, is invariably the same in them all. This, therefore, is the *idéa, αἰὼν*, *κ. τ. λ.* of the species *sphere*;—and so in regard to other forms of being.

Now, every abstract idea is spiritual. It exists only in *that*, which may properly be called *spirituality*; whether we be contemplating the spirituality of God, man, or any other intellectual being. Abstract idea is a spiritual thing, and is discernible by spirit only.†

That which embraces all abstract ideas in one, is *spirituality*, in the extensive sense; and is what Plato, in this place means by *αἰὼν* [EXISTENCE], if, by his *ὄντως ὄντα*, he intends *abstract ideas*.

Further, as, in his view, all generated things proceed from these ideas abiding in one *αἰὼν* [EXISTENCE] as the monad;

ARE NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT ITSELF? For in pure INTELLIGENCE, it holds the reverse of all sensation: that the PERCEIVER and the THING PERCEIVED are always ONE and the SAME.' His idea of spirituality is far more simple than that of Plato; but it may help to elucidate the meaning in which I now make use of the word.

* See 'Edinburgh Review,' vol. xiv.

† Plato explained this, rather humorously, in his conversation with Diogenes. The two being one day at table, 'and being fallen in conversation upon immaterial and external exemplars, Diogenes says to Plato, *I see very well there is a Goblet and a Table, but I see neither Gobleity nor Tableity.* To which Plato answered, *'T is because thou hast bodily eyes, which can see a Goblet and a Table, but not those of the mind, which alone see Gobleity and Tableity.'*

hence, the sum of individuals generated in conformity thereto, may properly be called an 'image, proceeding according to number, of the *spirituality* [*αἰών*] abiding in one.' It may, also, be called an image partaking of the nature and character of that from which it proceeds, that is, a *spiritual*, or, as I have rendered it, an *existential* image.

2. *Essences*, or actual *entities*; which, being diffused through individuals, make them what they are; — secret, invisible, spiritual existences, which assume appropriate materials, and reduce those materials to forms harmonizing with themselves; and thus produce sensible beings, of one or another species, according to that peculiar essence which, in each case, possesses and reduces them to consistency.

In this case, also, that which comprehends the whole sum of essences is the *αἰών*, [EXISTENCE] 'abiding in one.' The sum of individuals formed according to it, compose the '*existential* image proceeding according to number.'

These essences, in the view contemplated, are entirely *spiritual* entities; and that which comprises them monadically may properly be called *spirituality*.

3. *Patterns*, or *spiritual forms* produced in the Divine Mind by positive acts of the Divine Wisdom and Will, as models on which he would create things sensible.

In this case, likewise, that which comprises the sum of of spiritual forms produced by the Divinity, is the *αἰών* [EXISTENCE], or, rather the *spirituality* 'abiding in one'; and beings created according to it, compose the 'proceeding image' partaking of the nature and character of the original *spirituality*.

4. *Actual, spiritual existences* in the Divine Being, coëxistent with himself; the flowing forth of which, produces objects sensible; each '*according to his kind*.' So, that all things are in God, and God is in all things. And the universe, thus produced, or *generated*, he calls the 'one only begotten'; and a 'God.'

In this case, too, that which embraces the sum of original spiritual being in the Divinity, is the *αἰών* [EXISTENCE, or, far more appropriately, the SPIRITUALITY] abiding in one; and the sum of beings in the universe, which, in our view, have *been*, now *are*, or *shall be*, compose the 'image proceeding according to number,' and participating of the nature and character of the entire spiritual *existence*, from which it flows.

To the present inquiry it matters little which definition we adopt for those things which the Athenian sage speaks of under the beforementioned names. In any one of the above cases, the passage explains itself, with as little difficulty as could be expected, in a passage on an abstruse subject, in an author whose writings are confessedly obscure to an extreme. And, in any of these cases, that which is signified by αἰὼν, is, altogether, *spirituality*.

For myself, I believe the fourth definition to be the correct one; because it harmonizes well with Plato's expressions elsewhere, and with the general train of his mind, so far as we can gather it from his words. He seems clearly to have contemplated the universe as being filled with spiritual presence and energy, by means of existences in God, flowing forth at his will, harmonizing with that will, and forming and upholding all things. I believe, that in the passage in question, he called the comprehension of these spiritual entities in God, by the name αἰὼν [EXISTENCE, or SPIRITUALITY], and intended to express reference, of some kind, to that *wholeness* of original spiritual being by the term αἰώνιος [EXISTENTIAL OR SPIRITUAL].*

I am, of course, under no obligation to believe or defend the doctrine of Plato; but I am bound, in common honesty, to say what I think he meant, if I speak on the subject at all.

It may be made a question, — Why should Plato have employed αἰὼν [EXISTENCE] as the name of this comprehending completeness of spiritual being, in this particular place, when he had not employed it so elsewhere? — On this, it may be observed; —

He frequently changes the names of the spiritual subjects under consideration, when speaking of them either individually or collectively; and whether you believe them to be *abstract*

* Proclus, on this passage, if I apprehend him right through Taylor's translation, calls αἰὼν,† 'the monad of the intelligible unities. But I mean,' he adds, 'by unities, the ideas of intelligible animals, and the genera of all these intelligible ideas. Αἰὼν [existence] is the one comprehension therefore of the summit of the multitude of these, and the cause of the invariable permanency of all things; not subsisting in the multitude of intelligibles themselves, nor being a collection of them; but in an exempt manner; being present to them, by itself disposing and, as it were, forming them and making them to be wholes.'

† I presume it to be αἰὼν, which Taylor translates *eternity*. By *intelligible*, he means that which is not an object of *sense*, but only of the *mind*.

deas, essences, patterns, or vital existences. Sometimes he calls them by the name *ἰδέα* sometimes *ὄν*, or *αἰὲ ὄν* and by other names likewise. At times, also, he makes use of one or another of these names in a collective sense, expressing the whole sum of spiritual being.

He evidently intended, by these different terms, to describe something *invariable*; something constantly *the same*; under whatever varieties of form it might appear and act. These names, therefore, whether used individually or collectively, represent *that which EXISTS*; that which is *true BEING*; and he considered nothing worthy the name of true BEING but that which is of a spiritual nature. It would have been wonderful, indeed, if, among the different titles, he had no where made use of a term so appropriate as *αἰών* [EXISTENCE, or COMPLETENESS, or SPIRITUALITY], in order to express the comprehension of them as one. The ordinary import of this term is scarcely, if at all, different from that of some of the other names for the same things, which he had previously used, either in an individual or collective sense.*

Also the *Timæus* is an exceedingly *unique* production in respect to Plato. So much so, as to render it extremely doubtful, whether he was intending, in it, to express his own opinion, as to the mode in which the universe was made (or, as he calls it, *generated*), or, whether he was merely exhibiting, in a parabolic manner, a mode in which it might have been done. The latter is, certainly, the more probable. In this Dialogue, he puts the discourse into the mouth of *Timæus*, a name which he probably adopted from that of the Locrian philosopher, a Pythagorean; but when expressing what he himself thinks most likely to be true, he commonly puts the discourse into the mouth of Socrates. In the *Timæus*, too, the language is that of positive affirmation; whereas, the great peculiarity of Plato is, that he affirms nothing positively, as Cicero taught long ago. In such a production, we might expect that he would employ

* In order to show the manner in which terms of this kind were anciently employed, I here subjoin an extract from Alcinous, in a translation; by whom I know not;—‘*Idea with reference to God is the eternal [probably, αἰώνιος, existential] Intelligence; and with respect to us it is the first Intelligible; in reference to matter it is Measure; in reference to the universe it is the Exemplar; and in respect to itself it is Essence.*’

some terms not very common in his other works ; and that among the different appellations of the spiritual existences he was naming, he would sometimes describe them, either separately or collectively, by titles different from those most common elsewhere.

Further, it is the opinion of eminent scholars, that in this Dialogue, Plato was exhibiting a hypothetical cosmogony, formed according to certain principles, which he had derived from Timæus Locrus, the Pythagorean ; in common with whom he held the doctrine of essential spiritual existences ; each having, indeed, some little diversity of opinion respecting them.

There is, I believe, no work of Timæus extant, excepting his very brief treatise ‘ on the Soul of the World.’ But it is on record that he composed other works, and was a teacher of eminence in his day. Plato would hardly, otherwise, have condescended to learn of him. The use of words, then, by Timæus Locrus in this only extant work, although in few instances, is of some consequence in elucidating the meaning of the same terms by Plato, when the latter is speaking in some kind of association with him.

Now in the short work of Timæus, *αἰών* occurs, in the sense of *existence*, having reference to the spiritual state before named, too obviously to be mistaken ; and *αἰώνιος* occurs in connexions in which a sense of spirituality *forces* itself on the mind. *Αἰών* must have been a term of frequent usage among the Pythagoreans ; if we may judge from its frequent occurrence in the few extant fragments of Empedocles, one of the great masters of the sect. It can hardly be otherwise, than that Timæus must have used it often in his other works, and in his conversations with his Athenian friend, in a sense similar to that in which it appears in his treatise ; and it is a term equally as expressive of the thing in view, as any which Plato had before employed ; more so, in the design of expressing the comprehension of spiritual being in one.

Plato, therefore, Pythagorizing, in this Dialogue, as he obviously was, and this in connexion with Timæus, although mingling the simpler doctrine of the Locrian with speculations of his own, could hardly fail to make use of a term so appropriate to the comprehensive unity of his essential and changeless spiritual subjects, as *αἰών* [EXISTENCE],

although he had, previously, been in the habit of expressing the same by other words.

We often do something like the same now, after having hit upon the name; when we call a fixed or established being an *existence*, although we may have previously called it by other forms of speech. And we never mean to declare, in this word itself, whether the existence expressed is either temporary or eternal. We mean to assert nothing more than its simple *being*.

It may not be amiss to consider the very great propriety of this term *αἰών* [EXISTENCE], for expressing, in collective unity, those spiritual subjects, which Plato contemplated, under the name *ἰδέα*, κ. τ. λ.

There is no doubt that he considered them as eternal in themselves. But when naming them, he very seldom makes use of any term relating to their *duration*. He calls them by titles expressing mere *being*, without reference to duration. Even his *αἰὲ ὄν* is far less frequent, than his simple *ὄν* or *ἰδέα*; and *αἰὲ*, in this connexion, can hardly be counted a term expressing *duration*; so much as it does *constancy* or *steadfastness*.

I believe he abstained from terms signifying duration, designedly,* when naming these spiritual subjects. He contemplated them as simultaneous things subject to no order of succession; and the use of a term expressing duration would have raised in the mind an idea of succession, which he was anxious to avoid.

Speak of a thing as *enduring*, even *eternally*, the strongest term in our language in this intention, and the term itself gives birth to ideas of succession. The mind, at once, looks 'before and after.' We image a *succession*, which, to be sure, on one hand finds no beginning; but, still, we are running along the line of the *past*, in search of one; — a succession, also, which, on the other hand, finds no end; but, still, we are following along the line of the *future*, seeking one.

* I take the present opportunity to say, for the information of those who may be curious on the subject, that the term *αἰδιότης* does not occur in any of Plato's works. *Αἰδιότης* appears in ten instances only; of which, five are in the *Timæus*, and two in the doubtful, if not positively spurious, *Axiochus*. It occurs three times in *Timæus Locrus*. It does not occur in any of the examined *poets*, excepting once in *Hesiod* [Scut. Herc. V. 310]. It is very frequent in *Aristotle*.

Still more is it thus, when we make use of such terms as *everlasting, for ever, &c.*, in order to express limitless duration. They invariably present the idea of *succession*; an idea wholly inadmissible in regard to that which is changelessly existent.

Metaphysical *being* admits of no association with succession of any kind. It neither *was*, nor *shall be*; and, as Plato affirms, it is the only form of speech strictly appropriate to it. In contemplating the Divine Being, and all things existing essentially in him, he seems to have banished all idea of succession from his mind. He saw God in all things, and all things in God, as simply existing in an unsuccessional *nousness*; nothing prior, nothing posterior; nothing first, nothing last; but all were present existences in his contemplation of them. He therefore used the language of the present, when speaking of things existing in the Divine Spirituality, or of the Divinity himself.

A similar use of language appears in the Scripture occasionally, in regard to similar subjects;—as when the Divine Being revealed his presence to Moses, and called himself by the simple name, 'THE EXISTENT,' [*I am he who am.* אהיה אשר אהיה. *Ego sum o ē.*] In this expression, God attributes to himself *existence alone*; and counts it all-sufficient as his name, to one imbued with all wisdom. Had he made any allusion to *duration* in this connexion it would have destroyed the simplicity of the name. The addition *everlasting, always*, or any similar term significant of *duration*, would have raised the idea of succession in the human mind of even the philosophic Moses, and would have hindered him from reaching the conception of simple *being*, not merely without beginning and without end, but, also, without prior or posterior, first or last; a present and changeless *existence*.

For a similar reason, I believe, the Divine Being appropriated to himself, as his proper name, the significant title *JEHOVAH* [יהוה], which, also, I may be allowed to call *THE EXISTENT*; a name from which all idea of successional being is utterly excluded; a name so holy that the Hebrew in process of time became afraid to pronounce it; although it was the name of his own and his fathers' God.*

* Aristotle tells us that *aiōn* was pronounced *devoutly*, or as some-

I believe Plato had similar thoughts concerning the Divinity, and those essential beings which he contemplated as coëxisting with him. And he could not have chosen a more appropriate term for describing that which comprises them as one, than *αἰών* [EXISTENCE], nor one more appropriate for describing relation to this wholeness, than *αἰώνιος* [EXISTENTIAL]. But this no more proves that these words mean *eternity* and *eternal* in respect to duration, of themselves, than it does that the English word *existence* means the same, because it is the most appropriate term in our language for expressing the unsuccessional BEING of the Deity. The Greek *αἰών* and the English *existence* both stand on one ground in this respect. Of themselves, they are equally applicable to temporary, as to eternal beings. The particular subject concerning which they are employed, must, in each case, decide, whether that which they represent is eternal or temporary as to its duration. The words, in themselves, decide nothing in that respect. In truth, they have no reference to *duration*.

These observations are submitted, as applying, with little variation, to the matter in hand ; whether Plato, in the subjects under consideration, contemplated *abstract ideas, essences, patterns*, or the actual spiritual *existences* coëxistent in the Divine spirituality, which I believe he did.

In either case, the nature of the subjects is *spirit*; the realm of their dwelling is *spirit*; and that which comprehends them all in one, may, more appropriately than otherwise, be denominated *spirituality*.

I am the more glad to see this word employed in this sense by Plato, because I have long been persuaded of a meaning of a similar character in the Hebrew עוֹלָם; which persuasion derives support from this usage of *αἰών*. But, on this, no more can be said at present.

thing divine [*θεῖος*] by the *ancients*. A singular conjecture arises in the dim twilight of distant possibility ; — whether *αἰών* may not have had some original kindred with יְהוָה? The final N in Greek was seldom pronounced in a proper name; the ancient Hebrews, we are told by good authority, called their God ΙΑΩ, which could not have sounded very different from *αἰών*; each word gave birth to devout feelings in the speaker; and each signifies EXISTENCE in their respective tongues.

All this is hardly sufficient to found a conjecture on. Still it is well to consider even the possible consanguinities of ancient words.

IV. The use of the word χρόνος [*Chronos*, commonly translated *Time*, which I have also done in obedience to custom,] by Plato, in connexion with αἰών and αἰώνιος, may demand some attention.

It might seem, at first sight, that αἰών should signify *eternity*, and αἰώνιος, *eternal*, from their being employed in connexion with χρόνος, commonly called *Time*. But I think very differently. Plato does not set χρόνος in opposition with αἰών, as *Time* is commonly set with *Eternity*. These words in his usage sustain a relation to each other, very different from that which time sustains to eternity.

Suppose, for the moment, that Plato understood by χρόνος either *lapse of duration*, *measure of duration*, or *measured duration*, one or the other of which is what we commonly mean by *Time*; and that, by αἰών, he understood *Eternity*. Then, he calls *Time* 'an image of *Eternity*'; when, in either of these senses, it is its *opposite*, and not its image.

Again;—on this supposition, he calls *Time* 'an *eternal* image of *Eternity*.' Did he mean to say, that *Time* in either of these senses is *Eternal*? He could not have been so inconsistent. Nay, in almost the same breath, he speaks of *Time* [χρόνος], as something which may cease to be; '*Time* [χρόνος] then was generated together with the heaven; that having been generated together, together also they might be dissolved, if ever there should be any dissolution of them.'

To believe, then, that by χρόνος he understood what we call *Time*, in either of the views named, would be charging him with an inconsistency too glaring to be admitted. He clearly intended something different from this by χρόνος. It is desirable to ascertain what he did understand by it.

We are apt to conceive of *Time* as either *lapse of duration*, *measure of duration*, or *measured duration*. But, in strict truth, there is no such thing as *lapse of duration*. Of course, there is no such thing as *measured duration* or *measure of duration*. For, without *lapse*, there is nothing to measure or be measured.

It is only in our imperfect apprehension that such a thing seems to be. 'With the Lord [the *EXISTENT*] one day is as a thousand years; and a thousand years as one day.' Considered as *lapse of duration*, neither of them is any thing; and one nothing is as long as another.

It is not possible to establish, and maintain permanently in the mind, any commencement of creation, considered as a fixed point in duration, at which the Divinity *began* to create ; or so to establish and maintain any such point in duration at which he will *cease* to create. No sooner do you think to have set up such a point, on either hand, and begin to rest upon it, than a boundless eternity sweeps round the whole, and engulphs all *first* and all *last*, all *prior* and all *posterior*, in its fathomless abyss. It renders all being which, in our apprehension, *has been*, *is*, or *shall be*, a present and changeless *existence* in God. Things *seem* to be first and last, prior and posterior, to us, only because we cannot sound the depths, and measure the extent, of infinite and eternal existence.

Still, existing in the creation somewhere, as we individually do, we extend the mind on one hand, as we say, *backward*, through what we can comprehend in our knowledge ; and, on the other hand, as we say, *forward*, through what we can anticipate. Within these portions of existence, we behold beings rising and disappearing to our view, each by itself. We, therefrom, image an order of succession suited to our present powers, and present modes of apprehending things. We contemplate this apparent order of succession as occupying duration, and call this apparently occupied duration *Time*. We use language in respect to the existences thus apparently in succession ; and, in common sense, speak of first and last, older and younger. This we do, notwithstanding, in our deeper thoughts, we know that all things are present existences in him who knows no first nor last.

In strict truth, then, *Time* is no more than that amount of existence, which falls within our apprehension ; and which seems to us to proceed in an order of succession. But, in ordinary language, we speak of such *apparently* successional being, as a reality.

Plato was as well aware of all this as any of us can be. He, therefore, affirms it to be improper to speak of things, in regard to essential being, strictly as prior or posterior. Nevertheless, on account of our finite modes of apprehension, he admits the propriety of speaking thus, ‘ concerning a generation proceeding in Time [*ἐν χρόνῳ*] ; for the parts of time are motions.’ He accordingly speaks of them so. But, he takes pains to let us know, that this mode of speech is

not strictly correct [*ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς λέγομεν*]. It is allowable, only, on account of the imperfect apprehension of man, 'borne in sense.'

What, then, did Plato mean by *χρόνος* [Time], in this connexion?—I can make it nothing else than what he calls *generated being in motion*, or *succession*, as appearing to us. I do not mean *generated being* simply. The *motion*, or apparent *succession* is as requisite as the *being*, in order to constitute it *χρόνος* [Time].

Thus, for instance, the heaven may have been generated. But unless it be in motion, so that its contained objects appear and disappear in apparent successional order, it does not constitute *χρόνος* [Time]. Let it move, and the motion and existence together are *χρόνος* Time. Such motion being contained within a sphere, or a circle, returning into itself; like what Timæus Locrus calls *ἐγκύκλιον μεταβολάν* [an encircled change.]

With reference to this meaning of the word in Plato's age, Aristotle tells us, that 'some call the motion of the universe *χρόνος* [Time]; some, the sphere itself.' Plato puts both together; and *χρόνος*, in his use, is, in the abstract, the comprehension of all generated being (what is to us *past*, *present*, or *to come*.) considered as in apparent succession, or, as he calls it, motion. And as all generated being always *appears* to be in succession to us; therefore, we may speak of it, in its parts, in common apprehension, as what *was*, *is*, or *shall be*; assuming in speech as a reality, that which always *seems* to be so.

Thus, *χρόνος* [Time] is, in substance, what we call *successional being* considered as a whole; comprising, after a monadic manner, all generated things, from what we term the beginning to what we call the end of the universe.*

This may, according to Plato's notions, be very properly styled 'a movable image of' that sum of existence which abides unsuccessionally in God;—a very different thing from its being an image of limitless *duration*. Successional being may, consistently, be called an image of another being not in succession, (that is, a fixed and changeless existence,) if made according to it, as its paradigm. But it would be inconsistent to call such successional being an image of

* There is a modern use of the word *Time*, not very dissimilar from this. As when we sometimes speak of *Time* and mean by it the *world* with its objects and affairs.

the limitless *duration* of that constant existence ; inasmuch as the very circumstance of its proceeding successional, and being only '*both being and being to be,*' makes it, as to duration, the opposite, and not the resemblance, of a duration that is limitless.

With his views, therefore, Plato could, and does call *χρόνος* [successional being] '*an EXISTENTIAL [3] image [an image conformed to the original spiritual existence in the Divinity] proceeding according to number [successionally] of the [original, spiritual] EXISTENCE [4] abiding in one.*' And so, '*these things [which appear to us who are borne in sense] are generated forms of χρόνος [successional being, called also Time] which imitates [spiritual] EXISTENCE [5], and is being circularly revolved according to number.*'

Inasmuch, also, as generated being moves simultaneously with its generation ; and the being and motion together constitute *χρόνος* [successional being] ; therefore, he could say, as in the subsequent part of the paragraph, '*χρόνος [successional being, or, if you prefer the word, Time] was made together with the heaven*' '*and according to the paradigm of the EXISTENTIAL [6] nature*' [according to the pattern of the spiritual EXISTENCE in God] '*But, truly, that paradigm,*' [he adds,] '*is a being with respect to entire EXISTENCE [7] [it exists in association, as one, with all spiritual being ; or, in association with the whole spirituality of the Deity] ; but this, being generated continually with reference to entire χρόνος [the whole sum of successional being], is both being and being to be alone.*' — And so, as he thinks and affirms, all successional being, as a whole, has '*an imitation of the pervadingly EXISTENTIAL [8] nature.*'

I have here presented as clear a view as I can, of my understanding of this passage in Plato ; and in the whole, of his entire usage of *aión* and *aiónios*. I am aware, that some of my expressions are not so free from obscurity as might be wished. But my author is, himself, confessedly obscure ; his subject under consideration is abstruse ; and some obscurity in commenting in such a case is not always avoidable. I will fain hope, however, to have given you a general view of my understanding of his use of these words in this portion of his works. I have no suspicion that he employed them with reference to *duration* of any kind ; but to that *sum*, or *completeness*, which he contemplated, as what comprises all

existence in one; which I have sometimes called *spirituality*; and according to which all sensible being is produced.

After the foregoing comment on these words in Plato, little need be said on the instances in *Timæus* Locrus. They are as follows:—

P. 95. D. Speaking of the universe as made in a spherical form, he teaches, that it is necessary for all things to be inclosed in a sphere; so that all parts should be harmonious; and, though changing with respect to each other, should be the same with respect to the whole;—‘so that they put forth an encircled change [δι’ αἰῶνος] through EXISTENCE.’

This expression may signify, either, during the appropriate term of being, or, more probably, by reason, or means of Completeness, or Life, or Spirituality; διὰ with the genitive expressing the instrumental cause or reason.

I here also observe, that in several passages in the preceding inquiry among different Greek writers, this form [δι’ αἰῶνος] is susceptible of a translation and meaning similar to the last named.

P. 97. D. Εἰκὼν δὲ ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγεννάτῳ χρόνῳ, ὃν αἰῶνα ποταγορέουσι· ὥς γὰρ ποτ’ αἰδίων παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὁδε ἡρπύς ἐγεννάθη, οὕτως ὥς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὁδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἰδαμουργήθη.

It [χρόνος, Time] is an image of that ungenerated Time [χρόνος] which we call EXISTENCE; for as, according to an eternal paradigm, the idanic* world, this heaven was generated; so, according to the paradigm EXISTENCE, this Time, or successional being [χρόνος], was generated together with the world.

To render χρόνος, Time, in the common acceptation of the word, and αἰὼν, eternity, in this place, would make strange meaning. It would be calling change the image of unchangeableness; succession the image of constancy; flux the image of not flowing; division the image of indivisibility.

It is plain that the ungenerated Time of *Timæus* is not Eternity. It is some spiritual existence, according to which, as a paradigm, that which he calls χρόνος [Time] is formed.

I conceive that by χρόνος [Time] he means the same as Plato does; namely, generated being considered as in motion or in apparent succession; the motion or apparent

* I transfer *ἰδανικός*, rather than translate it. Cornarius renders, — ‘Mundum in specie extantem.’

succession being necessary in order to make the generated being *χρόνος* [Time].

But, in his view, all things exist spiritually, and essentially, in God; whether they are within the perception of creatures or not. That whole sum of being, therefore, which we call *past*, *present*, and *future*, and which in our view is successional [*ὁ πᾶς χρόνος*], exists as *one* in the Divinity; and this *whole* is, there, an *existence* [*αἰών*].

Indeed, Plato and Timæus appear, at times, to have thought, that the infinity of spiritual existence in the Divinity, would be, being exhibited to the perception of creatures (that is, generated) continually [*διὰ τέλους*] in *χρόνος* [Time], or apparent successional being. So that *χρόνος* [Time], considered as a whole, is a complete image of the Divine Spirituality.

As, therefore, *αἰών* [EXISTENCE] is 'infinite LIFE, at once perfect and full, the whole of which is ever present to itself;' so '*χρόνος* [Time] is a flowing image of such LIFE;' and this without reference to positive *duration*.

The meaning of the entire passage in Timæus Locrus, then, may be correctly expressed, in paraphrase, thus:— 'Generated successional being, as a whole, is an image of that ungenerated comprehension of being which appears to us successional, but which, in essence, we call EXISTENCE, or *spirituality*; for as, according to an eternal exemplar, the idanic world, this heaven was generated; so according to the exemplar EXISTENCE in God, this apparent successional being was fabricated together with the world.' — This is saying the same as Plato says after him; that *χρόνος* [apparent successional being] is a movable image of constant EXISTENCE in Divinity.

P. 96. C. *Mind alone can discern God, the EXISTENTIAL, the ruler and generator of all these things* [*Θεὸν δὲ τὸν μὲν αἰώνιον νόος ὁρᾷ μόνος τῶν ἀπάντων ἀρχαγὸν καὶ γενέτορα τούτων*]. But this [God, the universe,] which is generated we perceive by sight, &c.

It would be difficult to assign any other meaning than *spiritual* to this *αἰώνιος*. The antithesis in the text imperatively requires it. Even should we say *eternal*, we should mean *spiritual*.

P. 105. A. *The world, being full of Gods and men, and other living beings, which were fabricated according to the most*

excellent image of the ungenerated and EXISTENTIAL idea
[εἶδος ἀγεννῆτος καὶ αἰωνίου.]

The subject of this αἰώνιος is *spirit* itself. Whether Timæus intended to express its spiritual nature by this word, is willingly submitted to the reader. I readily believe he did. But I have no right to believe that he intended to express its perpetuity of *duration* by this adjective; until it shall appear, that αἰών, the parent noun, signified *perpetual duration* in that age; against which meaning the evidence produced is almost unanimous, and in no case positively in its favor. While, on the contrary, the evidence of a *spiritual* import in both that word, and the few discovered instances of αἰώνιος, is equally decisive.

In regard to αἰών, it carries about it an atmosphere of spirituality, in almost every instance in which it occurs in ancient Greek, within our present view; as the reader must have perceived without comment of mine. In many of the instances, its plain meaning is either *Spirit* or *Life*; or *spirituality* considered as *state of vital or intellectual energy*, — the secret, invisible state of existence and action in which the perceiver and the thing perceived are scarcely, if at all, different from being *one* and the same.

In regard to αἰώνιος, in every discovered instance, the context invariably leads you to something *spiritual*. It carries you, either among souls in Hades; or into the immaterial realm of *abstract ideas, essences, intellectual paradigms*, or actual *spiritual existences* in the Divine Being. A sense of *spirituality* is forced upon the mind, wherever, as yet, we read this word; and, in some of the instances, no other sense than *spiritual* can be consistently attached to it.

Remember, now, that these are the earliest instances of αἰώνιος in classic Greek, so far as yet appears; that they occur in writers who are treating expressly of *spiritual* subjects, even subjects similar to those on which Moses, the inspired, writes, although they are void of his simplicity and truth; that these instances occur in Greek writers, who, probably, were not wholly unacquainted with Scriptural forms of expression, in a Greek translation of the Books of Moses, where this adjective appears so often with reference to God, a ΣΠΙΡΙΤ, and things relating to Him.

Compare this with the *spiritual* import so extensively prevalent in αἰών, throughout the more ancient writers; and

with its special sense of *spirituality* as used by Timæus and Plato, when they are introducing the adjective into their language ; — and, the inference is almost irresistible, that the ancient, earliest, and first known meaning of *aiónos*, in classic Greek, is *spiritual*. I must, therefore, hold to this meaning, which is thus supported ; to the rejection of that relating to *duration*, for which I cannot yet find any support.

When, also, I search the Scriptures, pursuing after Divine truth through the medium of language, I must needs take with me this spiritual import of these words, to bear what evidence it may, in elucidating the sense of those Hebrew terms to which, in *ancient days*, they were thought fully to correspond.

Professor Stuart must forgive me for doing this, notwithstanding his having affirmed, that '*aiónos*, in the sense of *spiritual*, is an utter stranger to classic Greek.'

There are no more instances of either word in the works of Timæus the Locrian.

I have pursued the inquiry in this particular way, chiefly, for my own satisfaction. I publish the result, because it may be acceptable to any inquirer, so disposed, to have a concentrated view of the *entire* usage of these words, in such ancient Greek writers as come within the examination. It is well to have witnesses to tell not only the truth, but the *whole* truth which they know, relating to the case in hand ; and to have them so that they may be cross-examined.

If I have not been so fortunate as to elicit the true meaning of the words in question from these witnesses, still, there they are, the witnesses themselves. Let whoever will, question them as he will. But, until it is otherwise made manifest, I must continue to believe, that *aión* and *aiónos* sustained a *spiritual* sense in ancient Greek ; and expect to find them so employed in the ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures.

In conclusion ; — having ascertained that my former signature and date did not sufficiently indicate the responsible individual, and that some mistakes have happened in consequence ; and having no desire to shrink from any proper responsibility ; I hereunto subscribe in fulness,

Yours in good will,

EZRA S. GOODWIN.

Sandwich, March 1, 1832.

ART. III. — *Natural Theology; or Essays on the Existence of Deity and of Providence, on the Immateriality of the Soul, and a Future State.* By the REV. ALEXANDER CROMBIE, LL.D., F.R.S., and M.R.S.L. London. 1829. 2 vols. 8vo.

THE subjects, which are ably discussed in these volumes, have at different periods in the history of our race, afforded the most striking exhibitions both of the weakness and the power of man, as a moral and intellectual being. One of the last and highest efforts of the human mind is to acquire and retain such views on these topics, as are in a good degree worthy of their elevated nature. Between the extremes of man's progress may be found every variety of groveling superstition, of fantastic or unripe speculation, and of noble, sublime, and spiritual trains of thought or argument. There is nothing irrational, useless, or painful, and almost nothing wicked, which has not, in one shape or another, at one time or another, appeared in religious belief or sacred rites; and, on the other hand, there is scarcely a form of exalted thought or feeling, scarcely a pure and lofty aspiration of the soul, or a strenuous exercise of intellectual strength, which has not been called forth and matured in the advancing course of the religious sentiment among mankind. We cannot cast an eye over the annals of the world without coming to the melancholy conclusion, that some of the greatest of man's errors have been on the holiest of subjects; but the same survey relieves us with the consoling testimony, that these subjects have likewise excited some of the highest mental efforts, cherished some of the most noble hopes, and led to some of the most beautiful and glorious results, of which our moral constitution is capable.

To these varieties, we suppose, may be ascribed in a great measure the different estimation, in which what is called natural religion has been held. The conclusions, to which it has led or may lead the human mind respecting God, immortality, and moral truth, have by some been set at nought as quite without value, if not worse than useless, and by others extolled as bearing the authority of absolute demonstration, and possessing the beauty of pure

spirituality. No small part of this discrepancy of opinion arises probably from the difference in the aspects, which natural religion presents at the successive stages of its progress, from the first rude attempts of the mind to connect its thoughts with the invisible world to the elaborate, philosophical, and profound systems of the great masters of human reason. We need only turn to the accounts of savage or semi-barbarous tribes, to learn how poor and abject are the forms in which the religious sentiment there develops itself. Their religion is bound fast to their servile fears; and by these chiefly, if not only, it maintains an ascendancy over their feelings. In that rude state, attention is scarcely at all arrested by that tranquil and beautiful course of nature, which to enlightened reason proclaims with a testimony so irresistibly powerful the agency of One, who hath formed all things well. Terrific and awful events are those, with which alone the thought of a mysterious Power, higher than their own, is associated. They take no note of the calm and glorious sunshine, of the regular and delightful vicissitude of the seasons scattering blessings around the circle of the year, or, in general, of the steady and noiseless operation of cause and effect in the stupendous machinery of nature. In that low stage of rational culture, man turns his attention to something more stirring and fearful,—to the thunder that rolls over his head as if to sound the march of some tremendous power,—to the lightning leaping from the sky as a messenger of vengeance and destruction,—to the storm that sweeps into tumult the mighty waters, or tears from its ancient bed the deep-rooted forest. In these dismaying events only, the untutored savage sees the operation of a Deity. His religion is called out only by objects of terror, and its character, of course, partakes largely of this spirit. It fastens itself upon all the coarse and fierce passions, and is roused into action by none but agitating excitements. The worship which it dictates is of a corresponding character; its sacrifices are bloody, its ceremonies senseless, its rites barbarous. When we turn from such a view to contemplate the forms, in which natural religion appears in the writings and speculations of enlightened minds, of those who have brought the powers of a clear and comprehensive intellect to bear on the great

topics connected with the moral nature and expectations of man, we find the strange follies, the idle or melancholy superstitions which hung, like a cloud, over the first ages in the religious history of our race, cleared away. The progress of expanded inquiry, and the continually increasing maturity of thought, are manifested in the various exhibitions of profound reflection, of philosophical investigation, of methodical systems, of far-reaching theories, more or less sound or visionary, more or less rational or unsatisfactory, but indicating the vigorous and strenuous exercise of the mind, the calm and deep researches of the reasoning faculty on subjects which are felt to be intensely interesting, without borrowing any portion of their interest from slavish fear or heated passion. Spiritual truths gleam forth from high and pure sources; their beauty and power, their deep meaning and large extent, are apprehended in such degrees as the limited faculties of our nature permit; and the human understanding finds and delights to trace the chain of connexion between itself and the Supreme Mind, between the universe and its God. There is not, perhaps, a wider interval between the notions of the Eastern shepherds, who first watched the stars in the simplicity of wondering ignorance, and the astronomical science of Newton or Laplace, than between the rude and gross conceptions entertained in the infancy of the religious sentiment, and the researches, speculations, and views of such men as Plato and Cicero, Leibnitz and Clarke, Locke and Kant, Reimarus and Paley.

In the range of such a progress as this, it is evident that natural religion may be set forth in very different aspects, according to the point of view selected for the representation. It is sufficiently easy to make a specious plea against it, by dealing only in a certain kind of statements, by taking the miserable superstition, the childish reasoning, and the various abuses which have accompanied its development in some forms and at some periods, and presenting these as its only and its best fruits. We forget, perhaps, that Christianity is liable to suffer equal injustice in the same way, and may as easily be treated in the same partial and one-sided manner. The disposition to deal thus unfairly has not been wanting. We cannot understand why any true friend of revelation should wish to depreciate the

value of natural religion. Yet there are not a few writers, with whom this has been a primary and favorite object. They appear to have deemed it a pious and Christian duty to throw contempt upon the conclusions attained by pure reason in its investigations concerning Him, who bestowed it on man, as a distinguishing and glorious gift. There seems to have been in many minds a strange dread, lest the light of the outward works of God should mingle and blend itself with the light of the written word, — lest the testimony of our moral constitution should be placed by the side of the testimony of inspired truth. It is curious to observe how extremes meet here, as well as on some other subjects. Unwise defenders of revelation, and bold unbelievers have both shown the same disposition to throw scorn upon the light of nature, and to hold it utterly unworthy of the least reliance; the object of the former being to give to the instructions of the sacred volume a false exaltation, by building their glory on the subjugation, if not on the ruins, of reason, — that of the latter to introduce an universal skepticism with regard to the grounds of all truth, by casting suspicion and contempt on the instrument with which the mind operates in its inquiries. We respect highly the talent and argumentative power, which Dr. Chalmers has displayed in many parts of his book on the 'Evidence and Authority of Christianity'; but when he advances the strange proposition, that 'of the invisible God we have no experience whatever,' he seems to us to state a principle very nearly allied, to say the least, to some of those by which Hume has endeavoured to undermine or weaken the foundation of the primary doctrines of natural religion.

From the same erroneous way of viewing the subject, some of the advocates of revelation have injudiciously deemed, that they might best serve their cause by disparaging, as much as possible, the wisdom of the ancient inquirers after truth, and by pouring contempt on those efforts of the mind to penetrate into the future and the unseen, which were steps of great importance in the progressive education of the human race. Not so thought some of the fathers of the Christian church; for they spoke of the sages of the old world as men, who were guided by a divine impulse. And there is a sense in which this is true. In every age, those who have retired within themselves, that they might

trace and understand, however imperfectly, the bearings of their immortal nature, and have listened to that internal voice which spoke of a Divine Agency above and around, — who have looked abroad on the universe, and have read therein the handwriting of Power and Benevolence, — who have fixed their high meditations on the spiritual principle which allies man to his God, — those, who have thus felt the tokens of the Divinity in the outward world, and in the stirring of their own thoughts, may well be said to have received the gift of illumination. We are often told that the speculations of the ancient philosophers on subjects connected with the spiritual world and the spiritual nature of man were poor and miserably defective, — that their arguments were weak, and their conclusions unsatisfactory even to themselves. Doubtless they aspired after more than they could reach, and felt deeply their need of a clearer and better light. How can it be otherwise with unassisted reason? The master-spirit of Grecian philosophy is described, in a well known passage in the writings of his scholar,* as longing for the full and satisfactory instructions of a divine messenger. These men felt, as well they might, that they were surrounded by shadows and obscurity, and that the craving of the heart for views, on which it may rest with the quiet repose of assured confidence, was far from being wholly met and satisfied. But what is there in all this, that should authorize us to speak with pity or contempt of the inquiries and opinions of the greatest minds on the highest and most mysterious subjects? The history of philosophy down to the present day, even since the appearance of Christianity, bears sufficient testimony that the pursuit of abstract and speculative truth on such topics as God, eternity, and the human soul, deeply interesting as it is to many minds, is yet far enough from being the path to certainty. Yet who will say, that the discussion in modern times of questions, that stir so powerfully the strongest faculties and the best sympathies of our nature, has brought no valuable contribution to the cause of religious knowledge and religious truth? Why, then, should it be deemed necessary to cast contemptuous reproach on the wise men of old, and through them on the human understanding, as

* Plato in Alcibiade II.

if, because our faculties cannot grasp the mighty truths of the infinite and the spiritual in all their relations, it remains only that reason be silenced and put to shame by being taunted with its weakness and poverty? We understand but poorly the reverence due to our intellectual and moral constitution, — that image of God within us, — when we do thus. Though we may not admit the truth of what has somewhere been said, that ‘Socrates was a Christian born some centuries before his time,’ yet it is but an unfortunate way of rendering homage to revealed truth to maintain that men like him were children of condemnation, and have done nothing to enlighten their race, or to prepare the human mind for the bright and beautiful day of a heavenly dispensation. We have no sympathy with the spirit, in which Luther called Zuingli a Pagan, because he believed that the virtuous and gifted men of the heathen world had some knowledge of truth, and were capable of salvation.

Let it not be said that we would exalt natural religion at the expense of Christianity. It is not so; we would only ask for the former its place as a handmaid to the latter, and inasmuch as it is one of the forms in which God has been pleased to convey truth to our minds, we would claim for it its due value and real use. It is idle to say, that this cannot be done without disparaging the Gospel of Christ. We reverence the Gospel too much to believe this. Christianity is the mighty instrument appointed by God for the moral renovation, the spiritual advancement, of the world. It is the best gift of Heaven’s love to sinful and erring man, a gift conveyed through One in whom the spirit dwelt without measure. When we consider its instructions, bright with the light of that divine source whence they came, its sanctions solemn and far-reaching as eternity, its hopes full of immortality, its exhaustless treasures of consolation and grace, its adaptation not only to satisfy the wants of our spiritual nature, but to awaken a deep conviction of those wants, — we feel that every fountain of gratitude must have been dried up in our hearts, if we do not pour forth our offering of thanks for this communication between the Infinite Mind and our minds. We rejoice to believe, likewise, that the influence of Christianity has extended itself over every province of sentiment and thought, that literature has felt its purifying and ennobling touch, that imagination has been

chastened and exalted by its powerful action, and that if the philosophy of religion has taken in modern times a more truly spiritual and consistent character, and has arrived at more definite and satisfactory results, it is because it has been baptized into the spirit of Christianity, — because the power of heavenly wisdom has breathed into it a better life. But in all this we are unable to see the slightest reason why we should think lightly of the value of natural religion, or cast away its assistance. We believe, on the contrary, that Christianity presupposes the religion of nature, and rejoices to accept its aid and to coöperate with it on principles of harmonious concurrence. It is related of the celebrated Dr. Bentley, that he was apprehensive of having done harm to the cause of revelation by his famous sermons preached at Boyle's lecture in 1692, in which he demonstrated the being and providence of God from the discoveries of the Newtonian philosophy. There was a club of skeptics, he said, who acknowledged his reasoning to be unanswerable, but at the same time availed themselves of this concession to renew their attacks upon the religion of the Bible with the more vehemence, as being the weaker and more indefensible cause. We cannot understand how a man of Bentley's acute and powerful mind could have persuaded himself, that a protection might be found for the cause of Christian truth by giving up the province of reason as a sacrifice to the doubts, the cavils, and the sneers of skepticism; for such seems to have been the principle implied in the strange apprehension he entertained, on account of having defended the fundamental doctrines of the religion of nature so successfully, as to silence all objections.

It would be impossible for us, within sufficiently moderate limits, to go into an accurate examination of the comparative value of the different modes, in which the arguments for the existence and attributes of God proceed. They have commonly been divided into two general classes, — the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* ways of reasoning. The former of these scholastic terms is not, however, applied with strict propriety, at least, according to the usual definition of it. It has been customary with logicians to appropriate the term *a priori* to the method of reasoning from the nature of the cause to the nature of the effect. This method is manifestly inadmissible in an inquiry, the object of which is to prove the exist-

ence of the First Cause of all. The term, therefore, must be taken in a more comprehensive sense, as signifying the same thing with what is called the *synthetic* mode of arguing, in which certain axioms or incontrovertible principles are laid down, and from these other truths more complex are deduced. The proof *a posteriori*, on the other hand, proceeds in the *analytic* method, beginning with the phenomena and advancing from them up to God, their Author or Origin.

Of these modes the latter seems to have been generally considered, of late, as not only the most useful, but best adapted to the purpose of philosophical conviction. The whole class of metaphysical arguments on this subject have fallen not a little into disrepute. It has been said, that they either assume some point which ought to be proved, or reason in a circle, or may be evaded or retorted. The censure cast upon them by the late Dr. Brown is, we think, somewhat extravagant, when he says, that 'instead of throwing additional light on the argument for a Creator of the universe, they have served only to throw on it a sort of darkness, by leading us to conceive that there must be some obscurity in truths, which would give occasion to reasoning so obscure.' This inference would scarcely be justifiable as a general principle; for obscure reasoning is not necessarily unsound, since it may be obscure only because it is founded on abstract considerations remote from common apprehensions, and the obscurity may consequently be relative, not absolute. That such modes of reasoning, however, are not, for the most part, so satisfactory even to philosophical minds, as the arguments *a posteriori*, is quite evident. An interesting anecdote to this effect is related of Dr. Clarke by one of his contemporaries. 'When Dr. Clarke,' says Whiston, 'brought me his book ("Discourses concerning the Being and Attributes of God"), I was in my garden against St. Peter's College in Cambridge, where I then lived. Now I perceived that in these sermons he had dealt a great deal in abstract and metaphysic reasonings. I therefore asked him how he ventured into such subtilties, which I never durst meddle with? And showing him a nettle or the like contemptible weed, in my garden, I told him "that weed contained better arguments for the being and attributes of God, than all his metaphysics." Mr. Clarke confessed it to be so, but alleged for himself, "that

since such philosophers as Hobbes and Spinoza had made use of these kind of subtilties *against*, he thought proper to show that the like way of reasoning might be made use of *on the side* of religion." Which reason or excuse I allowed not to be inconsiderable. As to myself, I confess I have long esteemed such kind of arguments as the *most subtle*, but the *least satisfactory*, of all others whatsoever.*

The argument for the being and attributes of God from the indications of *design* in the universe has the advantage of being at once popular, and strictly philosophical. Its foundation is laid in principles implanted in the very constitution of our nature; for it is impossible to see unquestionable marks of contrivance, and especially of systems of contrivances, without inferring the existence and agency of a designing mind. The inference may be exposed to certain cavils of verbal sophistry; but, it should be remembered, that these cavils must be addressed to the reasoning power in man, and that it is impossible to place more confidence in the results of that power, than we find ourselves irresistibly led to place in the process of mind, by which we pass at once from an effect, or series of effects, evincing wise purposes and well adjusted relations, to the belief in an Agent, by whom these phenomena were constituted and arranged. This remark may be applied to the objections made or insinuated against such a mode of reasoning by Hume, in the 'Dialogues on Natural Religion,' which can never perplex one whose mind is not already prepared by other influences to lean to the skeptical side of the question.

The almost innumerable facts in the constitution of the universe, on which the proof from design rests, have been so often and so beautifully stated and elucidated, that it would be superfluous, even if we had room, to go into the subject at length. What, in truth, is the study of the natural world and of man, but the study of skilful adaptations, and of wise and benevolent plans? What but the investigation of ends, and of means to accomplish these ends? Let us divest ourselves, as much as possible, of that habit of apathy and inattention, which long familiarity with the system of things around us has so strong a tendency to produce, and then mark the facts which our observation,

* Historical Memoir of the Life of Dr. S. Clarke, p. 6.

or that of others, reports to us. We find ourselves living in the midst of a universe, where nothing stands insulated or unconnected. From the planets, in their ceaseless and stupendous revolutions, to the smallest plant which hides its humble growth from all but the curious observer, the whole is a system of relations and adaptations. Between the light shed by the sun upon 'the family of worlds' around him, and the human eye, there is the most exact congruity and the most delicate fitness. The appurtenances, with which the various orders of animals are furnished, have the most curious and nicely adjusted respect to the element in which they subsist, to their mode of life, their defence, and their means of sustenance. The human frame is such a piece of wonderful mechanism, with such relations of parts to each other and to the condition in which we are placed, as to have employed in every age the study and the admiration of the being himself, who is thus fearfully and wonderfully made. If we should deem it madness to suppose that an exquisite statue, with all its delicate and beautiful proportions, could have become what it is without the designing mind of some Canova or Chantry, shall we dignify with the name of argument that absurdity, which would teach us that the living, moving, thinking *man* is the workmanship of no wisdom, the result of no intelligence? What has the hand of man constructed, which is comparable to the hand itself, that admirable instrument, which works with such facility and so variously, which 'brandishes a sword or manages a pen, strikes on the anvil with a hammer, or uses a delicate file, rows in the water or touches a lute.' In short, let any one take such a survey of the facts and laws of the universe, as is exhibited in many judicious and well-arranged works on natural theology, and then say whether he can refuse the conclusion, that he stands here as the spectator of a vast and astonishing system of machinery, in which the close and curious connexions, and the mutual subserviency of the parts bear a testimony, not to be mistaken, to a Designing Cause. In adopting this conclusion, he reasons on precisely the same irresistible principles of inference, as did the philosopher Aristippus when he was wrecked on a desolate island, where he knew not whether there were any inhabitants, and having seen, as he was walking on the shore, some regular mathematical figures

traced on the sand, immediately exclaimed to his companions, 'Take courage, my friends, for I perceive the marks of civilized men,'—or as the poor Arab, who, on being asked how he knew there is a God, replied, 'In the same way as I know by the print of a footstep on the ground whether it were a man or beast that passed that way.' Let any one examine the construction of a well-built ship, prepared to traverse the ocean 'like a thing of life'; let him observe how skilfully her shape is adapted to the element, on which she floats and through which she is to make her progress, how the sails are suited to catch the breeze and may be shifted according to circumstances, how all the various ropes, notwithstanding their apparent confusion, are adjusted to perform certain offices, and to be used for definite purposes, let him remark the controlling and directing power of the helm, the accommodations for the reception of the cargo, and for the convenience of passengers, the provisions against accidents and perils,—let him take such a survey, and then let it be proposed to him to account for the existence of this noble object without supposing it to be the effect of contrivance, the workmanship of an intelligent agent, the production of a mind, adapting the whole and the several parts of the structure to a certain purpose. He would deem the proposal an insult to his understanding. Yet how feeble and inadequate is this illustration of the argument from design for the existence of the Supreme Mind! The truth is, that the universe in general is a system of references to a power beyond itself; through all its departments and degrees it points onward and upward to an Intelligence, and conveys suggestions to our minds in a strict and definite manner, like the words uttered in common speech, as Berkeley has shown in his admirable remarks on what he calls 'the language of vision.'* The first poet of our age,—one whose exquisite moral taste has opened new worlds to imagination in the still depths of nature's significance,—has an exceedingly beautiful turn of thought, which may be applied to this subject; having described a child listening to the murmuring sounds from 'the convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell,' he exclaims,

* Minute Philosopher, Dial. IV.

'Even such a Shell the Universe itself
Is to the ear of Faith ; and there are times,
I doubt not, when to you it doth impart
Authentic tidings of invisible things.'

The attempts which have been made to account for the origin of things, and for the peculiar character of the phenomena of creation, without admitting the existence of an intelligent First Cause, have been such as to show very convincingly how much more credulous a man the atheist is, than he who believes in God. They have furnished subjects for much disputation, and much ingenious argument ; but we think they will hardly be deemed worthy of very serious refutation by any reflecting or philosophical mind. When, for instance, we are told, in the spirit of some old hypotheses, that the order of nature with all its symmetry, its aptitudes, and its systematic arrangement, is the work of chance, the result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms (as the phrase is), we feel at once a disposition to ask, whether the solution be proposed seriously or in jest. Such a theory may be sufficiently met by an illustration, which has sometimes been used in the discussion of this topic. Let us suppose a triangular prism with three unequal sides, and a sheath exactly fitted to it, to be set in motion in the regions of space ; suppose them to have the power of varying their motions and of flying up and down in all directions. The probability that they will never meet is as infinity to one ; and if they should meet, the probability is in the same ratio that this would not take place just in that direction, in which the prism will enter its sheath ;—not to mention, that chance is likewise burdened with the task of having originally prepared this adaptation between the prism and its receptacle. Now, if the theory of chance be wholly at fault in a single, and that comparatively so simple a case, how is it, to be applied to the innumerable parts, the stupendous contrivances and changes of the whole system of nature ? We deem it no slight honor to the genius of a great man, when he is able by a sort of prophetic eye to anticipate some of the laws or facts, which are afterwards brought to light in the economy of the universe. Descartes, in opposing the theory of the progressive motion of light, advanced the objection that, if this theory were correct, the celestial bodies would not be seen in their true places.

The progress of astronomical science has established the fact, that the stars are not seen in their true places for just the reason assigned by that profound philosopher in his objection. Kant, reasoning from analogy, predicted the discovery of those planets, which were afterwards made known by Herschell and other observers. Anticipations like these are not mere fortuitous suggestions; they are, in almost every case, the result of principles of reasoning, consistently applied and followed out in their consequences. Now, if the discovery, or the prediction of the discovery, of some single fact or law in nature be the result of calculation, or of the use of means purposely and wisely applied, who will suppose that the whole mighty system itself, with all its appurtenances, proportions, and ends, is the work of blind chance? If it require forecast and reasoning merely to become acquainted with some little corner of a vast edifice, shall it be said that the whole structure itself was reared without plan, design, or intelligence?

But the most deeply interesting considerations and evidences in the province of natural religion are those connected with the intelligent nature of man, his moral sentiments and moral wants. Amidst all the varieties of situation and circumstances, amidst the happy or unhappy influences, to which mankind are exposed, and amidst the countless diversities in their habits of thought and tastes in other respects, we find some common features of resemblance deeply marked in the tendency to look above to a spiritual power, and forward to a future world. Man is by his constitution a religious being; and wherever or in whatever condition he is found, this part of his nature is never wholly torpid or dead. When we say, that the religious principle is a constituent part of our being, we are not about to revive the old dispute, whether the idea of God be innate in the human mind. We think it has been for the most part a dispute about words, rather than things. But we regard the fact of a universal consent of mankind (for universal it may justly be called, notwithstanding the few insufficient exceptions discovered or pretended) in the reception of certain points of belief with regard to the future and invisible world, as a very important fact in the way of evidence. The religious sentiment is so deeply rooted in man, that, as his moral history abundantly testifies, although it may be dislodged for a

time, or in some portions of the race, by incidental and temporary influences, it always recovers its place and power. The Roman orator described only the simple fact when he said of it, '*hoc omnibus est innatum et insculptum.*' It has been thrown into a thousand grotesque and revolting forms ; superstition has erected upon it her oppressive systems of folly and cruelty ; the artifices of the cunning and the tyranny of the powerful have taken advantage of its agency to hold men in the bondage of fear and servility, or to make their passions the subservient instruments of a crafty ambition ; and there is scarcely any exhibition of extravagance, which, under the misemployed sanction of its influence, men have not thought a sacred duty. But, notwithstanding these abuses, which might seem enough to alienate mankind from its sway, it has always lived with a fresh and strong power in the human constitution, as a marked distinction between our race and the lower orders of animals. It is a vital principle within, which nothing has been able to tread out; nothing has extinguished, nothing has crushed. The fact, that it bears and has borne so much without sinking under it, is of itself sufficient to show how deeply it is planted, how indestructibly it is lodged, in the human frame. The prince of English philosophers did but express what history proves to have been the common and spontaneous feeling of man, when he said, 'I had rather believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind.' Can we, then, suppose that a sentiment, which thus manifests itself to be one of the elements wrought into our nature, is all a cheat and a delusion, that it is continually practising falsehoods upon us, that there is no reality whatever correspondent to its suggestions, and that we are doomed to be the dupes of its fallacy? We do not judge thus with regard to other parts of our nature. When we find principles or faculties common to man all over the world, showing themselves steadily and constantly in the development of his being, belonging to him at every stage of his progress and under all circumstances, we believe that the objects to which they relate have a foundation in truth and reality. Why should we not believe so of that elementary sentiment in our constitution, which speaks and has always spoken to mankind of a power, wisdom, and providence far higher than human, of a connexion

between this scene of things and an invisible agency, and of a state of being beyond that in which we now live, to which we stand in some manner related ?

The atheist may attempt to resolve this sentiment into the effect of false and artificial impressions ; he may tell us that it is all the offspring at first of ignorant and blind fear, and may affirm, in the language of the ancient poet,

Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor —

that in order to awe the simple these fears were systematized and augmented by those, who behind the scene derided what policy induced them to teach, that these notions are transmitted and enforced by all the power of education and tradition, and that they have really no root in the human mind. But this vague, superficial, and flippant way of despatching the subject will never satisfy those, who have looked with a truly philosophical eye on the constitution of man.* It falls far short of accounting for the facts, which the moral history of our race exhibits. It does not explain that natural sense of God and of religion, which is developed with something like the power of an instinct whenever the interior life of man unfolds and expands itself ; which struggles up towards some knowledge of truths relating to the Divinity and its own immortal destination, as soon as reason begins its operations ; and which has the characters of the other properties natural to mankind, insomuch that we know not whether it would be too much to assert, that you might as rationally expect to find man without the external senses or the power of speech, as without the religious sentiment.†

* For some very sound remarks on the false sources to which the religious principle has been ascribed, see the recent and excellent work of Constant, *De la Religion*, &c. i. 13 - 20.

† The following somewhat homely and odd, but forcible, illustration of this point is given by Dr. Henry More : — “ If we were travelling in a desolate wilderness, where we could discover neither man nor house, and should meet with herds of cattle or flocks of sheep, upon whose bodies there were branded certain marks or letters, we should without any hesitancy conclude that these have all been under the hand of some man or other, that hath set his name upon them. And verily when we see writ in our souls in such legible characters the name, or rather the nature and idea, of God, why should we be so slow and backward from making the like reasonable inference ? ” *Antidote against Atheism*, p. 27.

Considerations like these have always been powerfully felt by some of the most enlightened minds. They have been carried so far as to furnish occasion, incorrectly we think, for inferences to the disparagement of all attempts to prove the truths relating to a spiritual and future world by any process or chain of mere argument. In the system of Kant the existence of the Deity is considered as a postulate of practical reason. Theoretical reason, it is said, cannot solve the problems which practical reason desires to have solved. The evidence, by which the great truth in question is to be established, must be drawn from the moral being and moral necessities of man ; and the wisdom of God, it is alleged, is manifested in the very fact, that his existence and attributes cannot be demonstrated by the process of man's speculative reason.* Another German philosopher, Basedow, attempts to prove the truths of natural religion on the ground, that these truths are indispensable to human happiness. If there be, he says, a principle, which is so inseparably interwoven with man's happiness, that it cannot exist without supposing the truth of that principle, then man is bound to receive it and assent to it. He next endeavours to prove that without God, Providence, and Immortality, the happiness of man is impossible ; consequently, he supposes that by this reasoning these great truths are safely established, and placed beyond doubt. Now if views like these be in some respects unsatisfactory, considered strictly as arguments, yet they evince how strongly the importance of taking into the account the nature of the human constitution has been felt by the most philosophical minds. They may be adjudged unsound, if tried by certain standards of metaphysical reasoning ; but the foundations on which they rest are those, on which mankind do and ever will repose some of their best and firmest faith. The belief in God, in His attributes, and in a future existence, is *a want* of our moral nature, a deep, inevitable, pervading want. We feel it to be so ; we feel that without it all is incongruity, perplexity, and darkness, that every thing about us is an enigma not to be solved, and that we are an inexplicable riddle to ourselves, that we are surrounded by appearances, which come and go as shadows with no object and no

* Buhle's 'Geschichte der neuern Philosophie,' vi. 672.

meaning, that this belief alone gives completeness to the explanation of human life, and satisfies that principle within us, the existence of which is a matter of consciousness, and which is ever springing up beyond the limits of the present condition of being, and striving to lay hold of those spiritual objects to which it feels within itself an irrepressible tendency and relation.

The human soul, moreover, is led to regard itself as the expression and the effect of a divine Power. On this token of such a Power some have delighted peculiarly to dwell, and have found in it more complete and satisfactory evidence than elsewhere. The mind turns its contemplation inward upon itself, observes the subtle and curious laws which regulate thought and feeling, and in that world of wonders within the breast recognises the same God, the evidence of whose wisdom and glory is written on the outward universe.

There is a part of our nature, which perceives and judges of truth, comprehends the relations and proportions of things, explores the labyrinths of nature, follows the winding and intricate chain of causes and effects, investigates the several departments of the animal, mineral, and vegetable kingdoms, measures the distances and traces the laws of systems, reduces to an exact science the movements of revolving worlds, constructs elaborate and profound systems of policy, refines and elevates society with countless inventions and improvements, kindles and transmits along the generations of men that light of thought, which time cannot quench. There is a part of our nature, in which the whole province of motives and affections is found; and who is ignorant of their power to quicken abstract belief into moral love and moral action, to twine themselves around the duties and the efforts of man, and bestow upon them a charm which identifies them with the sources of our most refined pleasures? There is conscience, which sits on a throne of judgment in the inner man, operating as a quick and instinctive sense of right and wrong, making the heart tremble at its rebuke, or exult in the warm 'well done,' with which it welcomes good intentions and good deeds. There are sympathies, springing up spontaneously with the growth of our moral powers, strengthening and brightening the bond that unites us in the social state at first, and then keeps us together amidst the darkness, the storms, and the disasters of life, multiplying and

sweetening the relations among mankind, and causing them so to act and react on one another, that no one liveth for himself alone and no one dieth for himself. All these are parts of our constitution, the existence of which is a simple matter of fact. Now with regard to their origin and purpose, what is the conclusion to which unvitiated reason would lead us? What but that our moral and intellectual nature is the work of One, who 'hath made man in the image of His own eternity'? What but that the principle of thought and of moral feeling is an emanation from the fountain itself of heavenly light? The religious philosophy of old, which taught that the human soul is a particle of the Divine Mind, was the ready and natural expression of such a conclusion: and however mysterious or romantic might be some of the conceptions associated with this doctrine, the foundation of it was laid in a great and beautiful truth. The spiritual nature had a consciousness of its high origin, which it could not shake off; it heard from the depths of its own existence intimations of its birth-place, from which it seemed to itself to have wandered far away; it deemed its residence in the body an exile, a banishment from its native home, to which in its contemplative hours of reflection and of pure feeling it sought with ardent longing to return. We may well pardon such a philosophy many of its erratic fancies, when we remember that the nucleus, around which it is gathered, unquestionably lies in the very nature of our intellectual and moral frame; and that it gave a noble and elevated turn to the speculations of its votaries.*

* A striking specimen of the mode of philosophizing on these subjects referred to above is given by one of the most eminent Oriental scholars of recent times, in a beautiful description of the metaphysical theology embraced by a numerous sect both of the ancient and modern Persians. 'Their fundamental tenets,' he says, 'are, that nothing exists absolutely but God; that the human soul is an emanation from his essence, and, though divided for a time from its heavenly source, will be finally re-united with it; that the highest possible happiness will arise from its re-union, and that the chief good of mankind in this transitory world consists in as perfect an *union* with the Eternal Spirit, as the incumbrances of a mortal frame will allow; that for this purpose they should break all *connexion* (or *trálluk*, as they call it,) with extrinsic objects, and pass through life without *attachments*, as a swimmer in the ocean strikes freely without the impediment of clothes; that they should be straight and free as the cypress whose fruit is

It is a consideration, which deserves to be well weighed and is of a nature kindred to those just stated, that the evidences for the being and perfections of God, and for spiritual truth in general, are perceived in their true and best power only in a sound state of the heart and of the affections. We do not mean, of course, that the estimation of truth is a mere matter of feeling. But we do believe that in proportion as our moral nature is purified, our intellectual nature is in not only a more favorable, but a more just, state for appreciating and realizing the evidences of all truth, whether natural or revealed. There is no affectation of a mysterious privilege for the good, no pretension to superior illumination, in this statement. We merely declare what is found to be a fact in accordance with the laws of the human constitution. The principle, that an investigation or a pursuit, in order to be conducted successfully and faithfully, requires an aptness or congeniality of mind for that investigation or pursuit, is a general principle, which we apply without hesitation on other subjects. It is equally applicable to the judgments we form of high moral truths. The habitual tastes and the state of feeling we bring to these subjects have a great, however silent and unobserved, influence on our estimate of evidence and on our appreciation of the results, to which it should conduct the mind. Soundness of moral sentiment, and the culture of the better parts of our spiritual frame, not only create a stronger interest in the fundamental truths of all religion, but enable us to perceive more clearly their bearings and relations, the foundations on which they rest, and the sort of proof of which they are susceptible in reference to the human mind. These are, after all, not

hardly perceptible, and not sink under a load like fruit-trees *attached* to a trellis; that if mere earthly charms have power to influence the soul, the *idea* of celestial beauty must overwhelm it in extatic delight; that, for want of apt words to express the divine perfections and the ardor of devotion, we must borrow such expressions as approach the nearest to our ideas, and speak of *Beauty* and *Love* in a transcendent and mystical sense; that, like a *reed* torn from its native bank, like *wax* separated from its delicious honey, the soul of man bewails its disunion with *melancholy music*, and sheds burning tears like the lighted taper, waiting passionately for the moment of its extinction, as a disengagement from earthly trammels, and the means of returning to its Only Beloved.' *Sir William Jones's Works*, Vol. III. 130.

mere questions for the academic exercise of the intellect. There is a light springing up from unvitiated moral feeling, which is frequently, perhaps always, a better guide to important truth, than the logical efforts of the understanding can afford without it. With some of the early Christian writers it was a favorite doctrine, that the will must be in a sound and pure state before the understanding can arrive at the knowledge of God. Theophilus compares the human soul to a mirror, which must be cleansed from the stains of sin in order to reflect the image of the Divinity.* We believe the cases are rare, in which the atheist or the scoffer will be found to manifest good taste, or a high standard of thought, even on points unconnected with religious inquiries. Voltaire was a man, who could not well appreciate any great or elevated subject. He had as little apprehension of the lofty or the spiritual in literature, as in religion. He flouted Christianity and jeered the government of God in the same vein that he ridiculed Homer as a prolix and heavy storyteller, and Plato as an inflated babbler; and his 'Candide,' that poor pasquinade upon Providence, is an exhibition of the same vitiated taste, which led him to despise the masterworks of ancient poetry and philosophy. It is related, that when the disciples of Zoroaster inquired of him, how their souls might become prepared to soar aloft amidst the effulgence of Divine Truth, he directed them to bathe in *the waters of life*; and when they further asked what these were, he replied, 'the four Cardinal Virtues, which are the four Rivers of Paradise.' There was fine wisdom, a noble significance, in the answer of the old sage. The best part of the life of man's intellect is palsied by that sensual turn of thought, that determination towards reckless levity and merry scorn, under the influence of which every elevated taste is benumbed, as by the touch of a torpedo.

The work of Dr. Crombie, which stands at the head of this article, is a valuable and praiseworthy contribution to the cause of Natural Theology. This author has been favorably known in the metaphysical world by his 'Essay on Philosophical Necessity,' to which, whatever may be thought of the opinions it supports, must be conceded the praise of

* Munscher's 'Handbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte,' i. 386.

presenting an ingenious, candid, and argumentative investigation of a very abstract and perplexing subject. His views on this question involved him in a controversy with Dr. James Gregory, to whose 'Letters' he published 'Replies' in 1820. His '*Natural Theology*,' the work now before us, is evidently the fruit of thorough reflection and painstaking inquiry. It exhibits an elaborate survey of the great questions belonging to the subject, sometimes too diffuse and heavy, but conducted throughout with ability, and, some few things excepted, in a truly philosophical manner. One of the highest praises of the work is the spirit of fairness and impartiality, in which it is written. Dr. Crombie discovers no reluctance to controvert what he considers an unsound argument, though it might seem to make for his own cause, or to withhold any concession required by just reasoning; no disposition to cover up and conceal weak places; no desire to wink out of sight difficulties and objections. This merit, we regret to say, is not very common among writers on either side of these topics. Natural religion has defences too strong to need the aid of weak or rotten outworks. Its cause, like every other, is only injured by contending for untenable positions, while it has so much ground that is securely fortified; and he is not its wise friend, who is not willing to spare such professed allies, as embarrass rather than strengthen its power.

Before proceeding to the main business of his work, Dr. Crombie institutes an able inquiry into the causes of atheism. These are assigned and explained with discrimination and good sense; but there are some important views of the origin of skeptical tendencies, which are either omitted or imperfectly presented. This investigation is followed by Essays on the leading questions of natural religion, which are discussed apparently with a single aim at the discovery of truth, rather than for the support of previously assumed opinions; and at the same time, an excellent moral feeling pervades and animates the whole.

In the first Essay, which treats of the Existence of Deity, our author examines the argument by which Dr. Clarke attempts to disprove the eternity of matter. This argument he considers as unsatisfactory, and his refutation of it is a specimen of acute and vigorous reasoning. He then, in an able manner, shows the utter incredibility and the unphilo-

sophical character of the theory, that matter, having existed from eternity, has assumed by accident or necessity the forms in which it appears at present. The atheistical hypotheses of Hume, and of Drummond, author of the 'Academic Questions,' and the system of Spinoza, are examined at considerable length, and their fallacy skilfully detected. The nature of the several kinds of evidence is explained; metaphysical evidence is considered as inapplicable to the question at issue; and the principles of the *a posteriori* argument are stated and illustrated. This argument is pursued in its application to the constitution and phenomena of the heavenly bodies, to the modes in which the living beings on the earth are produced, the means by which they are sustained, and their relations to the agencies that are in operation around them. The illustrations under this head drawn from the constitution of the atmosphere and of water seem to us peculiarly striking. The consideration of the evidences of a designing and intelligent Cause is pursued with reference to the organ of sight, the intellectual and moral nature of man, &c. A long chapter, written with impartiality and acuteness, is devoted to the attributes of Deity. From the nature of the discussion contained in this Essay, it is manifest that some of the statements and of the reasoning cannot have the recommendation of novelty. But they have, what is better on a subject like this, the recommendation of being presented with much power and in a happy manner. They are skilfully chosen, and made to bear in a convincing way on the point at issue. If the author has not conducted his argument in that terse, compact, and pointed manner, which has given such well-deserved popularity to Paley's work, he evinces a thorough comprehension of the subject, a clear perception and a judicious discrimination of the nature of his proofs, and a power of happy application in the use of the facts furnished by natural and intellectual philosophy.

The second Essay treats of Providence; and here the author defends the doctrine of a universal, or as it is more commonly called, a *particular* providence.

In the third Essay the question concerning the immateriality of the soul is argued with much acuteness, just thought, and extensive research. An elaborate view is taken of the arguments urged by the materialists against the existence of

a principle in man distinct in its nature from matter. These are examined with logical caution and discrimination, and are shown to proceed on false assumptions, or false principles of reasoning, or to be inapplicable to the question. The evidences of the existence of a principle in man, distinct from all the modifications of matter, but connected in the exercise of its energies with a material organization, are then exhibited with perspicuity and force. The reader, we think, will find peculiar satisfaction in this portion of Dr. Crombie's work. The following is an interesting view of the process of the human mind from materialism to immaterialism in its speculations.

'Man, in every stage and condition of his being, is occupied with sensible objects. These at all times engage his chief attention. In his earliest and rudest state of existence, he thinks of nothing but providing for the necessities of corporeal nature. Of his mental constitution he is profoundly ignorant. Seeing nothing around him but matter and its changing forms, he has no conception of the possibility of any other, than material substance. If surrounding phenomena should impress him with the belief, that there are beings superior to himself, he imagines them to be corporeal. He entertains no apprehension of any existent, which is not visible or tangible. He is a Materialist. As his experience however extends, he becomes more and more acquainted with the qualities and properties of physical objects. Ages elapse before he proceeds beyond the limits prescribed by external sense. But, as he progresses in knowledge, his curiosity is proportionably excited; and acquiring, in the advancement of society, accompanied with some degree of civilization, more leisure for reflection, he begins to look inward to his own mind, and mark with attention, what passes there. When he becomes acquainted with its various faculties, and what they are capable of accomplishing, observing also the subserviency of the body to the government of the will, he perceives, that his mental powers are so unlike to the qualities and properties of gross matter, that they must belong, he concludes, to something of a more refined character, than brute material substance. Unable, however, to divest himself of the notion, that nothing can exist, which may not be seen or touched, he forms a conception of some attenuated matter, some aërial being, by whatever name it may be called, whether soul, or breath, or spirit, which lives, and thinks within him. It is still, however, material; and he perceives on reflection, that the difficulty, though apparently diminished, is not remov-

ed. He is thence led to proceed one step farther, and to conclude, that the simple indivisible being, which he believes himself to be, can have no resemblance to matter, which is composed of parts.

Immaterialism then, it would seem, is not the doctrine of a rude and uncultivated mind. It is the result of examination and reflection. It can obtain only, when philosophy has shed her light over the constitution of man, as an intelligent being ; and, wherever it does obtain, is an infallible evidence of considerable progress in metaphysical science.' — Vol. II. pp. 451 – 453.

Perhaps the absolute materialism of man's notions in the rudest forms of his existence is here stated in rather too unqualified a manner. Pistorius, in his Notes on Hartley has remarked, that 'the enriching of philosophy with the idea of immateriality may be ascribed to the beneficial influence of the Christian religion.' We believe, nevertheless, that the germ of this idea may be discovered even amidst the rude and early speculations of man about his own nature, or about the phenomena of the universe.

Dr. Crombie's last Essay is on a Future State. The question, whether reason, or the light of nature, affords just ground to expect that we shall live again after our present form of existence shall have ceased, has always been one of trembling anxiety and intense interest to those, who have not enjoyed the blessing of revelation. We think, that the full light, which the Gospel, inculcating its lessons under the clear sanction of Divine Authority, has thrown on the doctrine of a future state of retribution, is beyond all price. But we do not understand why it is, therefore, necessary or reasonable to abandon all other evidence of this great truth ; nor are we prepared to say, in the unqualified language of Bishop Watson in his letter to Gibbon, that we 'have *no hope* of a future existence, except what is grounded on the truth of Christianity.' We believe that there are other indications and other considerations, in which just grounds of such an expectation may be found ; though we are well aware, that these without Christianity would be but imperfect and inefficient, considered as affording a place of satisfactory rest for the hopes of man. The question of a future life, treated simply and only as a question of unassisted reason, is discussed in a very interesting, and generally a

very able manner, in a work published in London four or five years since, with the title 'Immortality or Annihilation?' &c., though the book contains some things from which we should dissent. The view which Dr. Crombie has taken of this important subject is ingenious, and as satisfactory perhaps as any process of reasoning on such a topic can be. He maintains that even the materialist, who does not admit the truth of revelation, has no rational ground to reject as an absurdity the doctrine, that man may survive the dissolution of his body. In the statement of the argument for a future life drawn from conscience, the following striking observations occur with regard to the nature of the moral sentiment in man.

'Difficult as it may be to distinguish between sentiments implanted in our constitution, and those originating in education, we have reason to believe, that our genuine feelings are friendly to the happiness of our fellow-creatures; and that, antecedently to all rule, there are certain actions, to which we are spontaneously prompted, and others, from which we shrink with abhorrence. But, if all our moral sentiments were resolvable into education, it would follow, that man is wholly a factitious being; and that all actions, not affecting ourselves, would be equally indifferent to us; that we should hear the moanings of pain, the shriek of sorrow, and the laugh of joy, with equal unconcern; that we should behold a fellow-creature writhing in agony, and another relieved from suffering, with one and the same, or with no, emotion; and that benevolence and malignity, love and hatred, might be equally gratifying, or interchange their pleasures and pains, as early impressions might happen to have directed. It would be as easy to convince me, that darkness is as agreeable to the eye, as the light of day; a scream as delightful to the ear, as musical sounds; and that we might be so trained by education, as to make the rose and its thorn equally pleasing to the touch. In every attempt to resolve all moral feelings and emotions into education, it seems uniformly taken for granted, that, because education does much, nature does nothing. That the savage may be taught to exult in the sufferings of his captive enemy, or the tyrant feel a sort of pleasure in satisfying his revenge, is true. But mark the look of either in the moment of gratification, and contrast it with the complacent smile in the countenance of the man, who has just relieved a fellow-creature from distress, and then say, which is the gratification the more congenial to our nature.' — Vol. II. pp. 495, 496.

The imperfect outline we have given of the contents of this work is sufficient to show, that, if it be well executed, it must be an important addition to our treatises of religious philosophy. We think it is well executed; and among the numerous works on natural theology, we know of none in our language, which is better adapted to answer its purpose. We do not mean to say, that we assent to all we find in this work; for some of the speculations have failed to give us the satisfaction, which they have furnished to the mind of the author. But, as a whole, the work deserves no common praise, as a comprehensive, acute, and impartial investigation of the important topics of natural religion. We should be glad to see it reprinted in this country, believing that though it may not be sufficiently popular in its character for general use, it will afford light and strength of conviction to the large class of thoughtful and well-informed minds in our community.

It should not be forgotten, that the evidence for the truths of natural religion is not despatched in a single statement, or a single process of reasoning, but is the combined result of considerations and arguments drawn from various sources, each of which contributes its portion to increase the strength and swell the amount of the whole. A phalanx of the highest probabilities is thus presented, which no mind that acknowledges the common principles of all reasoning can resist, without evincing a strange credulity in receiving difficulties and absurdities. The attempt has very injudiciously been made to apply mathematical reasoning to these subjects; and we remember to have seen a work, in which all the parade of diagrams and of geometrical demonstration was used for this purpose. There are minds, to which such a mode of arguing may seem at first very attractive, because it appears to promise the absolute certainty of the exact sciences; but by failing, as it must, to perform its promise, it leads in the end to more doubt than conviction. Besides, it should be remembered, that the assurance left on the mind by an overwhelming mass of probable evidence is not to be distinguished, in the strength of its effect, from that produced by mathematical proofs. There are surely many things, which no one pretends to demonstrate, but which every one believes as firmly as any proposition in Euclid. So far as the actual satisfaction of the mind is concerned,

therefore, we need not the demonstrative mode of proof that belongs to the exact sciences. The difficulties and doubts, which accompany some of our speculations in natural theology, arise almost wholly from the necessary imperfection of our faculties and of our situation in this stage of being. We occupy a small nook, as it were, in the vast creation, and our vision is at best feeble and limited; how then can it be, that our knowledge of the physical laws and the spiritual truths of the universe should not be inadequate and obscure? Christianity, in the lofty and glorious views which it opens, teaches us to expect a brighter day, a larger growth of the rational nature, when the soul shall be as a mirror for the distinct reflection of all truth, and the enlightened and purified mind shall not need the slow process of argument in order to believe all that relates to God and immortality. To the child, or the ignorant man, nothing seems more confused and disorderly than the motions of the heavenly bodies; but to the eye of the scientific astronomer they present a sublime order, a magnificent harmony, even in their apparent anomalies and aberrations. Will there not be a far greater difference between our conceptions of God and of His universe in the childhood of this world, and those which shall dawn and brighten upon our souls in the manhood of another world? After all, the best we can do here is to gain glimpses of truth, which twinkle from afar, and beckon the spirit forward to a time, when these glimpses shall be enlarged into the broad, beautiful, and clear light of day, as those bright specks in the expanse of the firmament, which, at first, to the naked eye seemed only small glimmering points, are at length discovered by the aid of the telescope to be suns, and worlds, and systems.

At the present time it is peculiarly important, that the topics of which we have spoken should be considered faithfully and seriously. Amidst the wild strife of opinions, amidst the rapid fermentation of blind zeal and heedless party spirit, amidst the visions of ignorant or half-enlightened minds accredited for truths, there has grown up a spirit of profligate irreligion, — a giddy recklessness that laughs to scorn the hopes and the trusts of piety, and calls them all alike a mockery and a delusion, — a cold and heartless feeling of contempt for all that is elevated, which stigmatizes as folly every thing, that would carry us beyond the scramble and the dust of this world, or that would

teach us to look for higher joys than those of sense. It becomes every friend to the welfare of society to pause, and consider whither such a spirit would lead. What is the work, which it would achieve? It would take from man that, by which alone he is finally to be better than the beast that labors for him; it would rob the poor of the secret wealth of the soul; it would deny to the deserted their best, their only friend, to the wretched their hidden solace, to the wandering their guide, to the afflicted their comfort, to the wounded spirit its healing balm, to the departing soul the hope that warms even the chill of death; it would bring a dark and heavy cloud over creation, and leave the universe without a Presiding Mind; nature, which to the eye of rational faith is so full of rich, magnificent, and holy associations, would become a dead, unmeaning scene; the notes of praise and gladness would no more be heard from it, — the monuments of wisdom and love no more seen in it; the world would become blank, cold, and cheerless as the tombs of the departed, which hold only the lifeless ashes of the once animated frame; and we should find there is as much of truth, as of poetical wildness, in that celebrated vision, in which the romantic imagination of Richter has portrayed the dismay of creation, searching for a Deity and finding none. We have no apprehension, indeed, that religion can ever be driven from society. The hand of the Omnipotent has placed a strong guard around this consecrated interest, which the poor delusions of man will in vain essay to break down. All history shows, that, though atheism and reckless skepticism may from certain causes spread to some extent, yet men are at length carried back to the fundamental principles of religion by an irresistible tendency of their moral constitution. But even the temporary and partial mischief, which this folly may occasion, is sufficiently fearful to excite the deepest interest in every friend of mankind. Nothing can be more important, than that the religious sentiment of the community should be enlightened, guarded, and strengthened. All the sources, from which it may receive purity and warmth, whether in nature or in revelation, should be opened upon the mind; and man should be accustomed to feel that he stands, as a priest, in the midst of the magnificent temple of God's creation, to offer the praise of a devout heart, and to render the service of reverence, of love, and of duty.

ART. V. — *The Story of the Life of Lafayette, as told by a Father to his Children.* By the Author of the 'Children's Robinson Crusoe.' Boston. Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Wilkins. 1831. 18mo. pp. 284.

PARENTS and those interested in children will greet this 'Story' with pleasure, for several reasons. It is written in a style of good, idiomatic English; and that is a praise which cannot be often heartily awarded to American books for children. How few of our writers put plain and simple words together with elegant propriety; and how many, in aiming to be intelligible, sink into childishness or vulgarity. The unformed literary taste of the rising generation seems in some danger of being perverted by the bad style in which some of our popular books for children are written.

The moral and religious tone of this work is pure and elevated. The author has drawn the character of Lafayette, we think, so as to win the young to love and admire true heroism, and so as to teach them to distinguish between genuine greatness of soul and its often attractive counterfeit.

We have mentioned some of our author's claims to the approbation of the parents and guides of young people; for we do not quite agree with those who say, 'Let children themselves be our critics; if we satisfy them, it is enough. We care not for the censure of grown-up readers.' It is very true that children are the only judges as to what is *interesting* to them, and if a writer has not talent enough to please them, grown people may commend his excellent works in vain; — they will not be read. But children are not the best judges of what is *fit* for them. A boy will devour a book which is full of amusing facts or pleasant fancies, though the author may be weakening his moral sense in every page, or murdering the king's English in every sentence. The works of 'Peter Parley' are favorites with children, on some accounts deservedly so; but we do not think his young readers would be less charmed with them, and we are sure his older ones would more heartily approve them, if they were freed from the faults of careless composition; and his accounts of foreign countries would not be less entertaining, were he to weed from them all false and illiberal views of foreign character and manners.

The book before us, we are happy to say, is not wanting in those qualities which will render it attractive to children. First, it is true ; — and we all know that the first question of a child respecting a favorite hero is, ‘ Was he a real man ? ’ In the next place, the moral truth is not brought in as it were by force, as is often the case in books intended to do good to children as well as to amuse them. The entertaining and the edifying seem to spring up naturally together, like the wild flowers and green grass under our feet. The author does not insert a regular sermon every few pages, as the manner of some is, for the little reader to — skip ; but there is a concealed sermon running through the whole book, and the child is unconsciously made wiser and better while he reads.

We find here much of that tact, so unattainable by those who have not ‘ the gift,’ which enables a writer for the time to ‘ become as a little child ’ ; to see with the eyes, and to feel with the heart of childhood. There is great spirit and variety both in the narrative and in the dialogue. Questions and remarks are not put in at random merely to break up the narrative ; but the individuals in the little family party have distinct characters, which are naturally unfolded by whatever they say and do. The power of giving individuality to the *dramatis personæ* of a novel, a play, or a little book for children, is a rare and a happy one.

We take leave of our author with the hope that she will continue her good works in the field where so many are sowing weeds or unfruitful seed ; — and of the Hero, for whom she has kindled our admiration anew, in the words of Fuller, — ‘ Such a man’s soul is an impregnable fort : it cannot be scaled with ladders, for it reacheth up to heaven ; nor undermined by pioneers, for it is founded upon a rock ; nor betrayed by treason, for faith itself keeps it ; nor be forced by famine, for a good conscience is a continual feast.’

ART. VI. — *Sermons, accompanied by suitable Prayers, designed to be used in Families.* Vol. II. Edited by the Rev. J. R. BEARD. London. 1831. 8vo. pp. 503.

THE first volume of these Sermons was favorably noticed in our Number for November, 1830. The volume which is now published in continuation, is even more interesting than the other, because it not only contains excellent sermons from our English brethren, but presents them in connexion with excellent sermons from Unitarians of Geneva, and from our friends at home. Apart from the merit of the discourses, there is something highly gratifying in this union of kindred minds from three distant parts of the earth; this meeting of brethren in the only way in which it is probable they ever will meet, till they join each other beyond the grave.

Thirty sermons are comprised in this volume. The first in order is by Dr. Tuckerman, entitled 'The Gospel a Blessing to the Poor.' Of this sermon Mr. Beard thus speaks in his Preface;

'Great as is the importance of most of the subjects treated of in this volume, the Editor feels assured that many will think with him, in placing before all others the merciful attention to the moral and spiritual wants of the neglected poor, which is enforced in a manner that does equal credit to his principles as a Christian and his talents as a writer, in the sermon by Dr. Tuckerman. The Editor ventures to entertain a hope, that this discourse may do something to forward the establishment, in this country, of missions similar to that which exists in Boston; and to lead the members of families to use — each and all, the young and the old, male and female — to use their influence in exertions, made by themselves, not by proxy, in a degree greater than may have hitherto been done, to improve the moral, spiritual, and physical condition of the poor and depraved of their respective neighbourhoods.' — pp. vii, viii.

To this we respond a sincere Amen; and we trust that our English brethren will soon be able to tell us, that they have not only equalled but surpassed our own efforts in offering the blessings of the Gospel to the poor and destitute. We shall rejoice, and esteem them highly favored, if they obtain the services of such a man as Dr. Tuckerman. He will rejoice, if they obtain better services than his.

There are two other valuable discourses by Americans in this volume ; sermon the sixth, on 'The Religion of Principle, and the Religion of the Affections,' by Professor Ware, Jr., and sermon the sixteenth, on 'The Formation and Progress of the Christian Character,' by Mr. Parkman.

The character of the Genevan sermons is decidedly French. They are translated by the editor, and, as we should think, well. But we cannot agree with him in the estimate which he has formed of them. We do not deny them merit, but we do deny them the superlative merit which he claims for them. Mr. Beard expresses a hope that they may exercise an influence in his own country. Does he not forget the difference between the English and the Genevan character ? If the English pulpit lacks warmth, it is desirable that warmth should, from some quarter, be infused into it. But is it not possible, is it not a fact, that what sounds warm and soul-stirring to a Genevan ear, may fall coldly and without effect on the ear of an Englishman or a New-Englander ? Mr. Beard says of these sermons, 'There may be those, who, forgetting what is the legitimate object of pulpit addresses and moral admonitions, may, under the influence of a taste as false as it is fastidious, pronounce them too declamatory ; but glad would the editor be, to abide by the result of an appeal to Christian men and women, made by the introduction into our pulpits and closets of discourses conceived and executed in the same style as are they.' We are not aware that our taste is fastidious ; but, however that may be, we will venture to pronounce a passage like the following to be too declamatory. It is from the twenty-third sermon, entitled 'Simon the Magician, or the Worldling subject to Two Masters,' by M. Cellerier. The preacher is describing the worldling, placed between the two masters whom he has pretended to serve.

'Born in the church, instructed in religion, he has seen what so many holy men and prophets in vain desired to know. Faith has invited him ; it has said to him, "My son, give me thy heart : I will make thee an heir of God, and a joint heir with Jesus Christ." But passion held him back ; cast her chains on him ; put into his hands the playthings of infancy ; and forbade him to raise his heart on high. He obeyed ; he trampled under foot the blood of the Son of God ; labored for what profited not ; and walked amid vain shows. Meanwhile, the storms of

life fell upon him, and threatened him with adverse fortune. Faith invited him, and said, "Come unto me, ye that labor, and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." But passion held him back: it stopped him in the midst of suffering; threw him on a rock; withheld all aid. He obeyed; he remained to the end, beaten by the tempest; in the midst of those clouds without water, those raging waves of the sea, those wandering stars, of which an Apostle speaks. The enemy of his salvation drew up against him, in array of battle, his various temptations. Faith invited him; it offered to him every spiritual and divine weapon, and said, "I am the victory over the world." But passion held him back; disarmed him, and led him, defenceless, to the monster sin. He obeyed; he prostituted, in the service of the creature, that heart, where the Creator wished to dwell; and sullied and defaced the image of his Maker.

'At last, the king of terrors stretched out his sceptre, and summoned him to appear. Faith invited him, and said, "I am the resurrection and the life; though thy sins be red like scarlet, they shall be white as snow." But passion held him back; darkened his understanding; oppressed his heart; commanded him to descend, alone and without support, into the valley of the death-shade. He obeyed. He rushed into the depths of eternity, seeking his gold, his pleasures, his luxury; and the miserable man found only the hymns of Seraphim,—only the holy and virtuous emotions of the children of God! Meanwhile, the judgment-seat is prepared: the law of liberty is opened, for a testimony; and that law, to which he had voluntarily submitted himself. He had never thought of it; scarcely did he know it. Oh! at the sight of this excess of folly and misfortune, the imagination is troubled; the mind is confused; and the soul, in amazement, can only exclaim, "O inconceivable error! O unfortunate man! O just Judge!"' — pp. 370 – 372.

We do not say that this is bad, but we say that it is too declamatory, at least for our feelings, and we do not wish at all that such a style may be introduced into our pulpits. We no more wish to see it there, than we do to see the most fanciful Swiss costumes in our streets or farmyards. In the beginning of this notice we called the Genevan sermons excellent. We really believe them to be so. We have read them with pleasure. But we do not believe the striking peculiarities of their style are such as we ought to transplant among ourselves. They do better on their own soil than they could on ours. The apostrophe, the abrupt appeal, the extended personifications, the crowded

interjections, do not suit us, and do not affect us, as they do the people of some other climes. While we do not admit these sermons to be models for the English or for us, we acknowledge their beauties, we allow their suitability for their proper audiences, and we are glad to see them in this volume, and give them a hearty welcome. A foreign brother must not doubt the sincerity or cordiality of his reception, because we do not salute him on both cheeks.

The sermons by English ministers in this collection, are prevailingly good. Dr. Carpenter's discourse on 'Glorifying God through Jesus Christ,' breathes the true spirit of practical Christianity; as does that of Dr. Ledlie, entitled 'The Bereaved Parent Comforted,' the spirit of Christian consolation. We give the following as a specimen of the style of the latter sermon. The author is speaking of the bereaved parents after the funeral of their child.

'And when these sad services are over, and he returns to what is now a home of sorrow, a thousand circumstances remind him of the loss he has suffered. He meets the partner of his life, the sharer of his affliction, the mother of his buried child; whilst sigh responds to sigh, and their tears are mingled in the communion of grief. Forgetting for a moment all that has passed, he unconsciously looks around him for one, who, with a joyous heart, used to welcome his coming — but alas! no light footstep is heard. One place is now seen unoccupied at the social table; and the hearth, late so cheerful, now shows one melancholy blank. He asks himself, is it indeed true that he shall behold his child no more upon this earth, — no more hear that voice which was wont to gladden him, — no more see that happy countenance, which used to make him forget all the cares and troubles of the world? Again, a temporary oblivion succeeds. He starts, as the moaning of the wind recalls the low complaining of his poor sufferer: and he listens, almost expecting to hear those sounds, that are now hushed for ever in the stillness of the grave. Whilst other eyes are closed in sleep, the bereaved parents wake only to sorrow, — endeavouring to conceal from each other the intensity of grief; or dwelling, with mournful satisfaction, on the virtues of the departed, and the sad loss which they have mutually sustained.

'Let me conduct such mourners, and many such there are, to that benevolent Being who came into the world to strengthen the feeble, and to comfort the afflicted. His bodily presence is

indeed withdrawn, and this earth shall no more be blessed with his sainted steps. But his spirit breathes around us in that religion which he has left for our support, and guidance; and his promises, on which we rely with unhesitating faith, come with living power, to cheer the disconsolate bosom.' — pp. 40, 41.

There is much instructive remark in Mr. Tagart's sermon on 'The Parables' of our Saviour, though we could wish one or two things in it altered. Do not the following observations require considerable modification before they can be deemed just?

'Again: there is this difference between the figurative lessons of the Saviour, and the fable of more polished countries, designed also for the inculcation of a moral, that he pictures to the mind only what is possible and probable. He gathers instruction from the real processes of nature and the genuine forms of character and life. He never endows the objects of the animate and inanimate creation with powers which do not belong to them, nor condescends to the almost puerile artifice of giving to things dumb and senseless the reason and the speech of man. How far his practice in this respect indicates his reverence for truth, and throws a tacit reproof upon the license of other fabulists, is a question perhaps worth considering. — pp. 213, 214.

We presume that Mr. Tagart would not have written the above exactly as it stands, if he had had in his mind some of the Old Testament parables, especially Jotham's of the trees and the bramble. Still more serious objection lies against some passages in this sermon, in which the parables of our Saviour are praised in very much the same manner as the works of a celebrated author are wont to be praised; the effect of which species of criticism is any thing but pleasant, and is precisely the reverse of that which the preacher sincerely intended to produce. The following is the passage which we have particularly in view.

'And with what skill does he compress into a narrow compass deep and important meaning! With a few strokes he traces the outline of a perfect drama; introduces his characters, disposes his incidents, and in a moment brings on the crisis which moves the breast of the spectator with distress and pity, or overwhelms him with shame and conscious guilt! With what genius and beauty does he bring his own figure into

view, and under characters the most various, important, and significant, assign to himself a prominent place in the arena of the moral world; the sower; the vine dresser; the proprietor of an estate; the careful shepherd; the just master; the compassionate father; the splendid bridegroom; the powerful nobleman; the heir of a kingdom; and the king upon his throne of glory, judging the whole world.

'It raises our idea of this genius to a sublime height, if we believe, as there is reason to believe, that these admirable compositions were not the slow product of industry, not the work of effort toiling after perfection, but struck off at the moment they were needed; the play of a master-spirit, indulging his own powers. — pp. 214, 215.

Genius is a word which we seldom or never have heard applied by Christians to Christ. It never ought to be so applied. We involuntarily shrink from such a use of the term. It does not exalt our conceptions of the Saviour, but disturbs and hurts them. It is a word for hundreds of mankind, but not for him. Neither should he be spoken of as 'tracing the outline of a drama,' 'introducing characters,' 'disposing of incidents,' and 'bringing on the crisis.' Our feelings tell us at once, that such phraseology and its associations are out place in connexion with our Saviour, and that they do not suit at all the sacred theme. But we say this with the strongest conviction that the author's purpose was good in this as well as every other portion of the sermon. We have noticed what we deem an error of judgment.

We might give many extracts from this volume, which we are sure would interest our readers, but we shall conclude with one from a sermon by the editor, addressed to 'Persons in the Middle Period of Life.'

'One half of life is gone! Solemn and affecting thought! The days of our years are half numbered. There is then truth in what they tell us of the transitoriness of all sublunary things. The story of our mortality is an awful reality, and not a fiction of the imagination. Within the same period as that we have lived, we shall be dust and ashes, or sinking under the weight and infirmities of age. There stand our parents and their contemporaries on the point of descending to the tomb; evidences of our mortal lot, and types of our future selves. A few more years, a few more hurried joys, a few more trials, a few more tears, and we, as they do now, shall stand beside our

tomb, and our little ones perhaps be then engaged in reflections such as those we at this moment make.

'One half of life is gone! how short the space appears! Yet short as it is, many who began the course together with ourselves, have died, without witnessing its termination. Many a youthful head, rich in promise, can we call to mind, which now rests on the clods of the valley; and many a bosom, where kindness largely dwelt, and whence we ourselves drew perchance large draughts of refreshing and nourishing affection, is now as cold as the sward by which it is for ever covered. Brief, then, as is the space now fled, it is longer much than what has been conceded to many. And of those who began the course of life together with ourselves, no few were there who, through their little day, far excelled us in the virtues of their season. Yet they are gone, and we are spared. We therefore owe not to our own merits, but to the sovereign mercy of the Controller of events, the prolongation of our being.

One half of existence gone! and our rational nature is only just beginning to be. We have as yet scarcely had time or opportunity to think, to ask whence and what we are, and what is our destiny, and whither we are going. We look around us, and find we know nothing of what it most concerns us to understand. We enter into account with the past, and find but few subjects of pleasurable reflection. The half of our being gone, before we can act as independent and individual beings! The habits of our childhood and youth are yet strong within us. Arrived at man's estate, we are yet, too many of us, children in understanding. One half of life spent in learning, and we not yet taught! One half passed in probation, and we yet unprepared for the cares and duties of active life! Alas! some perhaps have gone backward in wisdom as they have advanced in years, and become less fitted for the duties in the very proportion in which they have gone onward in life; each passing year having left its trace, not in holy but in vicious impressions.' — pp. 226 — 228.

Altogether, this volume, from the variety of its matter, and the ability and usefulness of its discourses, is one of the best collections for family reading which we know, and, as such, we take pleasure in recommending it. An American edition of it is in press, which will soon be published, as we are told, by Mr. Bowles of this city, who also published an edition of the first volume. Would it not be better, if the conductors of 'The Liberal Preacher' here, should publish a whole volume of that work at once, instead of sending it out in monthly numbers?

- ART. VII. — 1. *The Select Works of ARCHBISHOP LEIGHTON, prepared for the Practical Use of Private Christians. With an Introductory View of the Life, Character, and Writings, of the Author.* By GEORGE B. CHEEVER. Boston. Peirce & Parker. 1832. 8vo. pp. 570.
2. *The complete Works of ROBERT LEIGHTON, D. D.,* some time Bishop of Dunblane, afterwards Archbishop of Glasgow. A new and enlarged Edition, together with *The Life of the Author*, by the Rev. G. JERMENT. Six vols. 8vo. London. 1828.

WE rejoice to find that the excellent works of the old divines of the seventeenth century are republishing among us; for they are worthy, and the memory of them is precious. It is a subject for congratulation, that, amidst the contentions of controversy, and much in the aspect of the civil and religious world for apprehension or grief; we may say too, amidst the accumulating stores of modern theology, which he, who takes pains to gather, must pull down his study and build a greater,—there is a disposition to look back to productions, not certainly of better but of former days, and to draw spiritual wisdom from sources which time has purified, and the piety of all Christians and of all periods will delight to honor. Such are the works of Baxter and of Leighton, of Hall and Taylor, of Bates and Barrow, of Howe and Tillotson. There are those, we know, whose opinions are not to be condemned, who affect to speak slightly of this last. Yet it is easier to condemn than to equal Tillotson, whether we consider his matter or his manner. The whole life of this truly Christian bishop was a beautiful commentary on his faithful preaching. And though undoubtedly he was a debtor for many things to Barrow, and, in some of his discourses, there may be found carelessness, or even tameness, yet who more skilfully has vindicated truth? who has better exposed the practical errors of his day, or recommended virtue with sweeter persuasion? To adopt one of his own expressions in his sermon ‘On the Happiness of a Heavenly Conversation,’ he speaks of heaven as if it was open to his view, and he saw Jesus standing at the right hand of God.

We have said, that the times of these worthies were not better. They were, in truth, much worse than our own.

They were days of theological and political warfare, such as have seldom, for bitterness, been exceeded. The church and the state were convulsed ; and the moral condition of the people was such as might have been anticipated from the example of a profligate court, as was that of Charles, and from their own unsettled faith. It was partly to Leighton's disgust at these contentions, operating on a contemplative spirit and persuading him to withdraw from the contest, that we owe some of his choicest meditations. Happily, however, in this part of his example, he was not imitated by his brethren. In an age fruitful of great men of all professions, there were found in the church some of the wisest and purest that have ever adorned it, who stood firmly in their lot in the most perilous season, and to whose preaching, and writings, and active labors, adapted to the exigencies of the times, to the refutation of papal absurdities or of the cavils of infidelity, to the establishment of the Christian faith and the enforcement of a holy life, the nation under God stood indebted for the reformation that followed. Among these, as we have said, are the works of Baxter, and of others already named. And though we find reason to differ from the theological views upon which some of their ablest treatises were founded, though we must absolutely reject some of the doctrines which they were accustomed to mingle with their earnest exhortations to a holy life ; yet, regarding only the spirit with which they were animated, their love of God and of souls, the courage and fidelity with which they discharged their ministry, even 'as seeing Him who is invisible,' we are ready to say of them, with one whose heart had been opened by the things spoken of Paul, 'These men are servants of the Most High God to show to us the way of salvation.' We can accept or reject, according to our light, their interpretations of the oracles by which we must together be judged, but we acknowledge in their productions the power of Christian eloquence, and in their lives the beauty of holiness. Regarded in the practical influences they proposed, their works cannot be too much commended. To borrow a sentence from old Hooker, 'They are to beginners a familiar introduction, a mighty augmentation of virtue and knowledge in such as are entered before, a strong confirmation to the most perfect among others.' They are a legacy of spiritual instruction, to be preserved and cherished by all

posterity. And no one can better express their value, than does Bishop Burnet — himself not least to be honored among them — when he says to young ministers in those words often cited from 'The Pastoral Care,' — 'By the frequent reading of these works, by that relish one has in them, by the delight they give and the effects they produce, a man will plainly perceive, whether his soul is made for divine matters or not; what suitableness there is between him and them; and whether he is touched with such a sense of religion as to be capable of dedicating himself to it.'

Of these writers, no one more deserves to be read, for there is none the study of whom will better repay the labor, than Leighton. He is spiritual and practical beyond all the rest; for he never troubles himself, as do Owen and Baxter, with metaphysical abstractions or needless argumentations, but takes for granted what most will admit, or perhaps none deny, and without useless applications to the brain to clear away doubts, enters at once and takes possession of the heart. His directness and brevity, too, are great recommendations, and they are almost peculiar to Leighton, in an age when, for the plainest subjects, elaborate treatises were composed; and he, who would exhort men to be honest, thought it necessary to prove first the being and perfections of a God, by whose law dishonesty would be judged.

A judicious selection, therefore, from the works of this admirable writer was much to be desired; and in making it, Mr. Cheever has conferred a favor on the religious community. Even those, who were already familiar with them, will be tempted to renew their gratification by the attractive dress in which they are now presented; and those, who are yet strangers, may be won to a study, in which it must be their own fault if they fail of benefit. And this, precisely, is the use of these new editions of our best ancient writers. They awake from the grave the sleeping dust. They strip of its grave-clothes the mouldering folio; and, arraying it in less cumbrous garments, they send it forth, as it were, to a new existence, for the instruction of another generation.

In the memoir prefixed to this work, the editor has assembled, with fidelity and judgment, the prominent, though not all the important, passages in the life of Bishop Leighton, with copious extracts from Burnet and other biographers. A fuller narrative of his history will be found in the work

of Jerment; but as a delineation of character, this, by Mr. Cheever, is highly interesting. It is a beautiful copy traced by no common hand, showing how well the artist had conceived, and how fervently also he admired, the original. There is, indeed, an ardor of admiration occasionally betraying to some slight extravagance of eulogy; yet, as a whole, it will be read, we doubt not, with lively pleasure. We were prepared to think favorably of the author's spirit from a few sentences in his preface, which are so much in accordance with the very spirit of Leighton, and so applicable, moreover, to the times, that we cannot forbear to quote them.

'There is a tendency in the external religious effort of this age to *stand in the place* of prayer and the study of the Bible, instead of *proceeding from* the steady performance of those duties, as their inevitable, legitimate result. Our religion, then, is in danger of becoming bustling and superficial.'

'Our danger is that of neglecting prayer and the Bible, the only means that can fit us for usefulness, and of entering on external effort, too much because the general current sets that way, and to be consistent we must go with it, whether our hearts are humble, broken, and contrite, or not. We are in danger of endeavouring to promote revivals, not because, by the acquisition of scriptural wisdom, and by habits of fervent, frequent, persevering prayer, our heads and hearts are prepared for it, and would naturally *constrain* us to it, but because others are working, the world is busy, and we ask, what will men say of us. "*La société, la société!*" says Madame De Staël, (and oh how much melancholy truth there is in it, even in regard to social religious effort,) "*comme elle rend le cœur dur et l'esprit frivole! comme elle fait vivre pour ce que l'on dira de vous!*" Society, society! how it renders the heart hard and the mind frivolous! *how it makes you live for what people will say of you!*" — pp. iii, iv.

And in coincidence with these views, which we wish might be considered by all whom in any degree they concern, Mr. Cheever, in remarking on Leighton's familiarity with the Scriptures, and the appositeness no less than frequency of his use of them, thus observes:

'Christians of the seventeenth century *meditated* much more on the Bible than we do now. We are too exclusively external, busy, *revival* Christians; they were thoughtful, inward, *biblical* Christians. They were formed to the stature of men so perfect in Christ Jesus, by much prayer, and long and quiet meditation

on the word of God. They received the grace of God, and it grew like peach trees with a southern exposure, and the fruit was rich, mellow, beautiful. Now "the tender plant in a strange unkindly soil" is exposed to all manner of storms and tempests (at least of temptation by growing for the observance of others) before it has become sufficiently indurated; it is not left long enough in the nursery, to expand quietly and happily beneath the beams of the sun of righteousness; and in our worldly, unwise haste, the fruit is plucked before it is ripe.'

Humility and heavenly-mindedness were the characteristics of Leighton. He understood the Apostle's meaning when he said, 'to be spiritually-minded is life and peace,' and he sought to obtain the blessing by 'having his conversation in heaven.' We admire his spirituality, we reverence his piety; but we cannot give unqualified praise to the means by which he sought to preserve them. He withdrew himself from public affairs, and quitted stations of honor and of duty, which were to be filled by some one, and by whom so well as himself? In the bishopric of Dunblane or of Glasgow, and especially at the head of the University, his piety and sanctity, his genius and learning, might have exerted a precious influence, and availed beyond any mere human power, to correct the very abuses he lamented. But he resigned them all out of impatience of the times. We can commend him with safety only in the confidence, that his example would not often be imitated; for men in general, and even good men, affect nothing so little as seclusion and obscurity. We rejoice that it is so, and for the same reasons must confess, that there must be some defect in an example, which, being generally imitated, would sacrifice some of the most important interests of society, and leave unperformed, or that which is nearly as bad, performed by unworthy or incompetent hands, its most responsible duties. Admitting that the susceptible conscience of Leighton found the fulfillment of his trusts in those stormy times incompatible with his high principles; that he was called, at the head of his church and as the servant of his sovereign, to do, or forbear, or even to suffer much that his judgment or inclination, or even his conscience, could not approve; yet who could more successfully have resisted than he? We are commanded to use the world as not abusing it. Our Saviour himself does not pray for his disciples that they may be taken out of the world, but that, being sanctified by the truth, they may be kept from the evil. And in estimat-

ing the comparative virtue of those who withdraw themselves from the busy scenes of life, that they may escape its corruptions, and those, who, amidst arduous duties and strong temptations, maintain their integrity, who will deny that the harder struggle, and therefore the higher honor, belongs to the latter ?

Besides, God himself, as the sovereign arbiter, has appointed our lot, not for ourselves alone, but for his own great purposes. It is his pleasure that to eminent gifts there shall be high vocations, from which he, to whom they are committed, may not be excused. And it is not more lawful to such an one to withdraw from his station, than to the soldier in the day of battle, from the place assigned him by his general.

Neither is that in our judgment the most just or acceptable piety, which disposes us to speak of the world as a desert, and life as a burden of which we should gladly be rid. For the world is God's, and life is his gift. It was an ardent love of holiness, and earnest aspirations for a world in which alone it could be perfected, that suggested to Leighton what might otherwise be interpreted as absolute impatience of life. Yet we should have preferred, as comporting better with the cheerful hopes of the Christian, some other signature in his letters to his friend, than that of 'poor weary brother,' or of 'your weary fellow pilgrim.' His preference also, which was granted him, of dying in an inn, might have suited well enough a recluse, or a hermit, who had no family to soothe or comfort him, or on whom to bestow his dying blessing. But what Christian parent, or child, or brother will not cherish it among his hopes, and anticipate it as a privilege, to die at home in the arms of his kindred, and to be gathered with his fathers. It was Jacob who acknowledged himself but a pilgrim, whose days had been few and evil ; yet it was the dying charge of this venerable patriarch to his sons, as they stood around his death-bed, 'Bury me with my fathers.'

The humility, which pervaded the soul of Leighton, and was in truth one of its most becoming ornaments, probably persuaded him, that others were better qualified than himself to struggle with difficulties, and that therefore he was at liberty to retire. But the times demanded him, and he should have yielded his inclinations, with himself, to the times. That

he possessed eminent gifts for action, as well as for contemplation, that he had within him that, which could sway the minds of men and give a direction to affairs, is evident from the eagerness with which he was sought and the reluctance with which his resignation of his charge, after being repeatedly refused, was finally accepted by the king. In dismissing therefore all public care and seeking his beloved retirement, he did precisely what multitudes of men, not to be named with Leighton, are continually doing. He yielded himself to his strong propensity; and left to others the weight of burdens, which they indeed might have been ready enough to take with the honor, but which, with him, it would have demanded a martyr's spirit to bear. To them he incurred the obligation, which the recluse and contemplative all owe to the superior energy and courage of the active, the liberty to be at rest. They should be thankful for the privilege. It gives them something of the same participation in the blessings of society, though certainly on very different conditions, as the unbeliever, who lives in a Christian community, has in the blessings of Christianity. As the one unconsciously partakes of the peace, security, and social order, which are among the good influences of a system he rejects, so the other shares in the benefits, which come to families and communities from services which they do not render; from the fulfillment of duties, which they leave to others to perform. We do not fear being misunderstood, if we draw an illustration of this from an honored example. It was well for Mary that she preferred to sit at the feet of Jesus and listen to his words. It was wise; and her Master pronounced his blessing on her choice. Yet some one must have served; and Mary was indebted to the more stirring virtues of Martha, mingled unhappily with an excess of solicitude, for the leisure and privilege she enjoyed.

But, after all, the great danger is from worldliness; and where one errs from quietism, thousands are in hazard of their souls from the cares of the world, and the deceitfulness of riches, and the madness of sinful pleasure. It is their character 'that they mind earthly things.' And it is of such that the Apostle speaks when he says, 'I have told you before, and I now tell you, even weeping, that they are enemies of the cross of Christ.' Leighton looked upon such with the same compassion. The times in which he lived,

especially the sorrows of his early youth, the persecutions inflicted by a most iniquitous sentence upon his aged father, the image of whose sufferings was never lost from his filial heart; the distractions of the kingdom and of the church; the fate of his unfortunate king, to whom he was a loyal subject; the disorders of the commonwealth; the profligacy of the court and the general corruption of manners, which followed the restoration of the heartless and unprincipled Charles, — all conspired with Leighton's natural tendencies to produce a disgust with the world, and the world's glory, and to persuade him, as he labored eloquently to persuade others, that every thing short of God and Heaven was but vanity and a fleeting show.

'Were I allowed to speak freely,' says he, in an address to his students, 'of the affairs of human life, even those, that are accounted of the highest importance, and transacted with the greatest eagerness, I should be apt to say, that a great noise is made about trifles. I should place in the same rank with this philosophical convention of yours the most famous councils and general assemblies of princes and great men; and say of their golden crowns, as well as of your crowns of laurel, that they are things of no value and not worth the purchasing. All, that we see, all that we do, all that we are, are but mere dreams; and if we are not sensible of this truth it is because we are asleep.'

In turning to his works, there are none in which he has expressed these truths with more eloquence and beauty, and stamped the prevailing character of his own mind, than in his valedictory addresses to the students of Edinburgh, when conferring on them the honors of the University, and sending them forth with his blessing. He gives them, indeed, but discouraging views of the world upon which they were entering; and we cannot but think, regarding the occasion, — commencement-day, — and the natural ardor and hope of youth, his strain must have seemed to them as of one, who sung dirges at a wedding. But, for spirituality of sentiment, for beauty of expression, for tenderness and pathos, they cannot be exceeded. They are the parting words of a father to his children; and the prayers, that follow them, are the prayers of a seraph breathing the very air of heaven.

There is something so spiritual in Leighton, and even what in another would seem like monastic austerity is min-

gled in him with a tenderness and heavenly-mindedness so rare in one who had attained his fame and honors, that it is difficult to do any thing but admire. Yet we do not fear we shall incur the charge of unnecessary fault-finding, — that besetting sin of critics, — in these remarks upon his exhortations to the ‘young gentlemen of Edinburgh,’ when the following extracts from them are considered.

‘As to *this little farce* of yours,’ says he, in the commencement of one of them, ‘it is now very near a conclusion, and you are upon the point of applying to the spectators for their applause. Yet I will not allow myself to doubt, but you are very sensible that there is indeed nothing in it.’ Again: ‘It would be very improper as the evening approaches, to detain you with a long discourse when you are already more than enough fatigued. I shall, therefore, only put you in mind of one thing. Let not this *solemn toy*, however agreeable to youthful minds, so far impose upon you, as to set you a dreaming of great advantages and pleasures to be met with in this new period of life you are entering upon.’

And, at the close of another commencement-day, still addressing his young gentlemen, he says,

‘This day, which has been the object of your earnest wishes, throughout the course of four whole years, is now almost over, and hastening to a close. What has it produced for your advantage? I will not take the liberty to depreciate too much your past studies, the specimens you have given of your abilities, and the degree that has been conferred upon you. But this I may say, without offence, the most of those things we greedily catch at, and labor most earnestly to obtain, is a demonstrative truth of that great paradox, “that there is a vacuity in the nature of things.” Though this day is marked with more than ordinary solemnity, it is, after all, the conclusion of a number of days that have been idly spent. But O! how glorious must be that blessed day, which such as are dear to God long for, and constantly wait with a kind of impatience, until it dawn, and the shadows flee away.’

Now who can doubt, that the impatience and vanity of youth need to be repressed, and perhaps never more than on commencement-day; when, if ever, they are disposed to think more highly of themselves, than they can persuade others to think of them. Still, when we consider the interest of that occasion, the ardent hopes it inspires in all generous

minds, and especially, the good impulse it may give to their future efforts, and even to their whole lives, as the beginnings of their strength, and the openings of a useful and honorable career, such dark views of life appear to us somewhat out of place. What did our blessed Master? He knew well the dangers to which his disciples were to be exposed. He knew, also, the feebleness of their faith and their faltering courage, yet he would not pray, 'that they should be taken out of the world, but that they should be kept from the evil.' Neither would he have them fast as long as he was with them; for he foresaw, that the days were coming, when he should be taken away, and their hearts then would have sorrow. Let the young be admonished faithfully of their dangers. But they are not to forget, nor should they be encouraged to forget, that it is on the theatre of the world they are to act their parts, to approve themselves to God and their fellow-men, and to work out their salvation.

Many of our readers will remember, and not a few with a filial gratitude, the paternal affection, with which the late President of Harvard University [Dr. Kirkland] was accustomed to commit the students on the commencement-day to the care and blessing of Heaven; the kind minglings of encouragement and caution, with which he would advert to their coming destiny; and the fulness and fervor of his prayer, that, amidst their unknown dangers and griefs, their lives and their labors might be a sacrifice, sending forth a savour

'Sweet to the world and grateful to the skies.'

We will here copy the last exhortation which Leighton delivered previous to his resignation of his place as Principal of the University. And we select it not so much for its eloquence, in which it is inferior to some others, as for its exhibition of those 'great and uncontroverted articles' of Christian faith, which Leighton deemed essential; and in which, we believe, all true Christians will heartily concur.

'Though this, I imagine, is the last address I shall ever have occasion to make you, I will not detain you long from your studies, nor encroach on the time allowed you for recreation. This is, to be sure, the first time that some of you have heard me; but I have a great many others to bear witness of the

constant design of all my dissertations in this place. They will testify, that the intention of all my discourses was, *that the form of sound words*, that is, the Christian doctrine, and consequently the fear and love of God, might not only be impressed, but also engraven, upon your hearts in lasting and indelible characters; and that you might not only admit as a truth, but also pay the highest regard to this indisputable maxim, "That piety and religion are the only real good among men." Moreover, that your minds might be the less encumbered in their application to this grand study of religion, and the more expeditious in their progress therein, I constantly endeavoured, with all possible warmth, to divert you from those barren and thorny questions and disputes that have infected the whole of theology; and this at a time when the greatest part of divines and professors, and those of no small reputation, engaging furiously in such controversies, have split into parties, and unhappily divided the whole world. It was my constant practice to establish those great and uncontroverted articles of our holy religion, which are but few and clear; some part whereof are confirmed by the common consent of nations, and of all the human race; and all the rest, by the unanimous voice of the whole Christian world. Of the first sort are those we have often advanced in treating of the being and perfections of the One Supreme and Eternal principle, and the production of all things by Him; the continual preservation and government of the world by His providence; the law of God given to mankind, and the rewards and punishments annexed to it. The other class of the grand articles of religion, are indeed peculiar to Christian philosophy, but believed in common by all the professors of that religion. These are the great foundations of our faith, and of all our hope and joy, with regard to the incarnation of the Son of God, his death and resurrection for the destruction of sin, and consequently of death; his ascension into the highest heavens with that same flesh of ours in which he died, and his exaltation there above all ranks of angels, dominions, and thrones, &c.; whence we expect he will return in great glory in that day, when he will be glorious in all his saints, and admired in those that believe. As many, therefore, as desire to receive him in this last manifestation, with joy and exultation, must of necessity be holy, and, in conformity to their most perfect and glorious Head, sober, pious, upright, and live in full contempt of this perishing transitory world, their own mortal flesh, and the sordid pleasures of both; in a word all the enjoyments which the mean and servile admire, they must trample under foot and despise. For, whoever will

strive for this victory, and strive so as at last to obtain it, the Lord will own for his servant, and the great Master will acknowledge him for his disciple. He will attain a likeness to God in this earth, and, after a short conflict, will triumph in the Divine presence for ever. These are the doctrines which it is our interest to know, and in the observation of which our happiness will be secured. To these you will turn your thoughts, young gentlemen, if you are wise; nay, to these you ought to give due attention, that you may be wise.' — pp. 554, 555.

Of Leighton's eloquence in the pulpit we have the testimony of one who heard him, and who was himself among the most eloquent and popular preachers of his day.* 'He had a sublime strain in preaching, with so grave a gesture and such a majesty of thought, of language, and pronunciation, that I never once saw a wandering eye, where he preached, and have often seen whole assemblies dissolved in tears before him.' His looks and manner in speaking are represented as expressive of the ardor and tenderness of his soul; and, 'so lasting,' says Jerment in his memoir, 'was the impression of his manner on the minds of his hearers, that one of them declared at the distance of thirty years that the image of Leighton in the pulpit was clearly before his eyes.'

Of the moderation and disinterestedness of this exemplary bishop in exercising his right of patronage, or of appointing to certain livings within his diocese, — a part of the Episcopal authority too often abused to the most selfish purposes of family aggrandizement or of personal ambition, and among the most fruitful sources of complaint at the present day, — we have a fine attestation in a letter written by Leighton himself to the parishioners of a church, the presentation to which was absolutely in his gift. We copy it from Jerment.

'Worthy Gentlemen and Friends,

'Being informed, that it is my duty to present a person fit for the charge of the ministry now vacant with you, I have thought of one, whose integrity and piety I am so fully persuaded of, that I dare confidently recommend him to you as

* Dr. Burnet, the Bishop of Salisbury, author of the '*History of the Reformation*' and of many other valuable works.

one who, if the hand of God do bind that work upon him amongst you, is likely, through the blessing of the same hand, to be very serviceable to the building up of your souls heavenwards, but is as far from suffering himself to be obtruded, as I am from obtruding any upon you ; so that, unless you invite him to preach, and after hearing him, declare your consent and desire towards his embracing of the call, you may be secure from the trouble of hearing any further concerning him, either from himself or me ; and if you please to let me know your mind, your reasonable satisfaction shall be to my utmost power endeavoured by

‘ Your affectionate Friend
and humble Servant,

R. LEIGHTON.’

This considerate and generous conduct, so worthy of a Christian bishop, will appear the more honorable, when it is recollected, that even to the present day there are not twenty churches within the establishment of Scotland, that have the privilege of choosing their own ministers ; — that the right of election, as vested in the patron or the body who holds it, whether it be the crown, the magistrate, the university, or an individual, is absolute, and may by law be enforced without reference to the people ; and that not only in Leighton’s troubled times, but within the memory of the present generation, instances have occurred, in which that power has been urged with so little regard, nay, in such violent opposition to the wishes of the people, that a military force has been necessary at the institution or ordination of the minister, to maintain the peace of the parish, and to give him legal possession of his place. It is, it will be observed, of the Presbyterian, or the established church of Scotland that we now speak. But whether of ‘the kirk,’ or of Episcopacy, or any other form of the religion of the Prince of Peace, we may surely say of such a resort to the arm of flesh,

‘ Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.’

We have spoken with its deserved commendation of the memoir prefixed to this volume, excepting only, as we have said, a somewhat indiscriminate admiration of the author’s subject, naturally enough inspired by contemplation of a character like Leighton’s. We have not adverted to the

uncourteous reflection upon Unitarians respecting their views of the Old Testament, which probably originated in his imputing the opinions of an individual to the whole body, and which we may hope he would not have indiscriminately applied, or on second thoughts, perhaps, would prefer to see wholly expunged.

In the more copious and historical memoir of Mr. Jerment, accompanying the complete edition of Leighton's works, the title of which we have placed, with that of the Selection, at the head of this article, our readers will find a detailed narrative of the events of his troubled life. And in the sweetness and tranquillity of the spirit he maintained amidst all his trials; the fervor of his piety and the closeness of his walk with God; in his severe judgment of himself and his boundless charity for the rest, even the worst, of mankind; in his painful self-denial, and his princely benevolence, they will see for themselves with what truth and gratitude Bishop Burnet has recorded his personal obligation to Leighton's example and character, when in his treatise on 'the Duties of the Pastoral Care,' he says, 'I was formed to them by a Bishop, that had the greatest elevation of soul, the largest compass of knowledge, the most mortified and heavenly disposition, that I ever yet saw in mortal.' — 'I can say with great truth, that in a free and frequent conversation with him for above two and twenty years, I never knew him say an idle word that had not a direct tendency to edification; and I never once saw him in any other temper, but that which I wished to be in, in the last moments of my life. For that pattern, which I saw in him, and for that conversation which I had with him, I know how much I have to answer to God.'

ART. VIII. — *Proceedings and Speeches at a Meeting held in the Capitol at Washington, January 13, 1832, for the Promotion of Temperance in the United States.*
12mo. pp. 12.

THE holding of a public meeting in the Capitol of the United States, in the hall of the House of Representatives,

for the purpose of calling out from among the leading men of the nation a voice in favor of Temperance, is certainly one of the striking signs of the times. Time was when the question could be discussed there only incidentally, in the form of a resolution for laying duties or excise on spirits; and then legislation would have resulted, most probably, in some act, pretending to relieve the burdens of the people, by which taxes should be diminished and drunkenness increased. For such has been but too much the result of legislative policy hitherto. But it cannot continue to be so. Now that our law-makers, in the very hall of their official deliberations, are willing to assemble, and maintain in the ears of the whole nation, that the use of ardent spirits is a curse and a sin, we may hope that by and by they will have regard to the same truth in their official acts. Not that we have any expectation or desire that the cause of temperance should be urged on by the power of the law. The motto of its friends should be, we think, in the words of one of the speakers at Washington, *Our object, Reform; our means, Moral Influence.* The law can do little, we apprehend, till moral influence has nearly completed the work. Then it may come in, and strike the last blow, by which the monster shall be annihilated. In the mean time, we rejoice to find men like the Secretary of War, the senators Webster, Freliaghuyesen, and Grundy, and the representatives Bates and Wayne, coming forward to wield their share of this moral influence, and give the weight of their arguments and eloquence to the great reform. We cannot but anticipate the best results from the open and full expression of opinion in such quarters. If it would do to say so, we should add, that it is a most happy union of the power of the state to that of the church; it is the political strength of the country joining hand in hand with the religious.

Mr. Webster very justly remarked, that 'perhaps the principal benefit, which may be expected from this meeting, is the united expression of opinion, by gentlemen from all parts of the country, of the effect which has been produced by societies for the promotion of temperance.' We wish to add the expression of our opinion on the subject, together with a few thoughts on the subject in general.

In the last article in which we treated of the subject of intemperance, we were occupied in striving to free the great

cause of reform from the impediments which we thought likely to arise to it through the exaggerated statements and doubtful doctrines of some of its friends. We never supposed that these impediments would prevent the final success of the measures which were so zealously pursued for the extermination of the disgraceful plague in question. We had confidence that this work would be accomplished. But we were sincerely anxious that it should proceed under the most favorable auspices, and not be embarrassed in any quarter by the association with it of opinions or measures of questionable expediency. That duty performed, though it subjected us, as we were aware it might do, to misapprehension in the minds of some, we have been content to watch the progress of the excellent work without further remark; rejoiced to observe, that however the extravagant positions taken by individuals may have excited the sneers of some, and served others as a pretence for incredulity, lukewarmness, and inactivity, a right public opinion has been on the whole advancing with a rapidity unexampled in any other case. Nothing has occurred more admirable and delightful in the present age, than this success. It is impossible to contemplate it without intense interest; and we wish to put down in our pages a record of its present state, and discuss a question or two respecting the duty of good men in regard to what still remains to be effected, and the measures by which the ultimate object is to be secured.

As regards the present state of the question, the remark to be made is, that the attention of society has at length been riveted to the subject. The public conscience has been effectually roused. The public mind sees, feels, acknowledges, and abhors the dreadful evils which it once allowed to exist unnoticed; and is convinced that, instead of being inevitable and irremediable, they are capable of being successfully opposed. Hence it has become active. It has undertaken the work of reformation in earnest. From one end of the country to the other the voice of reform has been heard, and the signs of it are manifest to the most casual observer. Who is not aware of it in the habits of his own neighbourhood? Who does not perceive that to offer grog and brandy has ceased to be, as it once was, a civil and hospitable thing? Who does not mark the difference in

travelling through the country in our stage-coaches ; passengers no longer fancy that gin and bitters are necessary stimulants on a journey, and you may find the bar scarcely approached, and the decanter untouched. These changes in ordinary custom, in habits of society long fixed and deemed innocent, indicate how deeply a prevailing thoughtfulness has sunk, and how far it has extended. They show that the familiar use of spirituous liquors has come to be esteemed unnecessary and unfashionable ; and when men have ceased to drink, there will of course be no drunkards.

The facts which are stated with regard to the sale and manufacture of ardent spirits are equally striking. Day by day the tidings reach us, they form paragraphs of not unfrequent occurrence in our newspapers, announcing the rate of decreased consumption in our towns, the abandonment of the traffic by individuals, and the stopping of distilleries. Nearly a year ago it was announced by the American Temperance Society that three thousand persons had relinquished the trade, and that one thousand distilleries had ceased from their labors. The number has been increasing from that time to this. With the increase of inquiry and discussion the conviction becomes more deep and more general, that nothing short of the annihilation of the intoxicating drugs will annihilate the evil beneath which the land has been groaning ; and the combination is fast becoming universal amongst the patriotic and religious members of society, by which the utter and final extinction of the plague is to be effected.

The diminution in the manufacture and the sale is not the only indication of improvement. The bills of mortality have been affected by it. A calculation, founded on the returns of the last year from Vermont, would show the number of deaths in the United States to have been diminished at the rate of seventy thousand ; and a similar calculation from other sources proves at least a diminution of fifty thousand.

The annals of pauperism and crime record their testimony to the same effect. In this State, the number of indictments for crimes has greatly diminished within three years, and the change has been attributed on the best authority, that of one of the law officers of the commonwealth, to the influence of the measures taken in behalf of temperance. Other causes are undoubtedly operating, which, especially in Bos-

ton, have tended to this result ; but none can doubt that the diminution of intemperance is one of them. In many places a marked improvement is stated to have been observed in the general health ; and as for economical results, it is asserted, to give one example, that the State of New York in one year has saved two millions of dollars in the cost of ardent spirits alone ; the saving in labor, morals, and happiness is not estimated.

We could fill this number of our journal with statements under this head. But we have said enough for our purpose, which is simply to show, that the dreadful apathy which for a long time brooded over the land has at length been effectually broken, and that, though slow in arousing to a sense of duty, the public mind is no sooner fairly awake than it acts with the most determined energy.

For how many years did the advocates of this good cause sound the alarm in vain, and pour their entreaties into deaf and inattentive ears ! What earnest appeals, what appalling statements, what fearful calculations, were made and published ! And yet the community slept on. Here and there a thoughtful, conscientious man was wrought upon, and banished the unclean destroyer from his family and his farm. The number of these good witnesses slowly increased from time to time. The truth gradually made its way to a greater number of minds. But on the whole the public sentiment was unaffected and the public conscience dead. Patriotism and philanthropy wept and mourned, and almost turned from the prospect in despair. We well remember those days of disheartening coldness, when we spoke and scarcely gained hearers, when we wrote and hardly found readers, when we caught now and then a feeble echo to our words, and here and there discovered a solitary fellow-laborer in the work, hoping on against hope. But we thank God we never allowed ourselves to despair. We look back with true pleasure to the passages of our journal in which we expressed our conviction that success must come at last ; and said what we could to animate the friends of the cause.

‘But we do not despair,’ was our language in 1819. ‘By unremitted exertions, and the constant extension of societies, public opinions and habits will finally be affected. The subject must be freely and obstinately pressed upon the attention, on every proper occasion, and in every proper

way. Temporary want of success ought not to discourage us. We must not believe our measures are ineffectual, because we cannot see the effects. The river deposits the alluvia of mountains for centuries at its mouth, before it rises above the surface of the ocean; but it comes in time to be the seat of vegetation and the residence of man.* And again, in 1823;

'We trust that no one, impressed with the magnitude of the evil of which we have been speaking, will despond of producing a better state of things. This is practicable, we believe, and may be hoped for. We cannot distrust human nature so much, as to think we may not entertain the strongest hopes, when engaged in a contest with naked vice. In the present case there are on the one side the laws of God, the awful sanctions of religion, every principle of duty, every humane feeling, the public interest, the happiness of individuals; and nothing can be arrayed in opposition to them but the vilest selfishness and the most degraded appetites.'†

In the mean time impressions were made far more extensively and numerous than appeared. The only organized association in the country, the Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance, by its annual Addresses and Reports, and the assembling of the friends of the cause at an annual meeting, was one efficient means of keeping the subject before the public mind, of multiplying its advocates, and preparing for a brighter day. By other means, also, God was raising up agents in every quarter independent of each other and unknown to each other; and while each, like the prophet Elijah, thought himself almost alone, behold there were many thousands who bowed not the knee to Baal, and were only waiting the signal to spring forth. Thus, by degrees, society became imbued throughout with a true sentiment, like the population of France just before the last revolution, and needed but a word to cause it to kindle into vehement and universal action. Symptoms of this state of feeling were seen every where in the altered tone of speaking and in the changing customs of familiar life. It was

* Christian Disciple, Vol. i. p. 62.

† Christian Disciple, Vol. v. p. 457. These passages are quoted as the language of the journal. They were written by different individuals, neither of whom is the writer of the present article.

only for those who watched the signs of the time to choose the moment, and speak, and they were sure of being seconded on every side. Then arose the American Temperance Society. Born at that auspicious moment, it sprang to full manhood and vigorous action at once. The fields were white, it rushed into the harvest, and it has reaped abundantly. The hour was come for efficient coöperation, and hand at once joined in hand, till a concert has been effected against which sin and hell must rage in vain.

Thus it appears that the principles on which the present efficient action proceeds, simple and obvious as they now seem, were the result of much consideration, and the long, mature reflection and experience of many persons. Other measures were tried first. Much reliance was placed on the laws especially; and we recollect perfectly when we had little hope of reform so long as the legislature should refuse to enhance the price of spirits by taxation. It was a later experience which taught us that the legislature is wholly a creature of public sentiment, and that the master must be corrected before the servant will dare to change his course. The true principles, in which the minds of all who attended to the subject gradually settled, were, — that none but moral means are to be used, — that entire abstinence is to be insisted on, — that habitual moderate drinking is the source of drunkenness, — and that the temperate must resolutely embody themselves into a standing example of abstinence. A European writer says, 'The great discovery has at length come forth like the light of a new day, that the temperate members of society are the chief agents in promoting and perpetuating drunkenness. On whose mind this great truth first rose, is not known. Whoever he was, whether humble or great, peace to his memory. He has done more for the world than he who enriched it with the knowledge of a new continent; and posterity, to the remotest generation, shall walk in the light which he has thrown around them. Had it not been for him Americans and Europeans might have continued to countenance the moderate ordinary use of a substance, whose moderate ordinary use is temptation and danger; and amidst a flood of prejudice and temptation, urged onward by themselves, they would have made rules against drunkenness, like ropes of sand, to be burst and buried by the coming wave.'*

* Quoted in the Fourth Report of the Am. Temp. Soc. p. 5.

We protest against the incautious and offensive expression, that the 'temperate members of society are the chief agents in promoting and perpetuating drunkenness.' It may bear a construction which is wholly false, and ought therefore to have been avoided. Neither are we aware, that what this writer calls a 'great discovery' is to be traced to any one individual. It is a conviction, which seems to have come simultaneously to many minds in the course of a long and arduous discussion, — the result, to which much experience, observation, and comparison of opinions naturally led. And the happy consequences which have ensued, are not to be attributed to that principle only, but to that in connexion with the others mentioned above ; — the vigorous concert of the temperate, and the formal pledge to observe and extend the rule of total abstinence.

Without this concert of action, it is obvious that comparatively little could have been done. The effect of separate, disunited exertion on so vast a subject is necessarily so slight as to be simply discouraging. Against a foe of so terrible power, the strength of single assailants is vain ; it is only when embodied into a regular and disciplined host, that they can present a force in any degree formidable, or be allowed to hope for successful combat. Many associations however have been formed, we believe, adopting the great principle of entire abstinence, but without requiring a formal pledge of the members. They have thought it better to leave each man free, and have contended that there are serious objections to requisitions of this nature which should forbid their being made, while they are persuaded that the great end may equally well be accomplished without them. And we have ourselves been strongly inclined to wish that they could be dispensed with. We think that there are objections to them, to a certain extent well founded ; and as many excellent men conscientiously refuse them, and thus are excluded from coöperation with the associations which require them, we have thought it worthy of very serious consideration whether it were not wise and right to dispense with them in all cases and altogether ; the result of which might be the complete union of all the friends of temperance in one undivided purpose. The question is deserving of a thorough discussion, which it is not possible for us to give it. We can only say, that in looking at it with a scrutinizing eye, we soon perceiv-

ed that the great object in view cannot be effected except this pledge be required ; and that therefore all objections to it must give way, as to an indispensable necessity. We can perceive no hope of uniting the whole moral force of society as a phalanx for the extermination of this vice, except by the bond of an explicit pledge. And that for this reason : A large portion of the moderate drinkers, — a class, which all agree, must cease to exist if we would annihilate intemperance, — are so attached to their habit and so easily led into temptation, that they never will be induced to refrain except by the force of this external motive. They are willing to promise in their thoughtful hours, because they esteem it right, they feel it to be their duty, to refrain. They can keep an express promise. It gives them moral strength. It stands by them when purpose and resolution fail. It is their salvation, when nothing else would save them. And by means of this, thousands are secured, and their example secures thousands more, who, if left only to a general understanding that they would not drink, would be decoyed from their firmness and draw down thousands with them. We therefore solemnly believe, that the hope of the cause rests, in some essential degree, on the requisition of the pledge ; and we should regard the abandonment of this as seriously detrimental to its prospects.

Now it is very true, that these reasons do not apply to the conscientious individuals to whom we refer above. They will sustain themselves by the power of higher principle. They will do right without being bound by a promise. But then it is none the less important to the great cause, that they give the promise, because of its influence on others less strong than themselves. Every man thinks himself strong. The weakest neighbour of these excellent objectors thinks himself as capable of self-government as they ; and if they reserve to themselves their liberty, will he surrender his ? Certainly not. Shielded by their example, he refuses to pledge himself. And what is the consequence ? For want of that safeguard, the only one perhaps strong enough for him, he abuses his liberty and is ruined. Can they reflect that they might have prevented this result by setting a different example, and not feel that their duty required of them to do so ? Could it have injured them so much to give the pledge, as it has injured that unhappy man to refuse it ?

We think that this statement furnishes a reply to the assertion sometimes made, that he who abstains without a pledge, effects as much by his example as he who gives it. For the very example which is necessary to be set, is this of giving the pledge. He cannot take away from his neighbour the deadly instrument, except he first agree to lay it aside himself. The example of not using it is worth nothing; what is wanted is the example of an engagement not to use it. My neighbour will cease to wear offensive weapons when he has been bound by a promise, and he will bind himself if I will; not otherwise. And why should I refuse to *say* that I will do what I certainly intend to do? It alters not my own course, and it effectually changes his.

Besides; if he do not enter into this engagement, how many persons will know what his practice is? It is a very few whom his example can reach. It will hardly be known beyond his own household. But if he make a public engagement, it is known to many, and operates widely; and if example be of any value, is it not worth while to adopt that course which will make it most efficient? Now if any man did, or could, act for himself alone, these considerations would be of no weight. He might refuse to make known in any way the principle by which he governs himself, and the cause which he espouses. But united as he is with others in the bond of society, in the midst of mutual relations, with an indefinite and responsible power of affecting by his example the character and happiness of others, he is just as much bound to have regard to their virtue and improvement as to his own. He has no right, by maintaining a single regard to his own convenience or preference, or by unwillingness to sacrifice his own feelings, to decline doing what would be evidently for their good, — to refuse the exertion of an influence on which their well-being may materially depend.

It is evident that this mode of viewing the subject meets the case of those, who object to the pledge because it is an inducement to act from an erroneous motive, a motive which is not virtuous. For obviously, if they be conscientious men, it does not form the inducement on which they act. They are abstinent because they think it right. The pledge is not the reason on which they adopt this course, but simply a declaration that they intend to persevere in it; a declaration founded on the same sense of duty with the abstinence itself.

The abstinence springs from a sense of obligation to their own virtue ; the pledge, from a sense of obligation to the virtue of others. To their own case therefore the objection does not at all apply ; and if it apply to others, is there any evil in that ? Suppose that they who cannot be induced to save themselves from sin by the power of the higher motives, may be led to it by this, shall we say it is wrong to urge it upon them ? Because it is not the best, is it therefore an unlawful motive ? Shall we do nothing for the amendment and virtue of our fellow men, until we can make them act from the purest principle ? It seems to us, that, to take this ground, is to cut off from all sinners the hope of reformation, and to withhold all aid from their miserable helplessness. It is to say, that they must not be allowed to do better until they have arrived at an elevated sense of duty ; and must derive no aid to their infant, feeble endeavours from those minor considerations, those preliminary and secondary motives, which every body knows to be essential to lead men on to the first and most exalted. How many are there who cannot appreciate the latter, and who can by no possible means ever be led to appreciate them, until their minds and habits have been trained upward by the influence of the former. Multitudes of men, habitually moderate drinkers, have not resolution enough from principle to abandon the perilous habit. Must they therefore be left to perish in it, because to abandon it by means of a promise, is to do so from a low and unworthy motive ? Certainly not. Get from them this promise, and what is the consequence ? You give their resolution a chance to strengthen, you give their virtue an opportunity to rally ; and they soon come to continue that from principle, which they began because they had bound themselves to it. This is the natural and inevitable process in all men. An exalted character cannot otherwise grow. There are no conceivable circumstances in this human probation, under which men can arrive at elevated goodness, without the aid of various inferior principles, which introduce successively to the higher, and aid their growth. We do not know what would become of human virtue in this world, if God had not graciously allowed it these many humble and imperfect handmaids. Especially we cannot conceive how any one who has begun to decline in sin is to be recovered in any degree, if their agency is to be prohibited, and we may be allowed to

act on him only through motives so high, that he is incapable of feeling them.*

It has been our object to state the principles on which this auspicious moral reform has been conducted, and to show that, as their agency is essential to the final accomplishment of the great enterprise, so there are really no insuperable difficulties in the way of their adoption. The objections which may be started are theoretical rather than practical, and are easily removed by application to the same scrupulous conscience which suggested them. Objections from other quarters, arising from opposition and dislike to the whole movement, we do not pretend to meddle with at present. The friends of the cause, the friends of virtue, order, and society, have nothing to fear from them in the end, if they do their duty manfully and discreetly. Let them avoid all frivolous, vexatious, and intemperate action, let them proceed with the seriousness and gentleness, as well as the decision and firmness, of gentlemen and Christians engaged in a great work, and they will see the work go on prosperously. Let them unite heartily. Every good citizen, every believing Christian, has something to do. No one can hold himself excused. Nothing but a universal coöperation can complete the work; and he who withholds his name is guilty of retarding it. Would to God that this thought could be carried forcibly home to the conviction of every member of the community. It is impossible for one to stand neuter without doing something to retard the progress of that happy regeneration, whose completion is more to be desired than any other project now in operation for the improvement and blessing of our country. How melancholy is it therefore to see so many standing idly by, not yet willing to act, not yet willing to speak, not yet even satisfied as to what duty requires, and perhaps not yet even willing to inquire concerning it! We would that we had power so to represent the subject that they should feel it to be, as

* The Editors of the Examiner, while they acknowledge the force of this argument for the necessity of a pledge, wish it to be understood, that they do not decidedly adopt the conclusion as their own, or consider their journal committed to defend it. Its pages are open to any who may wish to take the other side of this particular question.

it truly is, a point of the most serious and unquestionable obligation.

There is one other topic to which we can only advert in a few hasty lines, which yet we are not willing to leave untouched. We allude to the question respecting the traffic in ardent spirits; a question, which has excited much discussion, and which seems to us to be now the most important question connected with the subject. No one who has examined it, doubts that the traffic is wrong, and must come to an end. There is no moral principle on which it can be defended, and it is only in its abolition that the complete extinction of intemperance is to be hoped.

We are aware that this is a point of delicacy, and we mean to treat it as such. We mean to make no assault on any man or men, or to intimate any reproach to those engaged in the trade, or to say a word which shall excite against them an obloquy which they do not merit. They have engaged in a respectable calling of which the sale of spirit has always made part, and have only been occupied in selling what the best members of the community have readily bought. It is but recently that the latter have learned that they were wrong and have ceased to buy. It is time then at length for the former to ask, if it be not also wrong for them to sell? If the dreadful evils of the traffic be such as to render it necessary for the sober portion of the community to combine against it and proscribe it, — if it be necessary, for the protection of the republic and the peace of families, that the temperate cease to buy, is it not equally requisite that they cease to sell? Is it not at least clear, that the extermination of drunkenness is impossible, so long as the temptation is freely exposed in our common shops, and thrown directly in the way of every man, woman, and child, who goes for the family allowance of sugar and tea?

It seems to us, that this question must be regarded by a conscientious man, as standing on the same ground with that relating to the slave-trade. It does not at first present itself in the same light, because the one is carried on amongst ourselves by reputable men without question of its innocence, while the other has long been covered with ignominy. But time was, when the slave trade was deemed innocent and respectable. The case of John Newton has often been quoted, who was engaged in it at the time that he became.

a religious man; and it was long after his adoption of Christian principles of action, before he so much as suspected that his occupation was inconsistent with Christian duty. This is precisely the case with many who are engaged in the sale of ardent spirits. It never has been suggested to their thoughts, that it is inconsistent with religious principle to be thus engaged. Let them think of it, let them survey the subject on every side, let them realize that they are accessory to an incalculable amount of crime and misery, and that the virtue and happiness for which they daily pray never can prevail while this traffic exists, — and their eyes will be opened to see their vocation in a new character. Is it not a fact, that very many, upon the subject being seriously presented to their consideration, have abandoned the trade; have sacrificed to duty all its emoluments; have even given up the great gains of their distilleries; and, in opposition to the strongest dictates of self-interest, have changed the current of their business? This has resulted from a sober conviction of duty. We believe that no man can fairly examine the question, without being satisfied that they are right. We are confident, that, as it shall be more and more fully discussed, the conviction will become more and more general; till, in a few years, a good man will look upon his former engagement in distributing spirituous liquors, as Newton looked on his participation in the slave-trade, — inconsistent with Christian morality, and fatal to the best interests of the community.

We do not mean to pursue this hint at present. We only add, that on the minds of those who have most anxiously and practically contemplated the great subject of intemperance, the topic we have just touched has long pressed with a solemn weight. Even so long ago as 1816 the following strong language was used in regard to it by the Massachusetts Society for the Suppression of Intemperance. Speaking of what they call 'the cold-blooded selfishness of the irregular retailer,' they say, 'the paltry change in his money-drawer is *the price of blood*. It is scarcely too much to say of him, in regard to the tippler whom he allures to his shop and seldom sends sober away, that he is his neighbour's murderer. He leads him blindfolded to the precipice, and leaves him to plunge into the gulf of everlasting ruin.' This language certainly is not applicable, in all its

extent, to the licensed dealers ; far from it ; but it is still a serious and tremendous reflection, that so many excellent men are committing unintentionally and indirectly the very same evil which they condemn others for doing directly and avowedly. We beg of them, as men, as fathers, as citizens, as Christians, to think of this.

ART. IX. — *Life and Correspondence of Joseph Priestley*, LL. D., F. R. S., &c. By JOHN TOWILL RUTT. In 2 volumes. Vol. I. London, 1831. 8vo. pp. 424.

WE do not remember to have seen, in any of our journals, an extended and fair notice of the life and character of Dr. Priestley ; — the man who wrote on every subject, and always wrote exactly what he thought and all he thought. It was impossible that such a man should not have violent enemies and ardent friends, the former always ready to assail and calumniate, the latter tenderly alive to every impeachment of a character honored for its greatness and beloved for its goodness. Few in the religious, literary, scientific, or political world, have received more varied and flattering proofs of approbation ; very few have been subjected to more angry reproach and gross indignity. Yet, with all this, we are compelled to think that the true character of Priestley is as little known as that of any distinguished individual of the last century.

This we ascribe not altogether to that prejudice which his peculiar opinions, never concealed or softened, have naturally created, and which has hindered friends as well as foes from coming near enough to see the man as he actually was, but we ascribe it quite as much to the fact, that, when he has been approached with any feelings, he has been judged of by some of the most obnoxious passages of his controversial writings, and not by the character and tendency of his writings as a whole. A common opinion seems to be, that he was a reckless freethinker, a ready but careless and inaccurate writer, meddling with every thing, but understanding nothing thoroughly, and chiefly remarkable for his wild

theories and startling innovations. This opinion is not allowed to be qualified by the recollection, where the fact itself is known, that no man has written more in defence of Christianity, and in recommendation of its chief graces, — that no writings exhibit more unequivocal, though often indirect, proofs of a deep conviction of the worth of religion and an habitual communion with God. We do not say this without consideration. We do not say it in the vaunting spirit of party. We are not of Priestley's party, at least not in those opinions which most distinguish him ; and if we were, it would not be in that relation that we should speak of him here. It is not as a leader in theology that we regard him now, but as a Christian in heart and life. And our regret is not, that enemies assail and friends disclaim his extreme opinions, but that they will not see how much of Christian faith, humility, and devotion there was in his heart and life. We have known those who were inclined to think well of him, start and stare at the mention of his *piety*, as if that were something which they had never associated with the name of Priestley. And yet if piety have no necessary connexion with system or sect, — and if it have, who shall determine with what system or sect? — if piety can ever be seen in the temper and life alone, it may be seen here, and will be acknowledged by all who look with their own eyes, and judge as they would be judged.

Having just completed a more thorough perusal of the life of Priestley than we have ever given it before, and with greater facilities, we are moved to say this. Unable still to subscribe to all his opinions, looking only at his private and public life, and his uniform character, we have formed an exalted opinion of his talents and virtues ; and his own example would reproach and shame us, if we had not the honesty to say this, even if we differed from him in every one of his doctrinal views. We wish to present some of the grounds on which this opinion has been formed, and this can be done in no way so well as by giving an outline of his life. Every man's character can be seen in his life more truly than in his writings, or rather in his writings as interpreted and illustrated by his life. And we have now a better opportunity than we have had before of doing this in the case of Priestley. The book before us has just come from the hands of its compiler, Mr. Rutt, who edited the complete

collection of Priestley's 'Theological and Miscellaneous Works.' That was undertaken in 1815, and from that time Mr. Rutt has been collecting letters and information of various kinds from the family and friends of Dr. Priestley, in order to give the public as complete a biography as possible. The first volume only is yet published, and it is that which we are noticing. The two are to stand as the first and second volumes of the entire collection. Dr. Priestley's own 'Memoirs,' as he left them himself for publication, are here inserted, but divided into chapters, with his correspondence thrown in at such places, and in such portions, as best illustrate the different periods of his life. The 'Letters,' we believe, have never before been published. His own 'Letters to Lindsey,' of which there are about fifty, are the most important. There are several to Dr. Price, Cappe, Toulmin, Bretland, Franklin, and many others, with their answers. Beside these there are copious notes, adding greatly to the value of the work. We therefore welcome the book cordially, and feel sure that however familiar most readers may be with the prominent features of his life and character, they will find something here that will give it new interest and reward attention. In this notice we shall make free use of the notes, and all we can command from other sources.

Our readers will remember the easy manner in which Dr. Priestley introduces his 'Memoirs' of himself, and gives his reason for preparing them.

'Having thought it right to leave behind me some account of my *friends* and *benefactors*, it is in a manner necessary that I also give some account of *myself*; and as the like has been done by many persons, and for reasons which posterity has approved, I make no further apology for following their example. If my writings in general have been useful to my contemporaries, I hope that this account of myself will not be without its use to those who may come after me, and especially in promoting virtue and piety, which I hope I may say it has been my care to practise myself, as it has been my business to inculcate them upon others.'

That he did not attach any particular importance to these 'Memoirs,' appears from his leaving them unfinished many years before his death; and though earnestly solicited by his family to complete them, he deferred it till he had prepared

for publication some theological works which he said were more important, and about which he was employed to the very day of his death.

His father was a manufacturer of cloth, and had six children, of whom Joseph was the oldest, born in March 1733, at Fieldhead, near Leeds, Yorkshire. His parents were both Calvinists. Of his mother's piety he always speaks in the strongest terms. He did not live with her constantly, and she died when he was but six years old. Yet she used this short and interrupted period to give her son deep religious impressions, taught him the 'Assembly's Catechism,' so that at four he could repeat it without missing a word, and was so anxious to imbue him with the importance of moral distinctions, that she once made him carry back a pin which he had found at his uncle's house. His brother tells us, in his 'Funeral Sermon,' that at the age of six or seven, Joseph 'would now and then ask me to kneel down with him while he prayed.' A few years after the death of his mother, he was put under the care of his aunt, who, having no children, adopted him as her own, and did all a mother could do for him until her death. She also was Calvinistic; strongly so; but her nephew invariably speaks of her as a woman of great piety and Christian kindness, using her talents and wealth only to do good. By her he was sent to a large free school under the care of Mr. Hague, a clergyman, with whom he made great proficiency in the study of Latin and Greek. Not content with this, he used his holidays in learning Hebrew with the dissenting minister of the place, which shows a singular love of study in a boy of twelve. 'Joseph had soon acquired,' says his brother, 'more learning than the common schoolmasters, for he rarely spent an hour for any recreation. From eleven to about thirteen he had read most of Mr. Bunyan's works, and other authors on religion, besides the common Latin authors.'

The school at which he then was being soon given up, and Priestley himself having a violent disease upon his lungs, which nearly proved fatal, he did not go to any other place of education till the year 1752, when he had reached the age of nineteen. His aunt, seeing his studious and serious turn of mind, had designed him for the ministry, and his own feelings were in favor of that profession. But this sickness, which it was supposed must leave him in a consumptive

habit, changed this purpose, and led him to prepare himself for a merchant's counting-house, with a view to which he learned French, Italian, and German, without a master. His health however returned, and with it his desire of entering the ministry; and at the age just mentioned he went to Daventry, to study under Dr. Ashworth, a pupil of Dr. Doddridge, and finally his successor. This was not the place of education for which his friends had designed him. Their own views being all Calvinistic, they wished him to go to a Calvinistic Independent Academy under Dr. Conder. This he resolutely opposed, having already imbibed Arminian sentiments, and finding that at this place he must give his *experience* and subscribe 'ten printed articles of the strictest Calvinistic faith, and repeat it every six months.' Rather than do this, he was resolved to adopt some other mode of life. But his former teacher, Mr. Kirby, interposed and strongly recommended the academy of Dr. Doddridge. His aunt, not being bigoted, consented to the plan, and he entered that academy at an advanced standing. Though in feeble health, he had studied closely for some time, had learned Chaldee and Syriac, begun to read Arabic, and made himself familiar with Hebrew by instructing a Baptist minister in that language. Nor had he neglected more important pursuits during this interval. His mind and heart had been given to religion, and not a little affected by its power. We cannot refrain from giving here one or two passages from his 'Memoirs,' in which he speaks of his religious education.

'Looking back, as I often do, upon this period of my life, I see the greatest reason to be thankful to God for the pious care of my parents and friends, in giving me religious instruction. My mother was a woman of exemplary piety, and my father also had a strong sense of religion, praying with his family morning and evening, and carefully teaching his children and servants the 'Assembly's Catechism,' which was all the system of which he had any knowledge. In the latter part of his life he became very fond of Mr. Whitfield's writings, and other works of a similar kind, having been brought up in the principles of Calvinism, and adopting them, but without ever giving much attention to matters of speculation, and entertaining no bigoted aversion to those who differed from him on the subject. The same was the case with my excellent aunt; she was truly Calvinistic in principle, but was far from confining

salvation to those who thought as she did on religious subjects. Being left in good circumstances, her home was the resort of all the dissenting ministers in the neighbourhood without distinction; and those who were most obnoxious on account of their heresy, were almost as welcome to her, if she thought them honest and good men (which she was not unwilling to do), as any others.

Thus I was brought up with sentiments of piety, but without bigotry; and having, from my earliest years, given much attention to the subject of religion, I was as much confirmed as I well could be in the principles of Calvinisin, all the books that came in my way having that tendency.'

His seriousness at this time bordered upon melancholy, and caused great distress of mind. He was averse to all light reading, allowed himself no entertaining book except Robinson Crusoe, and at one time snatched a book of knight-errantry out of his brother's hands with great indignation. Not having experienced that sudden and mysterious change which his religious reading led him to expect, he supposed God had forsaken him, that he was one to whom repentance and salvation were denied, although he had nothing material to reproach himself with, and led a life of habitual devotion. Yet even of these conflicts, he speaks late in life with gratitude, as having led him to think habitually of God and a future state, too full of terror, but leaving 'a deep reverence for divine things, and in time a pleasing satisfaction which can never be effaced, and I hope was strengthened as I advanced in life and acquired more rational notions of religion.' He applied to the congregation which he attended for admission to the church, and the old minister and his aunt wished him to enter; but he was refused by the elders because he did not believe that all men were liable to the wrath of God, and 'the pains of hell for ever,' on account of Adam's sin. Still he acknowledges his obligations to this society for having deepened his religious impressions. He constantly attended a weekly meeting of young men for conversation and prayer, and took a leading part in the devotional exercises. At his aunt's also, there was a monthly meeting of women, who, he says, 'acquitted themselves in prayer as well as any of the men belonging to the congregation.' His aunt prayed in her own family every morning and evening, and after he was seven-

teen he performed this duty himself. On the Sabbath no food was dressed, nor recreation allowed, but the whole day was spent in religious exercises of some kind.

We have dwelt the longer on this early period of Priestley's life, because it gives us the foundation of his religious character, and its benefits were gratefully acknowledged by him long after he had changed most of his religious opinions. It is one of many instances confirming us in the belief of the inestimable value of a strictly religious education, even when the peculiar doctrines on which it proceeds are erroneous, and its first fruits are those of fear rather than love. We know great evil sometimes follows such impressions, where there is no counteracting influence ; but if called to choose between this chance and that of no direct religious instruction at all, we should prefer the former without a moment's hesitation.

Priestley entered the academy at Daventry an Arminian, still holding the doctrines of the trinity and atonement in their prevailing forms. Dr. Doddridge had died the year before, but the plan of study given in his published 'Lectures' was still pursued, and was found peculiarly favorable to free inquiry. The instructors, Dr. Ashworth and Mr. Clark, were of different religious opinions, and the students also about equally divided on all the great questions. This state of things was altogether favorable to the pursuit of truth, as both sides of every question were faithfully examined and warmly advocated, yet always in the most friendly way. At this time Priestley read with close attention Dr. Hartley's 'Observations on Man,' to which he ascribes a decided change in his religious opinions, and a most favorable effect on his mind through life, establishing him in the doctrine of necessity, and relieving his piety of the gloom and austerity that had before disturbed it. He remained in this academy three years, and saw reason, as he says, 'to embrace what is generally called the heterodox side of almost every question'; but was still a favorite with the orthodox Dr. Ashworth, and always retained his friendship.

It was at this academy that Priestley formed those habits of exact method in the division of his time and labor, which he always maintained, and to which we owe in great part the immense amount of labor accomplished by him then and afterward. He began with keeping a diary in which he noted the occurrences of every day, where he had been and

how employed, particularly what he had read, the authors, the number of pages, and the reflections suggested. At the beginning of each year he arranged his plan of study for the whole year, at its close took an account of what he had done, compared it with what he had proposed, and with a merchant's exactness struck the balance. This practice he continued through life, and derived from it great satisfaction as well as advantage. His son tells us that most of these diaries were destroyed in the riots at Birmingham; but those for 1754 and 1755, two of the years passed at Daventry Academy, were saved. That for 1755, when he was in his twenty-second year, is given in full in the Continuation of the 'Memoirs,' and indicates an amount of labor truly astonishing.

In two of the summer months, he read the books of Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus in Hebrew, and in the year wrote the whole of the first copy of the 'Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion,' and twenty-six sermons, and this beside his reading and study. He tells us himself, that he made an engagement with one of his fellow students to rise very early, and read every day ten folio pages in some Greek author, and generally a Greek play in the course of the week besides, and that they continued to do this long after they left the academy, writing to each other an account of what they read. Yet he does not appear to have spent more than six or eight hours a day in study. It was not the quantity, but the division of his time, and his close adherence to it, that enabled him to do so much. This regularity extended to every thing that would admit of it, and was followed to the last days of his life.

It is to be observed, particularly by those who have little faith in Priestley's piety, that in all the plans of study which he has given us, the Scriptures occupy a large place; and any one acquainted with his life will remember frequent proofs of his fondness for this study. However engaged, he never lost sight of it, but always expressed his preference of it to all other studies. Having rather unintentionally here referred to this feature of his character, we will give, in illustration of it, though not in place, one or two passages from his correspondence. In a letter from Leeds, in 1770, after saying that he was hard at work upon his 'History of Experimental Philosophy,' he writes: 'Theology, notwithstanding

my other pursuits, is my favorite study ; and if I live to complete my schemes, I shall with pleasure devote myself almost entirely to the study of the Scriptures. I believe there is in them enough to employ and reward the application of us all.' In 1774, while on a tour to the Continent with his patron, the Earl of Shelburne, he thus writes from Paris to Theophilus Lindsey :

' Upon my journey I have read and studied the Gospels very much. The more attention I give to the study of the Scriptures, the more attached I am to it ; and I hope the time will come when I shall apply myself to it chiefly. At present I read chiefly with a practical view ; and the attentive consideration of the facts in the Gospel history has certainly the strongest tendency to impress the heart and influence the life in the most favorable manner. The more I read the history of the death of Christ, in particular, the more reason I think I see why he was to suffer ; at least I see the old ones in a stronger light, and feel more of their force. Other studies and other pursuits, that to many others are very proper and useful, appear to me to be altogether insignificant compared to these.'

Leaving the academy, Priestley accepted an invitation to take charge of a small congregation at Needham Market, in Suffolk. There he passed three years in comparative neglect, being soon suspected of heresy, and not popular as a preacher. He had an hereditary impediment of speech, which injured very much the effect of his preaching, and gave him great distress. He says, however, that it was not without its use, as but for this he might have been disputatious in company, or seduced by the love of popular applause as a preacher ; whereas, having no attractions of this nature, he had been more attentive to qualifications of a superior kind. But his heresy was the chief cause of his want of success at this time. Ministers in the neighbourhood took part against him, his parish declined, his salary fell far short of thirty pounds, and he would have been reduced to great extremities but for the friendly aid of Dr. Benson and Dr. Kippis. Remittances failed even from his good aunt, partly through the influence of orthodox relations, but chiefly from her actual inability to do as much as she had done for him. He himself says this, and speaks of her in no terms but those of respect and gratitude. Notwithstanding his troubles, he was happy in this situation, and applied himself very assiduously to his studies, especially those of his profession. Having

come here with some belief of the atonement, as commonly held and expressed, but without definite views, he read the whole Bible very carefully, collecting all the texts that appeared to have any relation to the subject. The result was the rejection of the popular views. His observations upon the doctrine he submitted, in a regular treatise, to Dr. Fleming and Dr. Lardner, who advised him to publish it, and who themselves afterward published a part of it under the title of 'Doctrine of Remission,' &c. found in the seventh volume of his works. This led to an acquaintance with Lardner, of whom he tells us an interesting anecdote. Visiting him about a year before his death, he asked his assistance in a work he was then preparing, the 'History of Corruptions.' Lardner took down a large bundle of pamphlets and showing him his own, the same that we have just referred to, said, 'This contains my sentiments on the subject.' He was then eighty-three, and through infirmity had forgotten that Priestley himself wrote the pamphlet. It should be added, that Lardner did not approve at all the remarks which Priestley had made on the reasoning of the Apostle Paul.

At Needham Priestley wrote also a treatise on Divine Influence; executed in part an accurate comparison of the Hebrew text with the Septuagint, noting all the variations; gave lectures on the use of Globes; and issued proposals for a school. But not being Orthodox, all his plans of support were unsuccessful; and being recommended to a congregation at Nantwich, he went there in 1758, opened a school, and by various labors kept himself out of debt, though nothing more. Here he published his first book, 'The Rudiments of English Grammar' on a new plan, prepared for his own scholars. He became much interested in his school, and appears to have been entirely successful.

After passing three years at Nantwich, he was invited to succeed Dr. Aikin as Tutor in languages in the academy at Warrington, and took that office in 1761, at the age of 28. This was an important change. It brought him into larger and better connexions. In the second year of his residence there he married the daughter of Mr. Wilkinson, an ironmaster, and found in her a most invaluable companion for the rest of his life. He soon distinguished himself as a writer in science and literature. He composed Lectures on the Theory of Language, Oratory and Criticism, History and General

Policy, the Laws and Constitution of England, and the History of England. These were not published then, but used as introductions to these different studies in the Academy. He also published an Essay on Government, an Essay on a course of Liberal Education, and a Chart of Biography. Besides the Languages, he taught Elocution and Logic, and one year gave a course of lectures on Anatomy. He encouraged his pupils to write much in verse, as tending to give them ease in writing prose, and tells us that he himself, in early life, was a great versifier, though without any pretensions to the character of a poet. In connexion with this fact, he says, 'Mrs. Barbauld has told me that it was the perusal of some verses of mine that first induced her to write any thing in verse, so that this country is in some measure indebted to me for one of the best poets it can boast of. Several of her first poems were written when she was in my house.'

A visit to London at this time introduced Priestley to the acquaintance and friendship of several distinguished men, among whom were Dr. Price and Dr. Franklin. By them he was induced to attend particularly to the study of experimental philosophy, of which he had always been fond, but had wanted the facilities for pursuing it to any advantage. His favorite branch was Electricity; and having mentioned to Franklin his idea of writing a history of discoveries in this science, and being urged to go on and complete it, he gave himself to the work, and in less than a year sent Franklin a copy of it in print. During this year he had employed five hours every day in lectures, public or private, and yet had composed the whole of a work, which was several times reprinted, translated into foreign languages, and made him a member of the Royal Society. This is an instance of that hasty composition for which Priestley has been much censured. He adduces it himself as an answer to those who bring the charge; for he says none of his writings has been better received than this History of Electricity, and yet this was the most hasty of them all. 'My object was not to acquire the character of a fine writer, but of a useful one.'

It was no part of Priestley's duty to preach at Warrington, but he preferred to do it, and was ordained there with several other Dissenting ministers. Ordination among Dissenters was not common then, and Mr. Rutt gives us a curious note on the subject, which is worth transcribing. 'The zeal for

these public exhibitions revived in 1825, and *ordination* will probably again become general among English Unitarians. The practice has been indebted for no small encouragement, to the ability and eloquence with which these exhibitions have been adorned among the rapidly increasing Unitarians in the United States.' We find no particular account of Priestley's religious opinions at the time of his ordination, but believe he was an Arian. He took unwearied pains to correct his tendency to stammer, used 'to walk to time, pacing at a set step and speaking a single word at every step,' and succeeded in lessening the difficulty, though it was never wholly removed. He accomplished much and enjoyed much in this situation, but the compensation was not equal to the wants of his family, and in 1767 he listened to an invitation to remove.

His new residence was Leeds, where he was settled over a liberal and united congregation, and passed six happy years with them, finding encouragement for every kind of enterprise, but devoting himself particularly to the office of a Christian minister, which he considered as the most honorable of any upon earth. He now resumed his studies in doctrinal theology, which had been interrupted for some years, examining carefully the subject of Christ's nature; and led on by his characteristic fearless love of truth, he became what was called a Socinian. This result he ascribes chiefly to a perusal of Lardner's 'Letter on the Logos.' He attended particularly to the instruction of the young, having 'three classes of Catechumens,' and grounding them in the principles of religion. He wrote several tracts, for the use of his own people, on Family Prayer, the Lord's Supper, Church Discipline, and an Appeal to the Serious and Candid Professors of Christianity, which last was in great demand. He wrote also, at the request of Dr. Franklin, an 'Address to Dissenters' on the subject of the difference with America. He pursued his inquiries and experiments in philosophy with great ardor, and published a large treatise on Vision, Light, and Colors, the sale of which was not such as to encourage him to proceed in this course of publication. A proposal was made to him to accompany Capt. Cook in his second voyage on very advantageous terms, to which he agreed; but some clergymen had influence enough to prevent his appointment, thinking, we suppose, that his peculiar religious

opinions would be great obstructions on a voyage of discovery. This is one of numberless petty persecutions to which he was subjected. Such things however never ruffled his temper or drew from him the least complaint. We have in this volume many of his letters written while at Leeds, from which we should be pleased to give extracts. He appears to be entirely engrossed in his religious works and philosophical experiments. He began here his 'Theological Repository,' which cost him great labor. Although his salary met only the immediate demands of his family, he seems entirely satisfied, and would probably have remained at Leeds had he not had a pressing request from Lord Shelburne to live with him as his librarian, superintend the education of his sons, and collect information for him on subjects of parliamentary debate. The offer was a handsome settlement for life, and he thought it his duty after long deliberation to accept it.

Accordingly, in 1773, he removed his family to Calne, near Lord Shelburne's seat. His nominal office was that of librarian, but he was in fact a literary companion, passing the winter at the Earl's house in London, and the summer with his own family at Calne. Soon after leaving Leeds, he received the medal of the Royal Society for a treatise on different kinds of air. The medal was presented by Sir John Pringle with a most flattering address. Indeed the merit and effect of his philosophical publications are spoken of in the most extravagant terms, and gained for him marked honors. He now appeared as a metaphysical writer also, taking a bold stand in favor of philosophical necessity and materialism, and bringing upon himself charges of infidelity and thorough-atheism. His 'Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit' led to a friendly controversey with Dr. Price, leaving them as good friends as ever, and as determined opposers of each other on these subjects. As to his infidelity, he wrote at this very time the first part of his 'Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever,' answering objections to religion, especially such as are found in the writings of Hume. In this connexion, he says, 'I can truly say that the greatest satisfaction I receive from the success of my philosophical pursuits, arises from the weight it may give to my attempts to defend Christianity, and to free it from those corruptions which prevent its reception with philosophical and thinking persons, whose influence with the

vulgar and the unthinking is very great.' That he was not entirely mistaken in this view, we have very gratifying proofs in his letters from Paris, where he passed a month of the tour with Lord Shelburne. We give an extract.

'I am here in the midst of unbelievers and even atheists. I had a long conversation with one, an ingenious man and a good writer, who maintained seriously that man might arise without any maker from the earth. They may despise me; I am sure I despise and pity them. I was told by another, that I was the first believer in Christianity that he had met with, of whose understanding he had any opinion. I always told them very freely that I could easily account for their infidelity by the very corrupted state of their established religion, farther than which they plainly had not looked, and that they could not pretend to have studied the subject as myself and other believers in England had done. However, I left them all as I had found them; and whether they think better or worse of me on that account, I am very indifferent.' *

It is known to all our readers that Priestley wrote largely in defence of Christianity, in formal treatises on the evidences, and also in occasional appeals to unbelievers, in one of which he invited Gibbon to a free discussion of the subject. After he came to this country his attention was still directed to it. In an article which was published in an American newspaper or magazine, in 1798, we find this passage:

'Infidelity has made great progress in France, through all the continent of Europe, and also in England; but I much question whether it be not as great in America; and the want of information in the people at large, makes thousands of them the

* In a preface to one of his smaller publications, Priestley speaks again of the unbelievers in Paris, and states these facts—'When I asked what there was in Christianity that appeared to them so very absurd as to make it altogether incredible, they immediately mentioned the doctrine of the Trinity. An enemy as I am considered to Christianity by some, I have saved many from that infidelity into which the bigots are forcing them. While I am writing this Preface, I receive a letter from a man (Robert Robinson) whose abilities are universally acknowledged to be of the first rate, with whom I had no previous correspondence, who says, "I am indebted to you for the little I know of rational, defensible Christianity. But for your friendly aid I fear I should have gone from enthusiasm to deism; but a faith founded upon evidence rests on a rock." The greater part of my philosophical acquaintance ridicule my attachment to Christianity, and yet the generality of Christians will not allow me to belong to them at all.' — *Works*, Vol. XIX. pp. 310.

dupes of such shallow writings as those of Mr. Paine, and the French unbelievers, several of which are translated and published here. And either through want of knowledge or of zeal, little or nothing is done by the friends of Revelation, to stop the baneful torrent.'

The connexion with Lord Shelburne continued about seven years, and was brought to a conclusion by an apparent coldness on the part of the patron, supposed to be owing to the general odium attached to Priestley's religious and political opinions. He treated him however with the greatest delicacy, settled upon him an annuity of £150, and afterward asked him again to enter his family. But it was not a situation entirely to Priestley's mind, his habits and tastes being too simple for a nobleman's house. His leaving it was attended with the loss of half his income, but a generous offer was immediately made him of an annual sum of £100, raised by his friends, of which he would accept only £40. Other offers were made and some of them accepted, instead of a royal pension, which he was more than once told could be procured for him. He removed to Birmingham in 1780, and in a few months was settled as colleague with Mr. Blyth over an excellent congregation. This settlement he considered as the happiest event of his life, favoring all his plans in theology and philosophy. His first object seems to have been to interest the younger part of his society, and enlighten and warm them on the subject of religion. He had several classes of young men and women, between the ages of seventeen and thirty, whom he taught every Sunday. Lindsey, in a letter to a friend, speaks thus of Priestley's Sunday school: 'I was surprised on Sunday afternoon, to see near thirty young ladies, some of them, I was told, married, seated to be instructed in the principles of Christianity. This was the third class that had been before him that day; and this is his usual work every Sunday, added to his officiating to the whole congregation one part of it.' Another principal occupation at Birmingham was the Unitarian controversy, into which he was led by the publication of the '*History of the Corruptions of Christianity.*' The first part of this work was rudely assailed by Dr. Horsley, a Mr. Howes, and several others, who, by their singular statements, induced its author to look still further into the subject, and to write his '*History of Early Opinions concerning Jesus Christ.*' This multiplied

opponents, and for some years he wrote a pamphlet annually in answer to them all. His only Arian antagonist was Dr. Price. Much as he engaged in controversy, he discovers in his letters no love for it, but quite the contrary. He seems to have thought it his duty to appear for the truth whenever it was in danger or needed elucidation. He shrunk from no combat, but maintained a uniform self-possession and Christian gentleness. Never was there a temper better prepared for this severe test. He says of himself, 'What has always made me easy in any controversy in which I have been engaged, has been my fixed resolution frankly to acknowledge any mistake that I might perceive I had fallen into.' To the truth of this, his opponents bear ample and generous testimony. Bishop Newcome says of him, in reference to a controversy between them on the subject of the 'Harmony of the Gospels,' — 'I was often struck with the learning, ingenuity, and liberal spirit of my antagonist, and I consider him as a diligent investigator and sincere lover of truth.' One of his last plans at Birmingham was a new translation of the whole Bible. He engaged to translate the Old, if Lindsey would take the New Testament, and he thought they could do it easily in three years.

The volume before us brings up the life and correspondence of Priestley to 1787, the date which he affixed to the conclusion of his Memoirs so far as he wrote them in England. He had then been at Birmingham six or seven years, with little interruption of his happiness or his schemes of usefulness. There was enough indeed to irritate most men and render them miserable, but his religious principle and philosophic calmness saved him from all real annoyance. It is delightful, and far from common, to see the composure and kindness, faith in God and candid allowance for man, with which he met constant opprobrium, low insinuations, and foul abuse, charges of every name and degree in regard to his opinions and motives. The whole country was at that time in commotion from the opposition expressed to all existing establishments, political and religious, — an opposition of which Priestley was supposed to be the mover or at least the great champion. Added to these were the disturbances of the French Revolution, in which many of the English Dissenters expressed an interest not agreeable to royal ears or royal dependents. A storm was gathering from all quarters, and

Birmingham and Priestley were destined to be special marks of its fury. Its progress and end we cannot trace now, but may attempt it on the appearance of Mr. Rutt's second volume.

Deferring any remarks we may wish to offer on Priestley's religious opinions and peculiar character as a theologian, we will give some account of the most important letters in this volume. Of these, none interested us more in the reading than Dr. Franklin's, of which there are seven. There is something in the very name of this man that never fails to fix attention, especially in connexion with the opening of our Revolution in which he acted so important a part. It was just then that Priestley became intimate with him, and they had frequent conversations on the great subject of the colonies.

Much has been said of Franklin's skepticism in regard to Christianity. Priestley speaks of it with deep regret, and says, Franklin owned to him that he had not given the attention he ought, to the evidences of Christianity, and asked him to recommend to him some treatises on the subject, which he did. Dr. Stiles, President of Yale College, wrote to Franklin in 1790, asking for his portrait, and expressing a wish to know his religious views. To this wish Franklin replied, 'As to Jesus of Nazareth, my opinion of whom you particularly desire, I think the system of morals and his religion, as he left them to us, the best the world ever saw or is likely to see; but I apprehend it has received various corrupting changes; and I have, with most of the present Dissenters in England, some doubts as to his divinity.' There is no allusion to the subject in his letters to Priestley, but some account of his death is given in a note, taken from the letter of a lady in Philadelphia to a friend in England, and speaking in strong language of his fortitude under extreme suffering, his constant cheerfulness and piety. 'Even when the intervals of pain were so short that his words were frequently interrupted, I have known him hold a discourse in a sublime strain of piety.'

We have two letters from the Reverend A. M. Toplady, whose reputation as a violent Calvinist and polemic is not unknown. Zealous as he was for Calvinism, he was no less zealous for the doctrine of 'Christian Philosophical Necessity,' as he called a work that he published in 1775,

the very year that Dr. Priestley's work appeared in defence of the same doctrine. This is one of the curious and instructive instances of two individuals of strong mind and bold investigation, starting from points widely separated, coming to precisely the same result, and then diverging again as widely as before in their use of the great doctrine which they have both established, and the system they raise upon it. Who would think of bringing together the names of Priestley and Toplady! Yet their own inquiries brought them together on ground which they appear to regard as almost the foundation of Christianity. When Toplady saw Priestley's defence of his favorite doctrine, he at once wrote to him, though not acquainted with him. We will give as much of his singular letter as we dare, after trespassing so far already.

‘Reverend Sir,

‘Condescend’ to accept the thanks of a person who has not the honor of being acquainted with you, for the pleasure and improvement recently derived from a perusal of your spirited (and for the most part just) animadversions on the three Northern Doctors.* Allow me also to thank, in an especial manner, the good providence of God, which has raised up no less a man than yourself to contend so ably for the great doctrine of necessity; a doctrine, in my idea, not only essential to sound and rational philosophy, but, abstracted from which, I could not, for my own part, consider Christianity itself as a defensible system. Greatly as I admire the main of your performance, I should probably not have taken the liberty to trouble you with my acknowledgments, but for the following circumstance:

‘In your successful assault and battery of the new Scotch fortification, you have occasionally fired some random shot on a numerous set of men, who, so far as concerns the article of necessity, are your actual friends, and your natural allies. Permit me, therefore, Sir, to offer you in this private manner a few plain, but not intentionally disrespectful, strictures on some rash and exceptionable passages; which serve as foils to render your penetration and candor on some other occasions the more conspicuous.

‘Why are “the notions of Calvin” represented as “gloomy”? Is it gloomy to believe that the far greater part

* Examination of the Doctrine of Common Sense as held by Doctors Reid, Beattie, and Oswald.

of the human race are made for endless happiness? There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt entertained concerning the salvation of every young person. If (as some who have versed themselves in this kind of speculations affirm) about one half of mankind die in infancy; and if, as indubitable observation proves, a very considerable number of the remaining half die in early childhood; and if, as there is the strongest reason to think, many millions of those who live to maturer years, in every successive generation, have their names in the book of life; then what a very small portion, comparatively, of the human species falls under the decree of preterition and non-redemption! This view of things, I am persuaded, will, to an eye so philosophic as yours, at least open a very cheerful vista through the gloom, if not entirely turn the imaginary darkness into sunshine; for, with respect to the few reprobate, we may, and we ought, to resign the disposal of them implicitly to the will of that only King who can do no wrong, instead of summoning the Almighty to take his trial at the tribunal of our own speculations, and of setting up ourselves as the judges of Deity. * *

'You are, on the article of necessity, the reverse of an Arminian; and you are terribly afraid of being dubbed a Calvinist. I must own you are in some little danger. But cheer up; your case is not yet desperate. Poor Jansenius was in a situation somewhat similar to yours. He indeed swam farther into the Geneva lake than you have ventured to do; and, to elude the name of heretic, assured as many good people as would believe him, that he was all the while bathing in the Tiber. * *

"Zealous Calvinists," you tell us, "regard your writings with abhorrence." It would have been candid, Sir, to have expressed this with more restriction, and with less vehemence. Many very "zealous Calvinists" regard your writings, on some subjects, not only without "abhorrence," but with honor and admiration. Dark and "gloomy" as you have represented us, we still have sufficiency both of eye-sight and of day-light to discern the lustre of your genius, and the improvements which your equally profound and refined researches have added to the stock of philosophic knowledge. * *

'Our case is pitiable indeed. But why will not the illuminated and illuminating Doctor direct a few of his rays, by way of experiment, toward our dark and dreary habitation? Be honest, good Sir, and fairly tell us, that your reason for huddling the matter up, and for not descending to particulars, was not our stupidity, but your fear of the consequences that would

result to yourself, had you gone to the bottom of the subject, and unfolded all that was in your heart. To screen yourself, you affect to give us over, as incurable, before you have so much as tried what you can make of us. If you set about it, who can tell but, stupid as we are, some of us may recover our sight and sense, and be emancipated from our gloom and our surprise together? Electricity, under your auspices, may work miracles.

'However lightly I may occasionally have expressed myself, I assure you, on the word of an honest man, that I have the honor to be, with seriousness and truth, Reverend Sir, your admirer and very humble servant.'

This plain letter led to some acquaintance with Mr. Toplady. And when Priestley published his 'Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit,' he sent him a copy and asked his opinion of it. Toplady replied, that he 'considered Materialism as equally absurd in itself and atheistical in its tendency,' but approves, as before, the views of necessity. 'We can take but two short passages from this second letter.

'I revere and admire real probity wherever I see it. Artifice, duplicity, and disguise, I cannot away with. Transparency is, in my opinion, the first and the most valuable of all the social virtues. Let a man's principles be black as hell, it matters not to me, so he have but integrity to appear exactly what he is. Give me the person whom I can hold up as I can a piece of chrystal, and see through him. For this, among many other excellencies, I regard and admire Dr. Priestley. * *

'Can you bear this plain dealing? If you can, give me your hand; and I most heartily wish that all who differ from you, and especially, that all who may commence your public antagonists, may treat you, as I ever desire to do, with the respect due to your virtues and your talents.'

When the character of such a Unitarian as Priestley draws from such a Calvinist as Toplady encomium so decided as this, we must be pardoned for thinking that there is some uncommon excellence in the character itself.

THE
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N^o. LI.

NEW SERIES — N^o. XXI.

JULY, 1832.

ART. I. — *The Life of Sir Isaac Newton.* By DAVID BREWSTER, LL. D., F. R. S. [From the London Edition.] New York. J. & J. Harper. 1831. 18mo. pp. 324.

IF religion is ever cleared from its corruptions, it will be seen that the object of Christianity is to form character, and to give a finish to character, by bringing the principle of improvement into full operation. But there is nothing visionary in this purpose; though it shows us that this earth is but a prison compared with the world in which the soul shall exist for ever, it forms characters for this life as well as another; it directs us to give to each its share. We have no doubt that, generally speaking, the most distinguished Christians have been as remarkable for common sense and intellectual power, as for moral excellence and religious devotion. We shall take the opportunity afforded by this work, to describe the man who is thoroughly furnished unto all good works — perfect — wanting nothing, and of the parts of character which go to form the perfect whole.

First, there is the practical character; the sagacity in action, which enables a man to act with efficient usefulness in the concerns of the world. We know that this discernment is apt to degenerate into suspicion, and that sagacious men complain of others when perhaps others have equal reason to complain of them; we know too, that this character must have something to elevate and refine it before it can be honorable and truly good. Still, it is of immense importance to know how to judge of men and things, — to be able to take

the direct way to the object, without wasting time or power. We need not, however, describe this character, because we see every day, in the intercourse of life, men who make us feel the force of the saying; 'The children of this world are, in their way, wiser than the children of light.'

Next, there is the intellectual character, which belongs to thinking men. It is not confined to those who read and study; no; for there are many who read and study without ever thinking, that is, without bringing their minds into vigorous and successful action. The mind, like the body, wants only so much food as it can convert to its own support; more only injures its health and strength. There are some who never read any book but the Bible, some who never read any book whatever, who yet are truly intellectual, — who are familiar with the living letter and the illuminated page of nature.

Again, there is the moral or religious character. We consider moral and religious the same; by morality, we mean not merely external decency, but religious conduct flowing from religious principle. We call no man moral who is not so according to Christian morality. It is time to rescue the word 'moral' from undeserved reproach, and to insist upon it that the word is properly applied only to him who does his duty to God and man with zeal, with energy, and with all his heart. This can never be done without strong religious feelings; without a love of God as our father, — a love, fervent, sincere, and trusting; nor without regarding this world as the school of elementary education for another. With these feelings in his breast, a man cannot live to himself nor to this world alone, and whoever does regard himself and this world only, has no right to be called moral; that name is the prize of a higher calling, — the reward of an immortal ambition.

Now let a man possess one of these characters without the rest, let him for example be practical without being intellectual or moral, and what will he be? It may be said that he cannot be practical without being in a measure intellectual; but this is a mistake; for many of those who are most remarkable for address, are most deficient in understanding, like some of the meaner animals. There are many, whose sagacity seems almost unerring in their little circle, but whose movements are wholly mechanical; they do not think, by

disuse they have almost lost the power of thinking; they do not act from principle, their pleasure and profit are all they care for; they enter upon every undertaking, and pass on from one day to another, with a single eye to themselves and their own. No one cares for them more than they care for others; still no one accuses or upbraids them. Conscience is like a timepiece, which requires to be occasionally wound up; but, not liking its admonitions, they have suffered theirs to run down and be useless long ago. It is but too common for practical men, whose minds and hearts lie fallow all their lives, to injure others by unfair advantages, — by paltry extortions, — by exploring that broad field of dishonesty in which they can defraud under the shadow of the law. But, however successful they may be in gaining wealth, they are laying up no treasures for the soul.

If the intellectual be added to the practical, the character takes a higher stand: the man in whom these are united, becomes perhaps a statesman, who, sure of party support, sets aside his conscience and honor; or the soldier, who fights for himself and not for his country. No character is more to be dreaded than that of one, who, with mind to form and power to execute great designs, has no principle to keep him in the way of duty. Men do not perceive how pernicious such characters are, because the Providence of God brings good out of evil. They tell you of some great destroyer, who has left a red light in the skies where he went down; they tell you what monuments he has made, what glorious deeds he has done, what powers he set in motion, which have brought good to his country and mankind, — while they say nothing of the habitations he filled with anguish, nor of the blood and tears he caused to flow. If good does result from such deeds and such men, we should give God the glory. The conflagration which sweeps away two thirds of a city is a vast calamity; but in a few years, the streets and squares rise from their ashes more magnificent than before. Do we bless the incendiary's hand for this? do we give to him who destroys, the praise of the repair? It is the Almighty's hand which repairs the ruin made by the rash hands of man.

Let a man be intellectual without being either practical or religious, and he is forlorn and helpless as an open boat on the open sea. The mind is the great source of power; but this power must be guided in its action and its end, by the

good sense and conscience of its possessor. If he happens to be destitute of both, he is odious for his want of integrity and contemptible for his weakness. Without practical good sense, intellectual men are like promising children; they acquire knowledge without power to arrange or use it, and it becomes like green wood heaped upon a fire, which extinguishes the flame it was meant to feed. If they acquire knowledge, without that sense of duty which makes them feel responsible for all their attainments, they may as well remain unenlightened; it is even better to sit in darkness, than to use the lamp to our feet to guide us in the way of death. How little intellect without practical sagacity and moral principle profits its possessor, we see in the profligacy of many literary men. We do not refer to the base hirelings, who represent cut-throats as gentlemen, and pickpockets as men of honor; but among those highly gifted with original talent, the rarest gift of God, there have been some who have used all their power to turn vice into virtue and glory into shame. When we consider the beauty and power of their writings, the page shines with more than the brightness of the sun; when we regard its moral tendency, it seems set on fire of hell. We should detest them for their abuse of splendid powers, did we not pity them as we behold their miserable shipwreck of their own peace and glory.

Intellectual men who have had religious feelings without practical wisdom, have done no service to religion. Their constant attempts to do good are sure to fail; because they make their calculations without regard to human nature. They do not reflect, that it is not enough to present any great enterprise of benevolence to men. They expect to find a thousand hands and hearts ready to engage in it at once; but they find that, before any thing can be done, numberless obstacles must be removed; the selfish must be warmed into generosity, — a change which in them seems strange and unnatural as a change of expression on the face of the dead; the indifferent must be called away from their follies, though it is as hard as to catch and confine the feather that dances in the gale; avarice must unclench its grasp, though its fingers are grown to its gold; doubts must be satisfied; objections answered; wanton opposition put down. Long before he can accomplish this, the enthusiast despairs, because, when he began, he knew not what is in man; he who *did*

know what is in man, foresaw that his religion would prevail at last, though not till ages after he had suffered and died ; and with this joy before him, he patiently endured the cross.

This is the reason why intellectual men, who wish to reform the religious faith or feeling of a community, are so apt to despair. They see some wretched fanatic step before them, and work up a whole people into frenzy by the force of an eloquence which makes them blush for him and his hearers ; and they say that there is nothing for them to do, if such men can excite and impress the world. They do not reflect what it is that gives the fanatic his power. It is the prevailing want of knowledge, which enables him to produce great effects almost without exertion. The community believe that long prayers, which our Saviour thought a sign of hypocrisy, are the very soul of devotion ; the community believe that the solemn countenance and gloomy manner, which our Saviour prohibited in his disciples, are the true religious expression : he takes advantage of this prejudice, and impresses them with a high opinion of his own sanctity by his long prayers, his repulsive manner, and by frowning defiance on all pleasures except such as he wishes to enjoy. The mere statement of the way in which such men produce their effects, shows that they use means which men of better minds and feelings could never stoop to employ. The intellectual man should remember that their ambition differs from his own ; he is for building up, they for pulling down ; it takes many able hands to build the edifice which one villain can destroy, and he should remember that it naturally attracts less attention when it stands in its beauty, than when its fires light up the skies.

If we ask what the religious character is without the practical or intellectual, we can easily learn from our own observation ; we see thousands who mean well, and really wish to know what they must do to be saved, who go to interpreters instead of Scripture. Those blind guides tell them, not what they must do, but what they must believe ; they hear so much said of faith and believing, — so much said against those who believe wrong and so little against those who do wrong, that they feel at last as if it were of little importance to perform the duties, if they only believe the doctrines of religion. But if they are not quite satisfied with this ; if they are perplexed with the thought that God shall render

to every man according to his deeds ; if they determine to apply their faith to practice, what shall they do ? The doctrine of the Trinity is set before them as the chief cornerstone of religion. Imagine an attempt to apply the doctrine of the Trinity to practice ! If the least practical doctrines are the most important, evidently, practice must be lightly esteemed. Now if, in any way or degree, we release men from the obligation to do their duty ; if we allow that it is not important, or that other things are more important, then duty never will be done.

And the religious without the intellectual character has always led to excesses, — excesses which have brought reproach on the very name of Christianity. Those who wish to be religious without using their minds, — in other words, to be religious without trouble or exertion, not only discard reason, but cry out against it. All religion, they say, comes from inspiration ; — so it does, and both the mind, and the truth which came to enlighten it, are the inspiration of the Almighty. It is shameful in Christians to allow themselves to libel and blaspheme the mind. Take any other subject, and such a course would be one they would never dream of adopting ; they bring all their powers to bear on other interests, while they feel bound to be as weak and senseless as possible on approaching the subject of religion. They are told to render a reasonable service ; what is that but a service which their reason approves ? Their opinions and ideas of duty must be either reasonable or unreasonable ; if they will not allow reason to examine them, they cannot call them reasonable ; in truth, all are unreasonable which reason has not approved. Christianity advances no sentiment, recommends no course, enjoins no duty, which reason does not approve.

We think that the man of God, the perfect man, is one who unites within himself the practical, intellectual, and religious character. All these were assembled in Jesus Christ. How thoroughly practical he was in all his intercourse with men ! what caution in his actions ! what sagacity in his words ! How nobly intellectual he was in all his instructions ! they came from him with a depth and fullness, we may say an overflow of meaning, which is found in no other wisdom. How fervently devout he was ! how cheerful, social, and engaging was his religion ! who ever saw any thing cold, enthusiastic, or repelling in the example of the Son of God ? We look to

the history of one of his noblest followers, to show that the same traits of mind and character are assembled in his best disciples. Newton was practical, intellectual, and religious, and therefore excellent and great.

It is inspiring to remember that such men as Newton were Christians, and that they held all the discoveries of science as nothing compared with Christian truth. We do not want their authority to strengthen our confidence in the evidence of our faith, though it is certainly gratifying to know that men, unrivalled for sagacity, believed in it with all their hearts; we would use their authority for another purpose, — to show, that, in conscientious men, intellectual improvement will increase their excellence and devotion. There are those who would persuade us that the ignorant are the most single-hearted, — who persist, against all evidence, in maintaining the absurd, Arcadian fiction, that unenlightened men are most likely to excel in piety and virtue. The least reference to historical fact or experience destroys these idle imaginations, and shows that ignorance and corruption go hand in hand, as in the days when the prophets accounted for the guilt of their countrymen by saying, ‘Israel doth not know.’ The people of Hindostan are perpetually quoted as examples of this fine simplicity, and we are told that they would be injured rather than improved by the introduction of Christianity; while at the same time impartial witnesses agree in declaring, that they are familiar, not perhaps with the vices of civilized life, but with gross and enormous corruption of every kind and degree. It is easy to show that ignorance is the parent of corruption; but can we infer that every advance in intellectual improvement will add something to the religion of a well-directed mind? Can we extend the inference yet further and say, that, other things being equal, the most enlarged, improved, and powerful minds will be most likely to excel in the peculiar virtues of Christianity? Examples like that of Newton show that we may; there is reason to believe that such men tower as high above the common standard of virtue as above the ordinary level of mental improvement; and were it only to convince men of this animating truth, it is well to keep them before the public eye, and to point them out where they shine as stars in the firmament for ever.

We would produce these examples for another purpose also; to show that they paid the most unbounded reverence

to the word of God ; that Locke returned from his investigations of mind, Milton from his divine visions, and Newton from his triumphal march of discovery, and, in the moments of their highest glory, read the Scriptures with more interest than any thing beside, regarding them, not merely as sources of consolation in adversity, not as suggestions of duty only, but as fountains of light, where not only the loftiest human minds, but the highest archangels, might draw new revelations of nature and of God for ever. The Scriptures are not often regarded thus : there are many who never read them with interest, and some who do not read them at all ; many of those who do read them, do it as a matter of duty, and all the while it seems to them the same thing which they were familiar with years ago. But we venture to assure them that such men as Newton found new suggestions starting up in their minds every time they read : passages which they thought themselves familiar with, — words which it seemed impossible to make clearer, were continually awakening new trains of thought, and pouring light on new disclosures of truth ; they saw that the inspiration of God, like the heavens, contained wonders and glories which did not flash all at once upon the eye, and that a field of action was there opened to the soul in which it might range for ever without travelling it through. To us, this seems the most striking evidence of the divinity of Christian truth. If this religion was the work of man, who were the men whose written wisdom was so exalted above that of Newton, that he and other sages of equal glory pondered it with distant and awful dread ? Could such power have been found in the humble fishermen of Galilee ? had they, of themselves, an intellectual power to prepare a registry of truth, to which these men, but little lower than the angels, bent the knee in reverence, — which they could read again and again with wonder and delight ? And who is there too high or too humble to draw instruction from that word, which they regarded as the noblest work of God ?

The manner in which these great men held and treasured their favorite views of religion, may give much instruction to those who are disposed to receive it. They were men of ardent tempers, and likely as any other to grow warm in defence of their religious opinions ; but though they were forced into controversy on various subjects, they were never vio-

lent in support of their own doctrines nor against those of others. They held their sentiments without passion, because they had formed them deliberately, and stood ready to give them up for any other which came with stronger evidence or had a better effect upon the heart. But with most men, it seems to be a luxury to divide, and grow warm in religious divisions; a state of rest is no more to be found in the religious world than in the ocean which heaves in the calmest day. The ignorant, who never form any opinion for themselves, grasp with a sort of fury those which they have received from others, defying all mankind to convince them that they are wrong. In all other differences, those who are familiar with the subject, and know what can be said on both sides, are always least excited; there is most real earnestness where there is least stormy passion; the fires of party linger in its ignorant members, long after they have gone down in every enlightened and manly breast. But the men of whom we speak, gave others the same privilege which they assumed for themselves; they were not the material from which the rank and file of party is made. Still, they were nobly zealous in the cause of truth; they would not give up one inch of ground which they thought deserved maintaining, and it need not be said, that they defended their position with earnestness as well as power.

Though but little more than a century has passed since the death of Newton, and he might be supposed likely to inspire curiosity more than any one who has lived since that day, very little is known concerning his personal habits, and this work adds but little to what the world knew before. It is necessarily a history of science during the period when Newton ministered at its altars. In this view it has its value, though it will have but little attraction for the great proportion of readers. The author is not to blame for giving this character to his biography; for, beside that the poverty of materials compelled him to resort to general descriptions of Newton's character and private life, he is, evidently, no judge of Newton as a theologian; and, regarding him simply as a philosopher, he has treated his religious attainments as forming no important part of his character and not adding much to his fame. But to us, this is the most interesting light in which Newton can be presented; to see him, who is revered by nations and ages, bowing in unfeigned humility be-

fore his God, — to see him returning from his walk through the signs of heaven in a circle which all other minds despair to reach, and laying his trophies upon the altar, — to see him withdrawing his calm, observing eye from the heavens, the brightest page in the book of nature, to look with deeper interest upon the written inspiration of the Scriptures, — this gives the beauty of holiness to his majestic powers and virtues, and, in our opinion, excels and crowns them all.

Little is added by this biographer to what was formerly known concerning the childhood and youth of Newton. He gave early evidence of an active mind by his desire to excel in mechanical invention; it appears, also, that he had a poetical turn, and at a late period of life he was heard to express some pleasure at his success in the manufacture of verses; he gave some attention to painting, and his room was hung with pictures drawn, colored, and framed by his own hands. Various attempts of this kind show that his mind was gaining strength by action, long before it acquired its decided taste and direction. Prematurity of talent he had none. Biographers are, in general, anxious to trace something prophetic in the childhood of great men; but the life can no more be foretold from its beginning, than the river can be known by looking upon its fountains; its rapidity and depth are afterwards determined by the region through which it flows, and the streams that join its tide. It is no more desirable to have the mind developed before its time, than to have the body reach its full growth in childhood; in both cases, premature growth is the forerunner of premature decay.

If we may trust the accounts of biographers, the history of Newton's discoveries bears some resemblance to those of Columbus, who, while engaged in his fanciful project of looking for India in the west, became the discoverer of a new world, as unexpectedly to himself as to others. It is said that Newton engaged in the study of mathematics with a view to inquiring into the truth of judicial astrology. Of course he soon convinced himself of the folly of such a pursuit; but the impulse had been given; he had learned the secret of his own strength; and having found a practicable object, he brought the whole force of his mind into one direction. The result was, that he opened a path of light into the mysteries of nature, and looked through the depths of heaven with the

searching brightness of an angel's eye. This concentration of his powers upon a single object supplied the want of discipline to his mind ; till he went to the university, he had few means of improvement, and manifested but little of that self-educating principle by which great minds often supply the defect of early instruction. But when he was thus thrown among enlightened men,—men whom it was honorable to rival, and glorious to excel, he learned what he was, what the world had a right to expect from him, and what he was bound to do. There is reason to believe that a strong religious principle sustained him in the various trials and disappointments which he was compelled to endure. He knew the worth of the talents which God had given him, and felt that his reasonable return was to employ them in the service of him who gave them. When we consider what an influence one great man has upon the world, it is startling to think what the consequence might have been had Newton begun and ended his course without paying the reverence which he did to religion ; there can be no doubt that infidelity would have felt secure under the shelter of his name, and that thousands, who could not follow him in his march of science, would have been proud to imitate his indifference to Christianity. By imagining the evil he might have done as an irreligious man, we may estimate the good he has done, and is still doing, by his example as a Christian. Men of science there have been, who would have been glad to trample on Christianity and all its laws ; but Newton reprov'd them with his own living voice, and still frowns them into silence by his commanding example. When Dr. Halley ventured once to say something disrespectful to religion in his presence, Newton silenced him, saying, 'I have studied these things ; you have not.' How many unworthy reflections upon our faith might still be prevented, if the voice of conscience would but whisper to the infidel, 'Newton studied these things ; you have not !' The reproof is severe ; it implies that the objector is throwing contempt on a subject which he has never examined, and therefore cannot understand ; and that it is an unworthy thing to indulge and utter prejudices upon any intellectual subject which one has taken no pains to know. It is doubtless owing in part to the spirit and example of Newton, that science in our day is decidedly religious in its character and tendency ; so that few philoso-

phers feel as if they had learned the nature of any thing till they have discovered the benevolent purpose for which it was created, and taught all whom they can influence, to 'look through nature up to nature's God.' But Newton was not simply content with expressing his reverence for religion, nor was his a barren faith which dealt in professions and words alone. We learn from his biographers, that his religious principle gave a 'daily beauty to his life'; that he was simple and unassuming in his manners, benevolent in his feelings, judicious and most liberal in his charities, and attentive in all respects to the comfort and happiness of others. His modesty was remarkable, and, being entirely unlike what too often passes for religious self-abasement, deserves to be noticed as one of the best parts of his shining example. A short time before his death he said, 'I do not know how I may appear to the world; but to myself, I seem to have been only like a boy, playing on the seashore and diverting myself with finding a smoother pebble or prettier shell than ordinary, while the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.' In return for his reverence to Christianity, it brought him the usual overpayment of joy; it smoothed his path through life, though it was beset with many troubles, from which one might have supposed that he would be free, — troubles arising from the manner in which the results of his investigations were undervalued and opposed; and its effect upon his memory is, that his name inspires a veneration which was never paid to any other of all the great and good.

Newton, as we have said, regarded Christianity as the noblest work of God, and studied it with the most devoted exertion of those powers which had brought to light the mysteries of nature. Christian truth was in his eyes a thing too important to take upon trust, to receive from inheritance, or to borrow from another. First, he determined to understand what *was* the Scripture, rejecting all the additions and interpretations of men, and then to ascertain what it taught, — not what it had taught others, but what it might teach him. In his investigations on all subjects, at every step, he placed his foot on a demonstration; he was perfectly sure of his ground, up to the spot where he stood. The most ancient and venerable theories, if they wanted evidence, were rejected like dreams, and neither fear, favor, nor affection could

induce him to admit any suggestion which did not bring sufficient proof with it ; it being a point of duty with him to dismiss all prejudice as far as possible from his breast. Every one who is qualified to form an opinion on this subject, can see, that, by applying this philosophical investigation to the Scriptures, he came to them with facilities, beside what his natural ability gave him, immeasurably beyond most other men for knowing the truth, and nothing but the truth. And he came to conclusions eminently favorable to the cause of charity ; he saw that the deliberate convictions of a conscientious man were truth, — that such a man had what was truth to him, however widely his results differed from those of others. As might be expected, he advocated the great cause of toleration, which was then poorly understood by the world at large, and, as his biographer assures us, ‘ never scrupled to express his abhorrence of persecution, even in its mildest form.’ We observe that certain Trinitarian writers are attempting, as an exercise of ingenuity we presume, to shake the established fact of Newton’s Unitarianism ; we could almost wish them success ; we could almost wish that he stood before them as one of their number, that they might be tempted to follow his high example ; it would be reviving to hear one mighty Trinitarian voice giving out lessons of charity and toleration ; — to see a Trinitarian, giving up those spurious passages of Scripture to which his party fondly cling, without avowing his belief in the doctrine and making excuses for his manliness ; — to read the works of a Trinitarian, all whose writings are forced by his candor into a direction unfavorable to the prejudices and passions of his party, and who, while he believes in the Trinity, exhorts others to believe the truth.

But nothing has yet appeared to overthrow the common impression that Newton was a Unitarian. The utmost that can be proved, is, that he did not avow his unbelief in the prevailing faith ; and the reason of his silence is so obvious, that it never has been misunderstood. When he wrote his ‘ History of Two Corruptions of Scripture,’ in which the two favorite texts of the ‘ heavenly witnesses ’ and ‘ God manifest in the flesh ’ were conclusively shown to be no part of Scripture, he was, as Dr. Brewster says, ‘ afraid of the intolerance to which he might be exposed ! ’ And for this reason he requested Locke, who was preparing for a voyage to Holland, to get it

translated into French, and publish it on the Continent without the name of the author; afterwards, 'alarmed at the risk of detection,' he wrote to Locke to forbid the publication. Now, here is evidence sufficient for every reasonable mind. Can any one, in his senses, believe that a Trinitarian would have been afraid of intolerance, when one word of avowal would have prevented it? Had he simply said that he believed the doctrine, all would have been well; but he did not speak that word, and the reason, the only reason that can be imagined for his silence, was, that he did not believe it. The whole piece has been carefully sifted, to find something that might bear the form of an acknowledgment of this kind, but in vain. One sentence has been quoted to this effect, but for what reason we know not, except it be the want of a better. He says that, in former times, 'the faith subsisted without this text; and it is rather a danger to religion than an advantage, to make it now lean upon a bruised reed.' Herein he represents to Trinitarians that their clinging to interpolated texts is an injury to the cause of religion; so far from his identifying this faith with religion, he mentions them as distinct considerations, and speaks exactly as a Unitarian would to his opponents, of the injury which prejudice and false reasoning, on their part, would do to the cause which should be near all their hearts. This is the only evidence of Trinitarianism which any one ever professed to find in his writings. But it is said, that he attended Trinitarian worship; no doubt he did: if a Trinitarian attended Unitarian worship, it would prove something, because they are not in the habit of such liberality; but every one knows that there are thousands of Unitarians who attend Trinitarian worship all their lives, willing to hear Christianity preached, even if they cannot hear it in its purest form. It is said that he was displeased with Whiston for representing him as an Arian: the reason was, in the first place, that he was not an Arian, and in the second, that he had, as has been seen, a dread of intolerance, which made him unwilling to have his sentiments brought before the world. But, as we said before, the fact of his writing against Trinitarian texts without one word of his belief in the doctrine, is conclusive evidence that he did not believe it; and is so admitted by Trinitarians, who, we doubt not, agree with Dr. Chalmers when he said; 'I do not think, that, amid the distraction and the engrossment of his

other pursuits, he has at all times succeeded in his interpretation of the book ; else, he would never, in my apprehension, have abetted the leading doctrine of a sect or a system which has now nearly dwindled away from public observation.' Here, the heresy of Newton is alluded to as a notorious and incontestable fact, in a connexion where it was evidently desirable for the writer to deny it if possible, because he had just been praising the conscientious industry and philosophical candor, with which he studied the word of God. This distinguished preacher makes another remark in which we entirely agree. He says, 'When I look at the steady and unmoved Christianity of this wonderful man ; so far from seeing any symptom of dotage or imbecility, or any forgetfulness of those principles on which the fabric of his philosophy is reared, do I see, that in sitting down to the work of a Bible commentator, he hath given us their most beautiful and consistent exemplification.'

The direct evidence of Newton's Unitarianism is equally convincing. Mr. Haynes, who was connected with him by his official duties, and always treated by him as an intimate friend, declared to Mr. Baron that Newton was a Unitarian, as he knew from his own declaration. These were well known and excellent men, though we feel bound to inform our readers of the characteristic suggestion of Dr. Magee, that, being Unitarians, *they are not to be trusted*. After being duly cautioned with this amiable syllogism, our readers may give them what credit they will. There is evidence to prove that they were men of truth and honor ; but we shall not adduce it, because the fact to which they testify is not doubted by men in general, and can never be reasonably questioned without some testimony in opposition to the prevailing impression of mankind. Newton's papers were placed in the hands of Horsley, the controvertist, for publication. Does any one doubt, that, could he have found one vestige of of such testimony, he would have placed it where all the world could read it ? It was reported, that among those papers were some in which Newton's Unitarian sentiments were explicitly stated. Horsley never contradicted this report ; on the contrary we think that he confirmed it, by declaring that some of the papers were unfit for publication ! These circumstances, taken in connexion with Horsley's well-known bigotry, convince us that the report was true ; for who can

imagine any thing else that Horsley should wish to suppress : he had the means of proving the report false if it was so ; and his not denying it, proves that it was true.

The most interesting part of this work is that in which an explanation is given of the supposed insanity of Newton. Biot, in his life of Newton, first gave the world an account of it, derived from a manuscript journal of Huygens, in which it is stated that Mr. Colin, a Scotchman, informed him in May, 1694, that about eighteen months before, Sir Isaac Newton had become insane, so that his friends were obliged to take care of him, and that by their remedies he had been partially restored to the use of his mind. When Biot published this statement it was received with great surprise. It was thought incredible, that the greatest man of his day, a professor of mathematics in the University and a member of Parliament, should have lost his reason, and the first intelligence of the fact been received from abroad. One would have thought that they would have suspected, that such a statement, received from a traveller, was more likely to be mistaken, than the story to be true ; but Biot proceeded to remark, that the derangement of Newton would account for his never having published a new work on any branch of science after the age of forty-five. La Place went still further, and maintained that Newton never recovered the strength of his mind ; endeavouring to make it appear that his theological studies did not commence till after his mind began to decay. He does not seem to have reflected, that, although to him the circumstance of Newton's taking pleasure in such studies appeared an evidence of weakness, yet nevertheless others, who would take the trouble to examine the results of those studies, might be satisfied that no change had passed over his mind. Such is the fact ; those works are sufficient of themselves to disprove the information given to Huygens, so far as it implied that the mind of Newton was permanently affected.

But Dr. Brewster has fortunately been able to explain the whole matter satisfactorily ; a thing that could hardly have been expected at this distance of time. He has found a manuscript journal of Mr. de la Pryme, who was in the University at the time, and who noted down, February 3d, 1692, an incident which happened to Mr. Newton. The journal says, that Newton had a book on colors and light, containing the results of twenty years' study and experiment ; it was

nearly completed, when, on a winter morning, it was left with other manuscripts on a table near a burning candle, which, by some unexplained accident, caught and consumed all the manuscripts without doing any further harm. When Mr. Newton returned and saw what was done, 'every one thought that he would have gone mad, and he was so troubled that he was not himself for a month after.' Though the dates do not agree, this must have been the foundation for the story which reached Huygens, and which of course was altered by passing from hand to hand, and from one country to another. So far, however, from proving that Newton was insane, the utmost which can be inferred from it is, that he was much agitated at the time, and did not recover his spirits for a month after. According to Huygens' journal, the malady lasted nearly two years; and, as Dr. Brewster remarks, Biot ought to have known, that during those years Newton wrote his celebrated letters to Bentley on the existence of a Deity, and various other works in which he was engaged at the time are enumerated, which show any thing rather than mental decay.

Dr. Brewster has fortunately been able to throw light on this subject by means of letters never before published. One is from Newton to Mr. Pepys, dated September 13th, 1693, in which he speaks of himself as having been ill for a year, so as to lose his appetite and rest, and his former 'consistency of mind.' He is evidently describing a nervous complaint, which, as a natural consequence, impaired his energy of mind, and unfitted him for engaging with spirit in new labors; but so far from its amounting to insanity, we have seen that it was during this period of depression that he wrote his letters to Bentley. Mr. Pepys, on receiving this letter, wrote to Mr. Millington, of Magdalen College, to ascertain the opinion of others with respect to the health of his friend, and received an explicit answer. From this it appears, that Newton stated to Mr. Millington that he had been affected with a complaint in his head which had kept him awake for five nights together, and in that state he had written a letter to Mr. Pepys, which might have been incoherent and strange: he wished Mr. Millington to make this explanation. Mr. Millington goes on to say that Newton was still affected with some degree of melancholy, but it had not touched his understanding. It is plain from this correspondence that a depression of spir-

its, owing to sickness, was magnified by report into insanity, before it reached the Continent; but, though this was the extent of the disease, it is not strange that it should have been so misrepresented, when his letters betrayed how every thing was discolored to his view. A day or two after he wrote the letter which alarmed Mr. Pepys, he wrote another of the same description to Mr. Locke, in which he asked his forgiveness for some injuries, probably imaginary, and to which Locke returned a generous and manly reply.

“SIR,

“Being of opinion that you endeavoured to embroil me with women, and by other means, I was so much affected with it, as that when one told me you were sickly and would not live, I answered, ’t were better if you were dead. I desire you to forgive me this uncharitableness; for I am now satisfied that what you have done is just, and I beg your pardon for my having hard thoughts of you for it, and for representing that you struck at the root of morality, in a principle you laid in your book of ideas, and designed to pursue in another book, and that I took you for a Hobbist.* I beg your pardon also for saying or thinking that there was a design to sell me an office, or to embroil me. — I am your most humble and unfortunate servant,

“IS. NEWTON.

“At the Bull, in Shoreditch, London, Sept. 16th, 1693.”

‘To this letter Locke returned the following answer, so nobly distinguished by philosophical magnanimity and Christian charity: —

“SIR,

Oates, Oct. 5th, 1693.

“I have been, ever since I first knew you, so entirely and sincerely your friend, and thought you so much mine, that I could not have believed what you tell me of yourself, had I had it from any body else. And, though I cannot but be mightily troubled that you should have had so many wrong and unjust thoughts of me, yet next to the return of good offices, such as from a sincere good-will I have ever done you, I receive your acknowledgment of the contrary as the kindest thing you have done me, since it gives me hopes I have not lost a friend I so much valued. After what your letter expresses, I shall not need to

* The system of Hobbes was at this time very prevalent. According to Dr. Bentley, “the taverns and coffee-houses, nay, Westminster Hall and the very churches, were full of it;” and he was convinced from personal observation, that “not one English infidel in a hundred was other than a Hobbist.”—*Monk’s Life of Bentley*, p. 31.

say any thing to justify myself to you. I shall always think your own reflection on my carriage, both to you and all mankind, will sufficiently do that. Instead of that, give me leave to assure you that I am more ready to forgive you than you can be to desire it; and I do it so freely and fully, that I wish for nothing more than the opportunity to convince you that I truly love and esteem you, and that I have the same good-will for you as if nothing of this had happened. To confirm this to you more fully, I should be glad to meet you any where, and the rather, because the conclusion of your letter makes me apprehend it would not be wholly useless to you. But whether you think it fit or not, I leave wholly to you. I shall always be ready to serve you to my utmost, in any way you shall like, and shall only need your commands or permission to do it.

“My book is going to press for a second edition; and, though I can answer for the design with which I write it, yet, since you have so opportunely given me notice of what you have said of it, I should take it as a favor if you would point out to me the places that gave occasion to that censure, that, by explaining myself better, I may avoid being mistaken by others, or unawares doing the least prejudice to truth or virtue. I am sure you are so much a friend to them both, that, were you none to me, I could expect this from you. But I cannot doubt but you would do a great deal more than this for my sake, who, after all, have all the concern of a friend for you, wish you extremely well, and am, without compliment, &c.”*

‘To this letter Newton made the following reply:—

“SIR,

“The last winter, by sleeping too often by my fire, I got an ill habit of sleeping; and a distemper, which this summer has been epidemical, put me farther out of order, so that when I wrote to you, I had not slept an hour a night for a fortnight together, and for five days together not a wink. I remember I wrote to you, but what I said of your book I remember not. If you please to send me a transcript of that passage, I will give you an account of it if I can. — I am your most humble servant,

“IS. NEWTON.

‘Cambridge, Oct. 5th, 1693.’

pp. 217, 219.

The world is under obligation to Dr. Brewster for clearing up all doubts on this unpleasant subject. It would be painful to think of Newton in the condition of the subtle doctor, who, when he was old, wept because he could not understand

* ‘The draft of this letter is endorsed “J. L. to I. Newton.”’

his own books. Dr. Brewster has also shown that the theological works of Newton were not all among his latest productions ; but that some of the most remarkable of his scientific exertions were made after the time when La Place would *stultify* him, in order to destroy the weight of his authority in favor of Christianity. No human change would be more discouraging to think of, than the eclipse of such a mind ; we therefore rejoice to be assured that it retained its light, strength, and glory to the last.

Adam Smith, in his 'Theory of Moral Sentiments,' has a speculation upon the irritability of men of taste, compared with the quiet of men of science : the explanation is ingenious and satisfactory ; but whoever reads the life of Newton will doubt, whether the repose of science is quite so profound as it is represented. The most brilliant period of Newton's life was one long vexation, owing to the controversies in which he was involved, sorely against his will. When he discovered the different refrangibility of the rays of light, which led to the construction of his reflecting telescope, the moment it was disclosed to the world, it occasioned a perfect storm. Pardies, a Jesuit, of Clermont, began the war, but was soon silenced by the heavy fire of Newton. Next, Linus, a physician of Liege, published a letter upon the subject in which he treated Newton with a contempt which now seems ludicrous to the last degree. This letter Newton declined answering, but conveyed an assurance to Linus, that he was mistaken in supposing that the experiments were made under the circumstances which he had represented. Linus again took the field, and maintained that this assurance was false. This letter Newton was prevailed upon by his friends to answer, though it did not, in his opinion, require or deserve a reply. It was long before this matter was settled, and it cost Newton more trouble to show the cause of the mistakes of his adversaries, than to establish his greatest truths. When this was over, he was forced into a conflict with Dr. Hooke, a great genius, but very unamiable man, who criticized his telescope and the principles on which it was made. Newton answered him in an argument to which he did not attempt a reply. Huygens followed, and was routed by a reply in which Newton treated him with more respect than his other adversaries. When his 'Principia' appeared, his philosophy was opposed by some of the first mathematicians

on the continent; and made slow progress even in England, which would not be surprising if a complacent remark of Dr. Brewster were true, when he says that Newton made a popular statement of some of the most important propositions for his friend Locke, who had not turned his attention to mathematics; 'there can be no doubt,' observes the Doctor, in a most oracular way, 'that even in their modified form, they were beyond the capacity of Mr. Locke!' Newton's controversy with Leibnitz is generally known. Though he was successful in all his conflicts of the kind, even his victories gave him constant pain, and he often determined to renounce philosophy altogether. This shows that glory must be earned, and that troubles and disappointments abound in conditions which seem most calm and enviable to common eyes.

There is very little incident in the history of Newton's private life. His mother married another husband several years after his father's death, but when he was fourteen years of age she became again a widow, and recalled him from school to prepare him for the management of her farm. She found however that he had a decided passion for study, and wisely judged that she ought not to resist it. He therefore prepared himself for the university of Cambridge, which he entered in his eighteenth year. Dr. Barrow's optical lectures were published when Newton was twenty-seven years of age, and they contain an acknowledgment of valuable aid received from his hand. He had already been appointed to a Senior Fellowship, and at this time Dr. Barrow resigned the Professorship of Mathematics in his favor. At this early period of his life his brilliant course of discovery began. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society two years after. He remained in the seclusion of his college, devoted to scientific pursuits, till he was forty-five years of age, when he was appointed one of the Delegates who were chosen to defend the interests of the university against the usurpations of James the Second. The part which he took in this affair, together with his general reputation, induced his friends to propose him as member of Parliament in the succeeding year; and being elected, he sat as member of the Convention Parliament till it was dissolved. His finances were too limited to allow the expense of living in London, and it was complained of as a national disgrace that nothing was done for such a man. But in 1695, he was appointed to an office in

the Mint, and in 1699 was promoted to the place of Master of the Mint, an office worth twelve hundred pounds a year, which he filled with great usefulness and ability. This accession of good fortune came when he was fifty-seven years of age, and he was elected President of the Royal Society four years after, an office to which he was annually reëlected during the remaining twenty-five years of his life. The charge of his domestic establishment was left to his niece, who, with her husband, Mr. Conduit, resided in his house, the husband acting as his deputy in the discharge of his official duties in his later years. He died after a long and distressing illness, which he endured with perfect resignation in 1727, in his eighty-fifth year. His papers are still in existence in various hands; and though Horsley thought some of them unfit for publication, and Dr. Brewster fancies that nothing would be found in them peculiarly interesting to science, we hope that they will at last be given to the world. They would probably remove all doubt, if there is any, from the subject of his religious opinions, though they are not wanted to establish the fact, that he was a liberal and enlightened, as well as fervent and humble Christian.

ART. II. — *Library of Useful Knowledge. — History of the Church.* Parts I. — X.

SEVERAL of the late numbers of the 'Library of Useful Knowledge' have been devoted to the subject of ecclesiastical history, and furnish, on the whole, a useful compend, written in a vigorous and correct style and with tolerable fairness. The following extract from the Introduction shows a spirit of candor and liberality in the writer.*

'The reader of this work will observe, from the experience of every age of Christianity, that, through the failings and variety of our nature, diversity in religious opinion is inseparable from religious belief; they will observe the fruitlessness of every forcible attempt to repress it; and they will also remark, that it has seldom proved dangerous to the happiness of society,

* George Waddington, Trinity College, Cambridge.

unless when civil authority has interfered to restrain it. The moral effect of this great historical lesson can be one only — uncontentious, unlimited moderation, — a temperate zeal to soften the diversities which we cannot possibly prevent, — a fervent disposition to conciliate the passions where we fail to convince the reason ; to exercise that forbearance which we surely require ourselves, and constantly to bear in mind that in our common pursuit of the same eternal object, we are alike impeded by the same human and irremediable imperfections.' — p. 3.

So much Christians should have learned from the result of the effort made under Constantine to crush the heresy of Arius at its birth. This was the first grand experiment of the wisdom of attempting to repress freedom of thought by the arm of power, and should have been the last.

The 'Arian impiety,' as the old writers call it, first appeared on the banks of the Nile, and the devil, envious of the prosperity of the church under the first Christian emperor, sowed the seeds of it. All the Ante-Nicene fathers, however, admitted the inferiority of the Son to the Father. This implied that, in their opinion, they were two essences, which some of them distinctly assert. It is true, the learned Platonizing Christians sometimes use expressions, which now bear an orthodox sense, and it is hastily inferred, therefore, that they were orthodox in the modern signification of the term. But nothing could be further from the truth. A very moderate acquaintance with the remains of Christian antiquity must convince any unprejudiced mind that the language in question was used by the Fathers in a sense very different from that now attributed to it. If we go on to the assumption that they employed it in the modern sense, we shall mistake their sentiments at every step. Thus they occasionally make use of a phraseology which, in the mouth of a modern Trinitarian, would imply a belief that the Son is of one numerical essence with the Father. But this they never thought of asserting. The most they meant to affirm, was, that the Son, by virtue of his birth, partook, in some sort, of the same specific nature with the Father, that is, a divine, just as an individual of our race partakes of the same nature or essence with the parent from whom he sprung, that is, a human. At the same time, they taught that he was relatively inferior to the Father, from whom he was derived, and entitled to only inferior homage ; he was not 'uncaused as the

Father was; he had a beginning, the Father had none; he was the minister of the Father, and in all things subject to his will.

We have traced this doctrine from Justin Martyr down to Origen.* From the time of Origen to the rise of the Arian controversy, the opinions of the Fathers underwent no material change. This fact we shall endeavour to establish by a few quotations and references. We engage to be very brief.

Gregory Thaumaturgus, bishop of Neocæsarea, was a pupil and a warm admirer of Origen, and seems, in all respects, to have adopted his views of the Son.† Basil says, he de-pressed him into the rank of a 'creature.' ‡ He brings a similar charge against Dionysius of Alexandria, also a disciple of Origen, and a controversial writer in high repute with the Fathers. He 'sowed the seeds,' we are told, of the 'Anomæan impiety.' In refuting the errors of Sabellius he went into the opposite extreme, making not only a 'diversity of persons' between the Father and Son, but a 'difference of substance.' §

Of the writings of Dionysius a few scanty relics only are left us. That the charge brought against him by Basil was not without foundation, however, appears from some small fragments of his letters preserved by Athanasius, who was friendly to his memory. The Arians, it seems, made great use of his name. They quoted him as saying, in one of his letters against the Sabellians, that the Son of God is a 'creature differing in substance from the Father as the husbandman from the vine,' and that, 'as a creature he was not before he was made.' Athanasius acknowledges that these were the words of Dionysius, but thinks that the occasion on which they were uttered furnishes some apology for him. ||

Dionysius was thought by some of his contemporaries to have expressed himself a little imprudently, and complaints were made against him to his namesake, the bishop of Rome. The latter writes him a letter on the subject. The Alexandrian in reply says, that the term 'consubstantial' was not

* Christian Examiner, Vol. II, pp. 303 *et seqq.* and Vol. VI. pp. 22, *et seqq.* New Series.

† See his Panegyric Oration upon Origen.

‡ Epist. 41.

§ Ib. 64.

|| Epist. de Sentent. Dionys. Opp. Tom. I. — also De Synod. Arim. et Seleuc.

found in the Scriptures, and seems to insinuate that he might therefore be justified in its rejection. Still, he adds, the views he had expressed of the Father and Son were not in reality inconsistent with a belief of their 'consubstantiality,' as his accusers might have perceived from the illustrations and trains of argument employed by him in the letter alluded to. 'I took,' says he, the example of a 'human progeny, which, it is evident, is of the same genus,' or nature, with the parent.* They are 'consustantial,' that is, partake of a common nature, though not numerically the same. In this sense, it appears, he thought the Father and Son might be pronounced consubstantial; they were beings of the same species, that is, both divine, though as distinct from each other as two individuals of our race.

Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, lived about the middle of the third century, and was one of the eminent writers of the age. He left a variety of letters and treatises, mostly on subjects of Christian morality and discipline. From these it is not difficult to gather his sentiments concerning the nature of Christ. It is obvious that he regarded him as a distinct being from the Father. Of this, his short piece on the 'Vanity of Idols' † affords sufficient evidence. He speaks of God as 'One,' 'Supreme,' and bestows on him numerous other epithets, which show that he regarded him as without partner or equal. He then proceeds to speak of the Son as another and a different being. It is true he calls him God, but evidently in an inferior sense of the term. 'What Christ is, that, we Christians,' he says, 'if we have imitated him, shall become.' He calls him the mediator between two, sent to conduct man to the Father. This and similar language would not have been used by Cyprian, had he believed the Son to be of one substance with the Father, in the modern signification of the term. The ancient Christians had not learned that refinement of logic by which he who sends and he who is sent are made to appear one. They went on the assumption that they must necessarily be two.

Of Theognostus, another writer of this century, little is known. Athanasius however quotes him, and expresses a

* *Ib.*

† *Opp.* p. 229. *Ed. Par.* 1726. It is in the piece here referred to, that Cyprian advances the strange conceit that Jesus 'prevented the executioner, by voluntarily dismissing his spirit.'

favorable opinion of his character, though, according to Photius,* he adopted some of the worst errors of Origen, saying that the Son of God was a 'creature,' and 'presided only over beings endowed with reason.' Nor were the opinions he entertained of the Spirit any more sound.

Pierius, of Alexandria, on account of his learning and eloquence called a second Origen, also, as the writer just quoted testifies,† 'spoke dangerously and impiously of the Spirit, making him inferior in glory to the Father and Son,' and these he made 'two substances, and two natures.'

Methodius, bishop of Tyre near the end of the century, also taught the inferiority of the Son to the Father. Lucian, a priest of Antioch, appears to have been of the same opinion, or perhaps verged still further towards Arianism. Eusebius, Sozomen, and several of the ancient orthodox writers, extol his learning and piety, and speak of him in terms of high admiration; yet the followers of Arius were often called Lucianists, and Philostorgius tells us that most of the Arian chiefs, as Eusebius of Nicomedia, Maris of Chalcedon, Theognis of Nice, Leontius of Antioch, and others, were his disciples.‡ His orthodoxy, it may be fairly inferred, could not have been of a better stamp, certainly, than that of Origen, Dionysius, or Pierius. But that was the orthodoxy of the age.

Passing by Arnobius, who wrote a defence of the Christian religion very early in the fourth, or late in the third century, and who clearly distinguishes Christ from God, we come to his celebrated pupil Lactantius. Lactantius is generally admitted to have been unsound on the subject of the Trinity, as the doctrine has been explained in times subsequent to the council of Nice. We shall quote a little of his language. 'Before this glorious world arose,' says he, 'God, the maker and disposer of all, begat a holy, incorruptible, and incomprehensible Spirit, who is called his Son, and although, through

* Biblioth. cod. 106.

† Ib. cod. 119.

‡ Hist. Eccles. L. II. § 14. Lucian suffered martyrdom about the year 311 or 312. Epiphanius mentions two of this name, the elder of whom he calls a disciple of Marcion. The other, he says, lived in the time of Constantine, and was claimed by the Arians as a martyr. But it was from the presbyter of Antioch, as it is very evident, that the Arians were denominated Lucianists. Of his death by martyrdom there is no doubt. See Jerome, Cat. Script. Eccles. Euseb. Hist. L. ix. c. 6. Epiph. Hær. 43.

him, he afterwards created others, an innumerable host, whom we call angels, yet he has thought that first-begotten alone worthy the divine name' of Son.* Here are two beings, it would seem, entirely distinct. The union between the two is thus explained by the same writer. He takes the example of a father and son, occupying the same house, the son remaining subject to the father. Though the father grants the name and authority of master to the son, yet as they are perfectly united in will and consent, we may say that there is but one house and one master. 'So,' he proceeds, 'this world is a house of God, and the Son and Father who inhabit it, and are of one mind, are one God, for one is as both, and both are as one. Nor is there any thing surprising in this, since the Son is in the Father, because the Father loves the Son, and the Father in the Son, because the Son faithfully obeys the will of the Father, nor ever does nor did any thing except what the Father has willed or commanded.†' Thus, according to Lactantius, the only union between the Father and Son is one of will and affection. He calls the Son God, but speaks of him as 'created,' and as possessing only derived dignity and power. The Son, he says, deserved the title of God 'on account of the virtue he taught and exemplified.' 'On account of the virtue and fidelity he exhibited towards God, a kingdom, and honor, and power were given him, that all people and tribes and tongues should serve him.‡'

We might quote more to the same purpose, but the above is sufficient to show the views Lactantius entertained of the inferior and derived nature and dignity of the Son. He knew nothing of the atonement in the modern sense of the term. Christ died and rose again, he tells us, that he might 'give men the hope of overcoming death, and conduct them to the rewards of immortality.'§ In his Epistles, which are now lost, he 'denied,' as Jerome testifies, 'the personality of the Spirit, referring it, after the manner of the Jews, to the Father or the Son.'||

Such was the orthodoxy of the age; and it was but one step removed from Arianism. The points of difference and

* Inst. L. iv. c. 6.

† Ib. L. iv. c. 29.

‡ Ib. L. iv. c. 25, 16, 12.

§ Ib. L. iv. c. 10.

|| Epist. ad Pammach. et Ocean. 41 al. 65.

identity we shall hereafter point out. We now proceed to our historical details.

The incidents of the life of Arius before he promulgated his obnoxious sentiments, so far as preserved, are soon related. Epiphanius * tells us, that he was said to have come from Libya, 'a part of Africa,' says the pious Maimbourg, 'beyond all other fruitful of monsters, for before this time it produced the heretic Sabellius !' From an expression in one of his own letters it has been inferred that his father's name was Ammonius. But this is matter of doubt. He was made deacon by Peter, then bishop of Alexandria, but afterwards incurred his displeasure by the freedom he took in censuring his conduct in regard to the Meletians, which Arius, who is accused of having been formerly too partial to the sect, thought illiberal and harsh. For this offence he was excommunicated. Under Achillas, the successor of Peter, he was restored, and promoted to the rank of presbyter. Achillas was soon succeeded by Alexander, and Arius for some time enjoyed his confidence and friendship. He had the care of a church in Alexandria where he preached, and had full liberty to declare his sentiments.†

Of the origin of his controversy with his bishop, accounts in some respects differ. Sozomen‡ tells us, and Epiphanius, as we shall hereafter see, intimates the same, that Alexander did not interfere for some time after Arius began to divulge his novel opinions ; that he was blamed for his neglect or forbearance ; that in consequence of the complaints of the enemies of Arius or of his opinions, he was at length induced to appoint, successively, two conferences at which Arius and his opponents discussed the question at issue ; that Alexander was at first in some suspense, now inclining to one party and now to the other ; but that he finally decided against the presbyter.

This, however, seems to be a somewhat imperfect account of the matter. According to other authorities, some of them entitled to full as much credit, Alexander himself, by his innovations and extravagances, furnished occasion of the dispute. Constantine certainly, in a letter addressed to the parties,§ throws the blame on Alexander, whom he accuses of troub-

* Hær. 69.

† Epiphanius. Hær. 69. Theodoret. Hist. L. i. c. 2.

‡ L. i. c. 15.

§ Euseb. Vit. Const. c. 69.

ling his priests with foolish and unprofitable questions, which should never have been asked, or if asked, ought not to have been answered. Socrates* and Theodoret,† in the main, confirm this statement. According to the former, Alexander having one day discoursed with a little too much subtilty on the subject of the trinity in the presence of his clergy, Arius thought that his language savoured of Sabellianism, and in arguing against him went to the opposite extreme. Arius, too, in his letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, still extant,‡ represents Alexander as an innovator; and if the expressions he attributes to him were really his, which we see no reason to doubt, he certainly was so. These expressions, literally translated, are as follows: 'Always God, always the Son; at the same time Father, at the same time Son,'—that is, they are cœternal; 'the Son cœexists with God unbegottenly,' or without generation; 'always begotten; an unbegotten begotten; neither in thought, nor the least point of time, did the Father precede the Son; always God, always the Son.'

These are expressions to which the ears, even of the orthodox, were then unaccustomed. Arius says he could not assent to them, and hence was expelled the city as an atheist. Before this time, however, his adherents had become numerous, for he was, as his adversaries tell us, an acute logician, a man of consummate art, and every way qualified to form and strengthen a party. He was of tall stature, of a grave or even melancholy expression; and his whole figure, says Epiphanius, like the serpent's, was formed for craft and deceit. He wore a sort of short cloak and a scanty tunic, resembling that adopted by the monks, and with an air of unusual seriousness united a bland address, and assiduous and flattering attentions. He was evidently sincere; he abounded in zeal, and was susceptible neither of being intimidated by threats, nor lured by favor. He possessed the courage of a martyr, and sooner than profess his assent to opinions he did not believe, he would 'die,' as he says in his letter to Eusebius, 'a thousand deaths.'

The consequence was, Arius became, in time, an object of general admiration, a sort of popular idol. His opinions

* Hist. L. iv. c. 5.

† Hist. L. i. c. 2.

‡ The Letter is found in Theod. L. i. c. 5, and Epiphanius, Hær. 69, with some variation, not however materially affecting the sense.

were embraced, as Epiphanius tells us, by seven hundred consecrated virgins, by several deacons and presbyters, and some bishops. They diffused themselves beyond the walls of Alexandria into Libya and the upper Thebais.

The success and growing influence of his presbyter now first, according to the author just referred to, attracted the serious attention of Alexander, Meletius, at this time the enemy of Arius, having carried complaints to his ear. Nor is this statement inconsistent with the supposition that Alexander himself, by his imprudence, had excited the controversy. Arius might have believed it his duty, in discharging his office as pastor and teacher, to inculcate what he conceived to be sound views of Christian doctrine in opposition to the rash; and as it appeared to him, novel assertions of his bishop; and the latter, if acquainted with the circumstance, might not have thought himself called upon immediately to interpose. A certain latitude, as it appears from Epiphanius, was allowed to the priests of the several churches of Alexandria in the expression of their sentiments, and it might not at first have been clear, that Arius had exceeded it.

The hesitation ascribed to Alexander, may be accounted for by the supposition that the change, which his opinions underwent about this time, was gradual, and that he did not at first go the length he afterwards proceeded. He might, originally, have thrown out some unadvised expressions concerning the nature of the Son, though he as yet held, in the main, the popular belief. These expressions gave rise to controversy, and upon listening to a discussion of the subject the bishop for a moment felt embarrassed by the weight of authority and argument, which Arius was able to bring in support of his views. From this embarrassment, however, he soon recovered. Envy of the popular fame of Arius (for this passion was attributed to him) might have caused him to feel an increased aversion to his sentiments; and the progress of the controversy served still further to separate the combatants, till Alexander was led to express himself in the rash manner above related, and insist that all his clergy should echo his opinions. That Alexander's mind went through some such process as this, there can be little doubt. We have evidence of his change of sentiments, not only from the testimony of Arius, but from his own writings. Even after the expulsion of Arius from Alexandria, he continued

occasionally, from the effect of habit, to use language which savoured strongly of the old school.

But whatever might have been his previous views, Alexander now soon showed that he was resolved to exert his influence and authority to the full. He first makes use of counsel and admonition, and finally '*commands* Arius to embrace his sentiments,' and discard his own. But Arius was not the man to change his opinions, or profess to change them, in consequence of the '*command*' of a spiritual superior. Alexander, as Socrates tells us, now becomes enraged, and assembling a council of bishops and priests, excommunicates him and his followers, and orders him to leave the city. We are told by Arius, in the letter already alluded to, that Eusebius of Cæsarea, and several others whom he names, and 'all the oriental bishops,' since they asserted that 'the Father existed before the Son, being without beginning,' were anathematized, except only Philogonius, Hellanicus, and Macarius, whom he pronounces ignorant heretics. So general, at this time, was the leaning towards the sentiments of Arius.*

Arius was expelled from Alexandria, as it is generally supposed, about the year 320. After he left the city, no small part of the people, as Sozomen informs us, resorted to

*. The above account, meagre as it is, embraces all the information we can collect in relation to the origin of the Arian controversy. Theodoret, indeed, asserts that the heresiarch was instigated by envy and disappointment, Alexander having been preferred to the bishoprick, to which he thought he had superior claims. But of this he offers no shadow of proof, and his assertion is contradicted by Philostorgius, who tells us (Hist. L. i.) that Arius, seeing the votes inclining to himself, generously caused them to be transferred to his rival. The truth is, Theodoret was a man of violent prejudices, and a great bigot, and never speaks of Arius but in terms of extreme acrimony.

Philostorgius was an Arian historian, and it would be satisfactory to be able to compare his statements throughout, with those of the orthodox. It is always well, if we can, to hear the evidence on both sides. But the original work of Philostorgius is unfortunately lost, and we have only a brief abstract of its contents by the orthodox Photius, who shows himself exceedingly bitter against the author. His usual manner of commencing his sections is, 'the impious Philostorgius,' 'this enemy of God,' 'this artifice of lies,' 'this wretch,' says so and so. The little we have of him gives a complexion to the history of the times very different from what it assumes in the narratives of the orthodox. His history commences with the rise of the Arian controversy, and embraced the period of a little more than a century, including his own times.

him, consisting partly of such as approved his opinions, and partly of those who sympathized with his hard fate, thinking that he had been harshly treated by his bishop. His friends write to the bishops in several parts praying that, if wrong, they would teach them, but, if right, that they would intercede with Alexander to receive them. Arius soon after retires into Palestine, visits the several bishops there, and endeavours to procure favor for himself and his doctrine. He was well received by some, says Epiphanius, and repulsed by others. Among the former was Eusebius, the historian, bishop of Cæsarea. It was while residing with him, if Epiphanius is to be trusted, that he wrote the letter already mentioned to the bishop of Nicomedia. He addresses him as the 'orthodox Eusebius,' and proceeds with much brevity and neatness to give an account of the nature and result of his controversy with Alexander. His own sentiments are stated in simple and intelligible language. He writes with feeling, but without bitterness.

Eusebius of Nicomedia was distinguished for rank and talents; and the circumstance that the imperial residence was then at Nicomedia, gave him additional influence. Socrates complains that a multitude of bishops were obsequious to him. He became the personal friend of Arius, espoused his cause with warmth, and proved an able advocate for his opinions. He wrote many letters in his favor to Alexander and others, and from this time may be regarded, in fact, as the chief of the sect, and hence the Arians were afterwards often called Eusebians. One of his letters, addressed to Paulinus, bishop of Tyre, is still extant.* It was written soon after the receipt of Arius's letter just mentioned, and is particularly valuable, as it contains a short and clear exposition of his own views, and of the generally received doctrine, concerning the nature of the Son. 'He never heard,' he says, 'that there were two unbegotten, but only one, and one begotten by him, but not of his substance, nor partaking of his nature, but different in nature and power.' The letter concludes with a request that Paulinus would write to Alexander and induce him, if possible, to relent. Eusebius, besides, assembled a provincial council in Bithynia, which undertook the defence of Arius, and endeavoured to procure

* Theod. L. i. c. 6.

his restoration to the communion of the churches, and particularly of the church of Alexandria.*

But Alexander remained inexorable. The bishops of Palestine, however, at Arius's request, met in council and authorized him and his fellow presbyters in exile to collect their adherents, and preach to them, and perform all the functions of presbyters, as they had been accustomed to do at Alexandria.† Arius, it seems, passed some time with his friend at Nicomedia. While there he wrote a letter to his bishop, which Epiphanius has preserved.‡ In this letter, which, throughout, breathes a mild spirit, he gives at some length his views of the Father and Son, and says, 'This faith I have received from tradition, and learned of you.' Again, that the Father existed before the Son, he says, 'is what I learned of you who publicly preached it in the church.' The letter was signed by Arius and five other priests, six deacons, and two bishops. We have before alluded to the change of sentiment attributed to Alexander. We will simply add in this place, that the Arians constantly appealed to tradition as in their favor, and asserted that they held the ancient doctrine. This assertion must not be taken in the most rigid sense, though to a certain extent it was true. The Arians could quote passages from the old writers exceedingly embarrassing to their opponents. On some points, as the supremacy of the Father and his priority of existence, tradition was clearly in their favor, and they could say with truth that they held the old faith. The new doctrine embraced by the orthodox concerning the generation of the Son, they said was pure Manicheism and Valentinianism.

But to return; while Arius was thus employed, Alexander, too, was busy in writing letters to all parts, cautioning the bishops against showing any favor to him or his doctrines. Of these, Epiphanius tells us about seventy existed in his time. Two of them are still extant, one in Socrates§ and the other in Theodoret.|| They are written with no little acrimony, and, we are constrained to say, form an unfavorable contrast with those of Arius. In one of them, addressed to Alexander, bishop of Byzantium, Eusebius of Nicomedia

* Soz. L. i. c. 15.

† Ib.

‡ It is found also nearly entire in Athan. de Syn. Arim. et Seleuc.

§ L. i. c. 6.

|| L. i. c. 4.

comes in for a large share of abuse. In fact Alexander spares no effort to render the whole party odious. He calls them 'apostates,' 'impious,' 'enemies of Christ,' the most audacious of all the corrupters of Christianity, causing 'all preceding heresies to appear in comparison innocent,' such were the blasphemies they uttered wherever they went. He was 'troubled,' he says, 'at the destruction of these men'; but he adds, 'the same thing befell Hymenæus and Philetus, and before them Judas.' They were the men, he says, whose coming was predicted by our Saviour, and who should 'deceive many'; the same also to whom St. Paul alluded, 'who should depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils, hating the truth.'

Eusebius was still further provoked, and the war of words continued. Numerous letters were written by the friends and enemies of Arius. He collected and preserved those written in his defence, as did Alexander those written against him, and they were afterwards appealed to by different parties as authoritative documents.*

The dispute, by this time, had become a serious matter. Prelates contended in the churches; the people were rent into factions, and all places were filled with discord and tumult. Embassies were sent into all the Provinces, men's passions became more and more inflamed from day to day, and the whole empire exhibited a scene of violence and strife. Even Pagans were scandalized, and their theatres resounded with ridicule of the Christians.†

Constantine was now induced to interfere, and sent Hosius, bishop of Cordova, to Alexandria with the letter before mentioned, designed to soften the feelings of the parties, and, if possible, restore harmony. He blames all concerned, but especially Alexander, and represents the question at issue as very frivolous, a mere dispute about words.‡ They did not in reality differ in sentiment, he tells them, certainly not in any important particular. They might think differently on

* Soc. L. i. c. 6.

† Euseb. Vit. Const. c. 61. — Soc. Hist. L. i. c. 6.

‡ Some orthodox writers have been shocked that Constantine should have made light of so serious a matter, and have supposed, says Dr. Jortin, that when he wrote the letter, 'he had some evil counsellor at his elbow, either Satan or Eusebius.' He certainly had the orthodox Hosius at his elbow.

some minute points, but this need not prevent union ; they should, in such a case, keep their thoughts to themselves. Finally, he beseeches them to forget and forgive, and thus 'restore to him serene days, and nights void of care,' for their contentions had caused him 'excessive grief.'

But the evil was of too great magnitude to be thus repressed. The letter produced no effect. Alexander was inflexible and the Arians refused to retract, and the dispute ran higher than ever. A question arose, too, about the time of keeping Easter, which, though it excited little interest in the West, occasioned no small contention in the East. The emperor, despairing of any other remedy, now resolves to summon a general council.

This measure was probably suggested by some clerical advisers ; for we are told by Philostorgius,* that Alexander, coming to Nicomedia, held a consultation with Hosius, and other bishops favorable to his sentiments, the object of which was to devise some method of causing the consubstantiality of the Father and Son to be established, and Arius to be separated from the communion of the church by the decree of a general council, and that of Nice, in Bithynia, was not long after called. It was the wish of Constantine that the bishops from all parts of the empire should attend ; and that there might be no unnecessary delay, those who had not ready means of conveyance were authorized to make use of the public vehicles. Thither they came from the various Provinces, accompanied by a multitude of priests, deacons, and others. The number of bishops present is variously stated by historians. Eusebius says it exceeded 250 ; † Constantine makes it 300 and upwards, and Athanasius 318, or, as he expresses himself in another place, about 300. Their number is of less consequence than their character. Eusebius extols them for learning and other eminent qualities ; but Sabinus, a Macedonian bishop of Heraclea, in his collection of the 'Acts of Councils,' calls them stupid and illiterate. ‡ Neither the praise nor the censure was probably, in its full extent, deserved. The members of the council were, no doubt, what assemblies of divines have usually been, some ignorant, some crafty, some having in view the gratification

* L. i. § 7.

† Vit. Const. L. iii. c. 8

‡ Soc. Hist. L. i. c. 8.

of private feelings or the advancement of their interests ; some weak, some passionate, some arbitrary and domineering, some indolent, timid, and yielding ; a few wise and modest, but more empty, conceited, and noisy. So it was with the Fathers of Nice. With regard to the charge of Sabinus, Socrates gets them off by saying that they were supernaturally illuminated ; so their original deficiencies ought not to impair our reverence for their decisions.

The council met about the middle of June, A. D. 325, and there were present besides Christians, several pagan philosophers, some of them attracted, no doubt, by curiosity, and others, as Sozomen says, burning with a desire to encounter the Christians in argument, being enraged against them on account of the recent overthrow of Paganism.

As the subject which chiefly engaged the attention of the council had reference to Arius and his opinions, this may be the proper time to state what those opinions were, and in what respect they differed from those of the learned orthodox Fathers who preceded him. The strict and proper inferiority of the Son, as we have shown, was asserted by all the Ante-Nicene Fathers. Further, it was believed by those Fathers that the Son was begotten in time and not from eternity. So far Arius trod in their steps. But then the Fathers had some mystical notions derived from the later Platonists about the origin of the Son, who, as they supposed, had a sort of metaphysical existence in the Father from eternity, in other words, existed as his *logos*, wisdom, or reason, that is, as an attribute, which was afterwards converted into a real person, by a voluntary act of the Father. This Platonic mysticism, Arius, who was remarkably clear-headed, discarded, and this was the grand point of distinction between the doctrine of Arius and that of the Fathers, — a distinction which would seem, at first view, as Constantine originally considered it, to be of a somewhat shadowy nature, but yet a real one.*

* The difference, we say, was a real one ; yet, independently of the direct testimony heretofore adduced, the whole aspect of the controversy before the council of Nice shows that the old doctrine was on the confines of Arianism. Hence the perplexity into which a large part of the Christian world was thrown on the first publication of the opinions of Arius, and their rapid diffusion over Egypt and the several provinces of the East. The Oriental bishops generally, as above stated,

The characteristic dogma of Arius was, that the Son was originally produced out of nothing, and consequently there was a time when he did not exist. He maintained that he was a great preëxistent spirit, the first and chief of all derived beings, that this spirit became afterwards united with a human body and supplied the place of the rational soul. Some of the preceding Fathers attributed a human soul as well as body to Jesus, which, however, was so absorbed in the divine part of his nature, that they were, in a strict sense, one spirit, and not two, as modern Trinitarians affirm or imply. Such was Origen's opinion. According to the theology of Arius, however, the human soul was wanting in Jesus Christ, and he was a compound being only in the sense in which all human beings are, that is, he consisted of a body and one simple, undivided, and finite spirit. 'We believe,' says he, 'and teach, that the Son is not unbegotten, nor in any manner part of the unbegotten; that he was not made of matter subsisting, but by will and counsel,' that is, of the Father, 'existed before the times and ages,—who, before he was born, or created, or constituted, or founded, was not; for he is not unbegotten.' This language occurs in his letter to Eusebius. Again, in his letter to Alexander, he says, 'We acknowledge one only God, alone unbegotten, eternal, without beginning,—who begat an only-begotten Son before the times of the ages; by whom he made the ages and all things, having truly begotten him, and constituted him by his will immutable, a perfect creature of God, but not as one of the creatures; a production, but not as one of the [other] productions.' 'God, as the cause of all, is alone without beginning; but the Son begotten without time of the Father, and created and constituted before the ages, was not before he was begotten, but was alone produced of the one only Father without time and before all things; for he is not eternal, nor

and two councils, one in Bithynia and the other in Palestine, favored them, and the supporters and friends of Arius were among the best and most learned men of the age. Add the indecision attributed to Alexander, and the impression of Constantine that the controversy was a very frivolous one, which we have a right to infer was also the impression of Hosius who was then in his confidence, and no doubt one of his advisers. These facts afford pretty decisive evidence, had we no other, that the line between the old and new opinions, though visible, was not a very broad one, and that Arius, in fact, did little more than reject a metaphysical subtilty.

coëternal, nor existed with the Father unbegotten. God is before all things, wherefore he is prior to Christ as we have learned of you, who preached the doctrine openly in the church.' Such was the belief of Arius. He was accused by his antagonists, Alexander, Athanasius, and others, of teaching that the Son was mutable like other creatures, yet in both his letters he asserts the contrary, saying expressly that he was immutable.

The proceedings of the council are involved in great obscurity. We have no methodical account of them by any ancient writer. The information we possess is gleaned mostly from incidental notices, and uncertain and varying tradition, which often leaves us in doubt what to admit or reject. The historian, Eusebius, from prudential considerations, perhaps, or from tenderness to the Arian cause which he favored, if he was not himself an Arian, seems to have resolved as far as possible to avoid the subject. His history breaks off abruptly before the commencement of the Synod. In his 'Life of Constantine' he gives us a few particulars, but for the most part contents himself with general remarks, more in the style of declamation than of history. His letter to his people, written at Nice, during the session of the council, is, indeed, as far as it goes, a precious document. Athanasius, then a young man, was present, too, at the Synod, and his works contain frequent allusions to its debates and decrees, but nothing from which we can construct a continued narrative. Besides these, we have the Synodical Epistle, and two letters of Constantine written at the time of the dispersion of the council. These are all the contemporary documents of any value which we possess. Subsequent writers are to be used, of course, with much caution, and even some of the original documents require to be carefully sifted, as they contain the reports of interested witnesses, and truth may be found in them distorted by passion and party prejudice.

The Fathers of the council certainly gave evidence of retaining the imperfections of our common nature. Their attention was not so absorbed with the great questions they were called to discuss but they had time to think of their petty differences and private causes of dissatisfaction and complaint. Constantine undertook the office of pacificator, and it required all his authority and art to preserve among them the appearance of even tolerable decorum. It would

seem that there had been a good deal of discussion before his arrival. On the day appointed, he entered the assembly, clad in his imperial robes and glittering with gold and gems; and all being seated, the bishop who sat next him on the right, as Eusebius, the historian, tells us, referring, according to Sozomen, to himself,* addressed him in a short speech, to which the emperor replied in few words, in Latin, recommending peace and harmony. The debates, for some time, appear to have been conducted with no little acrimony, and much personal abuse was heard. The emperor, however, was patient; he listened, argued, and entreated, and did all in his power to promote concord and amity. One circumstance is mentioned very much to his credit. The Fathers tormented him with written accusations against each other which they were constantly placing in his hands. To put a stop to the proceeding, he assigned a day on which he would receive all papers of this sort; and, collecting them together, he burnt them with all those he had previously received, without reading a word of them, telling his bishops that they must wait the decision of the day of final account and the sentence of the great judge of all; as for himself, who was a mere mortal, he could not, he said, undertake to settle their differences.

On hearing the expressions imputed to Arius, most of the bishops, we are told, as if moved by one impulse, suddenly stopped their ears, in token of their real or well-feigned horror of such enormous impieties. They soon however recovered themselves, and Arius and his friends (for several of the bishops resolutely adhered to him) were afterwards permitted to explain and defend their sentiments; but they were no sooner heard, says Athanasius, than they were condemned. But what course was to be pursued? Some being persons of little curiosity, and averse to the labor of research and thought, were in favor of retaining the current and traditionary language. We ought to remain satisfied with that, they said, and not presume to innovate. Others argued against yielding a blind reverence to tradition, and contended that the opinions of the ancients ought not to be received without examination; the Scriptures should be the sole guide.

* Theodoret, with the appearance of great improbability, confers the honor on Eustathius of Antioch.

No little difficulty was experienced in framing a symbol which would prove generally acceptable, and at the same time have the effect of excluding the Arians. Their distinguishing dogma, as we have seen, was, that the Son was produced out of nothing, and that there was a time when he did not exist. This was to be condemned and the opposite doctrine affirmed. But the difficulty consisted in the selection of terms which the orthodox could, and which the Arians, without a change of sentiments, could not employ. It was at first proposed, says Athanasius,* to make use only of Scriptural expressions, such as, 'the Son is the *logos*, wisdom, and power of God,' the 'brightness of his glory,' and others of a similar character. The Arians professed their readiness to adopt the same; but it was soon discovered that they could evade their force by putting on them a construction consistent with their own views, and thus the church would not be freed from their detestable heresy. Eusebius, of Cæsarea, offered a creed, which he says, in his letter to his people, at first obtained the approbation of all, emperor and clergy; but it was found upon examination to contain no term which the Arians must of necessity reject, and would therefore be no sufficient test of orthodoxy. But luckily for them it was discovered from a letter of Eusebius, of Nicomedia, which was heard with shuddering, and torn in pieces as soon as read, that he and the Arians had great dread of the term *consubstantial*. Here then was precisely the term which was wanted. The word was immediately introduced into the creed just mentioned, and some other modifications or additions were made, and the symbol in its altered form was adopted.† The Arians loudly remonstrated. They urged that the language in question was new, that it had not the sanction of the sacred writings or of antiquity; but their complaints were disregarded.

Such, in brief, is the history of the famous Nicene creed. It was first subscribed by Hosius, then by the two envoys of the Roman bishop, the bishops of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, and finally by most of the others. Eusebius, of

* De Decret. Nic. Syn.

† Theodoret (L. i. c. 7.) says that the creed offered by the Arians was torn in pieces with scorn. Did they offer a creed before that of Eusebius? If not, his assertion is irreconcilable with the testimony of Eusebius.

Cæsarea, at first hesitated on account of the new and unscriptural term *consubstantial*, and some other expressions which had been introduced, and which he disliked. His scruples, however, were at length overcome, and he signed, not however, it seems, without great reluctance. He appears to have been aware that he exposed himself to the charge of fickleness or duplicity, and that some explanation or apology was necessary. He accordingly wrote to his parishioners in Cæsarea to put them in possession of the truth, and show that, though 'he resisted to the last hour for good reasons,' he made no compromise of principle in finally yielding. He required, he says, an explanation of the obnoxious expressions. It was asserted, he tells them, that by the phrase, 'of the substance of the Father,' was meant, that 'the Son was of the Father, but not as part of the Father,' that is, 'not part of his substance,' which opinion, he says, he thought sound. The expression was further explained as meaning only that the Son had 'no similitude to things made, but was in all respects similar to the Father who begat him, nor was he of any other *hypostasis* or substance, but that of the Father.' The phrase, 'begotten, not made,' he says, was used, because the term 'made' is common, and applied to all creatures, whereas the Son, as begotten of the Father, is 'of a more excellent substance than they.' It was added, that 'before he was actually begotten, he was in the Father by virtue of his power, in a manner unbegotten,'* that is, he had a sort of potential existence, which was the old doctrine of the Platonizing Fathers. With these explanations he was so far satisfied, he tells his people, that he gave his assent to the creed, as he says, for the sake of 'peace.'

With regard to the anathemas annexed to the creed, Eusebius says he found no difficulty in subscribing to them, as they only prohibited the use of expressions not found in the Scriptures. Yet the creed contained such expressions, which were admitted, as we have seen, in opposition to the strongest remonstrances of the friends of rational freedom. From the use of such terms, Eusebius remarks in the same letter, 'had come almost all the confusion and disturbance which had been raised in the church.'

Five bishops still resisted, and refused to subscribe. These

* See the letter as preserved by Theodoret. Socrates thought proper to retrench the last quoted expression.

were Eusebius of Nicomedia, Theognis of Nice, Maris of Chalcedon, Theonas, and Secundus.* Eusebius and Theognis afterwards consented to subscribe the creed, but resolutely refused to subscribe the anathemas against Arius, because, as they said, they attributed to him opinions which he did not hold.† Maris, it seems, did the same. They were reproached, however, for their insincerity and bad faith, and were said, at the suggestion of Constantia, the emperor's sister, to have used a very disingenuous artifice.‡

Theonas and Secundus, persevering in their opposition, were banished.§ Secundus, as Philostorgius tells us, when about to go, said to Eusebius, 'You have subscribed, Eusebius, to save yourself from exile. But I am confident, for God has revealed it to me, that you will be banished within a year.' The prediction was verified; for within three months, Eusebius having returned, as it is expressed, to his 'former impiety,' was exiled, as was also Theognis of Nice. They had continued, it appears, to teach the Arian doctrine, and had afforded an asylum to certain Arians, who, on account of their opinions, had been driven from Alexandria; and were therefore removed, and successors, by the command of the emperor, elected to fill their Sees.||

Arius and his adherents, his opinions, and his books, particularly his 'Thalia,' were anathematized and condemned, and he was forbidden to enter Alexandria.¶ The emperor confirmed the sentence of the council, and decreed, moreover, that the heresiarch and his followers should be branded with the name of Porphyrians. The more effectually to repress his 'wicked doctrine' and cause every memorial of him to perish, he ordered that all his books should be burnt, and that any person, who should be convicted of concealing any one of them, and of refusing immediately to produce and burn it, should be punished with death.**

The council, having finished its business, was dissolved

* Soc. L. i. c. 8.

† Ib. c. 14.

‡ Philost. L. i. c. 9.

§ Epist. Synod. — Philost. L. i. c. 9.

|| Theod. L. i. c. 19. — Epist. Const. ad Nicom. ib. c. 20.

¶ Epist. Synod. — Soc. L. i. c. 9.

** Emperor's Letter to the Bishops and People, Soc. L. i. c. 9.

late in August, after a session of a little more than two months.*

It has been pretended by the enemies of Arius, that, when he found himself anathematized, his courage forsook him, and he made his peace with the council by a sacrifice of principle. Such, however, is not the fact, though it is true that the Synodical Letter mentions not his exile, but says only that he was prohibited from entering Alexandria. That he went into exile is certain, for Eusebius and Theognis, in a petition for liberty to return, urge the fact that Arius had been already recalled.† The time of his recall is uncertain. It has been said that he remained in exile ten years, but this must be a mistake; for Eusebius and Theognis were permitted to return within three years after their banishment,‡ and Arius, as we have just said, had been previously recalled.

Meantime, Alexander had died, having survived the dissolution of the council only about five months; and the youthful Athanasius, as the reward of his zeal, was elevated to the primacy. So the orthodox tell us. The enemies of Athanasius, however, say that he obtained the See by deception and trick, having in the last resort, the votes of the bishops being divided, shut himself up in a church in the evening with several of his adherents, and two bishops whom he forced by threats to perform the ceremony of consecration, they, the whole time, remonstrating against the violence. The story, which is told at large by Philostorgius,§ may be false or exaggerated, though it will not do in reading the history of those times to believe the orthodox in every thing,

* The Fathers of the council, however, were not permitted to return home until they had attended a magnificent feast prepared by Constantine, that 'miracle of an emperor.' Eusebius (Vit. Const.) describes the scene with an amusing *naïveté*. The avenue to the palace, he tells us, was guarded with long files of soldiers, 'with the naked points of their swords, through the midst of whom the men of God, without fear, passed into the inmost rooms of the palace.' There some of them were permitted to recline with the emperor, and others were placed on side couches. 'One would have thought,' says Eusebius, 'that Christ's kingdom was adumbrated, and that the thing itself was a dream, and nothing more.'

† Soc. L. i. c. 14. Illyricum is mentioned as the place of Arius's exile.

‡ Philost. L. i. § 7.

§ L. ii. § 11.

and the heretics in nothing. The latter, it is to be presumed, had sometimes truth on their side. However it might have been in the present case, Athanasius was soon, to appearance, securely seated on the Episcopal throne of Alexandria. But he was not suffered long to remain unmolested. The Eusebians had assembled a council and deposed Eustathius, the orthodox bishop of Antioch, who had charged Eusebius, of Cæsarea, with Arianism, and had been himself, in turn, accused of Sabellianism and immorality. Their attention was now turned to Arius. They were determined that Athanasius should readmit him into Alexandria, and restore him to the communion of the church. Eusebius was resolute and persevering; he wrote to Athanasius, and, as Sozomen says,* employed entreaties and threats, but to no purpose. He then turned to the emperor, and endeavoured to prevail on him to interest himself in the cause of the unfortunate presbyter. In this he was successful. Arius was admitted to the presence of Constantine, and found means of satisfying him that he was sound in the faith.

This was brought about in the following manner. Constantia, the emperor's sister, had in her train an Arian presbyter, whom she treated as a friend and confidant. The presbyter, in some familiar conversations he held with her, took occasion to speak of Arius, and told her that he was an injured man, and that his sentiments had been misrepresented. Constantia gave credit to his assertions, but had not the courage to mention the subject to her brother. Falling sick, however, she, on her death-bed, recommended the priest to him as a man of piety and diligence, and well affected towards his government. The emperor admitted him to his confidence, and after some time, when the priest had become emboldened by familiarity, received of him accounts similar to those which had been given to his sister. The priest assured him, that if he would admit Arius to his presence, the latter would convince him that he was orthodox according to the sense of the Synod of Nice. The emperor heard this with surprise; but said that if Arius really held the Nicene faith, he would not only admit him to his presence, but would send him back with honor to Alexandria.

Arius was immediately summoned to court, but at first de-

* L. i. c. 23.

clined going. The emperor then writes, telling him to take a public vehicle and hasten to him with all speed. He comes accompanied with Euzoius, a fellow-sufferer on account of his opinions. At the command of the emperor they present a summary of their faith. This is expressed in very general terms. They profess their belief in 'one God, the Father Almighty, and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, who was begotten before all worlds,' and after enumerating some other articles, they add that they hold 'the faith of the church and the Scriptures' concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We discover in the confession no evidence that Arius's sentiments had undergone any change, or that he was guilty of any disingenuous concealment. The creed was sufficiently Arian, though it does not contain the obnoxious expressions, 'made out of nothing,' and 'there was a time when he did not exist.' These, as not being Scriptural expressions, the Arians seemed now willing, for the sake of peace, to avoid. They consented besides to call Christ, the *logos*, wisdom, power, of God; maintaining however, that the terms were applied to him only in a figurative sense. So, no doubt, they were intended to be used in their 'confession,' and 'if Constantine was satisfied with it,' we may say with Le Clerc, 'either he must have changed his views, or he gave little attention to it, or he but imperfectly comprehended the sense of the Nicene council.' He appeared, certainly, from this time very much softened towards the Arians, and may be said in fact to have become their patron.

Under sanction of the emperor, Arius now returns to Alexandria, seeks admission into the church, and is refused. Eusebius writes to Athanasius on the subject; the emperor, too, writes; but the primate is still refractory, and replies that to reinstate one who has been anathematized as a heretic was impossible. The emperor, in a rage, writes back, telling him that if he did not do as he was desired, he should be instantly deposed and banished. The haughty Alexandrian now saw the storm fast gathering over his head. The Eusebians had the ear of the emperor, and various charges were brought against him. He was accused of several violent and oppressive acts, of sedition, sacrilege, and atrocious murder.

Of some of these charges the emperor acquitted him, and ordered that a council, to be assembled at Tyre, should take

cognizance of the rest. The council, consisting of sixty bishops from various parts, met A. D. 335. Athanasius refused to appear, until the emperor threatened that if he did not come voluntarily, he should be brought by force.* He then makes his appearance with a train of Egyptian bishops, forty-seven in number, who had not been called, but who might be capable in various ways of rendering him service.

Much had been said about the hand of the murdered Meletian bishop, which Athanasius, as it was reported, kept in his house and employed for purposes of magic. The subject was called up by the council; but Arsenius, for that was the murdered bishop's name, was immediately produced, with two hands, hale and sound, and as there was no getting rid of this evidence, Athanasius was acquitted of the charge of murder.

The affair of the 'broken chalice' was not so easily disposed of. Athanasius complained that he was to be judged by his enemies, and in several respects took exception to the proceedings of the council. He urged that the committee of inquiry who were commissioned to proceed to Mareotis, where the sanctity of the church, as it was said, had been violated, the table overturned, and the 'mystical cup' broken, consisted exclusively of persons who were strongly prejudiced against him. Before their return he secretly withdrew from Tyre, and this was construed into an acknowledgement of his guilt. He was condemned and deposed upon several charges, among which Philostorgius mentions 'illegitimate ordination,' and a most foul slander which he was proved to have forged against Eusebius of Nicomedia.†

Athanasius, very probably, received on this occasion hard measure from the hands of his judges, who were unfriendly to him; but Arius had received the same from the hands of the orthodox, who were his enemies, and they could not now in justice complain.

The council, having completed their business at Tyre, repaired to Jerusalem to consecrate the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, for which they had been originally summoned. After the performance of this act they proceeded to readmit Arius and his associates to communion.‡ This was done, as

* Soc. L. i. c. 28.

† L. ii. § 11.

‡ Soc. L. i. c. 23.

they assert, in consequence of letters received from the emperor in which he stated that he was satisfied with the faith of Arius and Euzoius. The council then wrote to the church in Alexandria, requiring them to receive Arius, adding that harmony was now restored, and all cause of bitterness removed by the expulsion of Athanasius.

Athanasius, as we have said, had suddenly disappeared from Tyre. We next hear of him at Constantinople. As the emperor was entering the city on horseback, Athanasius, accompanied by some presbyters, suddenly threw himself in his way. The emperor, not recognising him, felt a momentary alarm. On being told that it was Athanasius, he ordered him to be removed. But the bishop kept his ground, 'nothing daunted,' till he made himself heard. All he asked, he said, was that the council which had deposed him should be summoned to Constantinople, that in the presence of the emperor he might prefer his complaints, and have a fair hearing. The request was granted, and a letter despatched to Jerusalem requiring the council, which was not yet dissolved, to appear at Constantinople.* The summons came like a thunderbolt, and the bishops were in no little perplexity. Most of them, so the orthodox historians tell us, concluded that it would be their safest course to get home as quick as possible, and immediately set off. But some, among whom were Eusebius, Theognis, and others, went and reported themselves at Constantinople. Another charge was now brought against Athanasius. He had threatened, it was said, to stop the supply of corn which was annually sent from Egypt to the imperial city. Constantine was satisfied of his guilt, and the friends of Athanasius trembled for his life. But the emperor listened to the suggestions of mercy and was content to banish him to Treves, in Gaul. There was a tradition current in the time of Socrates, the historian, that, in sending him into exile in a remote province, Constantine was influenced not merely by the crimes imputed to him, but by an earnest desire to restore peace to Christendom, which he despaired of doing, while the proud and inflexible prelate was allowed to mingle in its councils.

The friends of Athanasius at Alexandria witnessed the return of Arius with grief, and many disorders followed. He

* Emperor's Letter to the Synod, Soc. L. i. c. 34.

soon after appeared at Constantinople, having either gone there voluntarily, or been summoned to answer for the disturbances in Egypt. We have now arrived at the closing scene of his life. Alexander, a strenuous advocate of the Nicene faith, was at this time bishop of Constantinople, and Eusebius threatened that if he did not admit Arius to communion he should be deposed. The bishop was not intimidated. He turned to God for refuge. Retiring into his church he prostrated himself upon the ground beneath the table of the altar, and poured forth his prayers and tears. This he continued to do, it is asserted, for days and nights together.

Meanwhile Arius had appeared before the emperor, and expressed his assent upon oath to the decisions of the council of Nice. He is said to have subscribed the creed of the council. The orthodox accused him of using deception, asserting that he had a paper containing an exposition of his views, concealed under his arm, and then swore that he believed as he had written. But this seems to have been said without evidence, and was probably a calumny of his enemies. Socrates, who mentions the charge, is very careful to say that, 'he had so heard,' and repeats, that it was matter of 'hearsay only.'* Another version of the story is, that Arius was required to give an account of his faith in writing, and that he took care to express himself, on the disputed points, in Scripture language on which he could put his own construction. With this the emperor, who seems not to have been a very profound critic in these matters, was satisfied. This account seems more probable than the other. A similar occurrence, as we have seen, took place before. Arius and Euzoius, instead of subscribing the symbol of the council, were permitted to state their views in their own words. Arius, in the present instance, might have been allowed the same privilege, or he might only have renewed upon oath his assent to his former confession. We are not bound to believe every rumor to his disadvantage put in circulation by the orthodox. If Athanasius was guilty of one half the crimes imputed to him, he deserved to be sent to end his days in solitude, or among barbarians, for he was fit only to live with savages. We do not believe that he was guilty of one fourth part of

* L. i. c. 38.

them, and yet the charges against him are, with few exceptions, as well or better supported than most of those against the Arians. We only claim for Arius the benefit of that common justice and charity to which all are entitled. We ask only that some little allowance be made for the exaggerations of party feeling and the virulence of theological prejudice.

The emperor, convinced of his good faith, directed Alexander to admit him to communion. A council was also to be called to review the decisions of the synod of Nice. Alexander, in the last resort, sends up a prayer to Heaven, that 'if Arius's sentiments were true, he might not live to see the day appointed for the discussion; but, if the orthodox belief was correct, that Arius, the author of so many evils, might be speedily punished for his impiety.' The next day was the time fixed for bringing Arius to communion. But as he was proceeding from the palace through the city, accompanied by his friends in a sort of triumph, he was attacked with sudden sickness, and, retiring to the nearest office, miserably perished, A. D. 336, as his friends say, by poison, but according to the representations of his enemies, the orthodox, by a judgment of Heaven in answer to the very charitable prayer of Alexander, who would rather die than be convinced that he was in error. Such are the principal circumstances of the case, as given by the historians and Athanasius, though their narratives vary in some minute particulars.*

The Eusebians, as the orthodox tell us, were filled with consternation, and went and buried the companion of their heresy in silence. The spot where he died was pronounced execrable, and those who passed by, long continued to point the finger at it in pious horror, till a rich Arian, to wipe off the stigma, purchased the ground and erected upon it a

* Valesius contends that the Arius, who died at Constantinople, A. D. 336, was not the arch-heretic, but one of his followers of the same name. This it is impossible to believe. All the historians and Athanasius speak of the Arius who thus died, without giving any intimation that it was another Arius. It is impossible to read their accounts, as it seems to us, without a conviction that the writers all along have in view the author of the heresy. No historical fact appears more certain.

George Valla, a physician, and professor of polite literature at Venice in the fifteenth century, is said to have died in the same manner as Arius. *Bayle, art. Valla.*

beautiful dwelling. That the friends of the unfortunate Arius were sensibly affected by his sudden and tragical death, there can be no doubt. His enemies indecently exulted, and publicly returned thanks to God, who, as they thought, had graciously interposed to rid the world of a monster of impiety, and by a visible token confirm the consubstantial faith.*

Of the intellectual and moral character of Arius, we are compelled to think favorably. That he possessed a vigorous understanding, acute discernment, and great clearness of comprehension, admits not of doubt. He wrote, if we may judge from his letters, with precision and accuracy, and, by the confession of his enemies, united consummate skill in the dialectic art, with an easy address, and popular and insinuating eloquence. From the little which is known of his life, it may be inferred that he was tolerant and charitable, the friend of inquiry and rational freedom. He had the independence to think for himself, and the courage to express his opinions; but it does not appear that he had any disposition to restrain others in the exercise of their liberty. There seems to have been no bitterness in his nature. We do not hear that he ever indulged in reproaches against his oppressors. He attempted, in some respects, to reform and simplify the theology of the age, and was in consequence denounced as a blasphemer, a heretic, a Porphyrian, — a name which stood for all that was vile and hateful; — he was anathematized and cut off from the communion of the Christian world, and it was made felony to possess any of his books; but we are not informed that he was provoked to reply with acrimony, or gave evidence of being deficient in the meek and patient virtues of the Christian. It is certain that his life was unspotted, for calumny has never uttered a whisper against its purity.

Of his writings, with the exception of two Letters and the Confession already mentioned, we have little positive information. Philostorgius, as represented by his orthodox epitomizer, tells us that he wrote songs for mariners and those who were engaged at the mill and in travelling, that by calling to his aid the charms of melody he might the better disseminate his opinions among the illiterate portion of the community. If such were his motive, there was nothing culpable in it. But he might have had other objects in view. Persons

* See. L. i. c. 38. — Athan. Epist. ad. Serap.

employed in grinding at the mill, in ancient times, it is well known, were accustomed to cheer their labors with song; and those devoted to other occupations, no doubt, did the same. The motion of the oar, we know, in modern times, is often accompanied by chanting or music. If Arius could furnish popular songs preferable to those in general use in his time, if he could substitute those which had a meaning, and were unexceptionable in point of expression and thought, for such as were loose, profane, or contained erroneous sentiments, he had a right to do it. More than this, it was an act of great benevolence to do it.

There is another work of Arius which is often mentioned by Athanasius,* the 'Thalia,' which he calls a poem,—a light and effeminate poem, 'after the manner of the Egyptian Sotades.' He seems to speak of it as a sort of pleasant, jesting performance, a piece of profane buffoonery. It is difficult to say what Athanasius means by all this. He gives several extracts from the work, in which there is certainly nothing comic or humorous, or soft and effeminate. The introduction, if Athanasius has quoted it correctly, exhibits a kind of sonorousness and jingle, a pomp and affectation; and some expressions which occur in it savor of a childish vanity. But with this exception, the performance appears, for aught we can discover, to have been as plain, sober prose as was ever written. The quotations which Athanasius gives, which are very short fragments, contain some statements of Arius's views, and arguments in their favor, but perfectly grave and decorous.

If Athanasius means only that Arius in his songs, which, however, he plainly distinguishes from his 'Thalia,' made use of the Sotadean measure, which was peculiar, there was nothing criminal in that. A similar charge was brought against the early Protestant reformers, who were accused of taking their 'airs' from the 'best songs of the times.'

But then the songs of Arius, it is objected, were doctrinal. And so are those of Dr. Watts, and fifty others we could name. And if we mistake not, the Athanasian creed, which will be admitted, we suppose, to be somewhat doctrinal, is to this day appointed to be 'said or sung' in the English Episcopal Church.

* See particularly his *Orationes cont. Arianos*.

If the sudden removal of Arius had the effect of damping, for a moment, the ardor of the Eusebians, their courage soon revived. The cause of Arianism acquired new vigor after the death of Constantine, A. D. 337, and continued to be prosperous during the whole reign of his son, Constantius, who was himself an Arian. In this reign several Arian councils were assembled; Arianism was every where predominant, and the consubstantial, or Homoousian faith, seemed to be threatened with destruction. The great Hosius, as he is called, now a hundred years old, subscribes to the Arian faith. Liberius, bishop of Rome, follows his example, and, not to mention Felix, called by the orthodox, the intruder, the world for once, at least, beheld an Arian pope. The Arians had possession of all the great sees of the church. 'The whole world,' says Jerome, 'groaned and was surprised to find itself Arian.'

A schism took place among the Arians, one party called Semiarians, or Homoiousians, maintaining that the Son was, in all respects, of *like* substance with the Father, and the other denominated Aëtians, Eunomians, and Anomœans, who were the genuine Arians, asserting that he was of a different substance, and wholly unlike the Father.*

At their councils the Arians adopted various confessions of faith; Socrates enumerates nine,† and speaks of them as a labyrinth; and Athanasius mentions their 'ten synods or more,' and gives several of their creeds. Tillemont makes the latter amount to eighteen during the reign of Constantius. Their enemies reproached them for their frequent changes which were attributed to their fickleness,‡ but their friends perhaps might adduce the circumstance as evidence only that they exercised the right of inquiry and the free expression of sentiment, which the orthodox discarded. We could wish, however, that the Arians at this period had not disgraced their cause by cruel persecutions.

Constantius died A. D. 361. The infidel Julian succeeded, and neither party was fostered or oppressed. Jovian favored the consubstantialists. Under Valens, Arianism again recovered strength, but sunk beneath the severe edicts of Theodosius, and was afterwards little more heard of in the Eastern empire.

* Epiph. Hær. 73 & 76.

† L. ii. c. 41.

‡ Athan. de Syn. Arim. & Sel.; also Epist. ad Afr. Episc.

It long survived however in the West. The Goths received the Arian faith from the celebrated Ulfila, or Ulphilas, their first bishop, and the inventor of their alphabet.* It was embraced by the Ostrogoths, the Suevi, the Burgundians, the Vandals, and generally by the barbaric nations, which overwhelmed the Western empire. Orthodox writers assign the year 660 as the date of its extinction. That it continued to subsist as the belief of many private Christians, there can be no doubt. But its energies were crushed by the hard pressure of power, and it rose again into notice only after the slumber of centuries. With its revival in modern times we have nothing to do.†

* Soc. L. iv. c. 33. — Philostorg. L. ii. § 5.

† Historians have noticed the influence of *the ladies* on the fortunes of Arianism. 'The devil,' says Maimbourg, 'made use of three women to introduce the Arian heresy in the East, referring to the empresses Constantia, Eusebia, and Dominica; but God, to combat him with his own weapons, employed three illustrious queens, Clotilda, Ingonda, and Theodelinda, to purify the West by its extermination!' (*Histoire de l'Arianisme*, L. xii.) Maimbourg is an eloquent and agreeable writer, but exceedingly deficient in candor, and occasionally draws pretty freely upon imagination. Dr. Jortin classes him with those who '*make history*.' Tillemont has also written a history of the Arians, and no two works could present a more striking contrast in point of manner and style, than Maimbourg's and his. Tillemont's consists of a dry collection of quotations, interspersed now and then with an original remark. But Tillemont's work, too, takes a strong coloring from his prejudices, the exhibition of which is often not a little amusing. He is at no loss to account for the rise of Arianism just at the moment it appeared, for the devil, despairing of propping up the sinking cause of paganism after the conversion of Constantine, and having therefore nothing to do *out* of the church, went to work to see what he could effect *in* it. 'For this purpose he made use of the very name of Jesus Christ,' and Arius was the unhappy being he employed to maintain the 'impious tenet,' that 'he was either a different God from his Father, or, which is much the same blasphemy, that he was not truly God at all.' All 'which is horrid to think on!'

The Arians, if we credit several of the old ecclesiastical writers, and Maimbourg, Tillemont, and others among the moderns, were 'only instruments in the hands of the great adversary of God and man. Yet they will not suffer, as regards character, genius, or attainments, by comparison with the orthodox. True, they are represented as monsters, but then we must recollect that their enemies are their painters. We have feeling complaints of the persecutions kindled by the Arians. But had the Arians no tale of cruelties to tell? We know that their sufferings were great, and would, no doubt, have appeared much great-

The friends and coadjutors of Arius now claim a parting notice. Of these, Eusebius, of Nicomedia, called by some the great Eusebius, was the most prominent. From the time he embarked in the controversy till his death, the party continued to be animated by his counsels. His influence may be attributed in part, no doubt, to his facility of access to the emperor, but much more to his distinguished ability, his shrewdness, and activity. He always acted with vigor; his enemies accused him of faction and intrigue; but we must not form our judgment upon party statements. He had been banished for his resistance to the imposition of an unscriptural creed; his friends had been oppressed, calumniated, and some of them driven into exile, for presuming to exercise freedom of thought, the common birth-right of man. If the warmth of his feelings and his keen sense of injustice sometimes betrayed him into imprudence and excesses, which we neither deny nor assert, he may be entitled to some indulgence on the score of human infirmity. He was originally bishop of Berytus, afterwards of Nicomedia, the chief city of Bithynia, whence he was transferred, about the year 338, to the See of Constantinople. He died soon after the council of Antioch, probably before the end of the year 341. He was reputed to be a learned man, yet we are not informed that he left any writings except letters, of which one only is preserved.

Theognis, of Nice, as we have said, recovered his see after his exile, but of his subsequent history little is known except that he persevered with Eusebius in opposition to the consubstantial faith. Of Theonas and Secundus we find nothing worth adding. Maris, of Chalcedon, survived to the time of the emperor Julian, whom he had the courage pub-

er, had their own accounts been spared us. But the injuries of time, and zeal of the orthodox, have suffered few of their writings to survive, and their history is therefore to be derived chiefly from the suspicious testimony of their foes. Severe edicts, it is certain, were issued for the destruction of their books, and the story of their sorrows, as related by themselves, has perished. That in their prosperity they retorted upon the consubstantialists the wrongs they had received, only proves that they were not superior to the frailties of our nature. We are pointed to the wanderings of Athanasius as proof of their malice, and his history has been often and pathetically enough told; but a tear for the unfortunate Arius has been more than the world could give.

lily to reproach for his idolatry, as he was sacrificing on the altar of Fortune. He was then old and blind. He had formerly seen the philosophic emperor practise the exercises of the Christian religion, and now thanked God, he said in reply to a sarcasm of Julian; that he could not behold his impieties. The anecdote, if true, shows at least his honesty and zeal.

Eusebius, of Cæsarea, will always be named with affection and respect, so long as piety and learning are revered in the world. He was born in Palestine, as it is conjectured, about the year 270. He was of a studious habit, he read much, and composed many voluminous works, several of which are now lost. At the same time he appears to have been a man of courteous manners, and possessed many polite accomplishments. His temper was free from all asperity. His tender friendship for Pamphilus, the martyr, from whom he derived the surname of Pamphilus, and other circumstances of his life which might be mentioned, prove his sensibility, warmth of feeling, and amiable disposition. He was greatly esteemed by Constantine, and enjoyed his friendship, but, as it has been truly observed, never used his influence to depress others or raise himself. He had an aversion to creeds; he was fond of peace and a friend of charity. The part he took at the council of Nice has been already described. He was afterwards present at several Arian councils, but never showed marks of passion, and was never, we believe, accused of plot or intrigue. Athanasius found in him a firm, but not a bitter opponent.

The Christian world has been divided in regard to his sentiments. From first to last he acted with the Arian party, but it has been made a question whether his views were thoroughly Arian. Athanasius affirms that he was an Arian, and several others who were contemporary with him, or lived near his time, say the same. Several orthodox writers, in ancient and modern times, have attempted his defence, but with little success. It is not clear, however, that he embraced Arius's peculiar views of the origin of the Son. On this point he may have held the traditionary doctrine. We are inclined to think that he did, if he had formed any decided opinion on the subject. He seems to have been willing to avoid the novel phraseology of the Arians, though he fully believed the Son to be inferior to the Father, and taught that the Holy Spirit was not

God, but a creature. It is evident that he disliked controversy, and was willing for the sake of peace to make some concessions, but not, we trust, at the expense of his honor. There were some points which he seems not to have thought it necessary to discuss, as he did not deem the knowledge of them essential to salvation. That of the nature of the Son was one of them; for the promise of eternal life, he observes, is made 'to the *believer* in him,' not to him who '*knoweth his nature.*'

The rich and splendid see of Antioch was offered him after the removal of Eustathius, and he was earnestly solicited to accept it; but he refused, either from conscientious scruples, or from a real preference of the quiet, though comparatively humble residence of Cæsarea. He was once imprisoned in Egypt, in the earlier part of his life, for his religion, but escaped martyrdom. He sunk to rest full of years and honor about A. D. 340.*

* It may be proper to take notice of the charge of insincerity which has been preferred against Eusebius. It will be perceived from what we have said, that we do not believe the charge to be substantiated. He might have thought that Arius held a speculative error, yet very consistently have espoused his cause; for he might be convinced that it was wrong to cut a person off from the communion of the church for a mere error of opinion. The cause of Arius was the cause of freedom. His antagonists were the exclusionists of the day, the advocates of creeds and subscriptions, the abettors of the doctrine that dissent from the prevailing belief is criminal, and as such may be lawfully punished. Viewing them as such, and regarding Arius as the victim of their tyranny, Eusebius, though not perhaps a thorough convert to his opinions, might have thought it his duty to unite with him in the attempt to redress his wrongs, and defend the common liberty of Christians.

But then, it has been said, that he subscribed a creed which he did not believe, at least in the sense in which the Fathers of the synod understood it. This goes on the assumption that the term *consubstantial* was used by those Fathers in the more modern, and not in the ancient Platonic sense, which is not true, as the learned have abundantly proved, and as is evident from Athanasius himself. But we hardly need foreign testimony. Let us hear Eusebius's own account of the matter. In stating to his people the reasons which induced him so far to waive his objections against the term as to subscribe the creed, he asserts positively, that he consented to adopt it in the sense in which it was explained by the bishops after they had heard the objections which were urged against it, and the question of its meaning had been fully discussed. Now admitting that the Fathers of the council understood the term in one sense and Euse-

We have now done with Arius and his friends, and hasten to offer a brief tribute to the great champion of orthodoxy. We left Athanasius at Treves, where he had been banished for a real or supposed crime of state, A. D. 336. The em-

buis in another, we are reduced to this dilemma;—either the Fathers of the synod were guilty of deception, affirming that they used the term in one sense, when in fact they used it in another, or Eusebius was guilty of something worse than insincerity—he was chargeable with deliberate falsehood, which we do not believe.

But let us suppose that Eusebius's account of the matter is the true one,—and it is supported, as we have said, by the testimony of Athanasius,—what follows? Simply this; that the Fathers of the council were not orthodox in the modern sense of the term, which is very certain; that they insisted, however, upon the imposition of an unscriptural creed. Eusebius objects to subscribing it, and requires an explanation of a particular term contained in it, which he disliked. They explain it in a manner which he deems satisfactory, and he subscribes. Here is no proof of insincerity. The only question is, whether he ought to have consented to the imposition of any creed whatever. We may say he ought to have resisted. He tells us that he did resist to the last, and finally consented for 'the sake of peace.' We may say that he ought not to have yielded at all, and that he did yield was proof of erring judgment, of weakness, of love of ease, or selfishness. But this is a different question from that of his hypocrisy. We can easily acquit the bishop of Cæsarea of insincerity, we only wish that he had possessed a little more firmness.

As an historian, we may add, he was not always sufficiently discriminating; he was not wholly free from credulity, and he could on occasion indulge in very fulsome panegyric. But we have seen no evidence that he was wanting in honesty. He very frankly tells us (*Hist. L. viii. c. 2*, and *Martyrs of Palestine, c. 12.*) that he did not mention all the faults and infirmities of Christians which came to his knowledge, as it would subserve no end of piety or virtue; that the principle on which he proceeded was to record only matters of importance, and such as could be read with profit, and would tend to commend religion. Gibbon has made the most of this confession. We lay no stress on the famous title to the 31st chapter of the 12th book of his *Evangelical Preparation*, quoted by Gibbon and others as evidence that Eusebius approved the use of 'pious frauds,' because we think the chapter itself so explains or limits the principle laid down in the title as to render it almost, if not altogether, harmless. Thus the Scriptures speak of God as jealous, as angry, as resting from his labors, as having hands, eyes, ears, using language adapted to the comprehension of a rude and illiterate people. These are some of the illustrations Eusebius employs, and they show in what sense he understood the principle, and the extent to which he would push it. So, men are

peror was importuned by his friends to restore him, but he was inflexible, and replied that he was 'seditious and had been condemned by a council.' He was compelled, he said, to respect the decision of the bishops assembled at Tyre, who could not be supposed to have been under the influence of passion. Athanasius, he added, was 'insolent, proud, and kept every thing in a constant broil.' Constantine died soon after, having in his last sickness received Arian baptism from the hand of Eusebius of Nicomedia.

Athanasius, fortified with a letter from the young Constantine, now returned to Egypt, after an absence of nearly two years. His entrance into Alexandria was marked with blood and slaughter; his attempt to reascend the episcopal throne, from which he had been regularly deposed by the sentence of a synod, was vigorously resisted by the Arians, but the party of Athanasius prevailed. Complaints were made against him to the emperor Constantius, and a council, at which the emperor was present, having been assembled at Antioch, Athanasius was declared to have been guilty of an irregularity in resuming his episcopal functions without the intervention of a synod, and Gregory of Cappadocia was appointed to fill the see of Alexandria. On his arrival, accompanied with a band of soldiers to enforce the decree of the synod, Athanasius effected his escape and took refuge in Italy. According to some authorities he soon returned to Alexandria with letters from Julius, bishop of Rome, in which the latter severely censures the bishops who had deposed him, and in consequence receives from them a sharp reply, rebuking him for his impertinent interference. The usual disturbances followed on his arrival at Alexandria, and he was charged, besides, with selling the corn which the late emperor had provided for the relief of the poor widows of the city, and with appropriating the proceeds to his own selfish purposes. The emperor now threatens him with death, and he thinks it prudent again to fly. He passes some time in concealment; but the bishop of Rome, discovering the place of

taught by fables and allegories, and rhetorical ornament is resorted to, and truth is conveyed in the vehicle of poetic fiction. But is he who approves these and similar methods of insinuating useful instruction to be branded as a 'liar from principle,' and a 'defender of frauds?' Such, Eusebius has been pronounced. The censure, we think, is wholly undeserved.

his retirement, interests himself in his favor, and writes, inviting him to repair to his presence, and Athanasius finds his way a second time to Rome.*

Other authorities, with more probability, perhaps, assign to him only one journey to Rome, where he remained some years, during which a synod was holden at Rome in his favor. The council of Sardica, A. D. 347, after the secession of the Eastern bishops, too, proves friendly to him, absolves him from the sentence of the synod of Antioch, and decrees his restoration and that of some other bishops to their sees. The emperor of the West writes to his brother of the East, acquainting him with the fact, and entreats him to replace them. Constantius demurs; upon which the Western emperor writes a very laconic and menacing epistle, telling him that if he refused, he would himself come and restore them by force. The threat is effectual, and the Eastern emperor consents to their restoration.

On his way to Egypt, Athanasius passes through Jerusalem and is received to communion by a synod of his friends hastily assembled on the occasion, and was reëstablished in his see, A. D. 349. He had scarcely taken possession when the emperor Constans, his protector, meets a violent death, and he is doomed to experience afresh the effects of Constantius's anger. New charges are brought against him; the Western bishops, after a long delay, are induced to pronounce sentence of condemnation against him, and the emperor determines on accomplishing his ruin. He escapes and conceals himself in the desert. He wrote an apology for his flight, which is still extant. He remained in seclusion several years; but after the death of George, the Arian bishop of Alexandria, who fell by the hands of an infuriated mob,* he emerged from his solitude and resumed his office, A. D. 362. His stay was short, for Julian, who was then emperor, hearing of his return and fearing another commotion, sent orders to his prefect to apprehend him.

The saint again fled, saying to his friends, 'Let us retire a little while; it is a small cloud and will soon pass.' His

* Soc. L. ii. c. 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17.

† Philostorgius says that the violence was committed at the instigation of Athanasius. L. vii. § 2. The character of the Arian bishop

pursuers pressed hard upon him ; but, eluding them by artifice, he returned privately to the city and remained concealed till the storm was over. Upon the accession of Jovian, A. D. 363, he reappeared, and during his reign retained possession of his seat. Under Valens, the Arian emperor, he was again compelled to leave Alexandria. He retired and concealed himself four months in the tomb of his father. His friends at Alexandria were overwhelmed with sadness, and the emperor was induced to recall him. He became afterwards embroiled with the governor of Libya, whom he had excommunicated, but kept possession of his see till his death. He ended a life of toil and wanderings, A. D. 373, having been bishop 46 years, of which 20 were passed in exile or concealment.

His writings, which are numerous, relate mostly to the controversies of the times, and contain several elaborate vindications of his character.* He treats the charges of his enemies against him as calumnies, and strongly asserts, and sometimes, at least, proves his innocence. But he was forced to contend not only against their calumnies, as he pronounces them, but their arguments in defence of their theological opinions ; and these he seems to have sometimes found it difficult to refute. He says they were continually asking captious, absurd, and impious questions ; to which, it appears, he he could sometimes reply only by raising the cry of 'blasphemy.' He compares the Arians to mad-men, dogs, and swine. They contended that the expression, 'I and my Father are one,' could not prove the Son to be of the substance of the Father, for Jesus prays that his disciples 'may be one, even as he and the Father were one.' But in this reasoning Athanasius could see only 'indescribable temerity,' and 'diabolical madness.' They urged the texts, 'All power is *given* unto me' — 'The Father hath *committed* all judgment to the Son,' — and from his agony and prayer, he says, they concluded that he could not be God by nature. Again, had

is said to have been stained with many vices. It is a curious circumstance that he should have been afterwards transformed into the 'renowned St. George of England, the patron of arms, of chivalry, and of the garter.' The transformation, says Gibbon, though 'not absolutely certain,' is '*extremely* probable.'

* See particularly his *Apol. cont. Arianos*, Opp. T. I.

he been the proper wisdom of the Father, 'how could it be said that he grew in wisdom?' and 'how could he be ignorant of the day of judgment?' In reply to these and similar arguments, they get a great deal of abuse; they are denounced as impious, and their audacity is compared to that of the Jews, who stoned Jesus for speaking of his divinity. They were perfect hydras. They were always ready with some new turn, or new argument; though refuted by him, they were not silenced, and though he had shown them 'destitute of all sense,' they did not 'blush'! He quotes from the 'Thalia' of Arius, and exclaims, at such 'impious words, how shall not universal nature stand aghast, and all men stop their ears, and shut their eyes, that they may not hear those things, nor see him who has written them!'

Athanasius, however, possessed several of the requisites of a skilful champion. He was bold, resolute, and subtle, and wrote in a style of strong, though sometimes rude, eloquence. His spirit was indomitable; he was persevering and inflexible, but his temper was arbitrary and domineering, and his constancy was not without some tincture of obduracy. He was excelled in learning by some of his contemporaries, particularly by Eusebius of Cæsarea, and by many, we trust, in the meek and gentle graces of the Christian. His piety and love of truth we have no disposition to call in question; yet the history of his life would seem to authorize the suspicion that he was influenced rather by motives of pride and ambition than by a desire to promote the peace of the church. He would set all Christendom in a flame sooner than relinquish the patriarchal throne of Alexandria.

He was capable of inspiring warm friendships. He was a strong advocate for monkery. He wrote the life of a certain hermit, whose name was Antony, and was amply repaid by the affection and gratitude of the order. In the season of his deepest adversity, the monks remained faithful; they opened the doors of their monasteries to him, concealed him in the desert, where they visited him, ministered to his wants, gave him intelligence of the approach of danger, and in various ways evinced their attachment to his person.

His orthodoxy, particularly in the earlier part of his life, will not stand the test of subsequent times, as he did not admit the Son to be of one individual essence with the Father, though he believed him to possess the same specific

nature.* It is hardly necessary to add, that the creed which bears his name is the production of a later age.†

It may be asked in conclusion, what did the council of Nice accomplish? What in reality was the Nicene faith? How far did it differ from that of the learned Christians of preceding centuries? How far from that of subsequent times, after the doctrine of the Trinity was considered as in a manner defined and settled.

First, what did the Fathers of the council mean when they said that the Son was *consubstantial* with the Father? We have seen the construction which Eusebius put on the term, and which he says received the sanction of the council. They intended to assert that the Son was, 'in all respects, *like* the Father,' and 'unlike all creatures made by him,' in opposition to Arius, who maintained that he was a creature, and therefore not strictly divine. This was the meaning which the term then bore, as learned trinitarian critics, Petavius, Cudworth, Le Clerc, and others, admit and prove. It expressed, not *numerical identity of substance*, but *sameness of kind*. One man is of the same substance or nature with another, as they belong to the same order of beings. So the Son of God is of the same substance with the Father;

* Not *μονοούσιος*, or *ταυτοούσιος*, but *ὁμοούσιος*. The former terms, expressive of individual or numerical identity of substance, were then rejected.

† Gibbon's account of Athanasius forms one of the most splendid chapters in his history. His portrait of the saint however is an exceedingly flattering one. The temptation was great, to be sure. Athanasius had several heroic qualities; he led a life of adventure, and a writer possessing Gibbon's powers of description, could not wish for a finer subject. He could be just to Athanasius, as the writer alluded to at the commencement of our article observes, 'even when Julian was his persecutor.' At other times he could be partial. Gibbon had the art, if we may so express it, of falsifying history, without absolutely misstating facts. Athanasius and Julian were very different characters. But a person will get just about as correct an idea of the one as of the other from the 'luminous pages' of Gibbon.

The very slight sketch we have given of the character of Athanasius we believe to be sufficiently favorable. Others have spoken of his infirmities of temper in terms much stronger than any we have employed. 'Athanasius's Epistle to the monks,' says the learned Limborch, 'is proof enough of his ungovernable and angry temper, in which we find nothing but foul and reproachful language against the Arians, a plain proof of a violently disordered mind.' *History of the Inquisition*, c. 4.

he partakes in common with him of a divine, though not of the same individual, nature. Divine begets divine, as human begets human. The distinction between *person* and *being* was unknown to the Fathers; it is a refinement of later times. The Father and Son had the same specific nature, yet constituted distinct subsistences, persons, beings.* Such was the doctrine of all the Ante-Nicene Fathers, unless by the expression, 'of a different substance,' which some of them applied to the Son, they meant to teach something more than that he had an individual existence distinct from the Father.

The Fathers of Nice taught no other doctrine. The term *consubstantial* was not introduced by them. Athanasius tells us that it had been used before. The seventy Fathers of the second council of Antioch, which condemned the errors of Paul of Samosata, he admits, rejected it, and decreed that the Son was not consubstantial with the Father, and he attempts to apologize for them by referring to the nature of the controversy in which they were engaged.† But some Fathers, he says, had used it. In what sense Dionysius of Alexandria understood it, we have already seen. His explanation of it does not differ materially from that of Eusebius. Athanasius's explanation of the sense in which it was used by the council of Nice is similar. The Son has 'no similitude to creatures, nor is cognate with them'; he is the 'true offspring of the substance of the Father'; 'the substance of the Father was the beginning, the root, and fountain of the Son, who has a true likeness to him that begat him, neither is separated from the Father, as we are, by being of a substance foreign to his.' Again, he has the same relation to the Father as a ray to the sun, or a branch to the vine, for the 'branches are *consubstantial with the vine*, of the same sort, and inseparable.' Again, when we speak of identity or sameness, he says, we refer not to any accidental distinction, but to substances or essences. One man 'is of the same nature with another as regards substance.' But 'a man and a dog are of different natures; therefore *what is of the same nature is*

* The very term *consubstantial* implies two. We never say that a thing is consubstantial with itself.

† De Syn. Arim. et Seleuc.

consubstantial, what is of a different nature is of another substance,' or not consubstantial.*

Such is the explanation which this celebrated champion of the Trinity gives of the meaning of the term as used by the Fathers of the Synod of Nice and by himself. Christ was by birth God, as man is by birth man. There is one species of divinity as one species of humanity, and as all men are of the same substance, that is, all human, so the Father and Son are of the same substance, that is, both divine. This, if we may believe Eusebius and Athanasius, is all which they meant by the term. We know that it originally bore this sense, and these two witnesses, one of whom was partial to its use, and the other opposed to it, tell us that it was used by the Fathers of the council in no other. It is needless to introduce further evidence.†

Specific sameness implies a sort of natural equality, yet the Father and Son might be relatively unequal, and were so considered. The one *gave*, and the other *received*; the one was without cause, unbegotten, God originally, and of himself, — the other was a God by derivation, or birth, and not originally in and of himself. They were united however in will, purpose, and affection; there was but one original fountain of divinity, one supreme first cause, and therefore the unity of God, in a certain loose sense, was, as it was thought, preserved. So the preceding Fathers believed, and we have no proof that the Fathers of Nice entertained any other views. Their creed certainly teaches no other. It recognizes one unbegotten, uncaused Being, and one begotten, dependent, and inferior. Read the Nicene creed, and for the term '*consubstantial*' substitute the phrase, '*having as the Son of God a divine nature*,' which is equivalent to it as used by the Fathers of the council, and you have two beings

* Epist. II. ad Serap. de Syn. Arim. et Seleuc. — De Sentent. Dionysii.

† We mean not to affirm that there was entire unanimity of opinion among the Fathers of the council on this subject. This we may presume was not the case. The term in question was obscure, and, in some sort, ambiguous; but it was all the better for that, provided it had the effect of stigmatizing the Arians, since it allowed a certain latitude of opinion among the orthodox Fathers. That the prominent idea conveyed by it, however, was such as we have stated, admits of no reasonable doubt.

such as we have described. We do not perceive that in *sentiment* they differed in any essential particular from the Fathers who went before them. If they used the term 'consubstantial' in the sense which afterwards obtained, however, they certainly did differ from them and were innovators. But we are convinced, as we have said, that they did not so use it. If we may believe their own statements, they certainly did not.

Some time after the council, however, and even during the life-time of Athanasius, the opinions of the orthodox began to undergo a real and important change, and the council undoubtedly contributed to this change, inadvertently, by the introduction of a term capable of a sense very different from that originally attributed to it by the Platonists and Platonizing Fathers. Thus the term, which, at the time it was adopted, was understood to express only specific sameness of nature, was afterwards employed to signify individual identity; and subsequent times, while they have retained the language, have departed widely from the sentiments, of the Nicene Fathers.

The principal points of difference between the views of the Fathers, who lived before the synod, and the assertors of the genuine Trinity afterwards, may be stated in few words. The former taught the supremacy of the Father, and the real and proper inferiority of the Son without qualification, making them in fact two beings. The latter asserted, not simply an equality of nature between the Father and Son, but their individual and numerical identity, though this was not originally the doctrine of Athanasius, nor of the church till some time after the middle of the fourth century. The former maintained generally that the Son was *voluntarily* begotten of the Father, *not from eternity*, but *in time*, that is, a little before the creation of the world; the latter, that he was *necessarily* begotten, *from eternity*. Whether they attached any ideas to these terms we will not undertake to say.

There was a very remarkable difference, too, in the manner in which the advocates of the orthodox doctrine, before, and some time after the council of Nice endeavoured to repel the charge urged against them by their adversaries, of introducing two Gods. The former in reply to the objections of Praxeas, Noëtus, Sabellius, and their followers, asserted

that they worshipped the one only and true God, who is over all, supreme ; that the Son was inferior, another, different, sometimes, different in essence, the minister of the Father, and in all respects subject to his will, and entitled therefore to only inferior homage. Of these and similar expressions, however, the Arians took advantage, and they were therefore gradually dropped. The ground of defence was changed. Instead of saying that the Son was a different being from the Father, and inferior to him, the orthodox began to allege that they were of one individual essence, and therefore there was only one object of supreme worship. There were many passages of Scripture, however, which pressed hard upon this doctrine, and which *seemed* at least to speak of the Son as inferior to the Father. It was at this time that the fiction of the two natures in Jesus Christ was introduced, and then all difficulties vanished. The Son, as God, was coequal with the Father ; as man, he was inferior : as God, he could send ; as man, he could be sent : in his human nature he could pray to himself in his divine : as man, he could assert that he was ignorant of the day of judgment, which, as God, he knew.

The doctrine of the Trinity, however, was of very gradual formation. Huet, a Trinitarian, confesses that ‘so late as the time of Basil,’ who flourished after the middle of the fourth century, ‘and still later, the Catholics dared not openly acknowledge the divinity of the Spirit.’* The union of the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ is generally considered as having been first defined by the Fathers of the council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451, though, if they used language with consistency, even they taught not a numerical, but only a specific identity between the Father and Son.

We have said that the Fathers of Nice did not greatly innovate in *doctrine*.† The divinity of the Son had in a cer-

* Origeniana. L. ii. c. 2. Quæst. 1.

† We believe we have made our views on this subject sufficiently plain ; we will add one or two remarks, however, even at the hazard of being thought tedious, or of incurring the charge of repetition. The Fathers of Nice taught that the Son did not belong to the rank of creatures ; that by virtue of his birth he was in some sort divine. That they did not believe him one, numerically one, with God, is certain. That they regarded him as equal, we have no evidence, and much to the contrary. With regard to the degree of inferiority they ascribed to him, we have no means of forming an opinion. The tendency of the controversy was to induce them to speak of him in the most exalted

tain sense been the doctrine of the orthodox long before. But these Fathers, as it has been expressed, 'converted what was before a scholastic subtilty' into an article of the Catho-

terms their sentiments would permit. From the habit of so expressing themselves, their views would gradually become more sublimated. It is not surprising that they soon came to talk of an eternal generation and perfect equality of the Son with the Father. It had always been the belief, as we have more than once said, of the learned Platonizing Fathers, that he existed from eternity as an attribute of the Father. By a very easy transition they would come to believe that he had from eternity a distinct personal subsistence. So a belief of his specific identity might very naturally pass into a belief of his numerical sameness with the Father. The former belief was necessarily abandoned; since, after the perfect equality of the Father and Son was asserted, it palpably made two Gods. The change was the more easily brought about as the term 'consubstantial,' which was originally used to express the former, was equally capable of expressing the latter. The precise time when these changes took place, it is not important to settle. It is sufficient to say that the Arian controversy gave the impulse. The equality of the Father, Son, and Spirit, three persons in one God, was asserted by the council of Constantinople, A. D. 381. The controversy about the incarnation, and divine and human natures of Christ, subsequently arose, and was determined at the council of Chalcedon, A. D. 451. Philostorgius tells us that Flavian of Antioch, in an assembly of his monks, was the first who 'shouted forth' the doxology, 'Glory to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit'; for before his time the usual form was, 'Glory to the Father through the Son, in the Holy Spirit,' though some said, 'Glory to the Father in the Son and Holy Spirit.'—L. iii. c. 13.

After all, the question, What is the true doctrine of the Trinity? remains unsettled. The orthodox or consubstantial faith was designed to occupy the middle ground between Sabellianism and Arianism. These were the Scylla and Charybdis the Fathers were so anxious to shun. In their solicitude to avoid Sabellianism, they came near being ingulphed in the vortex of Arianism. From the brink of this dreadful abyss, they started back with horror; and from that period to the present, the 'good ship' orthodoxy has been tossed about by uncertain winds, and when she has seemed to have found a safe anchorage, time has soon shown that she was moored upon shifting sands.

One word more. It has been said that the Nicene creed is Arian. If by Arianism be meant simply the doctrine which teaches the strict and proper inferiority of the Son to the Father, it is so; but if by Arianism be meant the doctrine which teaches that the Son was produced out of nothing, which was the distinguishing dogma of Arius, it is not Arian, for it does not recognise this doctrine, and the anathemas subjoined to the creed expressly condemn it. The creed may, with more propriety, be called Unitarian than Arian. The controversy between the Fathers and Arius did not involve the question of the inferiority of the Son; it related solely to the *time* and *manner* of his derivation. The council undoubtedly condemned all that was peculiar

lic faith,' and in doing this made use of a very flexible term which was capable of a signification entirely different from the received one. Other mischief they did, from the consequences of which the world has not yet recovered. They encouraged, by their example, the pernicious practice of creed-making, and bequeathed as a legacy to after ages, the monstrous doctrine that error, or supposed error, of opinion may be lawfully punished as crime. The Arians, when they had the power, showed themselves too willing to tread in their steps. There was this difference, however, as Dr. Jortin observes, between the creeds of the Arians and those of the orthodox. 'The Consubstantialists drew up their creed with a view to exclude and distress the Arians: the Arians had no design to distress the Consubstantialists, but usually proposed creeds to which Athanasius himself might have assented; so that, if the compilers were Arians, their creeds were not Arian.'* So far the Arians showed a better spirit than their oppressors.

ART. III. — *Sermons and Occasional Services, selected from the Papers of the late Rev. JOHN HINCKS. With a Memoir of the Author, by JOHN H. THOM.* London. 1832. 8vo. pp. 516.

THIS volume contains the life and remains of a young minister of more than common promise, who died at the age of twenty-seven. It is impossible to open it without a deep and melancholy interest. We sigh to think that a mind, endowed with so many interesting and useful qualities, should have been so early withdrawn from the world, and then console ourselves with the reflection that it has been called to a better service above. It strengthens our confidence in a future

in the doctrine of Arius; to say that its creed is Arian, therefore, is to use language without due precision. But it is clearly Unitarian, since it plainly recognises the doctrine that the Son is a distinct being from the Father, and essentially inferior. This we take to be the essence of Unitarianism, of which Arianism is a particular modification.

* Remarks on Ecclesiastical History.

state, to see extinguished, so early, the bright lights of this world, since we are sure they would not have been kindled merely to be put out.

Mr. Hincks appears to have been one of those gentle and pure spirits, which have 'less of earth in them than heaven,' and whose removal, therefore, is regarded as almost a matter of course. He possessed a slender body, on whose every outline and movement frailty was written, and a modesty, delicacy, and shrinkingness of character which appeared suited to so helpless a frame. Yet there was an actual vigor within, strength of purpose and fervor of heart, which enabled him to surmount the obstacles thrown in his way by natural timidity and weakness, and to address himself with moral courage and consequent success to the public duties of his profession. In that, he was an interesting and promising man. He had much of the earnest solemnity and happy unction which come from a warm and sincere heart. We well recollect the impression of his appearance and manner, when, the day after accomplishing a tedious passage over the water, we went up to worship at his chapel in Renshaw Street, Liverpool. There was, undoubtedly, much in the season and its circumstances to excite the mind and prepare it to find more than ordinary delight in the house of God. Yet that same preparation of circumstances would have made a heartless and indifferent service, more than ever disgusting. The worship began with the singing of Old Hundred, — a tune which touched a thousand strings within us, and called up a thousand tender associations, and helped still further to prepare the mind to revolt from any but the most serious, simple, and earnest expressions of devotion and truth. That, at that time, Mr. Hincks, young as he was, fully engaged and satisfied us, always appeared to us an indication that he possessed the true spirit of his calling and the best gifts for its exercise. We heard him twice afterward. There was an absorption of mind in his subject, a reality and earnestness in his manner and tone, and a truly evangelical mode of thought and expression, which showed that he had at heart only the great purpose of his profession, and caused the hearer to forget the speaker in the subject. The death of such a young preacher is a more than ordinary loss.

At the time of his death he had not quite completed his twenty-seventh year. He was a native of Cork, Ireland, and

received his professional education partly at Dublin, and partly at Belfast.* His life was studious and quiet, and has of course left no materials for history. The few facts which could be stated are interwoven in the Memoir prefixed to this volume, which is written in a glowing strain of affectionate eulogy. The view given of his character corresponds with our own impressions.

‘His feelings and character, as is perhaps always the case with those who are endowed with superior minds, very early assumed the peculiar bent by which they were afterwards distinguished. His virtues seemed to be the native and unforced growth of his own pure and right spirit. There was in him a rectitude of feeling and of sympathy, or, if the expression may be permitted, a right-mindedness, which, as it were, determined his character. The gentleness, the purity, and the remarkable self-respect, which sat so becomingly on the man, and the minister of Christ, were the marked features of his earliest years. “As long as I can remember him,” writes one of his friends who knew him best and longest, “he was always the same. His temper was ever distinguished by gentleness and forbearance, and his mind by talents of no ordinary kind, which he wore with singular unambitiousness, although with meek dignity.” This simple sentence is strikingly characteristic of his maturer years.’ — p. xiii.

The sermons bear the impress, as the writings of a sincere man always must do, of their author's character. We see in them the image of his heart. They are marked by a natural, but careful and well studied method, are affectionate and earnest rather than strong, sometimes enfeebled by qualifications dictated rather by modesty than timidity, sometimes rising into warmth but never to vehemence, too frequently, perhaps, touching on controverted topics, but always presenting serious, devout, Scriptural views of the subjects treated. We should think it an excellent promise for the cause of religious truth, if our young preachers would govern themselves in the pulpit by principles of sermonizing as judicious, serious, evangelical, as those on which were framed the specimens before us.

* His father, the Rev. T. D. Hincks, is associated with the Rev. H. Montgomery in the charge of the Belfast Academical Institution. He has published a Greek and English manual Lexicon for the use of schools, which is much esteemed, and he is now engaged in an extensive, thorough work on a similar plan. A specimen of this, with the prospectus, may be seen at our publishers'.

The following passage, from a sermon on 'Purity of Heart,' is selected as a fair example.

'To see God, my fellow Christians, since it cannot, except in the way of allusion, be understood literally, must be considered as implying the enjoyment of the closest and most intimate communion with him. Nothing can be more certain than that every shade of sin and impurity must contribute to obstruct this communion, and cloud our spiritual vision. What man so happy or so thoughtless as not to have frequently felt an unwillingness, resulting from a secret consciousness of guilt, to give himself up to the contemplation of the Deity, or even so much as to admit the thought of his existence! Who has not frequently shrunk with shame, and even with horror, from the idea of the presence of the God of purity? Have there not been times with many, perhaps with all of us, when, oppressed beneath the recollection of recent sin, we dared not raise our hands or eyes to heaven in the attitude of prayer, and when, had we ventured to do so, the bending knee would have tottered beneath us, and the faltering accents of supplication would have died upon our lips? Have we not suddenly thought of the Psalmist's inquiry, "Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? and who shall stand in his holy palace?" And have not the first words of the answer, "He that hath clean hands and a pure heart," fallen heavily upon our ears and choked our utterance? And what, my fellow Christians, has been the reason of all this? Has it not been, that we had not long before experienced some moral defilement? Has it not been, that sin had been lately passing over our souls, and had left this withering blight behind it? Has it not been, in a word, that we had been forfeiting the blessedness of the "pure in heart?"

'The more nearly, on the other hand, we can approach to the attainment of perfect mental purity, the more intimate and delightful will be our communion with the Deity, and the more numerous, as well as brighter and more glorious, the manifestations of his attributes which we shall be permitted to behold. The clouds of sin will no longer shut out from our view the great luminary of the creation. We shall behold him in all his majesty, and feel him in all his power. His genial warmth will foster in our minds an innumerable multitude of interesting and edifying thoughts and of pious and benevolent feelings, and the whole face of the moral, as well as of the natural world, will be gilded by his beams. We shall no longer "love darkness rather than light, because our deeds are evil." Instead of shrinking from the Divine presence, we shall be constantly endeavouring to discover new manifestations of it. We shall see God in the

glories and in the beauties of external nature ; in its smiles and in its terrors. We shall see him in the conduct of his Providence ; in his favors and in his chastisements. We shall see him in the pages of his revealed word, and behold him gloriously and graciously manifested in the face of Jesus Christ. Nor does the blissful vision of the Almighty, reserved for " the pure in heart," end in this world. In the society of the just made perfect, they shall experience a more complete, as well as a more lasting enjoyment of it. There, where the sun shall no more be required to give light by day, nor the moon by night, and where the divine glory may be manifested, in a way of which we can now form no conception, the " pure in heart " shall experience a complete fulfilment of the Saviour's promise, and " see God " throughout eternity.' — pp. 243–245.

In the sermon on 'Christian Humility' we were a good deal struck with the following illustration of the doctrine of original sin:

'Suppose, now, my brethren, that a husbandman, who has labored diligently to prepare his ground, and to sow good seed in his field, were disposed, as all should be, after an abundant harvest, to return thanks to God who gave it. What should we think of such a person, if, instead of blessing his bountiful Creator for having given him a good soil, and favored him with the means of improving it, and given him diligence to employ those means, and, finally, for having blessed his rising crop with rain to refresh and sun to ripen it ; if, instead of thus piously ascribing all secondary causes to the agency of the great first cause, and looking through nature up to nature's God, he should fancy, on a sudden, that he had been favored with a miracle, — should refer to the third chapter of the Book of Genesis, and finding there the words written, " Cursed is the ground for thy sake," should strenuously maintain that the ground was, in itself and by nature, utterly incapable of producing any thing good, and fitted only for the nourishment of thorns, and thistles, and tares, and every thing mischievous, and acting upon this idea, should bless God for having miraculously, and with a view to his own particular harvest, prepared and renewed the soil, and altogether changed its nature and properties ? What would you think, my brethren, of such a person ? Would you not conclude that that man had lost his senses ? Yet such, I must confess, or differing from it in no essential particular, appear to me to be the commonly received doctrines of original sin, regeneration, and sanctification, equally unphilosophical in themselves, and little better supported by Scripture.' — p. 155.

We have learned that a few copies of this volume are expected to be soon offered for sale in this city ; and we take pleasure in recommending it to the notice of those who love to observe the works of youthful devotion, or who desire to circulate from our parish libraries books of wholesome instruction and fervent piety.

ART. IV. — *A Sermon, preached at the Annual Election, May 25, 1831, before his Excellency Levi Lincoln, Governor, his Honor Thomas L. Winthrop, Lieutenant Governor, the Honorable Council, and the Legislature of Massachusetts.* By LEONARD WITHINGTON. Boston. Dutton & Wentworth. 1831. 8vo. pp. 48. .

It is some time since this Sermon was published ; but we have intended, ever since its delivery, to say something on the subject to which it relates, and we will take leave to say it now. There were those, we believe, who, on the delivery of this discourse, thought that it was not called for ; who considered a defence of the clergy, in this country and at this day, as quite unnecessary. There were others who complained of the freedom of the style. We did not ourselves belong to either class of objectors. We might have thought that a phrase or two could be mended ; but, for ourselves, we are not disposed severely to criticize the peculiar manner and style of any man, because he discourses in the pulpit, more than we would if he discoursed any where else. We wish the pulpit to be free ; to be a field of intellectual action, as unembarrassed and various as any other. We do not wish those who are about entering the pulpit, or who may be turning their thoughts to it, to feel that they must tie themselves up, ever after, to a certain staid, or solemn, or intensive style of writing and speaking. Whitefield, though one of the most solemn and powerful preachers, was exceedingly various ; sometimes causing his hearers to smile, and the more certain, afterward, to make them weep. We do not, of course, propose Whitefield's manner as a model ; theatrical as it often was, and theatrical as were its effects, in too many instances. Still less do we wish to see any Sir Rowland

Hills in our pulpits. But we really think that our preachers would do well to give themselves up, more than they do, to the bent of their own minds ; to labor less to conform to any one standard of correctness, and more to bring out from their own experience, from their own hearts, the strongly marked, individual message ; to come to the people with a manner, not as if they would perform an appointed part in the public service of the sanctuary, but as if they had something upon their minds which *they*, and not somebody else, — which they individually wished to say. The best discourses are those which take the form of a personal argument with the people. But in proportion as sermons become the expression of personal, individual sentiment and feeling, they will vary, as different minds, and different moods of the same mind, vary ; and there will occur, in the same discourse, those alternations from the solemn to the cheerful, and from the joyous to the mournful, those contrasts of light and shade, those varied intonations of ever-changing emotion, which contribute so much to the interest and power of other writings. This variety, indeed, is one of the elements of power ; the mind wearies under sameness ; and any passion will be more powerfully excited from its succeeding, in the mind, an opposite or a different passion. If there are preachers who have power enough without this auxiliary, whose thoughts work with a kind of high-pressure, steam-engine force, that carries every thing before it, yet even they might find relief in using greater variety, instead of doing all by main strength ; and certainly those who wield lighter weapons, may justly be commended, in the disposition and management of them, to the utmost skill.

We have been led on to saying these things altogether without intending it, and especially, we hasten to say, without intending to offer any defence of the style that prevails in the Sermon before us. Mr. Withington's style does not need our defence. It is exceedingly felicitous and spirited ; and if it occasionally runs into what, in the pulpit, is called freedom, it will be found much easier to criticize than to imitate.

Neither did we object, as we have already said, to Mr. Withington's object, which was to vindicate the dignity of the clerical office. We seriously think that it is made to bear an unreasonable measure of disparagement, and distrust,

and restriction upon its just freedom ; and to these points we are about to invite the attention of our readers. But the great fault in this discourse, as we think, — and we respectfully suggest it for the consideration of the author, — is this, that it fails to make out a case. It does not make it sufficiently apparent, either by preliminary statements or by specifications as it goes on, that any indignity is really done by public opinion or otherwise to the sacred office ; and hence it appears as if the preacher were fighting a man of straw, a mere phantom of his own imagination.

And we expect that it will appear to many of our readers, at first view, surprising, that we should allege any want to exist, of a just and sufficiently high estimate of the dignity of the clerical function. And yet, we will ask them, in the first place, if they are not conscious that a vague feeling of disparagement is prevailing through the world with regard to this office ; if the prejudice from which every profession has to suffer in its turn, is not peculiarly severe and unsparing upon this profession ; if, for instance, the clause in a late celebrated Will, which forbade any clergyman so much as to step upon the ground of a projected literary institution, was not much more easily tolerated by public sentiment, than it would have been if it had, in like manner, excluded lawyers or merchants.

In the next place, we desire that the tone of our literature may be considered in reference to this point ; and let it be remembered it must exert a powerful influence upon public sentiment. What place has the clerical office in the books that are most read, whether of poetry, fiction, or fine writing ? Is it not oftener disparaged than otherwise ? It is worthy of notice that in the most popular series of fictitious writings which the world has ever seen, there is not one personage bearing this office, and made conspicuous enough to be remembered, who is any way respectable. They are all either very eccentric and absurd persons, or insane fanatics, or carousing monks. It is true enough that this writer takes very few of his characters from any profession. They are almost all either idle gentlemen and ladies, or outlaws and gypsies, or knights and nobles. But if he has made an exception with regard to the clerical profession, it is an exception not in its favor, but against it. These works, indeed, are occupied with portraying ages of less moral refinement than ours ; and we would fain hope that a series of works

will yet be written, furnishing, not more amusement nor exhibiting more genius, — for neither seems possible, — but furnishing more moral aliment and excitement; clothing lofty moral excellence, and the heroism of real, useful life, with a charm which it is too little the object of these wonderful tales to give them.

But to return; we ask our readers, in the third place, if they are not aware that many young men, in choosing a profession, are influenced in their rejection of the clerical office by a disparaging estimate of the dignity and interest that belong to it? Is it not well known, that not a few parents, from a feeling of pride, — we say not, at present, whether mistaken or not, — but from a feeling of pride, are indisposed to have their sons embrace this profession? The truth is, that, to these parents and their sons, — neither of them irreligious persons, perhaps, nay, thinking themselves very good Christians, possibly, — yet to both of them this profession does not seem a sufficiently lofty sphere; it is not a fine field enough for great talents; it is not, in their account, the path to grandeur and distinction. How should the worldly mind, with such worldly notions of distinction as have generally prevailed, but which, as we shall undertake to show, every step of Christian civilization and of moral progress must tend to weaken, — yet how, we repeat, should a worldly mind in such circumstances take any other view of the subject! And if it is the tendency of all worldly feeling to depreciate a profession, which is endowed with no revenues, and has no prospects of political preferment in reversion, then, it must be allowed, is our case very clearly made out.

‘But,’ — some of our readers are, perhaps, impatient to say, — ‘how much respect is paid to the clerical office by all classes! Its incumbents take precedence almost every where they go, in all processions, in the public places, and, to a considerable extent, in society.’ All this, of course, is very artificial; it is a mere matter of custom; it implies no real regard; it is often most deferential with the most irreligious; we have sometimes known it to be most punctilious and scrupulous with the most fault-finding; and, more than all, we are extremely afraid that this deference to the clergy is very invidious. It is sometimes very unjust to the claims of others, and then it ought to be invidious. For our own part, we should say, if we might speak for the profession, that we

had rather stand on the ground of our intrinsic respectability, whatever it may be ; that we would desire no deference nor attention but such as are due to virtue and intelligence, in whomsoever they are found. We believe, that to many sensible and modest men, some of these marks of deference are very distressing, and, at the same time, contribute not at all to their real respectability, and are forbidden, in fact, or ought to be, and will yet be seen to be forbidden, by the most refined maxims of politeness.

We may be told, that if all this be true, it is scarcely called for in these days ; that respect for the sacred profession and every thing else sacred, is fast enough declining ; that the levelling tendencies of the times need no help from any body. But all this, in fact, furnishes a still stronger reason for speaking out. These trappings of ceremony which others insist on putting upon the clergy, are cumbrous at all times, but will sink them outright in that popular wave which we are told is coming. It is as much the interest, then, as it must be the inclination, of all sensible men in this profession, to put themselves on the ground of real merit ; and no class ever can be, or ought to be, firm upon any other. In truth, it is only the artificial respect, — that which consists in form, and is paid to form, — that is at all likely to decline. And this really tends not to exalt its object. It begets more distrust than real deference. It is amusing, indeed, to observe the simplicity of self-contradiction with which many will speak on this subject. ‘What!’ say they, ‘defend the clergy ! It is a mere work of supererogation. They have *too much* influence and power already.’ The reputation of having *too much* power is certainly but a doubtful indication of the public confidence.

But we must go a little deeper into this distinction between a real and a factitious or ceremonious respect for the clergy. It is founded on the entire separation which public opinion has made between the character of this and of every other profession. Other professions are denominated *secular* ; this is styled *sacred*. This is holy, and the implication is, that others are unholy.

This use of language tends to give the very words, *holy* and *sacred*, a factitious, a merely official character, and to make the deference which they inspire artificial and unreal. Nay, this sort of deference may increase, while all real re-

spect declines, as the history of more than one priesthood shows. But when we connect with all this, the too commonly prevailing idea of religion as having its interests chiefly in another world, it will be easy to see how a respect for the clergy may be of a nature to debar them from many of their just rights in this world, to cut them off from the pursuit of many lawful objects, because they are included in the class of objects called worldly. Great power may be given them in spiritual things, and very little in temporal things. They may have great authority in the one department, and at the same time be deprived of their just freedom in the other. Public sentiment allows them to do what they will with the concerns of another world, provided they do not interfere with the affairs of this. They may almost legislate for another life, they may dispose of its treasures and enjoyments almost at pleasure; but if they venture to act as legislators in the civil affairs of this life, or if they show any desire to possess themselves of earthly treasures, or if they seek earthly enjoyments or recreations but under the most jealous restrictions, an outcry is immediately raised against them as out of their sphere.

Now, not to maintain that the concession is very dangerous, and has been proved to be so in the history of every hierarchy that ever existed, not to maintain, at present, that the restriction is equally unjust to the clerical office, we say, — to keep to the point in hand, — that this sort of respect for the office is not justly balanced. It is not fair, nor ought it to be satisfactory. It gives to the clergy an undue power on the one hand; a power which they ought not to desire; and on the other, it deprives them of their just rights. Or, to speak more truly, perhaps, it wrests from them substantial advantages and proposes to compensate them with useless concessions in matters of form and mere outward observance. The case between the clergy and the rest of the community, to state it plainly and somewhat freely, stands thus: — They are deprived of their civil immunities by public opinion; they are cut off, not from the unfair only, but from the fair contest for earthly advantages; and, by way of compromise, they have the chief seats in the synagogue and at feasts, and the back seat in the stage-coaches, and the head of processions, and the patronizing of every application for charitable donations of money which a public agent wishes

to shield under their names, — and we know not how many more invidious and nugatory distinctions.

Now, for our own part, — we speak considerably, — we would have all this done away. Let clergymen stand where other men do. It is the duty of every man to labor for the welfare of the community. No more than this is the duty of the clergy. It is the right of every man to take an interest in public affairs, to take part in the public counsels, and to improve, by lawful means, his earthly condition. No less than this is the right of the clergy. We should be unwilling indeed, most unwilling, to see in this profession a selfish and unconscientious pursuit of property or honor. But we are most unwilling to see it in any profession. And we are most especially unwilling, for the sake of morality and of the public good, that any profession should be able to do this, and to shield itself from guilt by calling itself secular; should be able to say, that it is worldly, and therefore has an apology for being selfish and unconscientious. No, let the great law of rectitude, the law of lofty and sacred virtue press down upon every being, with a weight that admits of no discrimination and no escape.

We are saying all this, not more for the sake of the clergy than for the sake of the community. We are contending in fact not so much for a matter of practice as for a matter of principle. We are contending not so much for personal liberty, as for official immunities, for the ground on which the clerical office ought to stand, for a respect towards it which is a real, generous, and manly, and not a domineering and despotic respect.

We think we have seen something of this latter kind of deference; where it would seem that people have such an extreme regard for a clergyman that they find all the fault with him possible. It is a sort of legalized detraction. The spirit of uncharitableness has lost its usual check. 'If it were not a clergyman,' one says, 'and if he had not a real respect for him, he would not speak as he does; but he does think that a person placed in such a station as that, set over the people to labor for their good, ought to do,' — to do what? why, just to do 'as his judgment directs.' And it is not one person who takes upon him to judge in this way; but hundreds, — we do not say, thousands, for we except many, — but hundreds there are who do this, and who extend

their superintending care not only to official conduct but to private manners; who would take the place of their minister's conscience, not only in his appropriate sphere, but in the management of his family and of his most private concerns.

All this, to be sure, is of less consequence since it prevails least among the most intelligent classes, and is less and less held to be right and proper among all classes. But there really is most serious and heinous wrong done by the liberties that are still taken and countenanced in quarters from which more consideration might have been expected. There is still an inquisition and an espionage carried into the private life of clergymen, and a censorship asserted over their duties and their motives, to which no profession ought to submit, or can submit with proper self-respect. There are things freely said, of men possessing the highest worth and talents, which no one would feel at liberty to say of them, for the same cause, if they were lawyers or physicians. A physician or a lawyer, after having devoted the best years of life to professional labors, may retire either wholly or in part from them; and he is followed to his retirement with respect, with thanks, and regrets. But if a clergyman is fortunate enough to be able to turn aside from the burden and heat of the day, a commission is immediately instituted by public opinion upon what he does, and upon what he does not do, and upon what he ought to do; and it extends even to his private studies, and to the most delicate questions of prudence and of personal ability. Now we should like to ask those who are *in the commission* to give us any good reason, why the clerical office should be subjected to this kind of supervision. For ourselves we must utterly protest against the propriety of such interference. We do not ask for this station any exemption from the scrutiny of public opinion, which other professions do not claim. We do not ask so much. We are willing that the public judgment should be strict in this case. We only desire that the dignity of an honorable and learned profession, and its just claims upon the choice of our studious youth, may not be prejudiced by its tamely yielding to an *unjust* censorship and an *unreasonable* interference. We would frankly plead the cause of a profession in whose respectability the whole community are really though not personally as much interested as we are.

What we have been saying thus far, is, that the very re-

spect for the clerical office is of such a nature as to do its incumbents some degree of injustice. We do not say that this is intentional. We admit, too, that much of this state of the public mind has been owing to the clergy themselves. But against the result, however it has been brought about, we think it right to enter our protest.

We have already adverted to one or two of the specific grounds of our complaint; and we shall take leave now a little to enlarge upon them. One is our political disfranchisement; disfranchisement, we say, for the jealousy of public sentiment does not, in fact, stop short of actual proscription.

There is so little disposition manifested by the clergy to enter into political life, there is so little object for them, there is so little congeniality between their peaceful pursuits and the stormy politics of the country, that there really seems to be no great occasion for a very jealous guardianship. And yet if the rare instance occurs of an election from that class to high political office, it is made a theme of as much reproach as if some gross breach of trust had been committed. The daring intruder upon the field forbidden to him, is reminded, as if he had violated it, of his vow sworn upon the altar; he is accused of the most heinous personal ambition; and he is sneeringly asked, 'with whom he left those sheep in the wilderness.' The instance, by the by, is an unfortunate one for the accuser. For it was David to whom this language was addressed; the man who was found fittest in the whole nation of the Israelites to be king. And the scornful inquiry came from his envious and ambitious brother. 'I know,' he says, 'thy pride and the naughtiness of thine heart;' but it is not difficult to discover *whose* pride and naughtiness of heart were disclosed in this ancient story.

But the serious question is, What right has the press or public opinion thus to disfranchise a large and learned class of citizens? What would the lawyers, or physicians, or merchants say, if attempts were made to create a public sentiment, which should make them ineligible to office and incompetent to exert any influence upon those laws and institutions to which their fortunes and lives are subject! It is true, indeed, that men, absorbed in professional employments of any kind, have little time to give to the public service; and clergymen generally are as little disposed, we repeat, as they are at leisure or at liberty, to engage in the duties of legis-

lation. But to set a mark of exclusion upon this class, is as anti-republican, illiberal, and unjust, as it would be to disfranchise any other class. And we are inclined to say that it is also injurious to the common welfare. For we believe that there are, in the pulpit, men of liberal views, political information, and commanding talents, who, on some occasions, might do great and useful service in the national councils; and we do not apprehend that there is such a surplusage of talent in our public affairs, that they can afford to part altogether with the contributions of any class, — certainly not of a learned and studious class. And we are disposed, indeed, to think that it would be of great use to the clergy themselves, if they mingled more freely with the concerns, and identified themselves more fully with the interests, of the whole community; if they took a part in the municipal affairs, and sat on juries, and performed all the duties appertaining to good citizenship. They would know more of the people, more of human nature, and their preaching would become at once more practical, more rational, and more thorough. It is, moreover, a conviction, — though this is not the place to dwell upon the topic, — but it is a conviction, which has for some time pressed on our minds, that it is the *duty*, not merely the right, but the duty of every intelligent and reflecting man, and his especial duty, to give his vote at the elections, and in other ways to exert an influence upon public affairs. There is a vast deal of the intelligence of this country, which, retired, loving quietness, and disgusted with party strifes, is really and entirely lost to the body politic. This is not a country, we believe, which can afford to suffer such a loss. We believe that this great *corps de reserve* ought to throw itself into the momentous contest that is passing here, for permanent freedom and order; and to do all in their power, by calmness and conciliation, by wisdom and principle, to bring the trial to a happy issue.

And from this cause, from the interest we take in the republic, from our view of the sacredness of the claim of country, and of such a country in such circumstances, we could not regret it, if some persons, more fitted for public life perhaps than for clerical duties, should turn from the labors of a sacred to those of a civil calling. And if a man cannot do this without being for ever after reminded, and that too as if it were a matter of reproach, that he was once a clergyman,

it is time to have done talking of equality and liberty, and yet more, of liberality ! For here is a class, by the supposition, that, so far as that course of treatment prevails, is as much abridged of its civil liberty, as the very slaves. This is less than the Roman freedom ; for the same man might be, interchangeably, augur and consul, as Cicero, in fact, was. And yet it is the obvious tendency of Christianity to make the priesthood far less an exclusive class than the ancient religions did ; far less to bind the priest, like the ancient haruspex, to the altar ; and far more to make him, in sympathy, and intercourse, and public spirit, one with the people, — a real and not a nominal member of the body politic.

But there is a further suggestion on this subject, that deserves attention. It is bad policy to lay this interdict upon the clergy. They are men, and they must be expected to act as men. There can be no principle more dangerous to them or to the community, than to consider them as, by office, better than other men. They are to be regarded as persons having the love of power natural to all men. And, therefore, if they are cut off from all participation in the ordinary social rights and civil immunities of the people, it must not be thought strange if they are tempted, and insensibly led, to build up a power of their own ; a power every way more dangerous than any that is denied them ; more dangerous, because it is removed by position, or secured by prejudice, from common observation. We believe it will be found that the clergy have every where been a bad class, and at the same time a powerful class, just in proportion as they have been separated from the mass of society. The people may not know it, but this stare with which they meet the clergy, or this clamor lifted up against them, whenever they approach the forbidden ground of common rights and principles, is the very way to confirm their spiritual power. In truth we hold society to be full as much in fault in this matter as the priesthood. The people often force upon the priest a power which he would never of himself have thought of assuming. Whenever we meet an associate of our earlier studies, who, in former days, was a modest and reasonable man, but who, in a few intervening years, has acquired a manner and tone upon religious subjects, strangely dictatorial and lofty, we are led at once to inquire what sort of people he lives amongst ; and we seldom fail to find that the people have

done full as much to spoil the favorite pastor, as the pastor has to spoil, or to despoil, the people.

But we must pass to another encroachment, as we consider it, upon the fair and rightful independence of the clerical profession. This relates to property and the choice of a residence: And the claim which we here set up, in behalf of the members of this profession, is, that, so far as is consistent with their usefulness, they have just as much right as other men to desire and seek the acquisition of property and the promotion of their social happiness. It does not, indeed, consist with their usefulness that they should personally engage in business, or be found eagerly grasping for preferment and distinction. But because the public good necessarily lays a heavy restriction upon them, is that a just reason why public opinion should follow it up and make it press upon them, in the severest manner possible?

The truth is, that public opinion has pressed upon the members of this profession in such a manner that many have lost, in a measure, the sense of the *duty* which they owe in their social relations. It is a fact, and we are able to state it from our own observation, that no impression among young men preparing for the ministry of religion is more common than this; that if they can be barely supported, it is all that they have any reason or right to expect; — supported, we mean, with a family, for public opinion exacts this almost as much as it inflicts poverty upon them. That is to say, all idea of acquiring property from their calling is, with most of them, out of the question from the very first. If their annual salary will pay the expenses of the year, they are to be content. Now we shall take upon us to say, that this way of thinking, so common among the clergy, is utterly wrong, — wrong in point of conscience and duty. A man has no right to surround himself with a class of beings entirely dependent upon the thread of his life. Not to say that these are his children, beings dearer than life, and whom every law of God and nature give the most absolute claim upon him, — he would have no right to take beggars from the hedge and treat them so. We scarcely dare repeat those words of authority for words of truth, applicable to this case, that ‘he who provideth not for his own, and especially for them of his own household, hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel;’ and yet we believe that they ought to be repeated, as meaning

something, in the ears of the most reckless class of the most reckless people that ever lived in a civilized condition. Such is the body of our American republic, and that from very obvious causes; nor does our proverbial love of gain offer any objection to this position, for there is an equal love of expending. But not to dwell on this; we are, at any rate, prepared to say, that every member of this profession has a right, — and that without the mean and miserable imputation of mercenary motives, — to demand a salary at his settlement, or afterwards an increase of salary, which shall enable him, with prudent living, to lay up something as a gradually increasing future provision for his family; and, if he cannot obtain this, and is cut off from all other means of acquisition, then, we are prepared to say, that it is a very serious question for him and for the community, whether he ought not to forego all the happiness of domestic life, and all the advantages which that position would give him.

But the disposition which exists, to lay restrictions upon clerical independence, often rises to the highest point at once of exasperation and injustice, whenever a member of this profession leaves one situation for another that offers a higher reward for his labors. Every one must know with what a sneering tone it is said all over the land, ‘Ah! he has a *LOUDER call* it seems!’

Now to say nothing of other good and sufficient reasons which a clergyman *may* have for a removal to another scene of exertion; the free use which he will thus have of the results of his past studies; the desirableness of a wider sphere of usefulness, which cannot be, and ought not to be, indifferent to him who is really interested in his profession, — the desirableness, when he is pouring out his soul, to utter exhaustion, of doing this for seven hundred, rather than for three hundred hearers; and to say nothing, we would add, of the just desire of distinction, if we did not consider the distinction of a clergyman as very little depending on the place he occupies; — to say nothing, we repeat, of all this, we are ready boldly to maintain that what is considered as the least excusable motive of all, may, in many cases, be sufficient to to justify the step in question. Cannot the public conceive that there may be cases in which a man has no right to be indifferent to such a consideration; where he is bound, whether disposed or not, to give the question of prop-

erty a controlling influence ; where there are claims upon him of the most sacred nature, too sacred, indeed, to be detailed in an apologetic memorial or a valedictory sermon, but which are, and ought to be, held superior to all other claims ? Cannot the public conceive that a man may leave a retirement he loves, for a care and responsibility he dreads, and be making a serious sacrifice at the very moment it is accusing him of the most unbecoming ambition and selfishness ? Many among us cannot have forgotten that beautiful tribute to the noble uses of property made by Judge Story in the Massachusetts Convention. But can no such honorable and generous uses of that gift ever be called for at the hand of a man, because he chances to be a clergyman ? In truth, if the world were not so dazzled with mere outward situation as to seem incapable of estimating the force of other and higher considerations, it would be difficult to look upon the uncharitableness and exasperation of the community in some such cases in any other light than as extreme and monstrous illiberality and injustice. A measure so unfair is certainly dealt out to nobody else ; and if it were, it would bring down upon it the severest frown of public opinion.

The violent prejudice in our community against transferring clergymen from one sphere to another, taken in connexion with the power which every congregation possesses to dismiss them, seems to us peculiarly unjust. If our churches hold the tie to be so sacred that it never ought to be broken, then let them carry out the principle, and never break it. But if they are ready without scruple to sever the bond between themselves and their pastor when they please, let them not, in common justice, deny the priesthood the same right. Perhaps we ought not to say, without scruple ; there is oftener great consideration shown in such cases, we admit. But here is the point of our comparison. Does public opinion reproach a congregation when it severs this tie, as it does a clergyman when he has ventured on the same step ? We are aware that there are some high and disinterested maxims which go to make up this public opinion, and especially the maxim that a distinguished and wealthy congregation ought not to disturb a sister church of humbler means, in their enjoyment of the ministrations of a favorite pastor. To the delicacy of this feeling we give all deserved honor ; but still we think that it goes too far among us, and that the best ecclesiastical

polity would require more removals and more frequent changes of the scene of clerical labor than are permitted by the prevailing opinion of our religious congregations.

With regard to the pecuniary inducement to the clergy to make such changes, it is far less frequently in favor of a city change than is commonly supposed. It is a singular fact, which it may require a moment's reflection, however, to perceive, that the clergy of our cities and wealthy villages are really, taken as a body, the poorest clergy in the country. It has been often remarked, that the most certain way to make a clergyman rich is to give three hundred dollars salary. He is then obliged to resort to other means for a support, which, together with his professional income, at length give him a fixed property. His brethren in the cities and villages have no such resort open to them. They have nothing but their salaries to rely upon, and these are regularly exhausted to meet the annual expenditure. We think it deserves to be considered by the more wealthy congregations in our cities, whether this is right; whether it is right that men who are qualified to fill the most distinguished situations in society, men, who, in any other profession, might have acquired fortunes, should be put upon stipends that serve barely to keep them alive; or, to speak without hyperbole, for the case does not need it, — upon stipends that barely enable them to live in that decent style which public opinion obliges them to support. It is to be remembered that there are no episcopal revenues in this country; and much as they have been abused, and unjustly as they have often been conferred, it may not be unworthy of being considered, that an arrangement, such as this, or similar to it, is necessary to make a case for the clerical profession as fair as public justice makes for other professions. Whether it is expedient for society to cut off clerical study and labor from that portion of incitement which is found in the natural and laudable desire to provide for one's old age, and for one's family when he is dead, we leave for others to judge. Would any profession hold out the just inducements to individual effort, upon this New-Harmony system? Would the lawyers, would the physicians, would the merchants do as well, if the greatest study, labor, and distinction could never reach a reward beyond bare subsistence.

But we must provide some space in our discussion for objections.

It may be said, then, that the case of the clergy is peculiar. 'In the first place, they are engaged in such a good cause, that they may trust themselves and those who are dependent upon them to Providence.' We cannot waste our paper with discussing such an argument as this. 'Those who have the presumption to commend to a heavenly providence, as its peculiar care, the children of human improvidence, come much nearer, in our apprehension, to impiety than to faith, and commit the greatest folly without half of the usual apology for it. But, in the next place, we may be reminded that 'the clergy are successors of the Apostles, who submitted to voluntary poverty, and were commanded to take no thought for the morrow.' We would ask if our Christian societies are not equally successors of that community of primitive Christians at Jerusalem, who 'had all things common?' When the inference on one side is submitted to, it will be time enough to urge the other. 'But Christian ministers,' it may be finally said, 'should be examples of moderation, and simplicity, and indifference to worldly possessions.' Is it not an argument worthy to be wrought into a picture? — and Hogarth might have painted it. The multitude grasping and holding on to their possessions; some of them stretched in a surfeit upon couches of ease; others rolling in chariots of wealth; others, with penurious care, laying up much goods for many years; and all saying — 'Give us good examples, O ye ministers of religion! Good examples; excellent things, these examples. We are so anxious to profit by them, that we cannot, in conscience, contribute any thing to mar them. Beautiful simplicity! delightful freedom from vexatious gains! holy lives of stipendiary poverty! it would be a sin to disturb such a useful arrangement, such excellent influences, such salutary lessons!'

Absurd and foolish reasoning all! that holds *any* man bound to be less pure and heavenly-minded than the holiest man that he pretends to revere; that holds it to be men's interest to get all the *advantages*, and escape all the *duties*, they can. Let, indeed, no minister at God's altar be mercenary, ambitious, selfish. We say it freely and earnestly, let him not be so. God forbid, he should be. But is this all we say? No: we say just as emphatically, let no man be so! Least of all, let any one be guilty of the consummate

folly and sin together, of supposing that *he* can be selfish, ambitious and mercenary, that *he* can gain the world and lose his soul, and fare better than any other being who incurs the same dreadful forfeiture! — that he can be ruined with less suffering and loss, because he is not a minister of religion nor a professor of religion, but only a poor, ruined, suffering, lost man!

But we will now proceed, in the last place, to vindicate the dignity and interest that belong to the clerical profession in a broader view. We would, in other words, express our sense, not only nor chiefly of the importance of this office to the public welfare, but of the interest which is to be taken in it, as a sphere of honorable and useful exertion. We will not conceal our desire, in the suggestions we shall offer, to say something to those, who, on the threshold of life, may be deliberating on the choice of a profession. It has seemed to us that this question is often decided on very vague, slight, and even boyish considerations; and especially upon considerations, that are not only worldly, but that bear the lowest stamp of worldliness.

We are inclined to believe that we should not misrepresent the thoughts of many a young man when fixing upon his pursuits in life, if we were to spread them out in something like the following soliloquy: ‘The time has come for me to decide, — sooner than I looked for; but the years have hurried on, and I must make up my mind upon my future course. Shall I be a physician, or a lawyer, or an instructor of youth, or a clergyman? The labors of the instructor seem to me dull; those of the physician, wearisome. Both of these professions, it is true, offer a pretty certain emolument; neither of them is bankrupt; but neither of them is likely to lead me to that conspicuous position in the world which I desire to occupy. But the law, — the law is the chosen path to honor. I look through it, as through a vista, and I see, in the distance, the grand prizes of political distinction. I may be a member of Congress, a governor, a secretary of state, a minister at a foreign court, — nay, I may reach the highest office in the country. It is true, this profession is crowded, and does not want me; but I must take the risk, and, if need be, “pluck bright honor” from the edge of competition. There is, indeed, the profession of a clergyman, and it calls for help; but it closes the door upon ambition.

I can never be a *great* man if I take that course. To labor unknown in some humble village, or to wear out my sinews and nerves, without reward, in some city congregation; to be for ever nothing but a minister, not even a bishop, nor so much, perhaps, as a Doctor of Divinity, — this does not suit the aims of my aspiring mind. Besides, I do not feel disposed to engage in an employment so serious; I might not have the proper sympathy with it; I would enjoy life, and not bring a fatal damp upon all its freedom and enthusiasm.'

If there had been included in this account, that heaviest objection, as we consider it, to the clerical office, namely, that it demands an exhausting, and often painful, sympathy with many and various states of mind, and some of them states of great affliction, we should have felt that a much higher view was taken of the subject. And yet no one, probably, ever met all those demands on his sympathy, and looked back upon all the scenes through which they had lead him, and wished that he had escaped them, or found them less trying to his feelings or less improving to his virtues.

The apprehension of wanting sympathy with the sacred office, is, indeed, a consideration that is to be treated with the greatest respect and tenderness. We would simply ask one who hesitates on this ground, what are his objects in life, what sort of a life he means to lead, whether he intends to be a man unscrupulously selfish, or a good and useful man. If the former, we have nothing farther to say to him of the clerical profession, nor of any other profession; he is unfit for any. But if any man feels that he would be a good and useful man, then, we will venture to assure him that, provided he will faithfully cultivate a just moral and pious sensibility during the course of his preparatory studies, he will be in no danger of wanting sympathy with the objects and duties of the sacred office.

We have said that the choice of a profession is apt to be governed by considerations that are not only worldly, but which bear the lowest stamp of worldliness. For what are the grand and noble objects even of this life? What are the aims on which it is meet that youthful enthusiasm should dwell? What are the objects that should engross especially the educated mind?

We know not how it may seem to others, but to us the great charm of existence lies in these three aims, to improve

ourselves, to be useful to others, and to rise to the knowledge of God. We know not how far this statement may commend itself to the youth of a Christian land; but we should very willingly submit it to the judgment of such as Socrates, or Plato, or Plutarch. Socrates says, that *resemblance to God is the only true happiness*; which embraces the whole ground of our statement. There are objects to be sought in this world. They are, so far as locality is concerned, worldly objects. They are objects to live for. Now they must be such as the seeking and soaring mind can pursue, or they are, in the lowest sense, worldly. Such only, the lofty objects, are those which we have proposed. If it be thought that fame should be added to the account of lofty aims, we will only say, that it must be fame of a far higher character than that which is founded on official honors and distinctions; fame to which every profession opens a broad and ample path.

But it is our business to show how the great aims of life have free and full scope in the walks of the clerical profession. In doing this we shall not confine ourselves to any method indicated by the statement which we have just made, and yet we may say, cursorily, that the conditions of that statement of the great objects of life are as completely fulfilled by the opportunities held out in the clerical profession as in any other.

We may say this even of fame; that is, of the highest kind of fame. Who are they that have enjoyed the most durable, wide-spread, and enviable distinction on earth. Not military commanders, nor kings; not consuls, nor presidents, as such. When Cicero is named, it is scarcely one time in a hundred that his having been consul or proconsul occurs to us. No; it is mind only what enjoys a distinction that lives; and that mind spread out in immortal productions. The really great names of the world are the names of studious men, of poets, historians, and philosophers; names to which, in modern times, the clerical office has contributed its full proportion; and to which, as it becomes more free from the shackles of scholastic theology, it will contribute a yet larger proportion. Success in authorship, and not success in politics, furnishes the best title to being remembered. When future times shall unroll the scroll on which the glorious names of our country are inscribed, will members of Congress or cabinet sec-

retaries, as such, be found written there? Who would not rather have the fame of Buckminster, than that of a score of kings or a dozen presidents, distinguished for nothing but their office? One breath of heaven-inspired genius shall be wasted farther in the coming ages, than the acclamation of millions that waits upon the car of the conqueror, or the chair of the successful candidate for office. One line traced by the hand of Homer or Plato shall outlive the Pyramids. Human nature is thus far true to its noblest distinctions. And of him who overlooks these in the pursuit of a short-lived, official notoriety, whom nothing will satisfy but to have some such illustrious prefix to his name, as General, or Honorable,—of him, we can only say, that his reward, if he gains it, will be just as great as his ambition.

But fame is not only within the reach of the most retired and studious life,—it is most especially within its reach, because such a life is most favorable to intellectual improvement. And such, more than that of most others, may be the life of a clergyman. No other active profession, certainly, enjoys so much studious leisure, so much opportunity for literary culture, or so great facilities for carrying self-improvement, pure, spiritual, intellectual self-improvement, to the highest point. Not only are its opportunities for study great, but the grand object of its cares and labors is one of the noblest of all objects,—to understand and improve the human soul; its themes, too, are all lofty, and the motives urged upon it are of the purest kind.

We scarcely need insist, in addition to this, that the clerical profession may be eminently useful, and thus may fulfill another of the noblest ends of life. We are not among those who would speak of it as possessing any singular distinction in this respect. We cannot accept so much as is often conceded on this subject. All the great occupations and professions are vitally important to the public welfare, and may be eminently useful. Besides, it is goodness, chiefly, that does good in this world, and the walks of virtue are limited to no pursuit or condition. Without setting up any extravagant pretensions, therefore, in favor of this sphere of usefulness,—nay, conscious, painfully conscious that it might be better filled,—yet we may say, surely, that if any man *would* do good; if he would lose ignoble selfishness in noble, expansive benevolence, loving those whom God loves, and for

whom he gave his Son to die ; if he would learn to make the welfare of the world, — that object so vague, impalpable, and indifferent to most men, — if he would make it to him a dear, and sacred, and individual interest ; if he would pour the sympathy of a benevolent heart through all the channels of society ; if he generously desires, not only to rejoice with those who rejoice, but to comfort those who mourn ; — if his mind would act a part so noble, surely, we may say, that no fairer opportunity could be given than that which is offered in the aims, the studies, and the labors of this profession.

And, then, if any man would seek the noblest end of all philosophy, of all wisdom, of all action ; if he would rise to the highest conceptions of the true and beautiful ; if he would carry forth the mind to its most glorious discoveries and to its ultimate attainments ; in one word, if he would arrive at the knowledge of God, where shall he find a sphere more appropriate, more calm, more holy, than that of the sacred office ?

But not to dwell longer on things that may seem so abstract as ultimate objects, we shall take leave to say that the immediate tasks of this profession are clothed with interest far too strong to be expressed in any abstract or formal manner. It is not, to our apprehension, the formal or merely official life that many are disposed to consider it ; it is not merely to solemnize marriages, or to attend funerals, or to pay visits of official condolence, or to pay any other visits of an artificial character ; it is not to preach dull sermons, in a dull, humdrum style and manner, as if it were a work to be done according to contract. No ; in the name of every thing sacred and interesting, let us say, No. Let public opinion say, No ; and demand of this profession all the energies of intellectual and spiritual life. Let clerical practice say, No, with a spirit and tone that none can mistake. Let every mind, pledged to this office, leap to its work, as at the voice of a trumpet, as at the call of country, and kindred, and brotherhood, as at the summons-call for all the energy, and enthusiasm, and heroism that are in human nature. Is there power ? Is there gentleness ? Is there love ? Is there eloquence ? Is there an aim soaring to heaven ? This is a sphere for them all ; broad, ample, infinite, we were ready to say ; but deep, too ; deeply searching and interesting, far beyond the measure of all ordinary pursuits.

What is this work, and what are the subjects, the living

subjects, upon which it is employed? The technical reply that is commonly given, says, that it is 'the care of souls'; that this is the work, and these its subjects. But it almost moves us to indignation, that any technical, any narrowing phrase, should be thought to describe it. Ah! what histories of human life, what crowded annals of the human heart, are often drawn under one compendious line! 'The care of the soul!' it is but a single phrase; it is uttered in a single breath; it presents but one general idea; and yet all that mortal men can suffer or fear, — all that mortal men, or immortal angels, can enjoy, hope, desire, aspire after, comes under the comprehensive import of that single phrase.

Look at a city, or village, or at a single congregation of human beings, and let the question be asked, — What is here? The mere man of business sees nothing but a collection of agents, who buy and sell; parts and portions of that machinery of trade that moves the outward world. The mere politician, the mere party-man, in other words, sees nothing but bodies of voters, instruments of power, agents with whom the most interesting association, in his mind, is that of numerical force. The political economist, in like manner, looketh on the outward appearance; he looks upon conditions, costumes that cover up the heart, and written thereupon, 'labor,' 'wages,' 'wealth.' The mere man of fashion, the worldly man of every class, comprehends nothing in his survey, but circumstances, distinctions of high and low, rich and poor, of success or disappointment. But now let it again be asked, What is here? The struggling together for happiness, of minds plunged into difficulties, agitated by fears and hopes, beset with perils, as if the waves of a literal sea were around them. Deep, silent, seldom declared or made a subject of distinct consciousness, is the conflict; but there it is; in the heart, in every heart that is blindly seeking or darkly suffering, — that is 'sounding on its dim and perilous way' in the voyage of life, with many questionings, and fears, and anxieties. Not one mind is there, among the busy throng of society, but conscience speaks in it the awful monition day by day and hour by hour, and every day and every hour passion strives against it. Not one mind is there but has interests in it, momentous, mighty, as if they were the embodied interests of a world. Not one is there but has its own peculiar burthen, its own peculiar strug-

gle, either with itself, or with others, or with circumstances. Yes, the charge of all that is dear in happiness, of all that is sacred in virtue, is laid upon every one ; and not heaven and earth only, but every inward daily sorrow, fear, and hope, plead for fidelity to the charge. So do men live, a life too much governed, indeed, by outward respects, but still a life that hath spiritual conditions, a life of solicitude and doubt, of conflicting pursuit and disappointment, of mingled sadness and joy ; a life, narrow as its visible sphere is, yet visited, and sometimes penetrated, with thoughts of the infinite, the divine, and the immortal ; a life filled, though with a vague, yet with a sublime consciousness, that it is leading onward to the ages of eternity !

Now this interior world, this world of thoughts and feelings, and often of the most sublime and dread ideas and emotions, is the appropriate sphere of the clerical office. He who sustains that office comes into the most immediate contact with the unveiled, spiritual being of man. He should have his ear open to the slightest whisper from that world of the mind and heart. To every tone that issues from it, whether of anxiety, of inquiry, of fear, of doubt, or trouble, he should listen, as if he lived but to hear it. Every movement in that world, from the broadest range of society to the narrowest sphere of domestic, of individual life, he should watch with irrepressible interest. When it is overshadowed with affliction, when it is brightened with prosperity, or when it moves on in its equable course, yet developing the experience of immortal creatures, he should be ready to speak to it, with words that come forth from the depths of his own mind. He should extend his care, as far as is practicable with his other duties, to individual cases, — to the young, to the erring, to the faltering, to the troubled. He should thus watch, ‘as one that watcheth for souls.’ Yes, he should be a watcher, more intent than they who, from the towers of old, gazed upon the depths of heaven. Not Saul, when he stood upon the borders of the unseen world, and waited for the mysterious vision, could have expected any thing more momentous than he may, who is looking for the revelations of the spiritual world around him.

Not that this must make the devoted pastor a perpetually solemn and gloomy man ; not that it must burden him with a painful sense of responsibility, or waste his powers with

preternatural excitement. If he is a man of any just reflection and humility, he will see that every thing does not rest on his arm, but upon the arm of God; that more, far more, depends upon those to whom he ministers than upon him; that he is ordained to be the helper of others, and not their supporter, or their substitute. He will feel that he is responsible for duties, not for results. And yet, entering into these duties with alacrity and energy, entering into them with his whole heart and soul, he will find results to repay, more than a hundred fold, all his labors. There will, indeed, be seasons of dearth and of darkness in his sphere of duty as well as in others: no earthly course is free from them. There will be those who will not hear his words, though his lips be touched as with a coal from the altar of heaven. But there will be those, too, who will hear, and understand, and feel, and resolve, and pray, and live, — yes, live a life, for whose sake it were not too much to die. There will be blessed fruits, there will be signal illustrations of truth around him, which he would not give for the brightest jewels in an earthly crown. These, indeed, will be ‘crowns of his rejoicing, in the presence of the Lord Jesus Christ at his coming.’

But there is one sphere of clerical labor which we must single out for more particular notice. It is the great action of the preacher’s life; the ministration of prayer and of the word of God in the sanctuary. We know that there has been, and is, much coldness and inefficiency in this high and blessed ministration. But we do fully trust that they are to pass away; that a new day is to rise upon the pulpit; that a new era, partaking of all the light and excitement of the age that is opening upon the world, is to shake the long-slumbering dulness of the sacred desk, and make it a throne of power, an altar kindled upon with fire from heaven. We do know, that if the candidates for this station will faithfully cultivate a moral and pious sensibility, and then if they will learn, as we are sure they can be taught, to speak forth that which is within them, they will address men, on the arousing and moving themes of religion, as no body of clergy ever yet has done; that an interesting and affecting ministration of the word of God will not be confined to instances of rare endowment, but will be *common*, to an extent that we scarcely dare to predict in definite terms. What is it, that is wanting

for this purpose, but simple feeling? It is not sense, it is not knowledge, it is not a correct and graceful style, that is wanting, for we have them all; but it is feeling. This is the power to be added that will move the world. Is it not to be added? Are not the principles and practical rules, concerned in the cultivation of religious sensibility, to be more fully unfolded and exemplified? We confidently believe they are; but we must not here enter upon so great a question.

We revert, then, to the signal opportunity offered by the pulpit for the noblest intellectual and moral action. We can scarcely conceive of any thing capable of imparting to every week's studies a more profound and lively interest than the expectation of bringing their results, on the Sabbath, into the presence of 'the great congregation.' Hardly any topic, in fact, of a high and affecting character is excluded from these ministrations. The highest philosophy, the philosophy of human nature and of divine truth; the public welfare and private welfare; the whole range of duties, social, domestic, and personal; the entire mass of human experience, with all its solemn eras, and momentous changes, and moving vicissitudes, and trials, and sorrows, and joys; and life, the whole theatre, on which is passing mortal probation, and from which immortal destinies are to take their date, their impulse, and their complexion, — all these themes are before the preacher. And if he feels their transcendent power, if he communes with his own heart upon them, if he sends out searching inquiries into the living world around him, and meditates as in the very presence of all its pains, and its pleasures, and its wants, with what profound interest will he prepare himself to speak to his brethren, in these solemn allotments and stupendous concerns of his being. If he has judgment or imagination, if he has genius or sensibility, if images of things that are fair and beautiful dwell in his thoughts, if his heart is penetrated with the love of God and of virtue, all these powers and affections will be called into the most intense action. To prepare his message will be no cold, dull, forced, reluctant effort; but to meditate upon it will be his most delightful employment; he will 'think upon these things'; and as he 'muses, the fire will burn'; he will pour out the treasures of his mind and heart to make an offering for the sanctuary, and unbidden tears will often consecrate it, and cause it to burn with a brighter flame, when he

lays it upon the altar. And when he brings his offering, when he stands in the sanctuary of God, what throne of power, what sphere of influence can he desire, more bright, more beneficent, more glorious than this?

'We say the pulpit (in the sober use
Of its legitimate, peculiar powers)
Must stand acknowledged, while the world shall stand,
The most important and effectual guard,
Support, and ornament of virtue's cause.
There stands the messenger of truth: there stands
The legate of the skies! — His theme divine,
His office sacred, his credentials clear.
By him the violated law speaks out
Its thunders; and by him, in strains as sweet
As angels use, the Gospel whispers peace.'

We must add one further observation.

These employments can never grow dull, or old, in the hands of him who is truly and rationally interested in them. A wise man will desire to choose something for an object in life, which need not pall upon the taste, which long habit and familiarity need not divest of its charm, which may still kindle the mind and heart amidst the waning light of declining years, and which will not shrink to insignificance, as many earthly objects do, amidst the opening and awful visions of eternity. Every aim of life may possess more or less of this character, which is connected with a sense of duty and with the interests of our spiritual being; but the legitimate aim of the clerical profession possesses it completely. If we desired to choose an employment in which the mind and heart need never grow old, it would be this. Whether it be true, as a late writer* suggests, that 'there is some natural tendency in the fire of genius to burn more brightly in the evening than in the morning of life,' it certainly is the tendency of *piety*, and we believe of sensibility also. But piety and sensibility have their brightest sphere in the ministrations of religion. The fire that kindles them may burn with growing

* Sir James Mackintosh's 'View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy during the 17th and 18th Centuries'; a very interesting work; full of fine and profound observations; characterized by those condensed sentences for which the author is so remarkable, in which are hoarded up the results of much exact reflection and learning; but after all, we must venture to say, less admirable for its reasonings than for its historical analysis;—in other words, less admirable for its analysis of principles, than of opinions.

intensity till the earthly part of us is consumed, and then leap upwards in one glorious flame to heaven.

Let it vanish from the earth! What matter of dread or sorrow, — if Heaven receives it and converts it into ethereal and everlasting brightness? And why, with such a prospect, — save as physical infirmity lays its hand upon us, — why should we ever grow old? Why should feeling in us, why should divine philosophy, why should the contemplation and love of God and of goodness, ever grow old? Old to the themes which endless progress is to make for ever new? No. Let him be assured, to whom religious offices and contemplations grow dull and irksome by familiarity, that he has not yet caught the true spirit of that sublime vocation. No; the aged man, with all the maturer wisdom of experience and the purer fervor of piety, may stand up and plead the cause of God and of godlike virtue with an eloquence never given to his youthful vigor. Holy cause of virtue and God, which shall never die! Blessed cause of human happiness and hope, for which it is not too much to die! — for which 'to live is Christ, and to die is gain!'

ART. V. — *Contemplations of the Saviour; a Series of Extracts from the Gospel History, with Reflections, and Original and Selected Hymns.* By S. GREEN-LEAF BULFINCH. Boston. Carter & Hendee. 1832. pp. 155.

If we had been asked, before the publication of this unpretending but useful little volume, what book there was which would furnish a series of Scripture lessons, accompanied with meditations, sufficiently brief for the religious services of a family, we should not have been able to point to a single one. We can now point with pleasure to the 'Contemplations of the Saviour,' by Mr. Bulfinch, as a work, which, so far as it goes, satisfactorily supplies a want which many have felt. The 'Extracts' give a connected view of the Saviour's life and ministry, according to the system of arrangement, or harmony, adopted by Dr. Carpenter, and are of a suitable length for introduction into the services of family worship.

They are fifty in number, and to each one is appended a few simple and appropriate reflections, which are followed by a hymn. Both the reflections and the hymns may of course be omitted or introduced according to the circumstances of a family; but both will be found useful, at all times, for private reading and Sunday schools.

Some of the original hymns we regard as real acquisitions to our stores of devotional poetry. One of these, toward the end of the volume, we will present to our readers, together with the reflections which precede it, as a specimen of the work, and an inducement to those who are in want of such a work, to make it their own immediately. The passage of Scripture to which the Reflections and Hymn refer, is that, from the twenty-fourth chapter of Luke, which relates the meeting of the Saviour, after his resurrection, with two of his disciples, as they journeyed to Emmaus.

‘ REFLECTIONS.

“ Did not our heart burn within us by the way ? ” May we not all look back upon hours in our own lives which answer to this description of the disciples’ feelings ? There are times when our hearts hold converse with a Being whom they do not comprehend, when a feeling of solemn thought comes over them, and they seem in the presence of something indescribably holy. It was thus with the disciples, as they trod, with their unknown master, the path to Emmaus. It is at such times that the Spirit of God is holding converse with our spirits. Let us not silence its whisperings by permitting the loud voice of the world to make them unheard ; but in solitude, “ commune with our own hearts,” and with our Maker ; “ and be still.” We shall find the thoughtlessness of our natures corrected by the exercise. We shall find virtuous principle acquiring strength, and the force of headlong impulse weakened. The things which before were hard to our minds in the dispensations of Providence, will become easy to understand, and doubt will give place to faith and adoring love ; as the sadness and ignorance which hung over the minds of the disciples, gave way as the Saviour instructed them from the Scriptures, in the prophecies relating to himself.

‘ HYMN.

‘ Hath not thy heart within thee burned
At evening’s calm and holy hour,
As if its inmost depths discerned
The presence of a loftier power ?

'Hast thou not heard, 'midst forest glades,
While ancient rivers murmured by,
A voice from forth the eternal shades,
That spake a present Deity ?

'And as, upon the sacred page,
Thine eye in rapt attention turned
O'er records of a holier age,
Hath not thy heart within thee burned ?

'It was the voice of God, that spake
In silence to thy silent heart ;
And bade each worthier thought awake,
And every dream of earth depart.

'Voice of our God, oh yet be near !
In low, sweet accents whisper peace :
Direct us on our pathway here,
Then bid in heaven our wanderings cease.'

pp. 147 - 149.

Few hymns have come under our notice which possess more of a contemplative tenderness, a deeper spirit of devotion, a sweeter flow of numbers than this. And so pure, so holy, is the tone which pervades and characterizes the whole volume.

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- ART. VI. — 1. *An Abridgment of 'Elements of Criticism, by the Honorable HENRY HOME of KAMES.'* Edited by JOHN FROST, A. M. Philadelphia. Towar & Hogan. 1831. 12mo. pp. 300.
2. *Outlines of History; embracing a concise History of the World, from the earliest Period to the Pacification of Europe in 1815.* Second American Edition, with Additions and a Set of Questions for Examination of Students, by JOHN FROST, A. M. Philadelphia, Carey & Lea. Boston. Carter, Hendee, & Babcock. 1831. 12mo. pp. 466.
3. *History of Ancient and Modern Greece; illustrated with Maps and Copperplate Engravings.* Edited by JOHN FROST. Philadelphia. Boston. Lincoln & Edmands. 1831. 8vo. pp. 358.

THOSE teachers who are looking out for really useful and sensible school-books, will do well to examine those which

have lately been edited by Mr. Frost, the titles of three of which we have copied above. He seems to go on the principle, and we are ready to go along with him, that it is better sometimes to recur to old text-books, and correct and improve them by the light which comes from use and acquaintance, than to be perpetually seeking after the unknown, and inundating our shops and seminaries with new inventions and systems. We confess ourselves to be pretty nearly tired with discoveries in elementary education; not because we are unfriendly to any positive advancements in learning, but because we have seen so many pretended advancements so frequently cross and oppose each other, and turn out to be superficial conceits rather than valuable improvements. Nearly all the half-educated people in our country, think they can enlighten the world on the subject of education. We must take the liberty to believe that many of them are mistaken in this matter.

The books before us are evidently intended for the highest classes in schools. We remember Kames's 'Elements of Criticism' very well. We once studied it in two octavo volumes, and were much interested in the study. The quotations from the poets are so frequent and good, and the criticisms are so lively, that a youth can hardly fail to have his mind engaged in the book, formidable as the subject may at first have appeared to him. But in its original form it was too long and bulky for a school-book, and Mr. Frost has done well in abridging it. He has done better still in expunging some improper quotations. A little more care, and a little more reduction, would fit the work still more completely for its end. One fault of the criticisms is, that they are sometimes hypercritical, and want generosity. When they are so, they might well be omitted or modified. In running over the book we accidentally met with what we take to be two contradictory criticisms on the self-same passage in Shakespeare. The first is from page 23 of Mr. Frost's Abridgment.

'The same communication of passion obtains in the relation of principal and accessory. Pride, of which self is the object, expands itself upon a house, a garden, servants, equipage, and every accessory. A lover addresses the glove belonging to his mistress as a

"Sweet ornament that decks a thing divine."

Veneration for relics has the same natural foundation. A temple is in a proper sense an accessory to the deity to which it is dedicated. Diana is chaste—so is her temple, and the very icicle which hangs on it.

“The noble sister of Publicola,
The moon of Rome ; chaste as the icicle
That 's curded by the frost from purest snow,
And hangs on Dian's temple.”

Coriolanus. Act v. Sc. 3.'

Here the passage is cited with approbation. But turn to page 178.

‘The strongest objection that can lie against a comparison is, that it consists in words only, not in sense. Such false coin, or spurious wit, does extremely well in burlesque ; but is far below the dignity of the epic, or of any serious composition.

“The noble sister of Poplicola,
The moon of Rome ; chaste as the icicle
That 's curdled by the frost from purest snow,
And hangs on Dian's temple.”

There is evidently no resemblance between an icicle and a woman, chaste or unchaste ;' &c.

Now, with all due deference to Lord Kames, this last criticism, which we have not patience to quote entire, is hyper-criticism and nonsense. And in neither case does he seem to apprehend that the true beauty of the passage lies in the accumulation of images of purity. Valeria is chaste, not only as an icicle, but *the icicle* that is *curded* from *purest snow*, and hangs, not on any common place, but on the temple of the goddess of chastity. In the second quotation, too, ‘curded’ is printed ‘curdled,’ and ‘Publicola,’ ‘Poplicola.’ What is a boy to think of all this ? Such blemishes might be taken away.

The ‘*Outlines of History*’ is Dr. Lardner's book, with questions for examination annexed by Mr. Frost. And a capital book it is, to give either boy or man an idea of the relation between particular histories and the history of the world. In this view it deserves a place in private libraries as well as in schools. It has nearly the brevity of a chronological table, and the interest of narrative besides.

The ‘*History of Ancient and Modern Greece*’ is, we believe, the only book which gives the whole history of that country in a form suitable for the use of schools. The an-

cient portion is a republication of the work which appeared some time ago in the 'Library of Useful Knowledge,' and the sequel is compiled from several authentic sources.

ART. VII. — *Du Pêché Originel, ou de la Dépravation Héritaire dans l'Homme.* Par M. CHENEVIÈRE, Pasteur et Professeur à Genève. *Second Essai.* Genève et Paris. 1831. pp. 196.
On Original Sin, or Hereditary Depravity in Man, &c.

THIS is the second in the series of Theological Treatises announced for publication by M. Chenevière of Geneva, the first of which (on the Trinity) was noticed at some length in the number of our Journal for March. It is marked by the same general characteristics with the former, a happy and lucid order, and a clear, manly discussion. It is divided into four chapters. The first contains the history of the doctrine of original sin from the earliest period of the church to the Reformation. The second states the several principal schemes, or expositions of the doctrine, in which controversy has resulted; namely, that of Augustine and Calvin, that of Pelagius, and that which may be called mitigated Orthodoxy, or moderate Calvinism. The third chapter contains a brief examination of these several systems, and a discussion of the principal questions which arise under them. The fourth and last chapter treats of the origin of evil, purporting to exhibit this subject as it is represented in the light of reason and the Scriptures. It is evident from this sketch of the plan of the work, that it goes over too much ground to allow of a very profound examination of any part of it; and that it must be, what it purports to be, a general and cursory survey of the main points of history and argument. Regarded in this light, the Essay is a valuable epitome, being at once concise and full.

In treating the history of this doctrine, M. Chenevière shows that nothing can well be more certain than that it was unknown to the primitive church as an article of faith. The early doctors differed widely from each other in their opinions concerning the native character of man, and seem

to have drawn their notions rather from the systems of philosophy into which they had been initiated before their conversion to the Christian faith, than from a study of the sacred records. Hence on this, as on many other points of speculative theology (if theology it can properly be called), Pagan philosophy gave an early and lasting taint to the dogmas of the Church. The Gnostics came in on one side and the Manicheans on another, teaching, in their various ways, that the Creating Power was not single, that man was the offspring of more than one superior, that good and evil are equal contending principles, and that sin results from the inevitable constitution of human nature. It is easy to understand how such speculators, coming in contact with the few hints of the Old Testament respecting the original condition and character of man, should seek to warp them to their purpose, and contrive to weave together their old and new dogmas into something of a consistent system. It was long however before it came to be thought necessary to teach any formal opinion on this subject as the doctrine of the church. None was introduced into the symbols which were in use; and individual teachers were left to form and express their judgments at will, which they did freely and variously, — as may be seen in the citations made by M. Chenevière from Origen, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, &c. But nothing like the doctrine, which has been so prevalent since the Reformation, made its appearance until it was broached by Augustin in the beginning of the fifth century. Christianity spread itself over the world, and became mistress of the Roman Empire, fighting her way through various fierce controversies and tainted by various notions of false philosophy, for four hundred years, before this doctrine of original sin or hereditary total depravity was made part of it. Even Calvin, an unsuspicious witness in this case, says, that ‘almost all the ancient Fathers, except Augustin, have expressed themselves on this subject with so much ambiguity and obscurity, that we can draw from their writings nothing clear and positive respecting it.’ By which very admission it is decisively proved, that they did not teach the doctrine in question, and consequently that it was not the prevailing doctrine of the first four centuries. And it would be difficult to conceive that such could have been the fact, if it had been a doctrine taught by Christ and the Apostles.

But, in the progress of time, a hot controversy and a heated controversialist were to create and establish a dogma which never perhaps would have suggested itself to a sober mind in quiet times. Augustin, in his controversy with Pelagius, went from step to step till he reached the extreme verge to which the doctrine could be driven, and this became the orthodoxy of the times, that is, it became the prevailing opinion, and was passed by vote in the council at Carthage, A. D. 412. Still, however, it was far from being universally prevalent ; — another council in Syria, in 415, decided against it, — the Eastern churches never acknowledged it, — it struggled for mastery during all the succeeding centuries, — and it never gained any thing like a universal reception until it was set up by the Reformers in the course of their opposition to the Catholic doctrine of works and merit. Every one knows how far it has been from obtaining unanimous acceptance since that time. Indeed, even at the moment when Luther was urging it in its extremest and sometimes most revolting form, — which we may believe he did, not only because it was a forcible weapon against the false doctrine of Rome, but because his education as a monk of St. Augustin had made him familiar with it, — at the same time, we say, the Swiss churches, as they came to the light of the Reformation, were advocates of the semi-Pelagian doctrine. Zuingli, their leader and prophet, 'the most wise, most consistent, and most modest of the Reformers,' fell far short of the measure of Calvin, who afterward held the supremacy in that land. And there were elsewhere those whose minds assumed more enlightened views.

The subject, however, never has ceased to be one of controversy ; and we should be glad, if this were the place, to run over the various forms it has assumed, and the different aspects in which it is at this moment standing before the world, each pretending to be the very and only truth. There is no more melancholy, amusing, and instructive chapter of history, than that which recites the positiveness and the mutations of orthodoxy. The rival popes of Rome and Avignon, each infallible and each anathematizing the other, are fit emblems of the rival doctrines respecting depravity set up by different portions of the Reformed church, each claiming to be orthodox, and each sending out anathemas against the other and against all heresies. But to follow this hint would carry us too far from our author.

M. Chenevière illustrates his rapid sketch with many citations from the Fathers ; among the most pleasant of which are those from Augustin, in which, arguing against the Manicheans, he directly controverts the positions which he was compelled to take in his writings against Pelagius.

After the examination of these systems, our author proceeds to the discussion of the following questions : Are we to believe that the first man was created perfect, or only greatly superior to his descendants ? Has the divine image been effaced from the human soul, and human nature become depraved in consequence of Adam's fall ? Has mankind been condemned, like Adam and in Adam, to misery and physical death ? Has the majority of the human race been condemned to eternal sufferings in consequence of Adam's sin ? We cannot give even a sketch of the manner in which these inquiries are conducted. We content ourselves with extracting a single passage, containing an allegorical explanation of the circumstances of the fall.

'Such are some of the difficulties attendant on the literal interpretation of the passage in question.

'If we take it in an allegorical sense, it is no longer exposed to the same objections ; besides, that all men are compelled, by the necessity of the case, to admit such an interpretation at least of some of the particulars. I am aware, indeed, that all have not allegorized alike ; and I shall take care not to bring forward all that has been drawn from the passage ; but it seems to me that it is rendered altogether clear by adopting an allegorical sense.

'We understand, then, why the tree which was selected to prove the loyalty or revolt, the virtue or the vice, of the inhabitants of Eden, is called "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," since it was to perform the office of making known which course they would choose. We understand how the "tree of life" represents the effects of well-doing, the recompense of virtue, — *life* ; and how the being deprived of it represents the effect of vice, *death* ; that is, the consequence of crime. As long as Adam obeys and submits to the law, he partakes of the fruit which is the symbol of reward ; when he has sinned, he is no longer worthy to bear the sign of innocence. St. John, in the Revelation (ii. 7.), calls the happiness of the life to come *the tree of life* ; — "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God."

'The guilty pair "saw that they were naked ;" that is, they found themselves without excuse and without defence against

the chastisement which had been denounced against them. Thus Moses, after the worship of the golden calf, says that he saw the people *naked*, in order to express the impression made on him by his knowledge of the sin of the people, and his foresight of the punishment which must follow. So, too, in the Apocalypse, St. John says to the angel of the church of Laodicea, who thought himself rich, "Thou art poor, blind, and *naked*;" and advises him to buy for himself white raiment; that is, to repent and live a better life.

'The serpent also may be understood allegorically. It represents the affections and passions by which Eve was led astray. Now the serpent is the figure of (is used figuratively for) the prince of the rebel angels, whom the sacred books describe as a seducer, and call the accuser, the old serpent, the enemy, the tempter. The sacred historian may have introduced the serpent in order to reveal, by his mouth (*par ses paroles*), the motives which led Eve to her fall. Moses has recited this history under the form of a *trial*, in which are found the seducer, the crime, the accused, the judge, the pleading, the sentence, and the punishment.

'The serpent was cursed; — which was not the case with Adam and Eve; — and this malediction is an emblem applicable to the baseness of those seducers who do not hesitate to creep, that they may entice to sin. In order to understand the allegory of the wounding of the man's heel and the bruising of the serpent's head, we must recollect that the Scriptures speak of ignorance, error, idolatry, sin, and death, as the subjects of an empire, of which Satan is king, whilst truth, innocence, virtue, and life form another kingdom under the dominion of God. Jesus Christ, by his meritorious services, has destroyed that empire of darkness and restored the kingdom of the supreme God.

'In the interpretation of symbols and allegories we are not to expect a perfect exactness of resemblance in all the minute particulars; we must not press the similitude too far. In these, as in parables, it is the prevailing idea which decides, and the details are to be more or less regarded. Thus it is urged against our explanation, that it does not show the connexion between the condemnation of sin, the moral serpent, and the sentence which adjudges the real serpent, the animal, to creep on its belly. I have already said, that this is probably an image of the crooked march and the baseness of passions indulged to excess; if the objection be urged against this, it may be retorted with force against every other allegorical interpretation, and especially against that which hides under the form of the serpent, the prince of evil, Satan, or the devil. In the latter

case there is no end to the incongrui, ties and one looks in vain for any connexion between the devil and the punishment inflicted on the serpent. We can easily explain man's weaknesses from our knowledge of the human heart; they flow, alas, too abundantly from this source to render necessary any recourse to the devil in order to account for our sins.'—pp. 308–311.

It is easy to see, that, from the brevity of this statement it is open to objection and cavil, and that a much more extended exposition would be necessary to do justice to the idea. For ourselves, however, we confess that we have very little confidence in the success of any attempt to draw a complete and consistent allegory from this much vexed passage.

ART. VIII. — *The Constitution of Man considered in relation to External Objects.* By GEORGE COMBE. Boston. Carter & Hendee. 1829. 12mo. pp. 310.

THE idea that the sciences border upon and run into each other, which is expressed by the popular phrase, 'circle of the sciences,' is not altogether a picture of the imagination. Little as its true force may be suspected by the multitude, it nevertheless aptly expresses the kind of connexion between them, and the course which the mind must pursue in order to behold the whole extent and depth of the common foundation on which they rest. But the shortness of life, the limited nature of our powers, and a variety of other causes, which impose on us the necessity of constant and unwearying attention to the main object of our inquiries, if we would obtain any valuable results, are continually making us lose sight of this great truth, and imagine in the sciences an independence that they do not possess. We are too apt to forget, if we ever entertained the thought, that the domain of human knowledge, vast as it is, is in fact but one; that its thousand paths are incessantly leading into one another, and that its divisions are artificial, made for the convenience of erring and limited beings. And as if the more effectually to perpetuate the neglect in question, the beginner in life is exhorted to an exclusive devotion of his time and talents

to the particular object of his studies, and to reject all other thoughts from his mind, if he means his acquirements to be solid and his investigations to be profound. If he would step beyond the little circle thus designed to confine his excursive powers, and range occasionally in the immense and inexhaustible field lying around it, he is said to be frittering himself away on a multiplicity of objects, with almost the certainty of gaining nothing but superficial and useless results. But, talk and act as we choose, still the sciences are closely and variously connected together; and whether this connexion depend on any similarity in the objects they embrace, or in the general principles of research and philosophizing that they acknowledge, it will equally engage the attention of the inquirer who measures his attainments, not so much by the number of ideas he possesses, as by that of the relations which he discovers between them. No science has ever been created that has not thrown light on other sciences, and some have derived their principal interest from this relation. Our advancement, therefore, in any department of knowledge, forbids this insulated and exclusive method of study, and enjoins the necessity of enlarged and liberal views. As we are obliged to contemplate the several portions of an edifice together, from turret to foundation-stone, and gain an idea of the general proportions and harmony of the whole structure, before we can appreciate the fitness and beauty of its particular parts; so likewise in order to obtain the most perfect knowledge of any branch of science, we must, to a certain degree, become acquainted with the nature and objects and general principles of all the rest.

No study has been pursued more in this insulated manner, and consequently been followed by fewer successful results, than that of metaphysics, or the philosophy of mind. Starting, as it has, from the general position, that every individual has within himself all the materials of this study, and that careful observation of the action of his own mind, without calling in any foreign aid whatever, is all that is necessary to gain the object of his search, it would evince no extraordinary discernment to tell where and how its inquiries must end. This is the crying sin of metaphysics, the foundation of its thousand systems, all equally perfect and equally false,— of its jarrings, its confusions, its mysticism, its eternal disputes about truth.

It saw, for it could not well help it, a scale of beings stretching through all nature, touching, at one extremity, the humblest zoöphyte, and reaching, at the other, a place little lower than the angels, exhibiting faculties, though few in number, yet diversified to suit every modification of rank and circumstance ; and, with a strange perversity, it selected one from the countless series, gave to him its exclusive attention, and shut its eyes on every other. If partial views, false reasoning, wrong conclusions have been the fruitful harvest of metaphysical labors, we have here most abundant cause for the result.

The present century has witnessed the rise and astonishing progress of a science which professes to have corrected the errors and supplied the deficiencies of the old metaphysics, and on this, as well as on other ground, advances claims to general and candid examination. Mr. Combe's work is the first that has come under our observation, in which these claims have been substantiated to any extent, and his views, it may be proper to remark, are not so much a necessary part of Phrenology, as they are legitimate deductions from its discoveries. But before noticing them, it may be well to expose more fully what we consider the principal sources of error in metaphysics as generally studied, though we would not be understood to mean that its results are entirely destitute of valuable truths. We mean only that it is burdened with numerous and gross errors, and that these have arisen chiefly from the vicious manner in which it has been studied.

In the first place, then, a mistake has been universally committed in regard to the proper objects of metaphysical inquiry. It has long been the habit of philosophers, until it has become a vulgar distinction, to divide man into two separate and almost independent portions, mind and body. The study of the former has been exclusively assumed by the metaphysician and regarded in all ages as holding the highest and noblest rank ; while that of the latter has been consigned to the anatomist, and invested in the popular view with an air of disgust and fearful apprehension. Thus early estranged from each other, with principles and ends of apparently the most opposite character, the powerful light which they might otherwise have mutually afforded, can be hardly recognised in the few glimmering rays that at distant intervals they have interchanged. Positive and well-marked as this

division at first sight appears, it is difficult, as in all cases of a close connexion, to point out exactly where the province of the one ends, and the other begins ; but, as we are not at liberty now to insist on rigorous distinctions, it will answer our present purpose to fall in with the popular notions, and regard them as established by nature, and their limits easily defined. It is admitted, and seems in fact to be the boast of metaphysics, that in one respect, at least, mind and matter are in the same predicament, — that it is only their properties that become cognizable to us, and are made the subject of our investigation ; though occurring, as both do, in the same individual, it is not easy to determine in every instance, which belong to one and which to the other ; more especially, too, as no general rule is given us for deciding in doubtful cases. Strange to say, however, with the very breath in which this admission is made, the possession of mind is accorded to one species alone, and positively denied to every other in the whole animal kingdom. Yet since it is with certain properties only that we are concerned, it is indifferent to us when and where they are manifested ; and if they unequivocally exist in the inferior animals, they become at once legitimate objects of metaphysical inquiry. That they do or do not exist in these beings, would seem to be as easy to establish, as the same fact in regard to magnetism or elasticity in a particular kind of matter. And yet when we say that no little diversity of opinion has always prevailed on this point, accordingly as men have been influenced by preconceived notions, or a regard to the consequences of their belief, we give but a faint idea how much more devotedly the *idols of the den*, as Bacon quaintly terms them, have been revered, than the sacred cause of truth. Descartes and his disciples denied every mental attribute to the brute creation, not surely because, after a proper examination, they could not be found, but that such attributes would suppose the existence of mind which is necessarily immaterial and indestructible, and brutes be regarded as immortal and responsible beings. The legitimate tendency of such a belief is strikingly manifested in the reply that Malebranche made to Fontenelle, who reproached him one day with cruelty for suddenly turning upon a dog that was fawning around him, and giving him a violent kick that sent him off howling with pain ; ‘ *Dost thou not know that he cannot feel?*’ Locke, however, who was greatly in

advance of his contemporaries, and in many respects of his successors, entertained more rational notions on this subject, and believed that the lower animals might sometimes reason.

But, not to rely on great names, it is sufficient to appeal to observation and plain common sense for a satisfactory solution of the question in hand. As the great proof of the existence of mind is drawn from the fact, that certain properties exist which cannot be referred to matter, it is a perfectly logical conclusion that a single one of these properties, it is indifferent how simple, is evidence enough of the presence of what we are pleased to call mind. Now that brutes can remember events for no inconsiderable time, and from what is termed an association of ideas, it is presumed no one will wish to dispute, and as little to deny, that these powers belong to mind and not matter. The distinctness and fidelity too, with which some facts are remembered by certain brute animals, strongly prove the activity and strength of this faculty, and entirely preclude the idea of its being merely the immediate result of impressions made upon the senses. Many of the acts which they perform indicative of design, are, undoubtedly, owing to their desire of imitation; but, preserving the condition of the question which we have just laid down, this very love of imitation must be considered an intellectual property. No one, of course, would think of comparing the mind of brutes in elevation and capacity with that of man, though there are not wanting instances where some of the mental operations have been conducted with singular accuracy and fidelity. Some have been able to remember the succession of the days of the week, a power, which, if some accounts of the savage state may be trusted, has not been always attained very readily by man. It cannot be doubted also, that they have sometimes understood language, not a few words, but a connected train of discourse, and have consequently performed a variety of mental operations. We do not imagine they can make syllogisms, or establish general principles; but that they have the power of reflection, is indicated by the facility with which they accommodate their actions to unexpected emergencies. Many observations in proof of this fact might be adduced were we writing an article on natural history; but enough has been said to warrant the general conclusion, that the inferior animals present us with numerous manifestations which must be classed with

what are called intellectual phenomena. Leaving all subtilty and wire-drawn distinctions, we know that brutes act ; that actions proceed from motives ; that motives imply will ; and that, for any thing we know to the contrary, the will of brutes is not different in its nature from man's.

In application to the subject before us, it follows that the science of the intellectual phenomena, or of the mind, as they are generally expressed, must necessarily be imperfect if confined to a single species of animals, instead of embracing every object in which they occur. It would seem almost to require an apology, to draw the inference apparently so obvious, that the conclusions arrived at by such a method of inquiry must be constantly liable to be impugned by new information, and that error and truth must ever be intimately allied, did not all past experience teach us that it has been most woefully overlooked, if not positively denied. It must be borne in mind, that, from time immemorial, the moral and intellectual powers have been classed, and systems of metaphysics ingeniously constructed, upon the idea that one species of beings only are not entirely under the dominion of the laws of organic matter. It would not be strange, therefore, if, this mode of studying the mental faculties having attained such general consent, people should consider it the right one, and never dream that a better could be substituted in its stead. This delusion seems still more wonderful when we recollect the fact, that, though metaphysics has been the subject of discussions and disputes from very early times, there is no art or science at the present moment so meagre in settled principles and practical results. All this has not been sufficient to excite a suspicion, that some grand and radical error was at the bottom of the whole matter ; but metaphysics has gone on broaching new theories, and heaping up speculations, which, with an air of ludicrous assumption, it has dignified with the title of philosophy. The laws of mind were the professed subject of their study, — of *mind*, not merely in man, but wherever it could be found ; and to pretend to have ascertained them sufficiently to form them into a system, would be as rational as to pretend to a thorough acquaintance with the laws of the material world from the study of a single body. With as much propriety, too, might the anatomist arise from the dissection of a single animal, throw down his knife, and declare himself master of the whole sci-

ence of organization. This however he has not done, while the metaphysician has ; and herein consists the difference in their respective sciences. While one is remarkable for the certainty and precision of its results, the other is, and must long continue to be, wrapped in the obscurity of ill-defined words and speculative theories.

Modern philosophy has rendered it a truism that general principles must be based upon facts ; but this same philosophy rigidly demands that the basis shall be broad and deep, — not the superficial structure which indolence or a warm imagination is contented with, but the strong and permanent one that is laid by painful industry and severe investigation. Had metaphysicians been anxious to establish their science on such a foundation, instead of shutting themselves up in their closets, they would have gone forth into the field and the forest, and, in the manners and habits of the inferior tribes, have found moral and intellectual phenomena regulated by the same laws as man's, and received for similar purposes from the same common source of benevolence. They would have found them, too, existing in far simpler conditions ; and by thus observing them unconnected with many others which might obscure their peculiar action and character, they would have obtained more definite ideas of their nature and purpose, than when studying them in man, where, existing in their most perfect state, they are necessarily more numerous and complicated. If they had doubted whether a *love of acquisition*, for instance, be natural to man, or only a forced result of artificial society, they might have seen the squirrel and beaver hoarding up nourishment for a distant period, and learned thereby, that a regard for the future in those who are to abide by its events without the power of foreseeing them, is equally necessary in one being as another. Had metaphysics thus sought the aid of zoölogy and considered it a portion of itself, or at least as an important collateral science, its condition would now have been very different from what it actually is. Of the precise extent of this difference, we of course are incapable of judging ; but we venture to say that many of those problems in mental science which have tasked in vain the subtlest ingenuity of metaphysical acuteness, would have been placed beyond the reach of dispute, and that the whole aspect and spirit of the science would have been different from what we now see. If less subtile in

its reasonings, less imposing in its appearance, and less transcendental in its pretensions, it certainly would have been more permanent, and its results have admitted a wider range of practical application. Had metaphysicians resorted to the pages of natural history instead of the musty volumes of scholastic warfare, they might have caught some of the spirit that pervades this science, their researches would have been characterized by a more inductive philosophy, and modest doubts and patient investigation have taken the place of dogmatism and speculation. Some of the splendid success with which the natural sciences have been pursued in consequence of following in the path marked out by Bacon, might reasonably have been anticipated for metaphysics, had it been studied in a similar manner.

Another radical error in the study of metaphysics consists in the almost entire neglect of the connexion between mind and body. The fact of such a connexion has undoubtedly been long known and acknowledged ; but the little attention given to it shows very plainly, that the importance of thoroughly studying it has never been properly appreciated. It seems never to have been imagined that inquiries should be directed to its history and conditions, and that the mutual influence exerted between mind and body was worthy of particular and faithful examination. The mere fact recognized, metaphysicians have considered their duty ended. And we hesitate not to declare, that to this neglect is to be attributed, in a great degree, the present imperfection of metaphysical science ; and as little to assert, that if ever its condition be improved, it must be by studying man as a whole, — as a being whose moral and physical natures are not to be torn asunder and held up as objects of independent study, but regarded as elements of his general constitution intimately combined and acting together. That the mind depends on the body for its manifestations, is a fact too obvious for even a child to overlook ; and the cases in which the action of each is modified by some peculiar condition of the other, would seem to have been always too numerous and striking to permit men to lose sight of this truth in their inquiries into the mental phenomena. Certainly no one could help seeing how the action of each is affected by their condition relative to health or disease, — that a little inflammation of the membranes of the brain, or of the stomach, gives rise to the most wild and

furious delirium, amid the mad ravings of which, we look in vain for the traces of 'the divinity that stirs within us ;'—that the shedding of a little blood in apoplexy, or the pressure of a splinter of bone, annihilates in a moment all the manifestations of our nobler nature ;—that a change in the structure of the brain so slight as to be almost imperceptible to the closest observation, is sufficient to lay this magnificent fabric of the mind in ruins. While superstition forbade the practice of dissection, it was not to be expected that metaphysicians would look to anatomy for assistance in their researches. But in modern times, when more enlightened notions prevail, and philosophers pretend to have discarded all senseless jargon, and profess to be guided solely by the light of observation, we may well be surprised that metaphysics has derived so little aid from the results of anatomy. This aid has not merely been slighted, but viewed with suspicion and distrust, and every attempt to press it into the service of intellectual philosophy has been defeated by the stupid charge of materialism and false tendency. If here and there a solitary inquirer has resorted to the table of the anatomist and professed to have derived a lesson from his instructions, he is ridiculed for attempting to unravel, amid the blood and filth of the dissecting-room, the great mysteries of mind which are more properly subjects of the lofty contemplations of the closet. It seems, in truth, as if the mere connexion of mind with something so different as matter would have been considered as one of its most remarkable features, and no farther inducement have been necessary to lead to an untiring investigation of all its conditions. But, on the contrary, the mind has been studied as if there was no such thing as matter ; its laws have been prescribed and its faculties have been pompously marshalled forth, as if neither were affected by the connexion and influence of its material neighbour.

We have thus far spoken as if the mind and body, though in some manner connected, were still distinct, and their limits marked out with rigorous exactness ; but in fact, this distinction, though undoubtedly existing, has never been satisfactorily expounded, and after all we are constantly meeting with phenomena which we are doubtful whether to refer to the mental or the corporeal part of our nature. To say merely that this is a property of mind and that of matter, is to assume, what it is our business first to prove, and to give a child's

reason in the place of philosophical evidence. When the moral and physical are so blended together as they are in the nature of man, we hold it to be no small matter to separate them accurately, and tell just what belongs to the one and what to the other. Who has yet ascertained the part they respectively take in the manifestation of the passions and what are called the moral affections? To regard them as qualities of mind solely is as little in accordance with facts, as to refer them exclusively to the action of the viscera.

To show more strongly the force of our remarks, we shall dwell a moment longer on this point. The literal meaning of the word *passion* conducts us readily to an understanding of its true nature. It is a *suffering* or *feeling*, and the sensations which it embraces result in part from moral and in part from physical causes. The instance cannot be found in all the history of the passions, where some one or more of the corporeal organs have not been necessarily affected in proportion to the intensity and duration of the passion. If it be true that the first links in the chain of sensation may sometimes be perceived in the mind, it is also true, that as frequently, considered in every point of view, the viscera are primarily affected. Cheerfulness arises from the consciousness of duties well-performed and happiness conferred; but it requires, and often seems to be produced solely by, a vigorous and well-balanced action of all our moral and bodily faculties. The anxious fears and gloomy forebodings comprehended in the general term *melancholy*, are not oftener occasioned by blighted prospects and ruined hopes, than by a torpid condition of the liver and bowels. The keenest insult never excited more furious paroxysms of anger, than an inflammation of the stomach sometimes does. And, in fact, wherever the train of sensations which constitute a passion once begins, if sufficiently intense and long-continued, they follow the course of the same circle of organs. We would not be thought to imply, that the passions and moral affections are qualities of matter exclusively; but that the several sensations into which each may be analyzed, partly arise in the mind and partly in the body, and that, however this may be accounted for, the fact is no less worthy of being noticed and studied. It does not solve the difficulty to say, that the passion is in the mind, though excited by certain affections of the viscera, or when produced by other causes, itself excites these affections. The sen-

sations experienced in the viscera are component and essential parts of the passion, and are associated in the mind with all our ideas concerning it. If any one imagines, that in the above-mentioned instances the parts respectively borne by the body and mind may be accurately enough distinguished, we would refer him to that well-known condition called *ennui*, and ask him to do the same respecting that. It has been defined a deficiency of mental excitement; but this can never produce *ennui* without painfully affecting the nervous system, or placing the viscera in an excited condition; for every body knows that this deficiency is not invariably accompanied by *ennui*. It is perfectly immaterial whether the remote cause of *ennui* act on the mind or body; the effect is the same; and hence, whether it be a stupid discourse, a dull companion, or dull weather; an insipid book or an insipid dinner; disappointment of a desired object, or a satiety of enjoyment; a misfortune, or a headache,—the same painful sensation in the region of the stomach is equally perceptible; the same yawning, and gaping, and stretching; the same restlessness and constant change of position; the same dissatisfaction with every thing around us; and the same gloom over the mind. Diverse as are its causes, the agents that remove it are no less so. Agreeable news, a pleasing book, or a lively companion, are remedies of long-tried efficacy in the removal of *ennui*, undoubtedly, and so are any other physical *stimuli* that will change the condition of the viscera. Who, then, will analyse these various phenomena, and tell us precisely what share is taken by the mind and what by the body in their production,—what is the effect and what the cause? In regard to some of our appetites and passions, it is a fact universally recognised, that the external impressions by which they are sometimes excited, require a certain condition of the material organs in order that the requisite sensations may be produced. The sight of a table loaded with delicacies is loathsome to one person and delightful to another; for the former is already full to satiety, while the other has been long abstinent. The one too is inclined to be peevish, irascible and sulky, while after his meal he becomes, like the other, cheerful, good-natured, and sociable. In such cases as these, the influence of the physical organs is so plainly observed, that the appetites and passions in which it is concerned have generally received the name of physical or animal in oppo-

sition, it would seem, to our moral and intellectual desires. The term is undoubtedly proper, if it mean merely that the physical organs are chiefly affected and gratified; but far from it, if the idea be conveyed, that these passions are wholly and exclusively properties of our material organs. It cannot be admitted that they are physical in any sense that would exclude a single other passion in our nature; for in all are the physical organs concerned in a greater or less degree. Every impression conveyed to the mind by the senses, is transmitted, in some way or other, by means of the nerves, to all the viscera, and the manner in which these are affected depends on their condition at the time. From them an impression is reflected to the mind, the will is called into action, and the passion, appetite, or desire is manifested.

It thus appears that there is a correspondence between our moral and mental conditions, and those of the viscera, and every day's experience teaches us how frequently changes in the one are associated with changes in the other. Talk to the hypochondriac of glory and renown, and present to his imagination the most flattering schemes of worldly ambition, and he will reply to you only in the language of despondency and doubt, and thus will continue to answer, till by proper remedial measures you have changed the state of his digestive organs. The exercise of compassion is so associated in the popular mind with a peculiar condition of the digestive organs as to have given rise to a phraseology which plainly and definitely recognises the fact. We might go on in this way showing the part which is borne by the viscera in the manifestation of the passions and feelings; but as we have wished merely to impress on the mind the importance of studying soul and body together, in order to obtain a proper knowledge of either, our purpose seems to be sufficiently answered.

There is one part of this subject, however, which, from many late discoveries, is worthy of particular and careful investigation; we mean the agency of the nervous system in the various moral and mental manifestations. The state of our knowledge on this subject warrants us in declaring, that the metaphysician who neglects the study of this part of our bodily frame in every point of its history, has but an imperfect notion of the true object of his science. His business is the investigation of mind in all its relations; not merely the

laws of thought, but their connexion with the material instrument by which they are manifested ; for it is mind not in the abstract that he is to study, but in conjunction with matter. If the physiologist has discovered many remarkable facts in regard to the nervous system which throw new light on the *modus operandi* of the moral and intellectual faculties, they ought surely to be no more interesting to him than to the metaphysician ; and every treatise on mental science should be considered deficient, in which these facts are not taken into consideration. If, for instance, it be well established that certain portions of the brain are necessarily connected with the exercise and developement of certain faculties of the mind, we confidently ask if a new epoch has not arisen in the history of mental philosophy. Whether the conclusion alluded to be established beyond a doubt or not, it is no less important that the facts on which it is founded should be candidly and thoroughly examined. Other considerations aside, it would seem as if the smallest attempt at experimental inquiry and inductive research would be cheerfully hailed and impartially considered, for the special reason that metaphysical science has hitherto been signally deficient in this kind of investigation. When Baron Larrey tells us, that a wound in a certain part of the brain was followed by a loss of the memory of words, though in other respects the mind was unimpaired, is the fact to be set aside as merely a curious anomaly, inexplicable by any known principles, and therefore unworthy of remembrance ? With some reason it might be, were it a solitary case without parallel or precedent ; but the same distinguished observer has met with several instances of the same kind, and pathologists have witnessed the same effect from causes which must have acted in the same way. If then innumerable cases of this connexion of particular portions of the brain with particular faculties of the mind, have been observed, where accident was out of the question, it is time for metaphysicians to deviate from their beaten track and look at the results which the progress of knowledge has been accumulating around their path. The day has gone by, irrevocably gone, when facts well observed and well authenticated might be quashed by devotion to favorite theories, or partiality for popular and time-honored opinions.

After all, however, the principal cause of the present imper-

section of metaphysical science is, that, in all its inquiries, the means seem to have been continually mistaken for the end. The *operations* of the mind have been faithfully, but exclusively studied, while the great *purposes* and *ends* of our moral and intellectual powers have been singularly overlooked. However interesting and profitable it may be to understand the history and laws of the mental operations, yet the real worth and dignity of the science must consist in the information it gives us as to the share which the mind contributes in putting the being which possesses it in relation with all other beings, and thus making up that harmony and correspondence of purpose which the Author of creation has instituted in all his works. Mind, therefore, must always be considered in reference to the sphere and destinies of the particular being in which it occurs; and every being is to be regarded as holding a definite place in the general scheme of existence, which, various and complicated as it is, is nevertheless regulated by immutable laws. The entire universe is a single and complete whole, made up of those innumerable parts which constitute the objects of human inquiry; and every faculty and power in nature, whether of matter or of mind, possesses direct and permanent relations with the entire system. Considered in this light, the universe is the only *individual*, and what we are accustomed to call such, are merely its constituent and essential portions. Not a single energy in existence can be removed, without disturbing the operations of the general system, any more than a wheel or lever can be abstracted from a delicate machine, without stopping, or materially impeding its action. It is one thing to know that mind exists and how it exists, but another and a far greater, to know why and wherefore. To accomplish any thing, therefore, on this point, it must be borne steadily in view, that mind is to be studied not in and for itself alone, but as an element in a great and determinate result. It is undoubtedly to this habit of confining the attention altogether to the *human* mind, that we are to attribute the partial and vicious manner in which metaphysical science has been pursued, and the very unworthy notions that have always prevailed regarding its nature and purposes. If some apology may be found for the ancients in their imperfect acquaintance with the collateral sciences, some other ground of excuse must be sought out for the moderns, whose stores of knowledge are ample, and who

have witnessed the torch of inductive philosophy shining brighter and brighter, with every fresh discovery, over the whole pathway of science. Comparative anatomy has pursued the history of organization through the whole scale of animal existence, and by examining and comparing structure after structure, it has unfolded a crowd of curious and magnificent relations, and opened to the inquirer a nearer and a clearer view into the very inner temple of nature. It has done for the bodily, what metaphysics must do for the moral portions of organized beings. It has shown by illustrations as beautiful as they are convincing, that in the animal economy every organ or system of organs is connected by definite and necessary relations with all the rest; that they are adapted to and strictly correspond with one another; that they are mutually dependent in the kind and quantity of their action; and that a modification in one requires a modification in all the rest. They are thus shown to be parts, on the concurrent and harmonious action of which depends the existence of the whole machine. The respiratory, the circulating, the nervous, the locomotive, the digestive systems in every animal, are all constituted in reference to this general law of organization, their joint and mutual action producing a result which itself has relations with a variety of other circumstances. If the structure of the digestive organs indicates an animal diet, comparative anatomy shows us the existence of acute senses to discern the prey at a distance, the requisite courage to attack, and locomotive organs sufficiently active and vigorous to pursue and overtake it, strong and sharp claws for seizing and holding it, powerful jaws and cutting teeth for tearing it in pieces. A single indication, however slight, which points out one of these conditions, conducts us surely and steadily to all the rest; insomuch that the most distinguished naturalist of this or perhaps of any age, has boasted that from the examination of a single bone he could obtain an idea of the formation of the whole animal to which it belonged, though an extinct species, and describe with considerable accuracy, its manners and habits. But who has ever dreamed, much less boasted, of ascertaining the moral and intellectual faculties of an animal from a knowledge of one or two? And yet, that such faculties do exist, to a greater or less extent, in a multitude of species, that they have definite relations with one another and with the powers of

the body, all must acknowledge, who do not consider them destitute of sensation, or merely automatic machines set in motion from the beginning by the hand of their Creator, and ever acting in obedience to a blind, unconscious impulse. The corporeal frame must be animated and directed by an inward principle, and as the one varies, so must the other; unless we would abandon every idea of correspondence and harmony in the animal structure. If the bodily organs are fitted for building a cabin to protect the being from the weather or its enemies, shall we not recognise a more curious, but not less certain because less obvious power, that gives the disposition and impulse to build; which teaches it how to cut and lay the stake, to plaster the wall, and place the entrance under the water? It is hardly necessary to ask, of what avail would the admirable members, the erect position, and the gift of speech be to man, without a regulating mind with capacities of corresponding perfection. But are we to shut our eyes upon similar relations between the moral and physical powers of the lower animals, and proclaim man to be exempted from the dominion of the general law to which every other being is subjected? If high happiness and an immortal existence are allotted to one being, and nature has bestowed on him the means of perceiving, appreciating, and preparing for his noble destinies, she has with the same unerring wisdom, surrounded every other being by external circumstances to which its whole constitution is accommodated in such a manner, as to produce the greatest possible amount of enjoyment of which it is capable. It will be only when mind is studied in relation with matter, and both in reference to the general laws of the universe, that we shall be no longer vexed with that vague term *instinct*, which ignorance and indolence have substituted for a rational exposition of the moral powers of the inferior animals.

Gall and Spurzheim are the first inquirers who seem to have looked at mental philosophy in this light, and to have developed the above views to any extent. To this they were fairly led by the deductions of that science by which they are popularly known; and though these views may have been established independently of phrenology, yet they are in exact accordance with its results, and impart to them additional force and beauty. It is immaterial no doubt to the strength of our convictions, by what process of investigation

a truth is arrived at ; yet it cannot be denied, that the data from which it is deduced, gather importance and interest from this circumstance alone, and lead us to pass an impartial, if not a favorable judgment, upon any other conclusions to which they may conduct us. We are far from offering this as a proof, or even as an argument, in favor of phrenology, but would merely put it to every reasonable mind, whether it be probable that a tree which bears such good fruit, is not sound and vigorous at the root. It should be remembered too, that the metaphysical inquiries of these distinguished observers were not of their own seeking, or necessarily connected with their peculiar doctrines, but that they were irresistibly driven to them by the conduct of their opponents who undertook to weigh the new science in the scales of an old philosophy. They probably would have contented themselves with examining heads, and preparing models, and establishing the single proposition that certain faculties of mind are connected with certain portions of the brain ; but they were obliged to go farther and prove that the faculty was necessary, and show the exact purposes for which it was given. As they proceeded in their investigation, their views naturally became more enlarged and definite, till finally the precise end and place of every faculty was fixed with wonderful distinctness, and the foundation was laid of a mental philosophy, destined, in the estimation of its friends at least, ere long to overshadow every other in existence. But whatever judgment posterity shall ultimately pass upon their doctrines, it most assuredly will never cease to pay the willing homage of admiration and gratitude to those intrepid inquirers, who traversed continents to pursue their researches in the wretched receptacles of poverty and crime ; who endured for years the toils of the dissecting-room, the wear and tear of which, to body and mind, none but a practical anatomist can adequately conceive of ; and, most of all, who successfully encountered the calumny and ridicule poured upon them without measure, and all this, too, with no other motive that we can assign, than an unfaltering love of truth.

Their notions on the constitution and condition of man are mostly scattered through their larger works and unpublished manuscripts, and are here collected and reduced to a system, for the first time, by Mr. Combe, who, though he

claims nothing on the score of originality, is worthy of all commendation for the ease and simplicity of his style, and especially for the pure and elevated spirit which characterizes his moral reflections. In truth, few of the ideas individually considered, are original with him or Gall and Spurzheim; but we believe they never before have been systematically arranged and formed into a body of doctrine, in which the relations between the laws and powers of the human economy and those of the material universe are clearly and strongly set forth. As the book is extensively circulated, it would be hardly worth our while to furnish an analysis of its contents; and we shall confine ourselves to a short account of the plan and general principles of the author.

After speaking of the general laws of nature, and showing how those of man, considered as a physical and organized being, are in harmony with the former, he enters upon the most important part of the subject, that in which he treats of man as a moral and intellectual being, exposes clearly his various powers, and shows that they are in perfect adaptation to his external circumstances. Physiologists have already expounded the organic laws, and phrenology, regarding the labors of metaphysicians as nothing worth in the present investigation, has set before itself the greater task of unfolding the laws and powers of man's higher and nobler nature.

The first point to be settled now is, that the moral and intellectual have the supremacy over the animal faculties; and this is done by showing that in external nature there is a direct reference in all its arrangements to this supremacy. The following paragraph will convey a better idea of the meaning of this principle.

'Every faculty is good in itself, but all are liable to abuse. Their manifestations are right only when directed by *enlightened* intellect and moral sentiment. In maintaining the *supremacy* of the moral sentiments and intellect, I *do not* consider them sufficient to direct conduct *by their mere instinctive suggestions*. To fit them for discharging this important duty, *they must be illuminated by knowledge of science, and of moral and religious duty*; but whenever their dictates, thus enlightened, oppose the solicitations of the propensities, *the latter must yield*, otherwise, *by the constitution of external nature*, evil will inevitably ensue.' p. 49.

From this we infer, that, though all the powers of any being are designed for the general end of accomplishing its own happiness, and the brutes obtain this end by yielding to the 'instinctive suggestions' of each faculty individually considered, yet in man these suggestions must be under the control and guidance of the moral sentiment and intellect, before the noblest purposes of his destiny can be fulfilled. It is an admirable corollary of this law, that, just in proportion as the intellect is enlarged and the sentiments elevated, will their control be productive of happiness.

The next inquiry upon which our author enters, is into the sources of happiness and the conditions necessary for maintaining it; and he lays down the fundamental principle, that all enjoyment is essentially derived from the *activity* of the various powers with which man is endowed. This being admitted, he very justly adds, that 'if Wisdom and Benevolence have been employed in constituting Man, we may expect the arrangements of creation, in regard to him, to be calculated *as a leading object to excite his various powers, corporeal and mental, to activity.*' It is however an essential condition, that the faculties act harmoniously, no one having an undue or engrossing share of exercise, for the greatest amount of happiness is produced not by the gratification of any particular faculties, however good in themselves, but by the regular and harmonious activity of them all. Endowed too as man is with capacities of knowing, and the various phenomena of nature being spread out before him full of the wonderful and new, he is plainly invited to the attainment of knowledge as an inexhaustible source of the purest happiness.

The relation of the human faculties to external circumstances having thus been pointed out, Mr. Combe then examines into the sources of human misery, and arrives at the conclusion, that it is chiefly referable to infringement of the natural laws. The physical laws being generally understood, calamities arising from their infringement are comparatively few, and their true cause is seldom mistaken. But the organic laws are violated every day, almost without a consciousness of their existence; and though the calamities which follow are among the most abundant and dreadful that can befall the race, we are accustomed to satisfy the curiosity that asks for a reason, with such unmeaning terms

as accident, misfortune, or an inscrutable Providence. Men must learn, before they can be happy, that in the least event as well as in the greatest, the universe is regulated by invariable laws, obedience to which is followed by happiness, and disobedience by misery ; and that whether they respect the authority of these laws or not, these conditions are immutably fixed.

The calamities which arise from infringement of the moral law next come under consideration, the following proposition being made the basis of all the subsequent reasoning.

‘The whole scheme of external creation is arranged in harmony with certain principles, in preference to others, so that enjoyment flows upon the individual from without, when his conduct is in conformity with them, and that evil overtakes him when he departs from them.’

The supremacy of the intellect and moral sentiments over the animal passions, is necessary to the existence of any thing like morality ; and the purity and perfection of a person’s morality will be determined by the degree of elevation and enlargement to which his higher faculties have attained. When the lower propensities alone are cultivated and ministered to, and the higher faculties are suffered to remain inactive, a great moral law is violated, and the calamities that follow, no man can number. Hence, what commercial people call ‘times of prosperity,’ our author regards as seasons of the greatest violation of the moral law, or precursors of extensive calamities. In such times, the whole population is overworked ; the merchant, the manufacturer, the operative devote the whole day to the production of wealth, or in the service of the propensities, while the moral and intellectual powers, which are naturally supreme, are totally uncultivated. The man who foregoes the ordinary pleasures of life, and toils from morning till night in the accumulation of wealth, may hear the praise of his industry and enterprise echoed on every side of him ; but, as sure as there is a Creator, he is violating one of his most general and fundamental laws, — that which requires the cultivation of his intellectual faculties.

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